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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2011, many nations in the Cradle of Civilization 
faced civil unrest, much of which continues today in the form of the ongoing Syrian Civil 
War, the conflict in Yemen, and instability in nations such as Iraq and Turkey.  As a 
consequence, antiquities and cultural heritage in the region are currently facing a 
notoriously exacerbated level of risk. Despite the looting and destruction of cultural objects 
and monuments presenting a longstanding global and historical trend, the field of 
antiquities trafficking research lacks a unique and effective perspective within its current 
body of work and research.  Likewise, criminology as a scientific field of study has largely 
overlooked the complex issue of looting and trafficking of cultural objects. 
 
This thesis focuses on the issue of Antiquities Trafficking Networks from a crime 
prevention perspective and attempts to demonstrate the effectiveness and apt nature of 
Crime Script Analysis and Situational Crime Prevention.  This is accomplished first with a 
study and analysis of the wider phenomenon of Antiquities Trafficking Networks (from 
looting to market), followed by a specific case study of antiquities trafficked from within 
Syria since the beginning of the Civil War. 
 
Following these analyses, thirteen prominent Situational Crime Prevention strategies for 
Antiquities Trafficking Networks, and ten strategies for future conflict zones are generated 
by this research project.  Through these strategies, Crime Script Analysis – in conjunction 
with Situational Crime Prevention – has proven to be a highly effective and efficient 
method and framework for studying this particularly difficult field.   
 
Ultimately, this thesis proposes a new crime prevention-focused methodology, to help 
tackle the issue of antiquities trafficking, as well as presenting one of the first prevention-
specific analyses in this area. In doing so, it offers of a basic model that maps the structure 
and necessary elements for antiquities trafficking to occur and allows for future research 
projects to adapt or customize this script model to situation-specific cases of antiquities 
looting, transit and marketing. 
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1. Introduction 
The State, because historically it has been the greatest secular accumulation of 
power, has always been the greatest art thief.  Its armies, consuls, explorers have 
been its agents.  The Louvre without Napoleon’s seizures would be a lesser 
gallery, the British Museum without Lord Elgin less rich.  Hitler’s Goering 
collected through his panzer agents and the Swedish Army in the 17th century 
served that ‘most predatory’ collecting Queen Christiana.  Recently, Iraq’s 
Saddam Hussein looted Kuwait’s museums, and rebels against Saddam looted 
Iraq’s museums.  Tibet upon the Chinese invasion was looted, vandalised, 
repopulated as a matter of national policy, to wipe out a people, destroy their 
achievements, symbols, community – art is expressive of each.  Today, whether 
in China, Mali, Turkey, Egypt, Peru, Russia, Kuwait, Cambodia or Lebanon, 
there has been recent or on-going looting on antiquities/art often connived in by 
local authority, whether provincial, revolutionary or bandit, whether via 
entrepreneurial bribe, police participation or ministerial directive. (Blum, 1995, 
p. 150)  
Antiquities trafficking has its origins in the long-held custom of wartime looting and the 
ancient practice of coveting beautiful or important objects of the past.  This can be traced 
throughout a global history, from ancient civilisations such as the Greeks and Romans, 
emperors and dictators including Napoleon and Hitler, up to present-day instances, which 
can range from an individual simply trying to survive, to over-zealous antiquities 
enthusiasts (Ulph et al., 2012). 
Antiquities trafficking can be loosely defined as an instance where an illegally excavated 
archaeological object or cultural object is smuggled or sold illicitly.  The occurrence of 
antiquities trafficking has long been a tradition and custom throughout the world, though it 
was only in the 19th and  20th centuries that many traditional forms of 'collecting' or 
'archaeology' were brought under scrutiny and deemed illicit, as the science of archaeology 
emerged (Brodie, 2006).  The discovery and investigation into prominent antiquities 
traffickers and networks in the 1990s have helped to highlight the issue, as well as help to 
promote more research into the field (Polk, 2000; Alder and Polk, 2002; Brodie, 2006; 
Brodie, 2012).  Instability in the Middle East, especially the region of the Cradle of 
Civilization, and the rise of extremist and terrorist organisations such as the Taliban or the 
Islamic State alerted a global audience to the serious nature of antiquities looting and 
trafficking – with the on-going Syrian Civil War in particular highlighting significant 
cultural heritage and antiquities destruction (Brodie, 2015b; Willett, 2016; Brodie and 
Sabrine, 2018). The issue of antiquities trafficking represents not just the loss of an object, 
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but the loss of culture and history.  It reflects the potentially permanent destruction of a 
group’s ability to know and to be materially connected to its past.  In some cases these 
object are still entrenched in a community’s history or traditions.  The destruction of 
Palmyra resonated around the world, reminding the global community of the importance of 
such sites.  Raising awareness of this loss of culture is important, but on its own will not 
prevent future losses. 
Despite this burgeoning public awareness, the field of criminology has unfortunately 
largely overlooked the issue of antiquities looting and trafficking – with little 
criminological research currently or historically being conducted within the field 
(Bowman, 2008; Polk, 2009; Polk, 2014; Brodie, 2015a). Criminology, a discipline which 
has developed powerful tools to predict and prevent crime, has yet to fully embrace the 
field of heritage harms as part of its core agenda.  Of particular note is that – as of yet – 
there has never been an empirical crime prevention analysis of antiquities trafficking 
networks on an international scale.  This thesis aims to expand the criminological gaze to 
include this important area of crime by showing how criminological methodologies and 
tools can impact this field.  It aims to provide for the first time, a systematic application of 
crime prevention perspectives to antiquities trafficking, with particular reference to the fate 
of antiquities in conflict zones. 
1.1 Motivation for the Study  
Currently, as noted above there are at most a handful of papers or research studies that 
focus on antiquities looting or trafficking from the perspective of crime prevention theory.  
Broadly speaking, crime prevention theory focuses on developing prevention techniques, 
procedures, or recommendations based upon empirical research and analysis (Lab, 2016).  
When considering the recent increase and awareness of the looting and trafficking of 
antiquities, this seems somewhat of an oversight on the part of criminologists and the 
global community at large.  There has been a documented rise of antiquities trafficking, 
especially conflict antiquities in recent years, which might be in response to the new way 
in which terrorist groups interact with cultural heritage – either destroying it for 
propaganda purposes or looting it for profit (Brodie, 2015b; Jesse Casana, 2015; Brodie 
and Sabrine, 2018).  Without further research into preventative measure or techniques, it 
seems unlikely that this issue will be resolved.  When reviewing current and previous 
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literature on antiquities trafficking, it becomes evident that a large portion of the material 
focuses on reactionary measures (Brodie, 2015b).  This study will attempt to offer a new 
and needed set of analytic tools and perspective in antiquities trafficking research, and will 
also seek to identify and present preventative measures for the broader construct of 
antiquities trafficking networks (ATNs), as well as apply this approach to a specific 
example.  This will be achieved through the consideration of two relevant research 
questions: 
(1) Can Situational Crime Prevention, with the use of Crime Script Analysis, be 
effectively applied to Antiquities Trafficking Networks? 
(2) When applied to case/crime-specific studies, can the application of Situational 
Crime Prevention and Crime Script Analysis indicate effective preventative 
measures?   
1.2 Aim and Scope of the Study  
In order to meet its goals, this thesis will evaluate and apply a particular form of crime 
prevention, situational crime prevention (SCP), to antiquities trafficking networks (ATNs).  
This will be accomplished with the use of crime script analysis (CSA) – an analytic tool 
which scripts the required actions for a crime to occur – in order to help determine the 
structure and necessary steps for antiquities trafficking to occur on an international level, 
as well as within highly specific or local examples.  In order to effectively evaluate the 
usefulness of SCP in the study of illicit antiquities trafficking, the thesis will focus on only 
the most essential and necessary elements of this criminal market.  An initial, broadly-
based analysis to determine common traits among international antiquities trafficking will 
be conducted in order to provide a generalised understanding of known instances of 
antiquities trafficking.  The results of this analysis will produce a general crime script 
intended to be broadly applicable to international antiquities trafficking. 
This will then form the basis for a second, more specific analysis to be undertaken of a 
case study of antiquities trafficking in the Syrian Civil War, as a means of demonstrating 
the use and applicability of SCP to highly specific forms of crimes.  As part of this effort, a 
crime script will also be generated for the Syria conflict, with the use of journalistic news 
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articles as a means of source data.  The use of this type of data is necessary, as the on-
going conflict with Syria has made field research virtually impossible.  Moreover, in 
relation to both the SCP and CSA analyses that will take place, given the language 
limitations all data provided and used was in English.  Despite these limitations, this study 
does appear to have provided both a broad overview or roadmap on the application and 
applicability of SCA and CSA to ATNs and the case specific application of these methods 
to ATNs as related to the Syrian conflict. 
1.3 Structure of the Study  
The following thesis is intentionally structured in such a way that it may at times appear to 
have a ‘textbook’ feel, as may be evident in the high volume of tables and figures within 
the text itself.  This structure is quite deliberate, as the content being discussed and 
presented in this thesis is both complex and multifaceted and therefore required a very 
detailed, comprehensive and rigorous analytic structure.  As one of the intended outcomes 
of this project is the aim of establishing a basic methodology which can be used to support 
further research concerning ATNs, such an approach seemed warranted.  Furthermore, this 
study and the text of this thesis has been specifically designed to try and provide the most 
logical representation of the aims and methods, in order to provide a clear understanding of 
the complex nature of ATNs, as a step toward the development and implementation of 
more effective measures and capabilities.  
Chapters 1 and 2, begin by introducing the topic and issue of international antiquities 
trafficking more thoroughly.  This includes an examination of the basic structure of 
antiquities looting and trafficking, common types of actors within networks, and prior 
research conducted within the field.  With a working knowledge of how antiquities 
trafficking operates and the current status of research and development in this field having 
been established, chapter 3 will then introduce the theoretical framework used in this 
thesis: SCP.  This chapter will delve into the theoretical underpinnings of SCP, CSA and 
crime prevention theory in general, so as to help contextualise the importance and 
significance of what this project aims to achieve, and demonstrate how this thesis has 
adequately prepared the design and execution of its research methods – which will then be 
presented in chapter 4.  This chapter will detail how SCP and CSA will be used within this 
project, and will also discuss in detail the methodology of this project.  Likewise, 
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difficulties or limitations faced in the process of conducting this research will also be 
discussed.   
Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to examining and analysing the operational structure and 
necessary elements for ATNs to operate.  Specifically, chapter 5 focuses on developing a 
master crime script for the overall area of antiquities trafficking, breaking the script into 
three separate phases – looting, transit, and market.  This crime script will be generated 
from a source of known examples of ATNs and will represent a universal structure of how 
these networks operate.  The ability to thoroughly break down and analyse each necessary 
step or process for the crime to occur will provide insight into the most efficient crime 
prevention techniques.   
With a basic understanding of what is necessary for ATNs to operate/occur, chapter 6 will 
be focused on a study of the factors or circumstances which allows these networks to 
operate.  The examination of what criminal actions these factors not only allow, but also 
often promote, provides a framework to allow for the consideration of prevention 
techniques for ATNs. These factors or circumstances help to highlight areas that have 
helped ATNs to continue to survive and overcome existing policies and regulations which 
target antiquities looting and trafficking. 
The conclusions derived from the facilitating factors are then analysed in chapter 7, where 
the situational perspective is applied, and preventative measures are considered.  This 
chapter will, in conjunction with the previous two chapters allow for consideration of SCP 
techniques or procedures that can be recommended for ATNs.  The recommendations that 
are generated in this chapter represent rather broad and generalised options, as they are 
meant to relevant on a universal level of ATNs. Essentially, what chapter 7 aims to 
accomplish is to establish basic situational prevention strategies from which further 
research can be conducted.  As this field is currently lacking in crime prevention research, 
to establish a structural basis for how antiquities looting and trafficking occurs provides a 
starting point for future researchers, while also highlighting significant necessary elements 
within these networks.   
Chapter 8 represents the final analysis chapter and applies the broader analytic techniques 
discussed in the previous analysis chapters (5, 6, and 7) to a specific case study.  This 
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chapter is the crux of the project, as it demonstrates how SCP and CSA can be adapted and 
used to effectively study ATNs.  The Syrian Civil War is examined as a case study of a 
region which has encountered significant antiquities looting and trafficking during a recent 
time of conflict.  For this purpose, it is examined by the same process that was employed 
when considering the wider category of ATNs, and a customized crime script for the 
specific situation is then developed from the broader suite of methods presented earlier. 
This is followed by the identification of facilitating factors or circumstance unique to this 
specific case, which then results in a final analysis of the script and factors to determine 
effective crime prevention methods or techniques for this specific case.   
The concluding chapter (9) will consider how effective SCP and CSA have been in helping 
to better understand ATNs, with the result of then determining potential crime prevention 
techniques or procedures.  A comparison between the crime script and situational analysis  
of ATNs within the case study will be discussed, with particular attention paid to how 
effective these tools and methods of analysis were, respectively.  Additional consideration 
will be given to the impact this research might have, as well as future projects that make 
use of CSA and SCP.   
1.4 Significance  
As noted earlier, this project seeks to develop and provide a new approach in antiquities 
trafficking research, as it offers one of the first studies focused explicitly on crime 
prevention.  Not only does it strive to evaluate the suitability and effectiveness of SCP 
within this field, but it also demonstrates the use of CSA as a potentially vital analysis tool. 
It is expected that a number of additional outcomes will be achieved in the process, 
including providing a more thorough and scientific understanding of how international 
antiquities trafficking occurs through the development of a crime script for ATNs. 
Similarly, while SCP has become an established framework since its conception in the 
1980s, the use of CSA in conjunction was not introduced until well into the 1990s. As 
such, this combination of approaches is still decidedly in the process of gaining traction in 
the wider field of crime prevention and crime science, and this thesis aims to contribute to 
that continuing development. 
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2. Antiquities Trafficking Networks  
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter sought to introduce the main goals of this thesis, which are focused 
on exploring and considering the application of CSA and SCP is in relation to ATNs.  In 
order to consider the application of crime scripting and SCP to the ATNs, a more 
comprehensive understanding of how these networks came to be, how they currently 
function, and any relevant prior studies is necessary.  This chapter will focus on reviewing 
current and relevant studies concerning ATNs as well as the present-day practices and 
methods employed by these networks.  For the purposes of this thesis, the term ATNs will 
be employed to refer to and encompass the range of actors, objects and relationships that 
participate in cultural heritage trafficking on a local and international level.  This will 
provide a more complete understanding of how and why the network operates as it does 
and will ultimately help provide context for the benefits of developing and using a crime 
script model and SCP strategies for this illicit network. 
First, a closer examination of how this illicit market (antiquities trafficking) has developed 
will be conducted.  This will be introduced by looking to the definition of an illicit 
antiquity – with special consideration to the particular use of the term ‘illicit’ for this 
network.  The phenomenon of antiquities trafficking is the culmination of centuries of 
casual or aggressive attitudes concerning cultural heritage that has only recently been 
regulated (Askerud et al., 2000; Brodie, 2006; Gerstenblith, 2007; Ulph et al., 2012; 
Brodie, 2012b).  Once a baseline of understanding has been established for the history and 
development of antiquities trafficking, there will be discussion about how the illicit and 
legal antiquities market currently operates.  This will focus on, rather broadly, how ATNs 
operate on a global level, but will also include some specific examples to demonstrate 
typical methods or techniques that are common within this network.  As this project makes 
use of the ongoing conflict in Syria as a case study, ATNs operating in conflict zones will 
also be considered.  Any previous research or significant studies will also be discussed at 
this point as well as difficulties faced within this network.  The chapter will conclude with 
a discussion of the context which has been presented and will highlight the importance of 
the work that is being discussed and developed in the course of this research project.   
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2.2 Defining the Problem 
To begin, a definition of what an antiquity and an illicit antiquity refer to must be 
established, as these are important terms that are discussed throughout this thesis and are 
essential in understanding illicit antiquities market and network.  Within the field of 
antiquities trafficking research there are a number of different terms associated with the 
types of objects trafficked including: cultural heritage, cultural property, archaeological 
objects, archaeological artefacts, cultural artefacts, art, heritage, or cultural material (Ulph 
et al., 2012).  Neil Brodie, a leading expert within the field of antiquities trafficking, 
defines an illicit antiquity as: “Illicit antiquities, archaeological objects that have been 
illegally excavated or exported from their country of origin for monetary gain.” (Brodie, 
2018).  For the purposes of this project, the term ‘antiquity’ or ‘antiquities’ will simply 
refer to an archaeological or cultural object.  The term illicit antiquity (antiquities) can then 
be understood to refer to a cultural or archaeological object whose transfer is legally 
prohibited or normatively disapproved.  This usually means that an object has been 
removed from its location of origin and traded or sold in an illegal or in a prohibited 
manner.   
This has allowed for a better understanding of the term antiquities trafficking (or illicit 
antiquities trafficking) which, refers to a variety of illicit actions including  “…clandestine 
excavation or theft, smuggling in transit, and either private sale or mixing with objects in 
the legitimate market.” (Mackenzie, 2010, p. 141).  The trafficking of antiquities or illicit 
antiquities are terms that has been created to reflect the scope and structure of antiquities 
trafficking.  Within this thesis it can refer to either the entire process of trafficking an 
antiquity (from ground to market), or individual/pairs of sections of the process.  It 
represents a comprehensive and inclusive term for a complex criminal market, which 
operates in a diverse and wide-ranging manner (Alder and Polk, 2002).  As this chapter 
will later identify, another important element which is necessary for comprehending the 
issue of antiquities trafficking, is the antiquities market.  The antiquities market operates as 
a grey network – meaning that the legal and illegal markets overlap in the same space – 
resulting in the marketplace of antiquities being a conduit for both legal and illegal objects 
(Polk, 2000; Bowman, 2008; Campbell, 2013; Mackenzie and Yates, 2016b).  The 
antiquities market offers a unique platform by which a large portion of antiquities will 
eventually be processed – evidenced by the consistent appearance of illicit objects within 
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the antiquities market (Gill and Tsirogiannis, 2016).  Having now defined ATNs, focus can 
now turn to how such networks were created and developed into the global issue it is 
today. 
2.3 What are Antiquities Trafficking Networks? 
ATNs refers to an individual or group of networks that seek to traffic archaeological or 
cultural objects that have been illegally excavated or exported from their country of origin, 
for profit.  These networks constitute three basic settings: a source of objects, the 
transportation of objects, and a market for the objects.  The legal antiquities market is a 
long-established market, which has its origins “in sixteenth-century Rome” (Brodie, 
2012b, p. 230).  Toward the latter end of the twentieth century, large portions of the 
antiquities market became increasingly illegal in nature, as nations implemented legal 
protection for archaeological and cultural heritage sites and objects (Alder and Polk, 2005; 
Brodie, 2012b).  The expansion of the art and antiquities market following the end of the 
Second World War contributed to an increase in demand for archaeological objects – 
antiquities – resulting in increased instances of looting (Gerstenblith, 2008; Brodie, 
2012b).  This resulted in the implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership 
of Cultural Property, which attempted to address troubling practices within the antiquities 
market – such as the common practice of selling or purchasing an object without a proper 
provenance (Unesco, 1970; Ulph et al., 2012). 
Though the 1970 UNESCO Convention, and the many conventions which followed it, 
have attempted to tackle the phenomena of illicit antiquities trafficking, it seems that the 
market in illicit antiquities continues to survive and thrive (UNESCO, 1970).  There have 
been increasing reports of conflict-based looting occurring in regions and nations 
(including Syria) (Polk, 2014; Brodie, 2015b).  While there is no accurate means of 
measuring the scope or value of this market – as it is illicit – there are estimates that place 
art and antiquities crime among the rankings of drug and weapons trafficking (UNESCO, 
2016).  This may be in part because of the high value of the objects being sold but will also 
additionally constitute large volumes of low to middle-end objects.  
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2.4 Previous Research  
The study of illicit antiquities and antiquities trafficking has primarily been conducted by 
those in the fields of archaeology, law, museum studies, or journalism (Brodie, 2012b; 
Brodie et al., 2013; Brodie, 2015a).  It was not until the late 1990s that criminologists 
began to study the issue (Bowman, 2008; Proulx, 2011b).  Therefore, the majority of 
research and literature about this topic has been conducted from an insider’s perspective, 
especially of those either familiar with, or have first-hand experience in the field of art and 
antiquities.   
2.4.1 Establishing the Field 
The 1970 UNESCO Convention brought to light the issue of illicit antiquities, but it wasn’t 
until the 1990s that significant research into the field of illicit antiquities trafficking took 
place (Brodie, 2012b).  Clemency Coggins’ (1969) article concerning illicit Pre-Columbian 
antiquities and Karl E. Meyer’s book The Plundered Past (1973) provided an in-depth look 
at the art and antiquities market at a time when the amount of academic literature and 
empirical research regarding illicit antiquities trafficking was rather lacking (Coggins, 
1969; Adams, 1971; Heath, 1973; Gonzalez, 1973; Seabrook, 1974; Schneider, 1982; 
Gutchen, 1983; Rogge, 1989; Szopa, 2004).  This changed in the 1990s, when there was a 
surge of documentation, research, and articles targeting specifically the looting and 
trafficking of antiquities, including most notably Conklin’s book Art Crime (1994) which 
provided an encompassing overview of both art and antiquities crime (McAllister, 1991; 
Nickens, 1991; Cameron, 1994; Chapman, 1994; Murphy, 1994; Blum, 1995; Rose and 
Acar, 1996; O’Keefe, 1997; Brodie, 1998; Brodie, 2012b).  The 1990s also produced the 
first quantitative study on the illicit antiquities market and was conducted by Gill and 
Chippindale (1993) concerning Cycladic figures.  This study analysed the market presence 
and purchasing of Cycladic figurines on the legal antiquities market, and was able to prove 
that large portions of these sales were likely a result of illicit looting (Gill and Chippindale, 
1993). 
Much of the research conducted during the 1990s focused on establishing fundamental 
aspects or evidence of antiquities trafficking.  It began by first establishing that illicit 
antiquities are an issue on an international scale. Research was conducted that studied 
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antiquities trafficking in a wide array of countries and regions including India  (Shankar, 
2001; Pachauri, 2003), Tanzania (Mapunda, 2001), Jordan (Bisheh, 2001; Politis, 2002), 
Cyprus (Hadjisavvas, 2001), Mali (Sidibé, 1996; Panella, 2014), Africa (Brent, 1996; 
Shyllon, 2011; Abungu, 2016), Argentina (Schávelzon, 2003), and Cambodia (Davis, 
2011; Mackenzie and Davis, 2016; Hauser-Schäublin, 2016; Miura, 2016).  Further 
qualitative studies relevant to illicit antiquities that followed sought to approximate the 
amount of looting occurring within archaeological sites (Gutchen, 1983; Ali and 
Coningham, 1998; Fernández et al., 2000; Elia, 2001; Luke and Henderson, 2006; 
Roosevelt and Luke, 2006; Brodie et al., 2013). 
A significant amount of time and energy was spent conducting research to firmly establish 
the existence and prevalence of antiquities trafficking (Brodie, 2006), and in the 2000s 
much of the research then turned to studying how the market functioned.  This included 
working at times, against the antiquities market, to attempt to prove the illegality of items 
that appeared on the market.  As Brodie states:  
I have reviewed this literature about provenance at some length to make the point 
that over the past decade the archaeological community has taken great pains 
and with no insider knowledge to establish its case from the study of published 
sources that are generally accessible to everybody.  It contrasts with what 
follows, where I record the trade community’s response, which has been 
unsystematic and unverifiable.  The trade community does not agree that absence 
of published provenance is proof that an object has been looted, and point out 
that provenances are often known but not revealed because of a vendor’s request 
for confidentiality, or because of the commercial requirement to keep a source 
secret. (Brodie, 2006a, p. 7)  
Further research worked to identify and examine how the market functioned, and so 
included a different market analysis of either: the entire market or specific sections (Luke 
and Henderson, 2006; Kersel, 2006a); the transnational nature of the market, as well as 
reports of organised crime (McCalister, 2005; Bowman, 2008; Lane et al., 2008; Campbell, 
2013); or how the market operates (Kersel, 2006a; Kersel, 2007; Brodie, 2012b).  
Further research concerning Hong Kong and Asian countries as upcoming markets in both 
licit and illicit antiquities has demonstrated that the antiquities market, like any market, is 
susceptible to changes (Gallagher, 2017; Yates et al., 2017).  This is especially relevant 
when considering how the internet has so drastically changed how communication and 
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transactions occur in the modern-day setting.  There has been initial research concerning 
how the internet has impacted the market and the manner in which antiquities are 
trafficked, but this is a field which could still benefit from further research (Chippindale 
and Gill, 2001; Lidington et al., 2002; Bland, 2009; Fay, 2011; Brodie, 2015c; Paul, 2018).  
Most recently the use of satellite imaging and other technologies have been explored to 
provide empirical evidence of looting by providing monitoring or contrasting photographs 
of sites or regions (Stone, 2008; Contreras, 2010; Brodie and Contreras, 2012; Parcak et 
al., 2016; Tapete et al., 2016; Cerra et al., 2016; Parcak, 2017; Deroin et al., 2017).  In 
particular, Parcak’s (2017) paper considers the ability to determine a likely site or area an 
object was looted from, based on specific parameters of the object – in this case an 
Egyptian mummy.  With further research – including soil samples and testing – it seems 
that in the future there may be the possibility of determining from where an object was 
looted (Parcak, 2017).  At the moment, this issue still presents one of the greatest 
difficulties in identifying and repatriating illicit antiquities.  The use of cutting-edge 
technology has provided a number of potentially exciting opportunities for helping to not 
only monitor antiquities looting and trafficking as it occurs, but also a consideration for 
crime prevention or rapid-response opportunities.   
2.4.2 Policy 
A major contribution of the overall research conducted on antiquities trafficking is in 
relation to local, national, or international policy.  One of the first ways in which 
authorities may attempt to prevent people from engaging in antiquities trafficking is to 
create laws making such actions illegal.  As stated in the previous section, much of the 
early research concerning antiquities trafficking was focused on proving that illicit 
antiquities and antiquities trafficking existed and was a legitimate threat to cultural 
heritage.  A result of this research was the ability to consider or create laws and regulations 
to combat antiquities trafficking.  When considering policy, it is helpful to refer back to the 
basic three elements of antiquities trafficking: loot (source), transit, and market.   
The amount of policy or legislation relating to cultural heritage is vast, as every country 
defines the meaning and scope of cultural heritage differently according to their customs, 
laws, and practices (Mackenzie, 2005; Ulph et al., 2012).  This section will provide a basic 
understanding of some of the more important pieces of legislation, but will by no means be 
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able to provide a full and thorough account of all policy or legislation relevant to the illicit 
antiquities trade.  To understand the regulations that are in place, a fundamental question 
must first be considered: who owns culture?  This represents a difficult and ongoing debate 
within the field of cultural heritage management (Merryman, 1986). There are those who 
believe that cultural objects are part of a national identity or culture, and are therefore 
owned by the state – they are often referred to as nationalists (Seabrook, 1974; Schneider, 
1982; Merryman, 1986).  In contrast, others argue that cultural objects are part of a global 
or common heritage, and contribute to a universal culture that should be shared and traded 
openly – they are often referred to as internationalists.  Often, source countries align 
themselves on the side of the nationalists, as they view their cultural heritage not only as a 
point of identity, but also as an economic resource (Seabrook, 1974; Schneider, 1982; 
Francioni and Lenzerini, 2006).  Italy is a prime example of just such a source country, 
with Italy having extensive export regulations in regards to cultural objects (Francioni and 
Lenzerini, 2006).  Most source countries often have at least basic legislation detailing the 
protection of their cultural heritage – with specific reference to the removal of objects from 
the country of origin (Seabrook, 1974; Polk, 2000; Massy, 2008). 
In contrast market, or destination countries are rather lacking in policy or legislation 
related to the export of  cultural objects (Schneider, 1982).  Market or destination countries 
represent countries where large art markets exist, and are therefore concerned more with 
objects being available for trade or sale (Mackenzie, 2005; B. Hoffman, 2006; Ulph et al., 
2012).  It is often the market-end of the antiquities market that appreciates an 
internationalist view of culture (Seabrook, 1974; Schneider, 1982).  Museums, auction 
houses, and galleries all profit or benefit from the free movement and trade of cultural 
objects, and as a result often express an international or common heritage view (Seabrook, 
1974; Schneider, 1982).  Many museums are inherently internationalist institutions, as 
without the trade of cultural objects they would cease to exists – consider the British 
Museum (Francioni and Lenzerini, 2006; Lewis, 2006).  While it adopted a stricter 
acquisition policy in 1972, many of the objects which currently reside in the British 
Museum are contested objects – such as the Parthenon Marbles or the Rosetta Stone 
(Lewis, 2006).     
The complexities of this debate become more relevant when the issue of repatriation of 
objects is discussed, for example by a repatriation claim made for an object that was 
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historically looted.  While the complexities of returning an object will be discussed in 
further detail in a later section, repatriation refers to the act of returning an object back to a 
nation or community (Ulph et al., 2012).  Restitution, on the other hand can be simply 
explained as a legal or cultural claim by a nation or community for the return of a cultural 
artefact that had been taken without the explicit permission of the nation or community 
(Ulph et al., 2012).  Repatriation and restitution claims often prove difficult, mostly in 
trying to determine the appropriate length of time in which a claim can still be made.   
An example that demonstrates the long and complex history of looting and repatriation 
would be the Triumphal Quadriga, or The Horses of Saint Mark, which are located on the 
façade of St. Mark’s Basilica in Venice (Tompkins, 2011). These four bronze horses are 
considered to be an iconic part of St. Mark’s Square.  These statues were so admired that 
during his conquests, Napoleon removed them from the Basilica in 1797 and had them 
incorporated into the Arc de Triomphe du Carrousel in Paris (Tompkins, 2011).  Following 
Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the Horses of Saint Mark were removed from Paris 
and were returned to Saint Mark’s Basilica by the Austrian Empire (Tompkins, 2011).  
While many are aware of the Horses’ ‘relocation’ to Paris and subsequent return to Venice, 
not many are aware that the Horses themselves were looted from Constantinople during the 
Fourth Crusade in 1204 (Tompkins, 2011).  Originally thought to be a part of the 
Hippodrome of Constantinople, the Horses were added to the façade of St. Mark’s Basilica 
in 1254, where it became evident that collars had been added to the horses.  This addition 
occurred in 1204, and was used as a means to hide where the heads of the horses had been 
sawed off – allowing for the transport of the sculptures to Venice (Tompkins, 2011). 
Consider, in this example, if the Horses has not been returned to Venice.  Modern-day 
Venetians could claim for repatriation of the Horses, as they were taken during wartime, 
and according to modern precedent, should be returned.  Just as equally, a citizen of 
Istanbul - the modern-day equivalent of a citizen of Constantinople - could claim the 
Horses be returned to their original location (Tompkins, 2011). To add a potentially 
complex layer to this scenario is the fact that at the time that Napoleon looted the Horses of 
Saint Mark, Venice had been annexed by the Austrian Empire, and so was technically 
under Austrian rule and control.  This brings into consideration the difficulties that would 
have arisen if Austria had taken the Horses and placed them in Vienna and not Venice 
(Tompkins, 2011).   
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These are the types of complexities that are faced when considering regulating the 
antiquities market: where does ownership begin or end?  The difficulty of defining 
historical looting also presents a difficulty – does the ‘collecting’ which occurred during 
English and French occupation of many countries around the world count as looting, or 
spoils of war?  These are not topics that will be answered in the course of this research 
project, but these are questions and issues that are certainly relevant within this field, and 
specifically in the creation of international regulations as to the protection and preservation 
of cultural heritage.  
There are a number of international measures that have been taken to help define and 
initiate strategies to reduce to regulate antiquities trafficking (Ulph et al., 2012), including 
the following UNESCO conventions: 
 • The Hague Convention, 1954 
 • The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, 1972 
 • The Convention of the means of Prohibiting and Prevention the illicit Import, 
Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970 
 • UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, 
1995 
The first part of this chapter focused on discussing the issue of who ‘owns’ culture.  This is 
an important issue in relation to cultural heritage policy, as in order to determine 
international conventions or regulations, the ownership of these objects must first be 
established.  The 1954 Hague convention was concerned with protecting cultural heritage 
during times of conflict – a direct response to the aftermath of WWII.  The 1970 UNESCO 
Convention was a result of concern with the protection of cultural heritage from the 
growing issue of illicit antiquities looting and trafficking (Gonzalez, 1973; Ulph et al., 
2012).  This convention, and the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention also dealt 
with the complex issue of ownership by placing emphasis on source countries, and the 
protection of cultural objects.  These were the first international conventions to address 
illicit antiquities looting and trafficking, and the preservation of cultural objects on an 
international scale (Unesco, 1970; Seabrook, 1974; Ulph et al., 2012).  These conventions 
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sought to promote international regulations by which countries would agree to the terms of 
the convention and work to protect global heritage.  (Unesco, 1970; Seabrook, 1974; Ulph 
et al., 2012).  The 1995 UNESCO Convention works to establish international regulation 
regarding the restitution and repatriation of objects, while the 1972 Convention also 
considered protecting natural culture, such as the great barrier reef in Australia (Unesco, 
1970; Blake, 2000; Vigneron, 2014). 
It is worth noting that the three Conventions so far adopted by UNESCO reflect 
the political and/or intellectual concerns of the time at which they were 
developed: the 1954 Convention expressed the powerful post-World War II 
desire to reduce potential sources of international conflict; the 1970 Convention 
embodied an approach to cultural property which might be characterised as 
"nationalist" or "statist" whereby the interest of the State of origin (often in the 
developing world) should be paramount, mirroring the strong feeling within 
UNESCO during the 1970's amongst developing nations that the power of the 
dominant developed States should be counteracted; and the 1972 Convention 
reflected both the growing concern in environmentalist issues in its integration 
of the cultural with the natural heritage as well as the concept of a "common 
heritage of mankind" which had been developing at this time in relation to 
seabed mineral resources. (Blake, 2000. p. 62) 
Of course, when considering the regulation of such an international market, complexities, 
such as the volume of legislation dedicated to monitoring the movement of illicit 
antiquities, or preventative measures taken by each nation, must also be considered.  
However, what these conventions hope to accomplish are an increased awareness of this 
issue as well as an attempt to have member countries make this issue a priority. 
A number of countries have enacted legal frameworks which attempt to regulate illicit 
antiquities including the UK (Act of 2003), the US, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, India, 
Cambodia, and Australia.  Unfortunately, the majority of international regulation 
concerning illicit antiquities can be found mostly in source nations, with emphasis placed 
on attempting to control the export of cultural objects (Seabrook, 1974; Schneider, 1982; 
Polk, 2000; Massy, 2008; Vigneron, 2014).  Targeting source countries has proved to be an 
ineffective means of regulating ATNs, as these networks are driven by the market (Bland, 
2009).  As Vigneron puts it, “the burden of regulating the trade of cultural objects cannot 
exclusively lie on source nations because this trade mostly operates at international level 
rather than national level.” (2014, p. 119) 
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2.4.3 Antiquities in Conflict 
Conflict antiquities are an issue that has become a prominent issue within the fields of 
archaeology, cultural heritage, and illicit antiquities trafficking (Chapman, 1994; Prott, 
2006; Rush, 2010; Farchakh-Bajjaly, 2011; Hanson, 2011; Hardy, 2014b; Willett, 2016).  
This was especially true after the world watched as the Baghdad Museum was looted in 
2003 at the start of the Iraq War (Atwood, 2004; Rothfield, 2009).  Much has been written 
regarding this event, and more attention and research has since been focused on other 
conflict zones (Atwood, 2004; Rothfield, 2008; Farchakh-Bajjaly, 2008; Brodie, 2008; 
Rothfield, 2009; Hanson, 2011; Isakhan, 2013).  Research has included conflicts in 
Croatia, Bosnia, and Hercegovina (Chapman, 1994; Šulc, 2001), the National Museum in 
Kabul  ((Brodie et al., 2006), the Cypriot Civil War (Hardy, 2014b) the 2006 ’33 day war’ 
in Lebanon (Farchakh-Bajjaly, 2011), Beirut during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) 
(Sandes, 2013), the Arab Spring in Egypt (Parcak et al., 2016; Fabiani, 2018) and some 
general research regarding conflict antiquities (Boylan, 2002; Prott, 2006; Urquhart Irvine, 
2011; Cerra et al., 2016). 
2.4.4 Criminological Research and Contributions 
Within the field of illicit antiquities, there was – until the early 2000s – a significant lack of 
criminological research being conducted or produced (Bowman, 2008; Proulx, 2011b; 
Brodie, 2015a).  Much of the work that was being contributed was from a cultural heritage, 
museum, legal, or archaeological field and perspective.  Criminological research within 
illicit networks such as ATNs are necessary in order to better understand how the network 
functions, and to consider effective preventative measures (Alder and Polk, 2002; Tijhuis, 
2011; Davis, 2011; Proulx, 2011b; Campbell, 2013; Bichler et al., 2013).  Kenneth Polk 
(2000) introduced a criminological perspective to the field with a number of papers that 
considered ATNs in comparison to drug networks, and later with Christine Alder examined 
the antiquities market as a criminal market (Alder and Polk, 2002) and established their 
function as illicit markets (Alder and Polk, 2005).   
Relevant criminological research that followed Alder and Polk includes the work of Simon 
Mackenzie, whose body of work includes law and policy relevant to antiquities trafficking 
(Mackenzie, 2005; Green and Mackenzie, 2009) market reduction and regulation strategies 
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(Mackenzie and Graycar, 2002; Mackenzie, 2011; Mackenzie, 2015), neutralisation 
techniques of actors within the market (Mackenzie and Green, 2008; Mackenzie, 2011; 
Mackenzie, 2014; Mackenzie and Yates, 2016a; Mackenzie and Green, 2018) and the 
study of how the market operates (Mackenzie and Davis, 2016; Mackenzie and Yates, 
2016b), A.J.G. Tijhuis’s article concerning the ‘lock model’ for transitioning illicit objects 
(2011), Blythe Bowman Proulx’s research which focuses on organised crime and the grey 
market of illicit antiquities (Bowman, 2008; Proulx, 2011b), and Usman Ojedokun’s 
(2012) article which examines the trafficking of Nigerian cultural objects via routine 
activities theory.  Kersel (2006) presents a market analysis antiquities trafficking which 
presents a basic structural model of how the illicit antiquities trade operates.  Additional 
considerations as to organised crime (Proulx, 2011b; Chappell and Polk, 2011; Mackenzie, 
2011; Alderman, 2011; Dietzler, 2013; Casey, 2017; Sotiriou, 2018), and white-collar 
crime within the network are also prominent themes in much of the research within the 
field (Balcells, 2014). 
There has been some criminological consideration as to a study of antiquities trafficking 
from a network perspective – specifically the analysis of the social networks of antiquities 
trafficking (Bichler et al., 2013; D’Ippolito, 2014), but this is still a field which would 
benefit from further study.  These studies focus specifically on the use of social network 
analysis to better understand the scope and organisation of ATNs.  This type of research is 
valuable to constructing a better understanding of how these networks form and operate, 
though a main issue this type of research faces is availability of necessary data.  While the 
volume of criminological research continues to grow in recent years, the significance of the 
research that these projects represent indicates the need for greater volume and breadth of 
similar projects (Bowman, 2008).  As discussed in the next section, there is a significant 
gap in research concerning prevention of antiquities trafficking, as much of the literature 
within this field currently focuses on reactionary proposals or research.  It is evident that 
there has been a progression in the field, from first establishing the issue of antiquities 
looting and trafficking, to more in-depth research concerning recording instances and 
examples of antiquities trafficking.  However, currently the field is at a stage where it must 
consider the specifics of how antiquities trafficking will be researched, and to determine 
effective means of both preventative, as well as reactionary work. 
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2.4.5 Crime Prevention/Potential Preventative Systems 
In the course of examining the literature and research available on the issue of antiquities 
trafficking, there is a glaring void of one particular area relevant to combatting the 
antiquities trafficking.  There is little to no empirical research concerning the prevention of 
antiquities trafficking (Polk, 2009; Polk, 2014; Grove and Pease, 2014).  As discussed in 
the previous section, policy and regulations seem to be the main conduit for attempting to 
reduce cases of antiquities looting but, as has been documented in various examples 
policies can actually do more harm than good if not correctly applied or targeted (Alder 
and Polk, 2002). 
Some policies that have been proposed are meant to target specific stages of the antiquities 
trafficking process – including border controls (Lobay, 2009), embargos on objects 
(Murphy, 1994), or by proposing a universally accessible form by which an annual report 
could be generated to provide a more clear understanding of antiquities trafficking – 
similar to crime victimisation surveys (Grove & Thomas, 2014), or even a global database 
of antiquities (Levine, 2013).  There is also the premise that the creation of a legal 
antiquities market of commercially or state excavated objects that would be available for 
sale to the public may help to reduce the criminal market for such objects (Boyce, 1997). 
Additional proposals include fingerprinting antiquities to deter or facilitate an easier 
recovery (Wei, 2017), while Hicks (2000) presents a more practical means of preventative 
actions by proposing an educational program targeting children, where he considers more 
attractive means of education, including role-playing or theatre-based learning experiences.  
This model unfortunately is intended mainly for a US audience (as it is based on data from 
Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) and usually assumes that there is a 
designated site manager (Hicks, 2000). 
There is one previous work to the present research concerning ‘heritage crime’ and SCP 
(Grove & Pease, 2014).  Grove and Pease discuss the application of SCP as a means of 
“reducing the risk of damage to or loss of heritage assets by the use of situational crime 
prevention” (Grove & Pease, 2014, p. 107).  They define heritage crime as “any activity 
that is prohibited by law that causes loss of, damage to, or other harm to places, 
monuments or objects considered to be heritage” (Grove & Thomas, 2014, 2014, p. 5).  
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This definition can include instances such as vandalism or theft, and are bound by legal 
regulations, though they state that their intended context is within the UK (Grove & Pease, 
2014).   They present a chart of the 25 techniques of SCP for cultural heritage crime 
(Figure 2-1). 
 
 
Fig. 2-1: 25 Techniques of SCP for Heritage Crime (Grove & Pease, 2014). Permission to reproduce this 
figure has been granted by the authors. 
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This table of situational techniques focuses mainly on protecting or preserving known 
cultural heritage or art objects, and considered these objects to be in a fairly established 
setting or area – placing much of the focus on potential managers of areas or sites increase 
risks of offenders being caught. 
2.5 How Antiquities Trafficking Networks Operate 
A focus of this research project concerns examining how ATNs operate, and as such only, 
a broad and simple explanation of this phenomenon will occur at this point.  A more 
detailed and analytic discussion of this network will take place in chapter 5.   
As has been discussed, the use of the term ATNs refers not to a specific set of actors and 
objects but more conceptually to the complete process by which an antiquity is looted, 
transported, and/or marketed.  This section will focus on detailing and explaining how the 
components that makes up this process, and how the network operates on a macro-scale.  
These processes can range from a simple process to the complex.  In the simplest of terms, 
the general process can be broken down into a three-step process: 
 (1) An item is looted (illegally removed from the ground or cultural site). 
 (2) The item is then transported from the original site. 
 (3) The item is then sold to a dealer or collector.  
This however, only generally outlines the main stages of the process, as a multitude of 
other factors builds up the complexity of the network in terms of prevention/disruption 
strategies, including: 1) the range of actors; 2) the source, transit, and market countries; 3) 
provenance; 4) the grey market; 5) the illicit market network itself; 6) and how demand 
drives the market; and 7) the importance and relevance of this issue.  Each will be 
discussed in turn.  
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2.5.1 The Actors  
The basic form of ATNs has been established as including looting, transit, and marketing 
elements.  Within each of these areas three very different set of actors operate, at times 
with varying methods and motivations.  While three types of actors that are common 
elements within ATNs have been discussed, this represents the role they play within the 
network, and not necessarily the actual number of actors within the network.  There are 
instances where a single individual can be involved in all three stages, or instead multiple 
individuals for a single stage.  These characteristics and an understanding of the overall 
structure of the network will be discussed in more detail through the analysis of the crime 
scripts, which will be presented at a further point in this paper.  Ultimately, this research 
project will contemplate the different methods and techniques used in the process of this 
illicit network, but at this stage, it will examine three different general characteristics of the 
actors of each stage of the process. 
2.5.1.1 Looters 
In reference to the individuals who do the physical undertaking of looting object(s) from 
their original location, there are three categories of looters; subsistence looters, profit 
looters, and leisure looters.  These categories can refer specifically to individuals, multiple 
individuals – even entire communities in some instances.  
Subsistence Looters: Subsistence looting refers to individuals, groups, or a community 
who partake in looting as a means of survival (Staley, 1993; Matsuda, 1998; Hardy, 
2015b).  This is typically due to extreme poverty or lack of additional resources/jobs 
(Kersel, 2007; Hardy, 2015b).  When this occurs, looting will take place as a means of 
providing an income for a family or individual’s survival.  In recent years subsistence 
looting has garnered more attention from the archaeological and legal fields.  There are a 
number of studies that document subsistence looting in South America and the Middle East 
(Matsuda, 1998; Roosevelt, 2008; Yahya, 2008; Contreras, 2010).  Research conducted on 
St. Lawrence Island in the early 1990s provided an in-depth examination of subsistence 
digging or looting, as it is now know it today (Staley, 1993).  Staley discussed how the 
community of Gambell on St. Lawrence Island engaged in digging not only as a result of 
monetary need, but as a social, cultural, and educational endeavour (1993).  This type of 
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research demonstrates the complexity of subsistence looting and recognises that it is not 
necessarily always a simple issue of individuals or communities engaging in illegal 
looting.  Subsistence looting represents a complex issue concerning an ongoing debate of 
‘who owns heritage?’  While an important and relevant issue, this thesis will adopt a 
traditionally legal perspective that cultural heritage belongs to the state or nation in which 
it resides.  This definition will be used for ease of understanding and clarification of 
national and international preventative measures that may be examined in further chapters.  
As such, in the context of this thesis, the term subsistence looter(s) will refer specifically to 
individuals, groups, or communities that engage in (illegal) looting as a means of survival.  
Profit Looters: For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘criminal looter(s)’ refers to any 
type of gang, or organised group of criminals who systematically loot cultural sites.  Tomb 
raiders, grave robbers, looters, plunderers, gangs, or terrorists are all terms that constitute 
profit looters (Atwood, 2004).  In Italy, there is even a specific term for such an individual 
– ‘tombaroli’ (Atwood, 2004; Campbell, 2013).  These types of looters can be found 
throughout the world, with the defining feature being that they engage in criminal activities 
for the purpose of profit.  Profit looters typically do the most amount of damage to both the 
site at large and the antiquities that are present, as they are attempting to find and loot as 
many objects of value possible (Bowman, 2008).  “On closer expectation, one of the boxes 
in the cupboards was found to contain gold rings with the finger bones of the dead still 
attached to them.  Clearly, when the tombs had been looted, the hands and fingers of the 
long-dead had simply been broken off by the tombaroli to save time” (Watson and 
Todeschini, 2006, p. 184).  Within the body of literature in this field, a significant amount 
of research has been conducted relating to organised criminal groups within the illicit 
antiquities field (Chappell and Polk, 2011; Proulx, 2011b; Alderman, 2011).  There has 
been enough significant and relevant research conducted at this time to be able to state that 
organised crime does play a role in ATNs.  This is almost certainly the case in the middle 
east where there has been evidence that on at least one occasion terrorist organisations such 
as the Islamic State (Daesh) have profited from ATNs (Daniels and Hanson, 2015).  As 
organised crime, groups constitute an individual or numbers of individuals engage in 
criminal activity, organised crime will therefore be classified as profit looters.  A wide 
scope of criminals and criminal activity will constitute the term profit looters in the course 
of this research project. 
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Leisure Looters: Leisure looters present a somewhat vague category of an individual who 
is not looting for survival (subsistence looting) but is not associated with a gang or 
criminal organisation.  They can be classified as enthusiasts, collectors, or history buffs, 
but all share the common trait of having a passion for either the objects they find, or the 
thrill of the ‘hunt’.  A popular type of leisure looter would be metal detectorists, which has 
become an almost mainstream hobby – a prominent example of its place in public 
awareness being the BBC television comedy The Detectorists (Moss, 2017).  While the 
ultimate motivation of these leisure looters is not necessarily profit, their enthusiasm for 
searching for and sometimes finding objects can result in as much harm to site or objects as 
profit looters. 
2.5.1.2 Smugglers 
Typically, an object is transported from its site or location of origin before being sold or 
traded, and as such, a smuggler is often required at some point in the process.  The role of 
smuggler can be an individual person or can be taken on by an individual playing multiple 
roles (Smuggler/Dealer or Looter/Smuggler).  This role simply represents an action of 
illegally or covertly transporting an antiquity.  This is a rather traditional role when it 
comes to illicit networks, as some smugglers engage in the smuggling of many types of 
objects (weapons, guns, drugs, and people).    
2.5.1.3 Middleman 
The role of a middleman presents a unique position within the illicit antiquities network.  
For the purposes of this project, a middleman refers specifically to a criminal actor who 
helps to connect sellers, buyer, or dealers.  Typically, a middleman would be an individual 
who is familiar with certain types or eras of an object, is well connected within criminal 
networks.  These types of actors are typically involved with contacting looters and brokers, 
arranging transportation of objects, or selling known illicit objects onto dealers (who 
willingly engage with illicit antiquities).  The middleman represents a vital component of 
these overall networks as without these types of individuals the bridge between illicit and 
licit would be broken – or at least more difficult to navigate.  
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2.5.1.4 Brokers 
Arguably one of the most important roles within the network, a broker’s main concern is 
selling (and netting a profit), from antiquities.  Brokers represent individuals who 
specialise in the sale, purchase, or transfer of antiquities.  They represent one of the main 
components of the antiquities market and play an integral role of finding and connecting 
objects, sellers, and purchasers (Kersel, 2006a; Massy, 2008; Mackenzie and Davis, 2016).  
They are similar in nature to middlemen although a specific difference is that brokers 
operate in the grey area of the legal framework of ATNs.  When referring to the grey area, 
this refers to the unregulated aspects of the antiquities market, which allow dubious 
methods or practices to be considered perfectly normal, and therefore licit.  Such practices 
include purchasing or selling objects without a verified provenance.  In Mackenzie and 
Davis’s important study regarding the structure of the illicit antiquities market in 
Cambodia they described the role of a middleman as the Janus figure (Mackenzie and 
Davis, 2016).  Janus being an Ancient Greek figure who is two-faced, they described the 
middleman as representing the contrasting sides of the antiquities market (Mackenzie and 
Davis, 2016).  As such, the broker represents an important component of these overall 
networks as without these types of individuals the bridge between illicit and licit would be 
broken – or at least more difficult to navigate.  While not explicitly illegal in many 
countries (or even enforced in countries where it is illegal), the market does not regulate 
itself concerning provenance, and as a result, dealers are able at times to purchase and sell 
objects sans provenance (Hardy, 2016).  Brokers are then able to operate in the legal 
antiquities market, while (often knowingly) benefiting from objects that are illicit in nature 
(Mackenzie, 2005; Mackenzie and Green, 2007). 
2.5.1.5 Purchasers 
Auction Houses: The antiquities market would not be what it is without the presence of 
auction houses (Ulph et al., 2012; Graham, 2014; C Tsirogiannis, 2016c).  From major 
international houses like Sotheby’s, Christie’s, and Bonhams, to smaller national or local 
auction houses these institutions enable antiquities of every type to be sold and purchased 
in an efficient and profitable manner.  Many antiquities in the course of their existence 
have passed, or will pass through some type of auction house.  They account for one of the 
most common forms of transaction in the antiquities market, besides perhaps antiquities 
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fairs or online transactions (Hardy, 2016).  There are a number of instances where auction 
houses have (either knowingly or unknowingly) facilitated the sale or purchase of an illicit 
antiquity (C Tsirogiannis, 2016a).   
Collectors: Private collectors are ultimately the one of the main drivers of the antiquities 
market (Gill and Chippindale, 1993; Mackenzie, 2011; Polk, 2014).  As established in an 
earlier section, most experts now agree that demand drives the illicit antiquities market 
(and indeed the legal antiquities market).  As with any market there are trends within the 
antiquities market – some types of antiquities at certain times are more popular, resulting 
in an increase in demand.  Collectors help to determine these trends and the success of the 
antiquities market by the simple act of engaging in purchasing objects.  For example, 
Cycladic figures were highly sought after in the 1990s, which resulted in an increase in 
Cycladic figures appearing on the antiquities market (Gill and Chippindale, 1995).  The 
market demand of private collectors and their willingness to engage in suspicious or illicit 
objects are part of what allows ATNs to continue to exist (Alder and Polk, 2005; Chappell 
and Polk, 2011; Hardy, 2016; Mackenzie and Yates, 2016a).  
Museums: The majority of a museum’s collection is unseen.  Consider the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art in New York City.  On display at any given time is only a small fraction of 
their entire collection: “Most museums show between 2 and 4 percent of a collection” 
(Fabrikant, 2009).  Museums usually acquire objects through one of two ways: they either 
purchase or they are given it – items are bequeathed or donated by museum patrons.  Both 
of these acquisition practices have the potential of supporting ATNs.  The Met is a perfect 
example of a museum that historically has engaged in unethical acquisition practices as 
they have done so on a number of occasions (Vogel, 1993; Watson and Todeschini, 2006; 
Felch and Frammolino, 2011; Mashberg and Blumenthal, 2013; Anon, 2018e).  Most 
famously the Met was involved with the purchase of the Euphronious Krater for 1 million 
dollars in 1972 (Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  The krater was proven to have been 
illegally looted and trafficked following the trial of Giacomo Medici and in 2006 the 
Euphronious krater was returned to Italy (Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  A modern 
example of donating an illicit antiquity includes the handiwork of Subhash Kapoor, a New 
York City antiquities dealer who is currently on trial in India for organising the looting and 
trafficking of statues in the state of Tamil Nadu.  Kapoor donated an object to the Honolulu 
museum that was later found to have been looted; the museum fully cooperated with 
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authorities to return the object (Kelleher, 2015).  Museums have long been central to the 
issue of illicit antiquities – especially in the context of repatriation of objects – but poor 
acquisition practices help to keep it relevant in modern discussions.  
2.5.2 Source, Transit, and Market Countries 
The general process of how the network operates has been established, and now the three 
phases of the network in the context of the countries that facilitate them will be considered.  
Within ATNs, the concept of market countries and source countries provide valuable 
information as to how the antiquities market operates.  “It is one of the ironies of the 
cultural property trade that the financially poor or developing countries are the ‘art rich’, 
‘supply’, or ‘source’ countries, while the wealthy, developed countries are most often the 
‘art poor’, ‘market’ ‘states’.” (Murphy, 1994, p. 288). 
A market country refers to a country in which a large number of antiquities are sold – 
usually due to a high level of auction houses, galleries, and museums (Merryman, 1986). 
This would include countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
France, Germany, Italy China, Japan, and Australia (Merryman, 1986; Alder and Polk, 
2002; Ulph et al., 2012). 
A source country refers to countries in which a large portion of antiquities originates 
(Merryman, 1986; Campbell, 2013).This would include countries which have significant 
archaeological remains such as the majority of the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, 
Lebanon etc.), Greece, India, China, Cambodia, Thailand, Peru, Bolivia, and Guatemala 
(Merryman, 1986; Ulph et al., 2012).  Additionally, some countries operate as both a 
source and market country (Alder & Polk, 2002; Campbell, 2013; Mackenzie, 2005).  
Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy all operate in both capacities, 
with significant art sales and purchases (Bland, 2009; Mackenzie, 2005)   
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Fig. 2-2: 'The International Art Market' in 1997 (Askerud et al., 2000).  Permission to reproduce this figure 
has been granted by UNESCO. 
  
 
2.5.2.1 Source Countries 
Countries with significant cultural heritage sites or objects constitute source countries.  
Often this will include areas, regions, or nations which are historically relevant or 
important in the development of civilisations or populations (Matsuda, 1998; Kersel, 2011; 
Ulph et al., 2012; Saad El-Gendi, 2012; Hardy, 2015b).  Typically, source countries are 
economically disadvantaged nations (Matsuda, 1998; Kersel, 2011; Saad El-Gendi, 2012; 
Hardy, 2015b).  As a result of volume or importance of their respective cultural heritage, 
many sources countries have legislation or policy to protect objects from leaving the 
country.  Many of these laws date back decades, or even centuries, demonstrating a 
historical awareness of the importance of these objects, and the demand for them 
(Gerstenblith, 2008; Ulph et al., 2012). 
2.5.2.2 Transit Countries  
These countries typically operate in one of two ways: first they either act as a means of 
quite literally transporting the object from one location to another (via one, or a number of 
countries), or second: they act as a means of creating a sense of legitimacy or means of 
transitioning an object from illicit to legal, via being transported through different ports or 
countries.   
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Transit countries are countries that operate mainly as a means of transit for these objects.  
This can have one of two meanings: the first being that the object is quite literally 
transported through or via this country; the second refers to the use of a transit country as a 
means of creating or establishing legitimacy for the object.  As was discussed in the 
following section, a large component of antiquities trafficking centres on the transition of 
an object from being illicit, to a legal antiquity.   
2.5.2.3 Market Countries 
Market countries are, as the name implies, those countries where the antiquities market is 
most prominent and active.  This usually correlates with wealthy nations as the collecting 
and purchasing of large volumes or high valued objects is conducted by wealthier 
individuals:   
Nonetheless, the main destination countries are fundamentally the most 
economically powerful countries.  The scale of the illicit market can be assumed 
to have some correlation with the scale of the ostensibly legal market and 83% 
of the global art trade is conducted in three countries – the USA (39%), China 
(22%) and the UK (22%) [TEFAF, 2015].  To be more precise, 83% of the 
wealth in the market was exchanged in those three trading hubs.  The 
commodities, the sellers and the buyers may be from – and indeed may be – 
elsewhere.  (Hardy, 2016, p. 7)  
Market countries represent nations where the art and antiquities market has long been 
established and prevalent (Kersel, 2006a; Proulx, 2011b; Ulph et al., 2012; Campbell, 
2013).  The ability to purchase such leisure items has long been a tradition that only the 
wealthy could afford (Alder and Polk, 2005).  This pastime continues to be an activity that 
those with resources are able to engage in, and as a result, many of the market countries are 
located in nations that either attract wealthy collectors, or where wealthy collectors reside 
(Brodie et al., 2006; Ulph et al., 2012; Mackenzie and Yates, 2016a).   
2.5.2.4 Combination Countries 
These descriptors are used as general categories in which countries fall but are by no 
means static or set characterisations.  Some countries operate as both source and market 
countries, where a nation may have extensive archaeological material as well as a healthy 
art and antiquities market as part of its economic makeup.  The United States, for example, 
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have large sources of Native or Indigenous American objects or materials as well as one of 
the largest art and antiquities markets in the world – New York City (Merryman, 1986) 
For example, there is a strong market abroad for works of North American Indian 
cultures, even though Canada and the United States are thought of primarily as 
market nations.  Conversely, there are wealthy collectors of foreign as well as 
national cultural objects in most source nations.]  Demand in the market nation 
encourages export from source nations.  When, as is often (but not always) the 
case, the source nation is relatively poor and the market nation wealthy, an 
unrestricted market will encourage the net export of cultural property.  
(Merryman, 1986, p. 832)  
Italy, as both a source and market country, has extremely strict regulations regarding the 
preservation and protection of cultural heritage.  It also provides an excellent example to 
demonstrate the difficulties that both source and market countries face in working to 
prevent or reduce the illicit antiquities network.  This is because Italy views their culture as 
a source of revenue.  This is not only due to the art and antiquities market, but also because 
of an extremely important economic resource of tourism.  As a source country, Italy takes 
the preservation of cultural heritage (including antiquities) so seriously that they have their 
own dedicated force within the Carabinieri, assigned to the theft and looting of art and 
antiquities.  They are considered one of few expert forces in the world in this field.  Just 
recently (2016) they were assigned as the Blue Shield task force, a branch of UNESCO 
tasked with actively helping to protect UNESCO world heritage sites in times of conflict 
(UN News Centre, 2016).  As a market country, Italy is an excellent example of a country 
that also places significant value on regulations and restrictions on the movement and 
purchasing of antiquities within their borders.  Italy is one of the few countries that have 
categorised significant works of art that represent the national heritage of Italy, and as such 
cannot leave the country.  This is to ensure that many of Italy’s most famous works of art 
do not leave their borders.  Individuals can purchase and sell these items as long as they 
remain in Italy.  Additionally, Italy has worked hard to repatriate many antiquities that 
have been proven to be looted (Park, 2002).  
2.5.3 Provenance 
A fundamental factor for why the antiquities market is unregulated lies in the issue of 
provenance.  Any illicit market is based around an illegal or unethical object or good that is 
desired or necessary for a particular need or desire.  Typically, these goods are either legal 
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or illegal – either being illicit in nature or representing legal objects that were created or 
obtained illegally (Alder and Polk, 2005; Brodie, 2006; Massy, 2008).  For example, drugs 
such as heroin or cocaine are universally accepted as illicit goods.  Weapons present a 
more complicated issue, as they can be legal goods (depending upon the use and 
geographic location) or illicit if owned or created by illicit actors.  Antiquities are more 
similar to the second example involving weapons, except for the crucial fact that 
antiquities are not man-made objects, but naturally found resources that are discovered 
(Cameron, 1994; Willett, 2016).  The nature of antiquities allows for this market to remain 
willingly unregulated, as a ‘master-list’ of every antiquity does not exist, nor a complete 
record of everyone who has owned or purchased an antiquity (Bowman, 2008).  This 
aspect of antiquities allows many illicit antiquities to be claimed as ‘lost treasures’, 
forgotten objects from distant relatives (Ulph et al., 2012).  This does happen on occasion – 
as with popular shows such as The Antiques Road Show, or Storage Wars – people 
stumble upon lost or forgotten masterpieces (Anon, 2017; Reppion, 2018).  This also 
allows individuals to take advantage of the antiquities market by passing off illicit object as 
simply unprovenanced heirlooms (or something similar) (Renfrew, 2000; Ulph et al., 2012; 
Hardy, 2016).  The result being that the market can continue to operate without requiring 
or enforcing the need for objects to have a proper or validated provenance (Polk, 2000).  
2.5.4 Grey Market 
Markets can traditionally be understood to operate in either a legal or an illegal capacity.  
When purchasing legal goods, it is expected that the items you have bought were legal in 
origin, and all further exchanges of the goods were conducted according to the laws and 
regulations of the country.  In contrast, when purchasing goods from an illegal or ‘black’ 
market it is implicit that the items were most likely illegally created or obtained.  In other 
forms of illicit networks, there typically exists both a legal market and an illegal market to 
obtain items – dual networks that compete to control the goods that enter the market.  This 
explanation may seem overly simple in the field of criminology, but this distinction is 
important to understanding one of the most significant difficulties in studying the 
regulation of the antiquities (licit and illicit) market.  This is because the illicit antiquities 
market operates as a grey market; in both a legal and illegal capacity (Mackenzie, 2011; 
Mackenzie and Yates, 2016b; Casey, 2017) (Polk, 2000; Bowman, 2008; Massy, 2008; 
Proulx, 2011b; Proulx, 2011a).  There is no ‘black’ antiquities market (or at least none of 
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any significance), but simply the antiquities market – which sells both legal and illegal 
objects 
In a word, the market for antiquities is half illicit, half licit.  While the peasant 
tomb robber in China may be executed by the state for his role in the initial acts 
which result in the availability of the artefacts on the market, the ultimate 
purchaser of Tan or Han Dynasty material at Sotheby’s or Christie’s […] does 
so openly and without fear of arrest.  (Polk, 2000, p. 3)  
The antiquities network represents a network full of contradiction between licit 
and illicit and somehow manages to present itself to the world with a fairly 
untarnished appearance… There is illegality at each stage of the [network] (at 
source, in transit, and in terms of trade and collection in market countries). 
However, at all stages of transaction there are deviance-normalizing and 
neutralizing engagements with the issues exercised by the actors and 
constituencies involved.  (Mackenzie & Yates, 2016, pp. 70-86)  
As such, the antiquities market can be considered a poorly regulated market (Mackenzie, 
2005; Bland, 2009; Kersel, 2011; Manacorda and Chappell, 2011; Gallagher, 2017).  This 
is because it is common practice for illicit antiquities to ‘legally’ appear in auction houses 
and galleries.  As antiquities are not criminal in nature, the antiquities market offers a 
perfectly legal marketplace for the selling or purchasing of antiquities (Bowman, 2008).  
As the marketplace (usually) faced no legal or actively enforced policies, it operates as an 
unregulated market – allowing illicit objects to enter the market freely, and often without 
consequences (Mackenzie, 2005; Bland, 2009; Kersel, 2011; Gallagher, 2017).  The result 
is a market that has developed to allow a lack of provenance from deterring people from 
purchasing an object.  Because this is such a common occurrence, it has led to an easy 
method of disposing looted and trafficked antiquities on the antiquities market.  With this 
standard in place, major auction houses and gallery dealers, who work within the 
international art market, are then disinclined to regulate the market and demand proper 
documentation.  As these organisations profit from these objects with or without the 
necessary documentation, they do not feel the need to enforce certification requirements 
for an object that was obtained illegally.  
2.5.5 Illicit Market/Network  
The antiquities market has been discussed as a grey market, but this discussion has not 
gone into great length concerning antiquities trafficking operating as an illicit network or 
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criminal market.  There have been a number of articles which focus on this topic (Polk, 
2000; Kersel, 2006b; Alderman, 2011), but Peter Campbell (2013) provides an empirical 
study of commonalities between the illicit antiquities trade and other criminal networks.  
He tests his hypothesis that the illicit antiquities trade is a transnational criminal network in 
his important 2013 paper.  By comparing known aspects of the antiquities trade as well as 
organisational and structural elements to criminal networks, he is able to conclude that the 
antiquities trade does in fact operate as an illicit network (2013).  He also discusses the 
need for further research into “examining the organisation structure” (Campbell, 2013, p. 
138).   
2.5.6 Demand Drives the Market 
A central theme that can be agreed upon at this point is that demand is the driving factor 
for this market (Alder and Polk, 2005; Lundén, 2012; Kersel, 2012).  With markets (legal 
or illicit), the market can be driven one of two ways: by supply or by demand (Davis, 
2011; Mackenzie, 2011).  In the case of antiquities, a supply driven market would mean 
that the objects would be looted regardless of if there were a demand for them – meaning 
that the market would accept any or all objects and be able to sell or transfer them.  
Whereas a demand-driven market indicates that the supply is driven or dictated by the 
market demand.  It is known that the antiquities market operates currently as a demand 
driven market (Polk, 2000; Kersel, 2007; Chappell and Polk, 2011; Kersel, 2012; Brodie, 
2015e; Brodie, 2015b; Gallagher, 2017).  This is a result of research that studies market 
trends in relation to reports of looting, such as Gill and Chippindale’s (1993) important 
study concerning the market for Cycladic figurines.  Further studies include Hardy’s ‘loot-
to-order’ paper which examines the reports of objects being looted based on specific 
requests (2015).  The example of Subhash Kapoor’s looting of the Dancing Shiva (which 
ultimately ended up being purchased by the National Gallery of Australia), was looted as a 
result of his request regarding a particular style of antiquity that was popular on the market 
at the time (Felch, 2013a). 
2.5.7 Relevance 
When looting occurs, the loss of the context in which an object is found is irreplaceable in 
an archaeological sense (Brodie, 2006; Lobay, 2009).  Without such context, the object’s 
45 
 
 
 
 
purpose or role cannot be fully understood or proven (Brodie, 2006).  “Since the middle of 
the nineteenth century it has been realised that archaeology, the study of the human past 
through its material remains, permits the reconstruction of the past of humankind in every 
region on earth” (Renfrew, 2000, p. 19).  An archaeologist’s purpose is to gain a better 
understanding of the history of humanity, through the close research and analysis of the 
only record that is left: cultural heritage – including human remains, objects, or 
buildings/monuments.  The loss of the object and context represents an additional and 
perhaps more universally relevant loss: the loss of a non-renewable resource.  
For all the publicity that illicit antiquities receive, some may ask why the looting and 
trafficking of antiquities merits such attention or resources.  In contrast to drug or weapons 
trafficking, it is unlikely that (besides disputes between looting gangs) the actual object of 
an antiquity is going to directly harm an individual.  A similar argument can be made for 
wildlife crimes – why should anyone care about the death of an animal hundreds of miles 
removed from where they live?  As with the case of wildlife crime, illicit antiquities are a 
non-renewable resource (Cameron, 1994).  Not only are the objects themselves 
irreplaceable, but both wildlife and antiquities present the possibility of an economic 
resource for local communities.  Subsistence crime – or crime that is committed as a means 
of survival – are typically a result of poor social-economic conditions within a region.  
When a local and native resource for the community is then exploited with no regulation, it 
represents a wasted opportunity for the community (Brodie, 2010; Saad El-Gendi, 2012).  
“Most buyers of antiquities are not directly involved in the illicit trade, but their demand 
for objects does stimulate theft, grave-looting, and illegal exportation” (Conklin, 1994, p. 
188).  Regardless of how the object was looted, the demand for these objects clearly drives 
the market, and results in the loss of culture and often, a loss of a potential economic 
resource for individuals or communities.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to provide a working understanding of the illicit antiquities 
network as this term is employed to encompass the stages, actors, processes and settings of 
ATNs.  The field of research concerned with illicit antiquities looting is made up by a wide 
variety of academics, experts, enthusiasts and members of the market itself, and as such the 
body of work for this field is quite diverse.  What has been lacking though is serious 
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criminological research, into what is undoubtedly a criminal network or market.  Polk 
(2003) has expressed amazement that the field of criminology has not been more attracted 
to the issue of illicit antiquities, as it is ripe for criminological research and perspectives.  
While there has been some criminological work conducted by experts in this field such as 
Simon Mackenzie, Kenneth Polk, Edgar Tilijhuis, and Blyth Bowman Proulx, there is still 
much work that needs to be conducted to better understand how this network operates.  As 
this thesis will demonstrate, there is a specific need for crime prevention research, 
especially targeted at elements of the network; this could prove extremely beneficial to 
helping combat ATNs.  This research project seeks to provide and establish a basic 
understanding of how these networks operate, but also significant crime prevention 
strategies to be considered.  Attention will now turn to the theoretical framework for this 
research project, to gain a better understanding and appreciation for how this thesis will 
accomplish these goals.  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the main theoretical frameworks which will be used in analysing 
ATNs.  Principally, and to fill the gap identified in criminological work in this area, it 
applies crime prevention/disruption theories to ATNs, beginning with Situational Crime 
Prevention.  The SCP framework has its roots as a policing tool, intended to help officers 
analyse and determine potential crime prevention techniques and ultimately, strategies 
(Clarke, 1995).  It has grown to become a fundamental aspect of crime prevention theory, 
with a wide field of research to its name (Cornish and Clarke, 2003; Clarke, 2005; Freilich 
and Newman, 2017).  The goal of this research project is to consider and apply SCP to 
ATNs in order to better understand how antiquities trafficking functions, and to consider 
potential crime prevention techniques or strategies.  In the course of this chapter the 
evolution of SCP as a framework will be examined while also considering a method of 
analysis closely associated with SCP – Crime Script Analysis. 
The discussion will first consider the original format of SCP, which included sixteen 
techniques, followed by an analysis of how this framework resulted in the twenty-five 
techniques of SCP that are currently in use (Clarke, 1995; Cornish and Clarke, 2003).  It 
will then further examine how the framework functions, and consider successful 
applications of SCP to criminal activities and illicit networks alike.  The following section 
will be focused on CSA, the main method of analysis for this research project, and one that 
is commonly used in conjunction with SCP.  A thorough exploration of how crime scripts 
operate and are used will be conducted, alongside discussion of prior research which has 
used CSA.  This chapter will ultimately provide the necessary level of understanding and 
context for both the theory and method of analysis used within this thesis. 
3.2 Evolution of Situational Crime Prevention Theory 
SCP is a criminological framework for targeting and determining effective interventions or 
suggestions to help reduce or eliminate specialized types of crime (Clarke, 1995; Smith 
and Cornish, 2003).   This framework draws on theory from Rational Choice Theory, 
Crime Pattern Theory, and Routine Activities Theory (Clarke, 1997b; Bullock et al., 2013).  
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The basic premise of SCP is to focus on the opportunities that allow a crime to be 
committed, and to determine the most effective means of reducing these opportunities 
(Clarke, 1980; Clarke, 1983; Clarke, 1995; Clarke, 1997b; Clarke, 2009).  The SCP 
framework falls within environmental crime prevention/criminology which is a field of 
crime prevention that is made up of a number of different theories that place focus not on 
the criminal, but on the environment or setting of the crime itself (Wortley and Mazerolle, 
2008). Traditional crime prevention tends to focus on the criminal and seeks to understand 
what motivates the offender (Bullock et al., 2013).  Environmental criminologists study the 
circumstances of a crime, and with various theories, attempt to reduce or eliminate the 
crime from occurring: 
Environmental Criminologists look for crime patterns and seek to explain them 
in terms of environmental influences.  From these explanations they derive rules 
that enable predictions to be made about emerging crime problems, and that 
ultimately inform the development of strategies that might be employed to 
prevent crime.  (R. Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008, p. 1) 
 
The 1970s was when the first consideration of what is now know to be environmental 
crime prevention was presented by two separate researchers: C. Ray Jeffery and Oscar 
Newman  (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008).  These authors, a criminologist and architect 
respectively, considered crime prevention through direct changes to the physical 
environment where crime takes place (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008).  From this general 
idea of allowing the physical space to act as preventative measure against crime, a new 
branch of crime prevention theory developed.   
SCP was initially developed from research conducted by the Home Office Research Unit 
in the 1970s (Clarke, 1995; Clarke, 1997b). Ronald V. Clarke often initially describes SCP 
as a ‘perspective’ rather than a theory, as it was originally designed as a framework within 
which a series of theories (Rational choice, Routine Activities, and Crime Pattern Theory) 
could operate (Clarke, 1980; Clarke, 1983; Clarke, 1995) . It was developed as a means of 
directly influencing policy and procedure within policing and crime prevention methods 
(Ronald V. Clarke, 1995, 1997).  It was further developed into the framework that it is 
known as today, and is defined as follows: 
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Situational prevention comprises opportunity-reducing measures that (1) are 
directed at highly specific forms of crime, (2) involve the management, design 
or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent 
way as possible, (3) make crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and 
excusable as judged by a wide range of offenders (Clarke, 1997b, p. 51).  
 
This chapter will begin by discussing the different theories that influence SCP, and then 
consider the progression of SCP from its original format that was introduced, to the 
modern form of the theory that is used today.  Only a basic overview of relevant theories 
will initially take place, as their use within the framework of SCP will be discussed in 
further detail later. 
3.2.1 Framework   
SCP was originally created to function as a framework, with the intention of creating a 
crime prevention framework that was accessible and efficient for police or law 
enforcement to use to determine effective preventative measures or techniques (Clarke, 
1980; Cornish, 1994a; Clarke, 1995; Lee, 2010).  As a framework, SCP draws upon three 
prominent theories, which include rational choice theory, routine activities theory, and 
crime pattern theory (Clarke, 1992; Clarke, 1995; Bullock et al., 2013). 
3.2.1.1 Rational Choice  
Rational Choice Theory is founded on the premise that the offender is a rational actor, whose 
actions and decisions are made to benefit oneself (Fennelly and Kitteringham, 2012).  It 
consists of six core elements: 
 
• Criminal behaviour is purposive  
• Criminal behaviour is rational 
• Criminal decision-making is crime-specific 
• Criminal choices fall into two broad groups: ‘involvement’ and ‘event’ 
decisions. 
• There are separate stages of involvement 
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• Criminal events unfold in a sequence of stages and decisions 
(Cornish & Clarke, 2002, p. 24) 
 
At the time that rational choice theory was proposed it developed and informed, what was 
described as the ‘situational perspective’, which evolved into SCP (Clarke and Felson, 
2004).  It was originally developed out of economic theory, which is apparent in the 
assumption that the criminal actor (as a rational actor) seeks to profit or gain in some 
capacity. 
Rational choice theory also presented the concept of ‘decision making’ or ‘choice’ models, 
which were precursors to crime scripts – which Cornish would later develop in 1994.  The 
inclusion of choice models was an attempt to demonstrate the inaccurate claim that the 
situational perspective merely displaced crime instead of preventing or deterring (Clarke 
and Felson, 2004).  The creating of a choice model helped to demonstrate the thought and 
decision-making process of an offender and provide more analysis into why an actor did or 
did not engaged in a crime (Ronald V. Clarke & Felson, 2008).  As a crime prevention 
theory, rational choice theory then assumes that an individual will engage in a criminal 
activity as a means of profiting from a situation or item if a satiable opportunity is present 
(Ronald V. Clarke & Felson, 2008).  A suitable opportunity is individually determined and 
is dependent on the individual weighing the risks and rewards to the situation.  This 
essentially represents an internal cost-benefit analysis of the situation and attempts to 
determine if the reward outweighs the risk for the individual actor.  The original 
conception of SCP details prevention techniques that could be implemented to deter or 
prevent individuals from engaging in criminal activity (Clarke, 1980; Clarke, 1995).  
Essentially, these crime prevention techniques make it harder to obtain a criminal target, 
increase the risks associated with gaining a criminal target, and reduce the reward the 
criminal target will give the offender.  
3.2.1.2 Routine Activities Theory 
Additionally, SCP theory makes use of routine activity theory within its theoretical 
framework.  Routine activity theory can be considered a sub-theory of rational choice 
theory, as it operates on the premise that the actor is a rational being who seeks to gain or 
benefit from his/her actions (Clarke and Felson, 2004).  Routine activities theory’s main 
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premise is that three conditions which must be present for a crime to occur: lack of a 
suitable guardian, a suitable target, and a likely offender (Clarke and Felson, 2004).  
In this context ‘guardian’ refers to an individual or physical preventative measure (i.e. a 
residence that does not lock the doors or windows, or an unattended store or items).  More 
simply put, a lack of suitable guardian would be the absence of whomever/whatever has 
guardianship of the target at hand, or any individual if present, who would act as a likely 
deterrent.  A suitable target can refer to either a person or an object.  The likely offender is 
an individual who determines exactly what would constitute ‘suitable’ in this situation.  
The likely offender is an individual who is likely to take advantage of the lack of a suitable 
guardian and the suitable target.  They make decisions as to the suitability of the target - 
depending on how the target meets their current needs/wants.  This criminological theory 
states that these three elements are necessary for a crime to occur, and factors significantly 
into SCP, as it places focus on necessary elements of the crime as a means of preventing or 
deterring the actor for engaging in the criminal activity. 
3.2.1.3 Crime Pattern Theory 
Crime pattern theory focuses on determining patterns of crime, through everyday decisions 
and routines of individuals engaging in criminal activity (Brantingham and Brantingham, 
2013).   It is largely focused on geographical or physical crime patterns – such as hotspots.  
This theory is particularly useful in examining displacement or adaptation to crime 
prevention techniques.  It can be applied to individuals, networks of individuals, or 
aggregations of individuals – with specific guidelines of each level of analysis (Wortley 
and Mazerolle, 2008).  The following demonstrates the different rules that guide crime 
pattern theory: 
• As individuals move through a series of activities, they make decisions.  
When activities are repeated frequently, the decision process becomes 
regularized.  This regularization creates an abstract guiding template.  
For decisions to commit a crime this is called a crime template. 
• Most people do not function as individuals, but have a network of family, 
friends, and acquaintances.  These linkages have varying attributes and 
influence the decisions of others in the network.  
• When individuals are making their decisions independently, individual 
decision processes and crime templates can be treated in a summative 
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fashion, that is, average or typical patterns can be determined by 
combining the patterns of individuals.  
• Individuals or networks of individuals commit crimes when there is a 
triggering event and a process by which an individual can locate a target 
or victim that fits within a crime template. Criminal actions change the 
bank of accumulated experience and alter future actions. 
• Individuals have a range of routine daily activities.  Usually these occur 
in different notes of activity such as home, work, school, shopping, 
entertainment, or time with friends, and along the normal pathways 
between these nodes.  
• People who commit crimes have normal spatio-temporal movement 
patterns like everyone else.  The likely location for a crime is near this 
normal activity and awareness space.  
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 2013, pp. 80-88) 
 
Within SCP, crime pattern theory works in tandem with routine activities theory to 
highlight opportunities that actors may encounter (Brantingham and Brantingham, 2013).  
Not only does crime pattern theory relate to physical patterns of crime, it can also be 
extremely valuable in the context of patterns of social and personal relationships.  This 
aspect will prove to be important when considering ATNs, as an understanding of the 
individuals and relationships which make up a network will prove valuable to preventing 
or disrupting a network from operating.  
3.2.2 Original Crime Prevention Techniques  
The original format and structure of SCP theory placed more focus on the prevention of 
property crimes.  (Clarke, 1980; Clarke, 1983; Clarke, 1992; Clarke, 1995).  This is evident 
when considering the original twelve techniques of situational prevention (see Figure 3-1, 
below). Following this original format, at what was referred to at the time as the 
‘situational perspective’, the use of this perspective was implemented in studies conducted 
at the UK Home Office, where the perspective developed further.  By 1997, Cornish and 
Clarke presented the now updated sixteen opportunity reducing techniques, which had 
expanded the situational categories to include: remove excuses (Clarke, 1997b).  This 
indicated a move away from purely property types of crimes and demonstrated the growth 
and potential depth of these techniques to address a wide variety of crimes.   
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THE TWELVE TECHNIQUES OF SITUATIONAL PREVENTION 
INCREASING EFFORT INCREASING RISKS REDUCING THE 
REWARDS 
Target Hardening 
Steering locks 
Bandit screens 
Slug rejecter device 
Vandal-proofing 
Toughened glass 
Tamper-proof seals 
Entry/Exit Screening 
Border searches 
Baggage screening 
Automatic ticket gates 
Merchandise tags 
Library tags 
EPoS 
Target Removal 
Removable car radio 
Exact change fares 
Cash reduction 
Remove coin meters 
Phonecards 
Pay by Check 
Access Control 
Locked gates 
Fenced yards 
Parking lot barriers 
Entryphones 
ID badges 
PIN numbers 
Formal Surveillance 
Police patrols 
Security guards 
Informant hotlines 
Burglar alarms 
Red light cameras 
Curfew decals 
Identifying Property 
Cattle branding 
Property marking 
Vehicle licensing 
Vehicle parts marking 
PIN for car radios 
LOJACK 
Deflecting Offenders 
Bus stop placement 
Tavern location 
Street closures 
Graffiti board 
Litter bins 
Spittoons 
Surveillance by Employees 
Bus conductors 
Park attendants 
Concierges 
Pay phone location 
Inventive schemes 
CCTV systems 
Removing Inducements 
‘Weapons effect’ 
Graffiti cleaning 
Rapid repair 
Plywood road signs 
Gender-neutral phone lists 
Park Camarro off street 
Controlling facilitators 
Spray-can sales 
Gun control 
Credit card photo 
Ignition interlock 
Server intervention 
Caller-ID 
Natural Surveillance 
Pruning hedges 
“Eyes on the Street” 
Lighting bank interiors 
Street lighting 
Defensible space 
Neighborhood Watch 
Rule Setting 
Drug-free school zone 
Public park regulations 
Customs declaration 
Income tax returns 
Hotel registration 
Library check-out 
Fig. 3-1: From ‘Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, 2nd edition’, edited by Ronald V. 
Clarke. Copyright © 1997 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Used with permission of the publisher. 
 
By this point SCP had gained attention as a viable crime prevention perspective, and even 
had a number of successful case studies to its name (Clarke, 1992).  Then, in 2001, Richard 
Worley offered a critique of these sixteen techniques which ultimately resulted in the 
twenty-five techniques of SCP framework which most are familiar with today.   
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Fig: 3-2: From Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, 2nd edition, edited by Ronald V. 
Clarke. Copyright © 1997 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Used with permission of the publisher. 
 
 
3.2.3 Wortley’s Critique 
Richard Wortley’s paper A Classification of Techniques for Controlling Situational 
Precipitators of Crime (2001), was a significant critique of SCP, but also provided 
additional comments and considerations to the theory.  His previous paper, A Two-Stage 
Model of Situational Crime Prevention paper outlines what he considered a significant gap 
in the theoretical approach of SCP and offered his own two-model system on which he 
places specific emphasis upon precipitating influences on criminal behaviour (Wortley, 
1998).  His two-model system consists of ‘regulating factors’ and ‘precipitating factors’, 
which are both necessary for a crime to occur.  He argues  that there can be situationally-
generated motivation which can influence an individual’s decision to partake in criminal 
activities and lays out four categories of precipitating influences: prompts, pressures, 
permissions, and provocations (Wortley, 1998).  A later paper built upon previous criticism 
and considerations, resulting in additional techniques to be considered. (Wortley, 2001) 
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• Prompts: “Situations may present salient cues to potential offenders that 
prompt criminal behaviour.” 
• Pressures: “Situations may exert social pressure on individuals to perform 
inappropriate behaviour.” 
• Permissions: “Situational factors can help distort moral reasoning processes 
and so permit individuals to engage in normally proscribed behaviour." 
• Provocations: “Situations can induce stress and provoke an antisocial response, 
particularly some form of aggression.” 
(Wortley, 2001, pp. 7-23) 
 
Cornish and Clarke response to Wortley’s critique was a renewed format of SCP that 
included twenty-five crime prevention techniques, including techniques from Worley’s 
own model (Cornish and Clarke, 2003).  This updated version of the techniques of SCP 
addressed the theoretical difficulties of social and external precipitating influences on the 
opportunity structure, as well as provided additional methods of analysis to determine the 
opportunity structures of criminal activities – CSA  (Cornish and Clarke, 2003). The 
popularity and success of SCP is responsible for such a significant shift for the original 
structure.  As many worked to adopt the framework to different types of crime, it became 
apparent that additional factors must be considered.  In their response to Wortley’s 
critique, the authors discuss the ‘default’ setting of SCP.  In this ‘setting’, the framework is 
most effective for the most common types of crime.  They go into further detail on the 
specifics on tailoring SCP to be more effective for particular types of crime (Cornish and 
Clarke, 2003). 
 
3.2.4 25 Techniques of Situational Crime Prevention 
The modern form of SCP will now be discussed.  The current twenty-five crime prevention 
technique model has been much changed from its original format of sixteen environmental-
based crime prevention techniques. Over the past ten years or so, SCP practice has 
continued to develop within an overall rational choice framework, but some of its specific 
working assumptions about the nature of crimes and offenders have subtly changed in 
response to an increase in the range of crimes being tackled and in associated preventive 
techniques (Wortley, 2001).  
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Fig. 3-3: 25 Techniques of SCP (Sourced from the Centre for Problem Oriented-Policing, 2018) 
 
This theory was designed to be applicable in many different types of property or 
specialized types of crime.  This is evident when considering its founding principles, which 
are based on twenty-five general techniques that contribute to the evaluation and 
examination of the issue at hand.  As evident in Figure 3-3, the twenty-five techniques fall 
into five different categories (Cornish and Clarke, 2003): 
• Increasing the Effort 
• Increasing the Risks 
• Reduce the Rewards 
• Reduce Provocation 
• Reduce Excuses 
 
These categories summarize the main objective of SCP: to essentially eliminate the 
situation for a crime to take place, by creating an environment in which the risk and effort 
expended to commit a crime, outweighs the reward.  As the popularity of this framework 
continues to grow, it seems to appeal to more and more fields of study, and applications.  It 
has now been applied to broader forms of crime, including illicit wildlife and 
environmental crimes.   
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3.3 Application of Situational Crime Prevention  
SCP theory’s ultimate goal is to create an environment or opportunity where the risk 
outweighs the rewards and will deter criminal acts (Clarke, 1992; Clarke, 1995; Cornish and 
Clarke, 2003; Clarke, 2005; Clarke, 2009; Bullock et al., 2010).  Clarke describes SCP 
theory as:  
 
Proceeding from an analysis of the circumstances giving rise to specific kinds of 
crime, it introduces discrete managerial and environmental change to reduce the 
opportunity for those crimes to occur.  Thus, it is focused on the settings for 
crime, rather than upon those committing criminal acts.  (Clarke, 1997b, p. 2) 
 
The nature of SCP theory then allows for variation in its interpretation of any intervention 
to the situation at hand.  Because of its adaptability to different circumstances, SCP theory 
lends itself to a wide range of different uses in the field of criminology. 
   
3.3.1 How it Functions 
The purpose of SCP was to originally provide a perspective, but now operates as a 
framework by which criminal events and opportunities can analysed and examined.  Clarke 
describes the methodology of SCP as the following: 
 
1. Focus on very specific categories of crime or disorder 
2. Focus on crime concentration 
3. Understand how the crime is committed 
4. Use an action-research model 
5. Consider a variety of solutions 
(Clarke, 2009) 
 
Typically, these SCP techniques are applied after an action-research method been applied 
to the crime or situation at hand.  An action-research method used with SCP includes (1) 
data collection, (2) analysis of the problem, (3) choice of solution, (4) implementation, (5) 
evaluation (Clarke, 2005).  The fundamental aspect of using SCP is to apply either a 
specific criminal event or a specific type of crime (Cornish and Clarke, 2003; Clarke, 
2005; Clarke, 2009).   
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In the course of this thesis, the particulars of how SCP will be applied to both highly 
specific criminal events (Syria) and a specific crime typology (ATNs) will be discussed.  
As SCP has evolved into a versatile framework, its strength is not in attempting to consider 
why an offender committed a crime, or other forms of traditional criminology, it simply 
places the focus on the opportunities which allowed the crime to occur.  This allows SCP 
to be applicable to virtually any crime, as rational choice theory states, the necessary 
elements for a crime to occur are an actor (offender), a place, and a target (Cornish and 
Clarke, 2003; Clarke, 2005; Clarke, 2009).  With those three elements, SCP can analyse 
and determine situational measures to techniques that are appropriate to increase risks, 
increase effort, reduce rewards, remove excuses, and remove provocation (Cornish and 
Clarke, 2003; Clarke, 2005; Clarke, 2009).   
3.3.2 Successful Examples  
There are many examples of successful applications of SCP.  They offer a wide range and 
variety of fields of study, from all over the world.  Figure 3-4 (below) provides some 
understanding of the scope of these studies, as well as the volume.  This figure not only 
demonstrates the scope of SCP, but also demonstrates how this framework has expanded 
from a few significant studies in the early 2000s, to a multitude of research and studies 
developing through the mid-2000s to recent years.  Particular areas which have generated a 
significant volume of research includes terrorism, wildlife trafficking, sex crimes and 
environmental crime. 
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Applications of SCP 
Application Authors, Year 
Disciplinary problems in prisons Wortley, 2002 
Internet Crimes Newman and Clarke, 2003 
Death of illegal immigrants on US/Mexico 
border 
Guerette, 2004 
Identity Theft McNally and Newman, 2008 
Crime and incivilities in libraries Cromwell et al. 2008 
Bar-room violence Graham, 2009 
Suicide Lester, 2009 
Disrupting elections in India Verman, 2009 
Crowd violence  Madensen and Knutsson, 2011 
Homicide in Brazilian favelas De Souza and Miller, 2012 
Domestic livestock theft in Malawi Sidebottom, 2012 
Church Lead Theft Price, Sidebottom, and Tilley, 2014 
Corruption Graycar and Sidebottom, 2012 
Kerosene attack on young women in India Natarajan, 2014 
Ransom kidnapping in Columbia Piers et al. 2014 
Global piracy Shane and Magnuson, 2014 
Organised crime Bullock et al. 2010 
Public transport crime in El Salvador Natarajan et al, 2015  
Disrupting criminal networks Bichler and Malm, 2015 
Wildlife crime Kurland, Pires, McFann and Moreto, 2017 
Terrorism Clarke and Newman, 2006 
 Gruenewald, Allison-Gruenewald and Klein, 
2015 
 Mandala and Freilich, 2017 
 Lasley and Guffey, 2017. 
Wildlife Lemieux and Clarke, 2009 
 Shukla and Bartgis, 2010 
 Piers and Clarke, 2010 
 Piers and Clarke, 2012 
 Piers and Guerette, 2014 
 Petrossian, 2014 
 Petrossian et al 2015 
 Clarke et al 2013 
 Kim et al. 2013 
 Petrossian and Clarke, 2014 
 Reuter and Bisschop, 2016 
 Kurland et al. 2017 
 Moreto and Lemieux, 2015 
Sex Crimes Wortley and Smallbone, 2006 
 Terry and Ackerman, 2008 
 Leclerc, Feakes, and Cale, 2015 
Environmental Crime:  Crofts, el al. 2010 
 Vollard, 2015 
 Sahramäki and Kankaanranta, 2017 
Fig. 3-4: Applications of SCP - adapted from: (Clarke and Bowers, 2017). Permission to reproduce this 
figure has been granted by Taylor and Francis (Books) Limited UK. 
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3.3.3 Situational Crime Prevention within Illicit Networks 
SCP theory has been employed in a number of international criminal fields, such as 
wildlife protection, environmental protection, illegal waste disposal, illegal logging, and 
the trafficking of animals and plants (Pires and Moreto, 2011; Wellsmith, 2012; Ayling, 
2013).  While SCP theory has been successful on a local scale, as evidenced in localized 
policing and hotspots these successful applications of the approach have established that 
SCP theory can be an effective tool in in crime prevention on an international level  
(Clarke, 1997b).  In regard to the antiquities looting and trafficking networks, SCP theory 
offers a unique solution.  The nature of antiquities trafficking, difficulties such as 
availability of data in this field, and the grey market of antiquities sales and auctions 
contribute to a collective lack of a comprehensive understanding of how these networks 
function.   
With a wide and diverse range of illicit networks that have employed SCP, it seems to be 
an oversight that those studying antiquities trafficking have not considered SCP.  While 
there are a few instances of researchers identifying SCP as a potential tool, these have been 
mostly hypothetical consideration.  Usman Adekunle Ojedokun considers its merits 
specifically regarding the issue of the trafficking of Nigerian cultural objects, as well as 
Louise Grove, in its possibilities within cultural heritage crimes (Ojedokun, 2012; Louise 
Grove, 2013)  
There are a number of cases of illicit markets (operating on an international level) where 
discussion within articles is purely theoretical, but there are a few exceptions that consider 
the actual application of the twenty-five techniques (Clarke, 1992; Clarke, 1997a; Tillyer 
and Kennedy, 2008; Natarajan et al., 2015).  Clarke himself discusses the use of an 
international policy concerning The Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which was introduced in 2009 (Lemieux and 
Clarke, 2009).  In Lemieux and Clarke’s article The International Ban on Ivory Sales And 
Its Effects On Elephant Poaching In Africa, the authors focus on the issue of elephant 
poaching in Africa and prevention techniques implemented by CITES (2009). 
In Figure 3-5, the respective authors have provided an overview of case studies of research 
that applies SCP theory to the illegal wildlife trade (Pires and Moreto, 2011).  This table 
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demonstrates that the majority of techniques employed by these studies generally focused 
on increasing risks and reducing rewards.  These are some of the few instances of SCP 
theory being implemented to an illicit market and demonstrate the rather simple logic and 
reasoning behind this theory.  While every illicit market faces its own unique issues, the 
similarities between antiquities trafficking market and the illegal wildlife market 
demonstrate how this theory can be applied successfully to the specialized crime of illicit 
markets. 
 
Fig. 3-5: Summary of SCP Case Studies Relevant to Illegal Wildlife Trade, sourced from: (Pires and Moreto, 
2011).  Permission to reproduce this figure has been granted from the publisher. 
      
3.4 Crime Script Analysis  
The use of crime scripts within illicit markets can work to provide an in-depth 
understanding and analysis of how a market operates (Cornish, 1994a; Leclerc, 2014; 
Leclerc, 2017).  One of the main difficulties associated with the study and understanding of 
the illicit antiquities market is a lack of significant data and criminological study (Polk, 
2009; Polk, 2014).  By creating a detailed, step-by-step breakdown of the process that is 
taken by the actors involved in the network, better understandings of the best means of 
intervention can be examined and potentially provide more informed policy decisions. 
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CSA is a relatively new method of analysis, which focuses on the particular details of how 
a crime is being committed (Leclerc, 2017).  Traditional forms of criminology focus on the 
motivations behind why an offender commits a crime (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2013).  As 
this project is considering the potential of SCP theory in relation to antiquities trafficking, 
the use of crime script and social network analysis provides a framework that will allow a 
focus on the environment in which the crime is committed.  In previous literature, the use 
of CSA has been used in both general cases of how an overall market operates, as well as 
individual cases of specific crimes. 
Because there is a lack of significant data in the market of illicit antiquities – and for the 
purpose of this research project – the use of crime scripts and social network analysis will 
focus on specific case studies.  For the purposes of better demonstrating the way in which 
the illicit antiquities market generally operates, a crime script will also be generated for 
how the market operates on a broad and all-inclusive manner.  
3.4.1 Previous Research/Literature Review 
In the study of illicit networks, new methods of analysis have been employed to help to 
understand how the networks operates, significant actors within the networks, and the 
significance of the interactions between actors.  While the term ‘illicit networks’ can be 
applied to many illegal activities, for the purposes of the scope of this paper, illicit 
networks such as illegal wildlife (i.e. illegal poaching, illegal logging) and 
green/environmental criminology will be compared to the network structure of the 
antiquities trafficking.  This is because the diverse nature of wildlife crimes are fairly 
equally paralleled in illicit antiquities crimes – as there is no set type of object or 
representation of either network.  Illegal wildlife activity can include a wide variety of 
criminal activity which can include but is not limited to; trafficking of endangered species, 
trafficking of exotic plants/foliage, poaching of endangered species, illegal logging illegal 
fishing (Schneider, 2008; Pires and Moreto, 2011; Wellsmith, 2012; Lavorgna, 2014; Jun 
and Pdf, 2014; Moreto and Lemieux, 2015; Reuter and Bisschop, 2016; Kurland et al., 
2017; Lavorgna et al., 2018; Petrossian and Pezzella, 2018). 
For the purposes of this thesis, antiquities trafficking can include any type of object or 
monument, which is considered to be culturally or archaeologically important (i.e. pottery, 
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stonework, textiles, statues, or jewellery).  Additionally, both antiquities trafficking and 
wildlife trafficking  represent networks which operate on a global level, and which are not 
typically manufactured, but are a natural, finite resource (Brodie et al., 2000; Alder and 
Polk, 2002; Brodie, 2006).  It would also seem that demand drives both markets, as is 
evident in illicit wildlife trafficking by the success of programs such as CITES which 
specifically targets the market end of the network (Lemieux and Clarke, 2009; Lavorgna et 
al., 2018).  There are similar difficulties in researching both of these illicit networks, as 
there is a distinct concern regarding collection of data due to dangerous or difficult 
conditions, and often unknown origins of the respective commodities within the networks.  
The diversity of the types of criminal activity that can occur within this network provides 
an appropriate comparison for the illicit antiquities market.  Similarities between these two 
networks also include the international nature of the markets, and the difficulty of 
displacement of criminal activity.  These illicit networks share many similarities and 
difficulties faced by illicit antiquities.  
Keeping in mind the difficulties discussed previously, the use of CSA has the potential to 
provide professionals and academics with a better understanding of the specifics of how 
the illicit antiquities market functions.  While many experts in this field could explain how 
the market performs on a general level, in order to create effective policy and regulations 
to help reduce the looting and trafficking of antiquities, an empirical understanding of 
network structures are necessary.   
CSA has its origins in cognitive science, when Roger Schank and Robert Abelson (1977) 
first introduced the concept of scripting when researching how knowledge structures are 
created and accessed.  Derek Cornish (1994b) introduced the concept of crime scripting or 
CSA with his paper, The Procedural Analysis of Offending And Its Relevance For 
Situational Prevention.  Cornish provided a general format from which crime scripts for 
specialized types of crimes could be constructed, as well as how they can be used in 
tandem with SCP theory.  This initial format of a crime script has five levels of specificity 
(from least specific to most specific): universal script, metascript, protoscript, script, and 
script-track (Cornish, 1994b) .  Within each category, there is an additional breakdown of 
the script into stages in which the crime is committed.  They include: preparation, entry, 
pre-condition, instrumental pre-condition, instrumental initiation, instrumental 
actualization, doing, post-condition, and exit (Cornish, 1994b).  In Borrion’s 2013 paper, 
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Quality Assurance in Crime Scripting, he provides a helpful explanation of Cornish’s 
levels of scripting:  
Examples of scripts at track level include subway mugging, and sexual abuse of 
male children in a particular institutional setting.  At the next level (script level), 
the crime is generalised.  The scripts for the above examples become ‘robbery 
from the person’, ‘sexual abuse of male children’, respectively.  At the next level, 
further generalization is conducted, and the scripts become ‘sexual abuse against 
children’ and ‘robbery’.  Finally, reaching the metascript level, only remains the 
direct subgroups of an offense, with ‘theft of property’, and ‘sexual offending’.  
(Borrion, 2013, p. 6)  
 
As CSA has developed over the years, it has become a more popular tool for crime 
prevention and there have been a number of articles that have proposed alternative 
methods of structuring or organizing the elements of crime script.  For example, Borrion’s 
aforementioned (2013) article on quality assurance, likewise Benoit Leclerc and Naidelle 
Raynal’s article discussing the concept of creating an additional track, which focuses on 
guardianship opportunities within a script (Leclerc and Reynald, 2017).  There are 
additional articles which consider the practicality or feasibility of implementing crime 
script, such as Moreto and Clarke’s (2013) article, Script Analysis of the Transnational 
Illegal Market in Endangered Species.  At this point, the discussion will now turn to 
specific case studies in which CSA has been employed. 
3.4.1.1 Crime Script Analysis within Antiquities Trafficking Networks 
This method of analysis is still rather a new concept in the field of criminology, and as 
such the overall literature available for CSA is still relatively limited (Borrion, 2013; 
Wortley and Mazerolle, 2013; Dehghanniri and Borrion, 2017).  When examining existing 
literature on crime scripts, there is especially limited research concerning the specifics of 
generating crime scripts (Borrion, 2013; Dehghanniri and Borrion, 2017).  This can make it 
difficult to determine the best means of structuring or formatting a crime script, but at the 
same time it provides the ability to adapt a crime script from extremely broad levels of 
crime to highly specific ones.  This project seeks to contribute by producing a crime script 
for both ATNs and the case study of Syria, and in this way demonstrate how this method of 
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analysis could be implemented within the field of antiquities trafficking, while also 
providing a breakdown of ATNs for reference and future prevention efforts.  This section 
seeks to present an overview of how past studies have structured and developed crime 
scripts within illicit networks to provide a reference of how this method has been put into 
practice.  The following section provides an overview of previous literature with specific 
attention to: (a) the aim of the study, (b) the type of data (combination, questionnaire, 
police records, etc.), (c) number of participants, (d) level of script, and (e) format of crime 
script. 
3.4.1.2 Case Studies  
The case studies that will be examined were specifically chosen because they either created 
or used a CSA as a method of analysis within an illicit network on an international level 
(see Appendix 1).  It should be noted however, that because of the inherent practical 
difficulties involved in conducting research on illicit networks, the amount of literature 
employing this specific method of analysis in this subject area is quite small. While these 
case studies present a portion of CSA literature, perhaps the largest body of work that has 
implemented CSA within a body of research has been conducted on sex crimes.  There is a 
significant volume of studies, which have focused on creating scripts of highly specific 
types of sex crimes, and ultimately work to determine effective methods of intervention 
through the use of SCP Theory (Beauregard et al., 2007; Deslauriers-Varin and 
Beauregard, 2010; Leclerc et al., 2010; Brayley et al., 2011; Savona et al., 2013; Li, 
2015).  While an excellent resource, these studies will not be examined in-depth in this 
paper, as they focus on more individualistic types of crimes, in which the relationship of 
the actors within the network typically constitutes offender-victim.  In contrast, many of 
the illicit networks that will be reviewed in this paper relate to individuals who willingly 
agree to engage in illicit activity (Jacques and Bernasco, 2014). 
3.4.1.3 Discussion of Case Studies 
With the diversity of ways in which crime scripting can be applied, organized, and 
formatted there does not yet exist a standardized format that is universally accepted 
method (Borrion, 2013; Hutchings and Holt, 2015; Dehghanniri and Borrion, 2017).  After 
considering the case studies that are reviewed in this paper, it becomes evident that there 
are some similarities among the crime scripts that have been generated.  First, many of the 
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crime scripts that were developed for international illicit networks use either (a) a 
combination of semi-structured or in-depth interviews and police/court records, or (b) data 
from either online sources or police/court records.  As one of the main difficulties facing 
illicit networks is a lack of available data, this would be appropriate.  Many of the studies 
used a combination of research methods to ensure that there was enough data in order to be 
able to create a crime script.  While many of the studies reviewed made use of 
questionnaires or interviews, it should be noted that many of these interviews were 
conducted with experts in the field, and not individuals who were directly involved with 
the offense. 
Only two studies conducted interviews with individuals actively involved with an offense: 
Lavorgna’s study on the online trade in counterfeit pharmaceuticals and Jacques and 
Bernasco’s study on drug dealing in Amsterdam’s Red-Light District (Jacques and 
Bernasco, 2013; Lavorgna, 2015).  Lavorgna (2015)conducted 12 interviews with key 
informants from 30 cases, while Jaques and Bernasco (2013) interviewed 50 drug dealers.  
This may be partly due to the fact that illicit networks typically try to operate as concealed 
markets.  As such, individuals involved in illicit networks are likely harder to find, and/or 
unwilling to cooperate with a study.   
Second, many of the studies seem in some way to modify the original eleven stages that 
Cornish developed – they instead ranged from four to six stages.  Overall, the studies were 
a mix of extremely broad to extremely specific examples of crime scripts.  This 
demonstrates the versatility of the use of crimes scripts.  For example, in the article Drug 
Dealings: Amsterdam’s Red-Light District, the authors created a crime script which 
displayed both necessary steps (a more generalized drug dealing script) as well as 
facilitating steps, albeit more specific to Amsterdam’s Red-Light District (Jacques and 
Bernasco, 2013).   Additionally, in the article Wildlife Trafficking in the Internet Age 
(Lavorgna, 2014) the author employed Hancock and Laycock’s (2013) model for crime 
script for organized crime, in which an altered form of the original format of crime script is 
created to allow for considerations of ‘three parallel processes’ instead of simply the crime 
actions.  This allows for additional information, such as criminal lifestyle and criminal 
networks, to be taken into consideration when considering specifically how organized 
crime is structured and occurs.   
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Third, in Cornish’s paper (1994), he discusses a variety of different methods for using 
crime scripts – such as proposing a crime script of why a crime failed.  Some of the case 
studies evidently took this into consideration and have done something similar.  Not only 
do Leontadis and Hutchings (2015) create a crime script for the illicit online prescription 
drug trade, but in their crime script they also have the legitimate script for online 
prescription drug trade.  The next section will examine similarities and methodology 
between illicit networks such as the illicit waste and wildlife networks with the illicit 
antiquities market. 
For the purposes of this paper, the format of crime scripting has been drawn from previous 
research which provides general crime scripts, which organize a broad range of activities 
(or variables) into different categories and are then examined more in-depth in the scripting 
process.  This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, but these case 
studies demonstrate that crime scripting can vary from extremely detailed instances, to also 
representing broad areas of criminal activity, as in the case of child sex trafficking and 
drug laboratories (Brayley et al., 2011; Chiu et al., 2011). An example of CSA being used 
to focus on each step and stage of a criminal process, while providing analysis as to 
potential points of intervention on an international scale is outlined by Tompson and 
Chainey (2011), when they focused on illegal waste disposal. The authors use CSA as a 
means of assessing the amount of data available and documenting the structure and process 
of international illegal waste disposal. 
Additionally, William D. Moreto and Ronald V. Clarke explore the possibility of CSA in 
their paper Script Analysis of the Transnational Illegal Market in Endangered Species.  
Even while the authors ultimately concluded that a script analysis was not possible for the 
TIMES (Transnational Illegal Market in Endangered Species), they stress in their paper the 
importance of script analysis and advocate the effectiveness to the TIMES of a crime script 
should one ever be created (2013) . They stated the market was simply “too diverse, too 
complex and too dangerous and difficult to study to allow script analysis of the entire 
process involved in the TIMES…” (Moreto and Clarke, 2013, p. 217).  In light of this, one 
may wonder why then, this research project attempts a similarly difficult feat.  The 
intended use of the crime script that will be generated for antiquities trafficking is to 
provide a basic format from which further research can be conducted.  It is not intended for 
specific use of policy or procedure, but merely demonstrates the most basic understanding 
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of how this illicit network operates, and how effectively CSA demonstrates this.  This 
point is further clarified with the deliberate inclusion of the generation of a case-specific 
crime script in the design of this project.  The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the 
strength of CSA and SCP for antiquities trafficking.  As such, its use within highly specific 
forms are crimes is necessary, and the Syria case study demonstrates how effective this 
method of research may be for further research.   
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to provide an overview and examination of the theoretical 
framework from which this thesis is based.  SCP and CSA demonstrate a useful and 
efficient means of analysis that provides case or crime type specific preventative measure.  
The volume of successful case studies alone demonstrates the versatility and success that 
this framework has achieved.  With this in mind, it seems to be an appropriate theoretical 
framework for the specific nature antiquities trafficking.  Because of the nature of ATNs, it 
proves to be a tricky and complex issue to attempt to research or examine in-depth.  
However, the adaptability of SCP allows for any difficulties to be considered, while CSA 
provides an efficient manner by which to determine essential components of ATNs.  The 
following chapter will now consider the methods and methodology that will be used in the 
course of demonstrating the application of SCP to ATNs.   
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4. Methodology and Research Design 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the application of SCP to ATNs, using CSA.  The focus of 
this project is to consider and apply this framework to an illicit network, which is severely 
lacking in criminological and particularly crime prevention research.  In this sense, the 
purpose of the project is to focus on preventative or proactive measures, as opposed to the 
main current strategy of responding to trafficking in reactive ways through policies or 
programs that have the aim of lessening damage to cultural heritage.  This chapter will 
discuss and outline the specifics of the methodology and design of the research while 
demonstrating the analytical and empirical strength of the SCP framework.   
To begin, a broad discussion as to the intended goals of the project will be considered, 
followed by a more detailed examination of the methodology (4.2), the research design of 
the project (4.3).  It will also include an examination and discussion of how the crime 
scripts were developed, and the difficulties encountered in this research, as well as 
limitations of the project (4.4) will be considered.  Ultimately, this chapter will help to 
demonstrate the reasoning behind the use of both SCP and CSA, in an effort to lay the 
groundwork for the application of the methodology presented in the subsequent chapters.  
4.1.1 Purpose of Research 
As stated in the introductory chapter, the aim of this thesis is to provide a consideration 
and analysis of the use of SCP to ATNs.  In seeking to accomplish this aim, a number of 
additional goals will be considered, including a conceptual examination and analysis of 
how ATNs are structured and operate.  This is necessary in order to determine more 
effective crime prevention measures or techniques specific to the unique nature of ATNs.  
Within this, the following research questions are proposed: 
(1) Can Situational Crime Prevention, with the use of Crime Script Analysis, be 
effectively applied to Antiquities Trafficking Networks? 
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(2) When applied to case/crime-specific studies, can the application of Situational 
Crime Prevention and Crime Script Analysis indicate effective preventative 
measures?   
These two research questions help to frame the goal of trying to better understand the 
structure and elements of ATNs in order to better tackle this issue, and further, the aim of 
the consideration of SCP to ATNs.  This project will attempt to answer these two questions 
through the creation of crime scripts and SCP analysis of ANTs, primarily in general terms 
drawing on a range of examples, and developing in a final analytical chapter. the case 
study of antiquities trafficking within the Syrian civil war.  This thesis will present a 
systematic and thorough analysis of ATNs from a criminological and crime prevention 
perspective.  This is achieved by first analysing and creating a crime script for the concept 
of ATNs, followed by an examination of the script, which will determine prominent 
facilitating factors, which allow the network to continue to operate.  These elements will 
then be analysed with the use of SCP, in order to determine the most effective prevention 
strategies and techniques.  Similarly, this model of analysis will also be applied to a case-
specific study of antiquities trafficking during the Syrian conflict.  These two applications 
of SCP and CSA will demonstrate the versatility and strength of SCP as a theoretical 
framework by which an effective study of ATNs can be accomplished.  The following 
section will now examine the methodology that is employed within this thesis: CSA and 
SCP.   
4.2 Methodology 
This thesis seeks to examine, apply, and consider the use of a methodology and analysis 
tool, which has not yet been seriously considered in relation to ATNs.  As was mentioned 
previously, to date there has been only one previous study, which specifically applied SCP 
in relation to antiquities (Grove and Pease, 2014).  This application of  SCP targeted 
heritage crime prevention, and included “damage to or loss of heritage assets” (Grove and 
Pease, 2014, p. 107).  This represented a consideration (including both looting and 
vandalism) limited to UK sites and not addressing transnational dimensions of trafficking.  
It also uses SCP in a general sense, with no analytical tool being employed or dataset or 
sources provided.  This thesis, presents a rather different approach, as it seeks to combine 
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both SCP and CSA in an integrated and comprehensive manner to the entire field of 
antiquities trafficking.  
This section of the chapter (4.2) will being by addressing the following questions: 1) why 
use SCP?; 2) why use CSA?; 3) why consider organizing the process of illicit trafficking of 
antiquities in terms of antiquities trafficking ‘networks’?; and 4) why use Syria as the 
initial test of the application of these methods and approaches?  In the next section of this 
chapter (section 4.3) the focus will turn to the design of this study with special 
consideration to the methods, type of script to be developed, the data sources that will be 
employed; data collection and data analysis.  Then, section 4.4 will outline the difficulties 
faced in the study of ATNs; the general lack of documentation, grey markets, the lack of 
criminal association, and the general nature of the global antiquities market.  Finally, in 
section 4.5 some of the factors that acted as limitations or challenges to the conduct of this 
study such as; the lack of available data; the challenge of data collection in conflict zones; 
potential inherent data bias; language issues; limits on what can be accomplished will be 
discussed.  
4.2.1 Why Situational Crime Prevention? 
The core ideas suggested by Braithwaite call our attention to the need to have a 
mix of strategies which combine mostly persuasion aimed at demand reduction 
(through education, training, negotiation, arbitration, and similar processes) with 
some attention given to major sanctions for the more outstanding criminal 
ventures.  (Chappell and Polk, 2011, p. 108) 
At the beginning of this thesis, consideration was given to the question of how this project 
and the application of Situational Crime Prevention could contribute to the field of ATNs.  
In reviewing the literature, it became apparent that there is a gap, concerning preventative 
research for antiquities trafficking.  In trying to determine the most effective way to reduce 
the damage and loss of culture resulting from antiquities trafficking, the field of crime 
prevention seemed an obvious option.  This project strives to establish a basic 
understanding of the ATN through the use of CSA, but also to consider the application to 
ATNs in the framework of SCP, as part of the development of better prevention techniques 
for this issue.  ATNs have grown as an international issue since the initial burst of interest 
and research in the 1990s (Brodie, 2012b).  These networks have also changed 
dynamically from traditional forms of trafficking evident in the example of Giacomo 
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Medici, when compared to the more modern equivalent of Subhash Kapoor (Watson and 
Todeschini, 2006; Felch, 2013a).  There is now more documentation and evidence of 
antiquities trafficking, as chapter 2 established, but what is lacking is a systematic study or 
understanding concerning specific data or research pertaining to what occurs between the 
antiquity between being looting and entering the antiquities market.  There are many 
theories and concepts of how this occurs, and a handful of notorious examples (Kapoor, 
Medici, Swetnam), but there has been little data or research that has allowed us to 
empirically analyse or study the full process of ATNs (Polk, 2009).   
From the outset of this study it appeared that the SCP framework might provide an 
effective mechanism for the examination of available data, while also providing insight 
into the most effective measures to help prevent or reduce the occurrence of illicit 
antiquities looting and trafficking.  Considering the isolated and unknown location of many 
antiquities, not to mention the vast areas in which they may be located, preventative 
measures are difficult to envision and implement, which explains the lack of preventive 
work to date but also the urgent need for developing preventive approaches to tackle the 
issue of illicit antiquities.  In the field of criminology, there are many theories of crime 
prevention, and one of the strengths of SCP is that it draws on multiple theories to create 
an effective framework (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008).  It also proposes preventative 
measures that can be enacted, with empirical data to support such measures (Clarke, 1992; 
Laycock and Tilley, 1995; Coyne and Eck, 2015; Leclerc, 2017; Freilich and Newman, 
2017).  In many of the case studies which made use of the SCP framework that were 
previously examined in chapter 3, these proposed preventative techniques focused on both 
physical adjustments, as well as changes to policy or parts of an overall process (Shukla 
and Bartgis, 2010; von Lampe, 2011; Pires and Guerette, 2014; Leontiadis and Hutchings, 
2015; Shane and Magnuson, 2016; Lavorgna et al., 2018). 
Given all of this, it is clear that the SCP framework is an appropriate framework to use for 
ATNs, as it adapts to the constraints of the network, while still providing valuable insight 
and prevention measure and techniques for this illicit network. 
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4.2.1.1: Criticisms and Strengths 
Situational Crime Prevention has faced a number of criticisms during the course of its 
evolution.  Ronald Clark provides a breakdown of the seven most common criticism that 
situational crime prevention faces in his paper “Seven Misconceptions of Crime 
Prevention” (Clarke and Bowers, 2017).  These criticisms include that situational crime 
prevention: is simple and atheoretical, displaces crime and often makes it worse, has a 
conservative/managerial approach to crime, promote a selfish, exclusionary society, diverts 
attention from the root causes of crime, promotes ‘Big Brother’ culture and restricts 
personal freedoms, and blames the victim.  The following section will address these most 
common criticisms of situational crime prevention.   
(1) It is simple and atheoretical. SCP does not claim to present revolutionary preventative 
measures for potential crimes.  It provides a framework which allows a systematic 
evaluation for the most effective and practical means of working to prevent a crime.  SCP 
draws from three prominent criminological theories: routine activities, rational choice, and 
crime pattern theory.  The twenty-five techniques of SCP offer relevant categories of major 
preventative focus, from which traditional or case-specific preventative measures can be 
taken.  More importantly, SCP is designed to be considered and used in highly particular 
types of crime and is specifically intended to prevent crimes within each certain area or 
type. 
(2) It has not been shown to work, it displaces crime and often makes it worse.  There have 
been many examples of successful uses of SCP (Guerette, 2009; Smith, Clarke and Pease, 
2002), many of which did not result in displacement.  These range from property crimes 
such as theft from cars, or shoplifting, to more complex crimes such as terrorism which 
Clarke and Newman tackled in their book “Outsmarting the Terrorists” (2006).  In 
particular, the study by Guerette produced interesting results, in that in a review of 206 
SCP implementations, approximately 75 percent of the examples proved successful, with 
approximately 25 percent did not meet expectations (Guerette, 2009; Clarke & Bowers, 
2017).  This criticism of displacement has existed since SCP’s creation, and has, since its 
creation been able to demonstrate that SCP does not disproportionately displace crime in 
contrast to other forms of crime prevention.   
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(3) It is a conservative, managerial approach to crime and (4) promotes a selfish, 
exclusionary society.  As SCP was originally developed particularly for use with property 
crimes, it may be rather understandable that it faces this particular argument.  SCP 
considers crime from the crime triangle perspective (a more thorough explanation of the 
crime triangle will take place in chapter 7), in which three elements are considered 
necessary for a crime to occur: a criminological target, an offender, and a particular place 
(or setting where crime takes place).  This triangle has a corresponding outer triangle 
which demonstrates the elements responsible for governance of the inner elements.  These 
outer elements include the manager (place), the handler (offender), and target/victim 
(guardian).  This does place more responsibility upon the elements of the outer triangle, but 
this once again can be adapted and developed specifically for the case at hand, with 
consideration for the economic or social requirements deemed necessary.  
Many of the criticisms that SCP seems to face, target the specific methods of 
implementation or design decisions rather than with the actual framework itself.  In the 
case of a criticism of conservative, managerial approaches to crime prevention, this may be 
simply a result of specific applications of SCP being conservative or managerial as a result 
of meeting the needs or requirement of the individuals or community which implemented 
it.  In many cases SCP can offer economically and socially acceptable solutions for crime 
prevention measures, but it would be responsibility of the implementors to ensure that they 
kept in line with community or individual’s needs and requirements.  For example, in the 
use of conflict zones, it is not expected that every community or area will have the same 
type of crime prevention measures, and in many cases, prevention may take little to no ‘on-
the-ground’ action, but rather focus efforts of other stages or phases of the trafficking 
network.  This would have to be determined by experts and local/national authorities at the 
time of implementation.   
(5) It diverts attention from the root causes of crime.  SCP was designed to be used for 
particular and highly specific types of crimes.  It does not present itself as a new 
criminological theory, but mainly a crime prevention framework from which practical and 
efficient measures can be derived.  It has also been created to be versatile and adaptable for 
particular situations, and it is up to those implementing preventative measures to determine 
the scope and range of how SCP is being used.  As such, it focuses on a specific type of 
crime, and seeks to employ crime prevention measures to reduce crime.  It does not claim 
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to solve or eliminate a criminal activity, but simply attempt to prevent or deter a crime 
from being committed in a particular case.  If one’s aim is to attempt to understand or 
eliminate criminal activity, then this framework is not the method by which this should be 
achieved, and instead a focus on criminological theories of criminality may be better 
suited.    
(6) It promotes ‘Big Brother’ culture and restricts personal freedoms.  This particular 
criticism typically describes SCP as creating a ‘fortress’ society or environment, however 
this often results from a lack of understanding of the guiding principles of SCP.  
Criminology acknowledges that crime could be essentially eliminated, however this would 
entail a police state, with little to no privacy or personal freedom.  What criminologists, 
and specifically those working within crime prevention have to consider is how this 
balance of personal freedom/privacy and crime prevention can work effectively.  This is 
something that we are seeing unfold in the field of cyber security and online/social media 
related laws and regulations.  SCP differs from traditional crime prevention theory in that it 
does not focus on solely on the offender but considers the situation which has allowed the 
crime to occur.   
(7) It blames the victim.  Traditional crime prevention focuses on why the offender 
committed a crime and seeks to determine how to stop the offender from offending again.  
As such, it may be easy to assume that SCP is seeking to place the blame on someone else 
– perhaps the victim.  SCP does not seek to blame the victim but instead focuses its efforts 
on the many factors which allowed multiple elements to meet, resulting in a crime taking 
place.  It is simply attempting to observe crime prevention from a new perspective, 
allowing it to focus on a variety of elements or variables which may have impacted an 
offender’s ability to commit a crime. (e.g. weather, lighting, marketability).  In the case of 
ATNs, a more rounded approach is better suited to the complex nature of antiquities 
trafficking, and as such benefits from the situational approach that SCP offers. 
Overall, it seems that many of these criticisms stem from a lack of thorough understanding 
of the aims and implementation of SCP, which does not offer a solution to crime, or a 
particularly deep insight into criminal nature, but merely a framework which can help to 
reduce or deter crimes from occurring.  As a result of the adaptable and versatile nature of 
SCP, it is understandable that it is not fully understood.  Considerations as to how SCP is 
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implemented may bear stricter scrutiny, as perhaps one of the dangers in implementing 
SCP is a lack of understanding of context of the crime and the area in which the crime 
takes place.  Without a thorough understanding of the social, religious, cultural and 
economic understandings of where a crime takes place, it is unlikely that an outsider could 
effectively employ SCP.  As such, one of the areas that this thesis attempts to stress is that 
a close working relationship with local communities is vital in order to enact viable and 
successful prevention measures.  The use of CSA helps to more fully understand the 
criminal script which occurs during the crime, and so ensures a more thorough 
understanding of the context.  With an analytic knowledge of how the crime occurs, more 
effective – and likely successful – crime prevention measure and tactics can be achieved. 
4.2.2 Why Crime Script Analysis? 
“Undertaking situational crime prevention involves the analysis of subsets of offences with 
common opportunity structures with a view to homing in on modifiable conditions that 
enable or encourage the crime.” (Bullock, Clarke, & N., 2010, p. 1)  With the decision to 
use SCP, Crime Script Analysis appeared to be a natural choice to use in collaboration, as 
it allows for a close and thorough study of the elements and structure of criminal events 
and types.  As the understanding and examination of the specifics of how ATNs operate is 
a crucial goal of this project, CSA seemed an obvious method of analysis.     
Previous research in the field of ATNs has largely been based in the fields of museum 
studies, archaeology, law, or art history (Bowman, 2008; Brodie, 2012b; Brodie et al., 
2013).  As a result of this, there is an increasingly large body of work, which focuses on 
the objects, which are looted, or the legal aspects and frameworks in which illicit 
antiquities operate (Brodie, 2012b).  This thesis has already addressed the lack in this field 
of any significant research from the field of criminology, resulting in the lack of a crucial 
perspective to better understanding how these crimes are being committed.  When there is 
a lack of criminological research, this means there is a lack of research that focuses on the 
types of individuals committing a crime, the opportunities which allowed the crime to 
occur, the motivations for committing such crimes, how criminal networks form or 
develop, and most importantly, the most effective means of preventing such crimes.  CSA 
offers a structured technique to show how these crimes are committed and specifically 
provides a general tool that can be used by a number of fields of research to understand the 
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necessary step and elements in order for a crime to occur (Cornish, 1994a; Leclerc, 2017).  
It does not draw heavily on specific criminological theory in order to be able to use it, but 
more requires the necessary time, data, and understanding of the network to analyse and 
form a useful script (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2013).  It was originally developed to be used 
by law enforcement, and such does not require highly technical or an academic background 
to be able to make use of it (Cornish, 1994a; Hancock and Laycock, 2013; Leclerc, 2017).  
Its aim is similar to how a detective would try to piece together to breakdown and work 
through each step of a crime.  Except that the crime script does this in reverse.  It begins at 
the point where a criminal decides to commit a crime, and then not only analyses how an 
offender commits the crime, but also the accompanying thought process (Leclerc, 2017).  
This then allows for prevention measures or techniques to be considered at each stage of 
the criminal process (Lab, 2016; Leclerc, 2017).    
Criminology is generally focused on why crime happens, whereas the field of crime 
prevention – especially environmental crime – is specifically focused on how crimes came 
to occur, and therefore prevent them (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2013; Lab, 2016).  What 
makes crime scripting so unique and powerful as a method of analysis, is that it considers 
both the ‘why’ and ‘how’ in tandem.  It considers both the physical and mental aspects of 
the crime, and places those two aspects in context (Schank and Abelson, 1977; Cornish, 
1994a).  Though it should be noted that the ‘why’ in the case of crime scripts is more 
relevant to why the criminal actor chose to participate in this specific crime, and not 
necessarily every criminal act he or she may have committed.  Whereas traditional forms 
of crime prevention tend to emphasize the motivation that drove the actor to commit a 
crime (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2013).  CSA (in the framework of SCP theory) takes into 
consideration the situation, which allows for the crime to be committed, often including the 
motivation of the offender (Cornish, 1994a; Leclerc, 2017).  
The use of CSA also works well with dark or illicit networks, having been used for a 
number of these networks including human trafficking, drug manufacturing, terrorism, and 
wildlife trafficking (Shukla and Bartgis, 2010; Lavorgna, 2014; de Bie et al., 2015; Sytsma 
and Piza, 2018; Viollaz et al., 2018).  CSA has often been used in combination with social 
network analysis as it can then highlight both the script actions as well as the network of 
individuals involved in the network (Leclerc et al., 2011; Lavorgna, 2014; Berlusconi, 
2017).  While social network analysis was considered as a tool to be used in this research 
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project, ultimately it was concluded that there was simply not enough data concerning 
actors within the network, as well as requiring significant technical skills to learn and use 
social network analysis.  As ATNs provide specific complications (mainly being that the 
target objects are not known to exist until they are discovered), it requires a method of 
analysis that can put the issue in context and provide a meaningful analysis. 
4.2.3 Why Antiquities Trafficking Networks? 
This section will address the use of the entire concept of Antiquities Trafficking Networks, 
instead of the much more traditional method of using SCP and CSA with case-specific 
studies.  In chapter 3, Moreto and Clarke’s (2013) work concerning an attempt to create a 
crime script for TIMES was discussed.  The authors concluded that they were unable to 
generate a crime script for this illicit network/because the market was being too diverse, 
dangerous and, and difficult to be able to effectively develop a script (Moreto and Clarke, 
2013).  Throughout this thesis, the issue of applying such a highly specific methodology 
and tool to a rather broad conceptual network will be addressed.  In this section though, the 
aim to demonstrate why a consideration of the entire field of ATNs is attempted, and why 
this attempt will prove beneficial to the continuing research concerning antiquities 
trafficking.  As has been stated, the aim of this project is to consider the application of SCP 
and CSA to ATNs.  This means the aim of the project is not to produce specific techniques, 
procedures, or recommendations to combat antiquities trafficking.  It is meant to 
demonstrate a methodology and analysis tool, which when used in the context of 
antiquities trafficking, will provide efficient and effective results.  In the process of 
examining and considering this methodology, a number of general situational prevention 
techniques will be considered and discussed, as a means of helping to establish a basic 
model of how ATNs are structured.  Therefore, in the course of striving to meet the aim of 
this project, a number of similar goals will be achieved – in providing a basic model of 
ATNs, general preventative recommendations or techniques for ATNs, as well as 
preventative measures that can be considered for future antiquities looting and trafficking 
within conflict zones.  The crime script and SCP analyses of ATNs presented here will 
contribute research and knowledge, and have analytically considered this illicit network 
and case study to determine an effective method and methodology for future researchers. 
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4.2.4 Why Syria? 
The case study that will be used within this project has been selected based on its 
appropriateness for the consideration of illicit antiquities being looted and trafficked, as 
well as the availability of data.  In present day Syria, the level of disruption is huge, with 
awareness that there is large scale cultural looting and destruction but with extreme levels 
of disorder making systematic mapping of this loss impossible. Selecting such a site offers 
a challenging case for testing the techniques being argued for here. Not only is it 
worthwhile to attempt to map and anticipate with the hope of preventing future (heritage) 
losses in Syria, but if it can be done in this situation, it is likely that these techniques hold 
value for prevention strategy development in far less disrupted areas.  The lack of data 
within this field is a direct result of ATNs being an illicit network – resulting in the 
difficulty of measuring or study the network (Polk, 2014).  In comparison to the many 
examples of illicit networks given in chapter 3, the development of a crime script for 
antiquities trafficking proves more complex, as a result of one element.  The location or 
existence of an antiquity is (typically) unknown until such times as it is discovered – in this 
case, usually when it is being looted (Brodie, 2006a).  Whereas in the case of drugs or 
weapons manufacturing, the origin or creation of objects is clear, and typically requires 
certain resources (making it easier to target).  This means it is difficult to trace an antiquity 
to its location or origin, or origin of discovery (Brodie, 2006a; Brodie, 2012).  The 
resulting issue is then a lack of data or information concerning how and when objects are 
looted.   
When discussing the lack of data within this this field of research it is important to note the 
importance that investigative journalism has played in providing and revealing information 
relevant to antiquities trafficking (Brodie, 2012b; Brodie et al., 2013).  In the previous 
chapter, it was noted how much of the literature that was generated in this field was a result 
of research conducted by archaeologist, lawyers, museum and cultural heritage experts.  
However, there is still very much a lack of empirical research being conducted in the form 
of interviews, surveys, or statistical analysis of relevant data (Brodie, 2012b).  Journalists 
have filled this gap up until now, and at times are able to do so more effectively than law 
enforcement agencies, as they do not have to work within specific jurisdictions (Brodie, 
2012b; Brodie et al., 2013).  Two prominent examples of antiquities traffickers Medici and 
Kapoor (previously mentioned in chapter 2), both had vital stories broken by investigative 
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journalists (Watson and Todeschini, 2006; Brodie, 2012b; Brodie et al., 2013; Felch, 
2013b).  This research project is using journalistic articles, as they are one of the few 
sources of data about the situation on the ground, with direct quotes from individuals 
involved in the network.  With this in mind, using news articles as a data source highlights 
some challenges of using data that is meant to be consumed by the general public.  It 
cannot be ignored that many of these pieces were written (and any subsequent research 
conducted) in a snapshot of the overall conflict.  The political atmosphere of the time may 
be reflected in the piece, and unlike academic research, a journalistic article have different 
requirements that need to be met in order to publish (Brodie, 2012b; Brodie et al., 2013; 
Brodie, 2015e).  While journalists strive to report the news with as little bias or influence, 
as possible, journalistic standards and aims different from academic (Brodie et al., 2013).  
Their research and investigations have ultimately, different motives from academia (Brodie 
et al., 2013).  This is not to say that their motives are in any way malicious or inferior, but 
certainly different from academic motives.  With this in mind, in order to try and keep the 
data as pure and uninfluenced as possible, only direct quotes (or direct paraphrasing) were 
used when collecting data.  Even using only direct quotations from individuals, the 
researcher is aware that some of these quotes may have been taken out of context or given 
to the journalist for political or personal reasons.  As such, journalistic work provides data 
from difficult situations, like conflict zones, that are often unattainable for an academic.  
The result of this then being that this data will be used to construct a general sense of how 
the specifics of this conflict are facilitating ATNs. 
A number of practical reasons have been listed regarding the use of Syria as a case study, 
but it should be noted that the Syrian conflict has become a prominent issue of both 
research and discussion within this field.  There have been major strides taken in research 
specific to the documentation and preservation of heritage during conflicts and 
preservation (Contreras and Brodie, 2010; Casana and Panahipour, 2014; Parcak et al., 
2016; Rayne et al., 2017).  Additionally, a number of research and interest groups have 
been created specifically to consider the Syrian conflict (Leckie, Cunliffe and Varoutsikos, 
2017).  This focus on Syria is likely a result of practical elements, such as availability of 
data, international interest in the issue, and available funding.  As large portions of 
literature and research being conducted in this field centre on the Syrian conflict, this 
provides an additional rationale for using Syria as a case study within this research project.  
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Using Syria as a case study demonstrates the versatility and strength of both CSA and SCP 
within extremely complex and layered circumstances.  If these methods can efficiently 
operate within a complex environment such as Syria, they can most certainly be used in 
other areas facing the issue antiquities trafficking. 
4.3 Research Design 
At this stage, the aim of this research project should be clear. The following section will 
now provide a detailed discussion of how this project was designed and executed.  Specific 
attention will be paid to the collection of data and construction of the script that will be 
presented in subsequent chapters.  To begin, a discussion of the scope of the research will 
take place, followed by an overview of the design of this research project.  A detailed 
explanation concerning how the data was collected, the creation of the crime scripts, and a 
discussion concerning the analysis of the scripts will take place.   
4.3.1 Methods 
This project involves the creation of crime scripts, for both the entire network of 
international illicit antiquities, and as well for the case study of the Syria conflict.  Once a 
crime script has been developed, it will be analysed, alongside pertinent data, to determine 
the most prevalent facilitating factors, which allow each stage of the crime script to occur.  
This is then followed by an additional analysis and consideration as to effective situational 
prevention measures or strategies, which could be implemented for either the case-specific 
or crime-type of network of international illicit antiquities.  The development of this 
project drew upon aspects of previous research projects including those discussed in 
chapter 2, and in additional made use of Doctoral and Master’s theses working with crime 
scripts to help provide constraints and scope to these efforts (Unal, 2009; Tompson and 
Chainey, 2011b; Chiu et al., 2011; Jacques and Bernasco, 2013; Gilmour, 2014; Lavorgna, 
2014; Hutchings and Holt, 2015; Leontiadis and Hutchings, 2015; Lavorgna, 2015; 
Fabiani, 2016).  Specifically, the structure and format of this thesis drew heavily upon the 
work of Memhet Unal (2009), and his integration of facilitating factors and development of 
specific strategies.  Additionally, a similar approach to collecting and coding available data 
was influenced by the work of Michelle Fabiani, which focused on strategic versus 
opportunistic types of looting within the conflict in Egypt (2016).  Within these previous 
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studies, which used crime scripting, it was evident that their scripts were developed either, 
after a thorough analysis of the data, or on a rolling basis, with adjustments being made as 
more data was analysed.  This project will employ a combination of both, as it will begin 
with a simple model of antiquities trafficking using data from well-studied cases, and apply 
and adapt this model based on the data relating to Syria.  With no standard format to 
inform how the script should appear or operate, the development of the various elements of 
the script (stages, format, stages) were constructed and adapted as a result of the data 
(Borrion, 2013; Dehghanniri and Borrion, 2017).  For example, in Appendices 2 and 3, 
initial drafts of the scripts can be seen.  This script, when compared to later versions, is 
much more detailed, and complex, due to the amount of information or variables present.  
As a result, this script was adjusted, to eventually produce the script that will be presented 
in the following chapter. 
With the digital and technological advances that have been made in the media, our social 
interaction, and our consumption of news, it is only reasonable to assume that our methods 
of research would soon follow suit.  There have been more and more qualitative studies 
which are designed around the gathering and analysis of large data-sets relevant to social 
or digital media (Chang, Kauffman and Kwon, 2014).  This project made use of content 
analysis as a means of analysing secondary open source data (in the form of journalistic 
articles), aiming to determine relevant articles and then extracting or highlighting 
significant terms or processes (pertinent to antiquities trafficking) to develop the crime 
scripts presented in subsequent chapters.  The primary source of data for the development 
of the crime scripts were open-source journalistic articles, which were gathered using 
public web searches.  Traditionally, content analysis is used as a means of analysing 
sections of texts or documents in order to examine frequency of word use, or specific 
language (Crowther-Dowey and Fussey, no date; Maxfield and Babbie, 2012).  In the case 
of this project, content analysis was used to determine common words, phrases, or themes 
associated with antiquities trafficking activities or actions.  The scripts that were developed 
from this analysis then reflected specific types of actions or elements that occurred in the 
process of a crime being committed, and were present in the text, ultimately informing how 
the script of antiquities trafficking occurred. As such, the analysis which took place was 
closely aligned to content analysis but differed subtly from its traditional aims by targeting 
specific actions or processes rather than word frequency or value.  
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Typically, the creation of crime scripts has been developed out of data sources such as case 
files, police records, or interviews (Shukla and Bartgis, 2010; Jacques and Bernasco, 2013; 
Lavorgna, 2014; Petrossian, 2014; de Bie, de Poot and van Leun, 2015).  Due to a lack of 
data pertaining to antiquities trafficking, these more traditional and rigorous sources were 
not a viable option for this research project.  As such, this project focused on digital media 
as a data source.  As has been mentioned previously in this thesis, investigative journalism 
has played a large role in gathering data and producing evidence of ATNs.  In using digital 
media as the main source of data for the development of the crime scripts, which in turn 
were the basis for the SCP measures that were developed, this presented a number of 
difficulties.  Media content is generated with a very different motivation than empirical 
research, and as a result any content used must be presented in a manner that acknowledges 
any potential bias.   
4.3.1.1 Type of Script 
One of the main strengths of crime scripting is its adaptability, and ability to focus on 
specialized forms of crime.  This also creates the challenge of developing a standardized 
method of creating and using crime scripts.  When considering the different ways that 
previous researchers have developed their crime scripts, many different factors had to be 
considered.  First, the detail quality of the data had to be considered.  Depending on how 
detailed the data was would consequently determine the amount of detail of the crime 
script.  Additionally, it is important to consider that much of the data that was available did 
not discuss all three stages of ATNs, but portions or snapshots of how the network 
operated.  Generating a crime script out of multiple snapshots could lead to misinterpreting 
the data or the structure of the market.  As such, it was determined that a potential crime 
script would be the most effective means of interpreting the data in a way so as not to 
misrepresent the overall structure of ATNs.   
A potential crime script is one that displays the various options that a criminal may take in 
order to achieve a crime (Borrion, 2013).  It considers all possible routes/options/methods 
so as to gain a better understanding of how an offender would choose his/her method of 
choice.  In contrast a preformed script is concerned with a script that has already occurred 
– this would include using historical data or crime scripts to demonstrate the criminal 
actions and stages that the actor took to achieve their crime (Borrion, 2013).  There is also 
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planned script, which as the name indicated, reflects actions that someone has planned – 
possibly failed examples can inform such script (Borrion, 2013).  By using a predictive 
crime script, the data is then reflected in the script without losing the overall context of the 
structure or methods used within ATNs. 
4.3.1.2 Data Source (Antiquities Trafficking Networks) 
For the generation of an ATNs crime script, the data source will be a large body of case 
studies in which portions or the entire process of trafficking an antiquity takes place.  The 
data source available for ATNs represents only a sampling of the total amount of case 
studies relevant to antiquities trafficking.  Unfortunately, there does not currently exist a 
master list or even prominent dataset from which to collect data for research pertaining to 
antiquities trafficking.  There are a few databases that are concerned with art crime, but 
these often combine both art and antiquities cases together and as such are not are relevant 
for the purposes of this thesis.  As such, in order to gain even a sampling of examples of 
antiquities trafficking, a dataset was created using the Trafficking Culture’s Case Studies 
database, which consists of 128 entries.  In order to produce an effective crime script for 
ATNs, these case studies were used.  As such, it is clear that this script will not reflect 
every case study or example of antiquities looting which has occurred, but that is not its 
intention.  The crime script that has been developed for this project is one that was created 
with the intention modifying or adjusting in response to new or overlooked data.  The case 
studies provided by the Trafficking Culture project provides a data source that is a good 
place to begin, as it ultimately yielded 74 case studies that were deemed viable for analysis 
for the script.  This process will be discussed in more detail in section 4.3.2. 
4.3.1.3 Data Source (Syria) 
To appreciate the methods that will be used within the project, the source and type of data 
should first be established.  There are two scripts that will be developed, the first being a 
script for ATNs.  It has been established that this will be a more complex process and one, 
which, as evident from the examples given in chapter 2 is not the intended application for 
which crime scripting was developed.  However, crime scripting does not have a standard 
form or format, as one of its strengths is a versatility to reflect elements relevant to a 
specific crime (Borrion, 2013; Dehghanniri and Borrion, 2017).  The examples of previous 
studies were able to create crime scripts from interviews and case studies, as that was data 
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or research that was available in their fields (Chiu et al., 2011; Tompson and Chainey, 
2011b; Jacques and Bernasco, 2013; Gilmour, 2014; Lavorgna, 2014; Hutchings and Holt, 
2015; Leontiadis and Hutchings, 2015; Lavorgna, 2015).  As noted above, in the study of 
antiquities trafficking, a primary source of data and information are investigative 
journalists, and journalistic articles (Brodie, 2012b; Brodie et al., 2013).  
4.3.2 Data Collection and Script Development 
Having now establish the data sources, the method by which the data was collected can be 
discussed and examined.  While ultimately the script for ATNs and the Syria case study 
proved to be different, the method of collecting the data, and analysing it to develop scripts 
was similar.  These following sections will detail the specifics of each script.   
4.3.2.1 Antiquities Trafficking Networks 
The data source for this crime script is the Trafficking Culture’s list of case studies 
(available on their website: https://traffickingculture.org/encyclopedia/case-studies/all/).  
Their initial list of case studies presented one hundred and twenty-four entries relating to 
cultural heritage issue and antiquities trafficking.  After reviewing all one hundred and 
twenty-four entries, fifty-one were determined to be relevant to this study.  The case 
studies that were not used were eliminated based on: (1) a significant lack of data – from 
which no relevant data for a script could be retrieved; (2) they were not relevant – focusing 
on human remains, underwater archaeology, or other disqualifying factors; (3) they 
concerned theft of repatriation cases of art/antiquities – not looting.  The fifty-one 
qualifying entries were entered into a Microsoft Excel worksheet, and were coded based on 
specific variable.  It should be noted that the majority of these entries were paraphrased 
from news articles, books, or academic research articles.  Often, these original sources 
were checked to see if additional information could be gained.  In most cases though, the 
entry on the Trafficking Culture website reflect the relevant information concerning 
necessary elements of antiquities trafficking.  These variables included: location, full 
script, phases of script, one instance, multiple instances, individual, group, community, 
actions, additional notes. 
When examining each entry, special consideration was given to explicit details of how the 
looting, transit, or market of the object occurred.  The variables listed above attempt to 
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identify important elements within each entry such as: how often did this activity occur, 
how many people were involved, and what actions were taken within the script.  The 
dataset for the ATNs script can be seen in Appendix 4.  A preliminary script, consisting 
simply of looing, transit, and market had initially been establish, but modified and adjusted 
as the data was processed, until the final crime script was developed.  This final script 
reflected the various actions, elements, and stages that was evident within the data.  
4.3.2.2 Syria 
In collecting data for crime scripts, a search was conducted through Google of all news 
articles between January 1, 2005 to December 31st, 2016 using these key search terms: 
antiquities | antiquity | object | artifact | culture | cultural | heritage AND smuggler | 
smuggling | smuggled | smugglers | route | ‘black market’ | illegal | illicit AND Syria | 
Syrian AND dealer | dealers | market | trade | network AND loot | looters | looted | looting | 
stolen AND trafficked | trafficked | trafficking | traffickers.  Specifically, the type of data 
that was being targeted was direct quotes or particular paraphrasing from individuals 
involved in ATNs in some way. 
The date range of January 2005 to December 2016 was chosen specifically as it included a 
number of years prior to the beginning of the Syrian Civil War.  This was partly to 
demonstrate the visible increase in articles being generated concerning Syrian cultural 
heritage and antiquities after the outbreak of fighting, but also to see if any data could be 
retrieved to establish the type of looting or trafficking of antiquities prior to the outbreak of 
the civil war.  It has been noted that antiquities trafficking did occur prior to the conflict, 
and the method by which this looting occurred would likely have been different from the 
types of trafficking that appears in the Syria script.  If a direct comparison could have been 
made, this would have allowed valuable comparisons between a ‘before’ and ‘after’ scripts 
for this region – unfortunately, this was not the case. 
These searches were conducted in the autumn of 2016, on the University of Glasgow 
campus.  This is relevant as the result of a search query on Google are often dependent on 
personal preference and location.  Once a complete data-set was collected, the results were 
entered into Microsoft Excel in order to organise and determine viable data.  A similar 
process was employed for the ATNs script, was also employed for this script.  The data 
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was coded, examined thoroughly, crime scripts were developed based upon the direct 
quotes, and paraphrasing that existed in the journalistic articles.  Viable data was 
determined by the following criteria: (1) did the article include either direct quotes or 
paraphrasing from individuals involved in antiquities trafficking; (2) and was there enough 
data within the article to help inform the crime script.  This search complied a total of four 
hundred and ninety-two results, of which two-hundred and twenty-six were examined for 
further data.  Two-hundred and sixty-six results that were eliminated at this stage were a 
result not being directly relevant to the search parameters.  Examples of this include non-
relevant blogs making note or reference to cultural heritage (by non-experts), reposting of 
media articles by individuals, or official announcements or reports/press reports by 
international organizations.  Thirty were found to contain direct quotes relevant to the 
search parameters and were therefore examined and from these articles, crime scripts were 
generated.  A full list of the complete search, with the relevant thirty articles highlighted 
can be found in Appendix 11.   
Script Development: From these thirty articles, once again, a similar process that was 
used to develop the ATNs script was used with this script.  The data and initial individual 
scripts created at this point can be seen in Appendices 5, 6, and 7.  The same set of 
variables was employed, and each article was examined for specific actions, or direct 
quotes.  When constructing the Syria crime script, the ATNs script was initially used, and 
then modified to reflect the specific nature of antiquities trafficking during the Syrian 
conflict.  The dataset for this script was different in nature from the ATNs script, resulting 
in the actual process of creating the script being slightly different.  As the ATNs script was 
largely based on sources, which paraphrased, while much of this dataset had direct or 
indirect quotes available.  Within the Syria data, much of the data represented a more 
complete perspective of each phase, with articles identifying either individual or multiple 
stages.  So, while initially using the ATNs script as a basis for the Syria script, a new script 
quickly emerged, which reflected (as accurately as the dataset allowed) the structure of 
antiquities trafficking during the Syrian conflict.   
4.3.3 Data Analysis 
Following the creation of these crime scripts, in their relevant chapters, these scripts were 
analysed to determine facilitating factors for each phase.  The data collected, it must be 
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remembered, was not complete in the sense of containing interviews of all relevant 
individuals involved in every part of the trafficking process, from looting to final 
transaction and disposition of an object.  This unfortunately also reflects a reality of 
studying such networks – they are often fragmented and disjointed, with various actors 
becoming active in the network, or leaving the network, at various stages.  This is not 
always the case, but with specific reference to conflict zones, it seems to be a more 
disrupted network.  The main concern for developing these crime scripts were to 
demonstrate the most necessary actions that were required for ATNs to occur.  These 
scripts potentially demonstrate when breaking down every example or case study of 
antiquities looting, the core elements of the crime can be found and scripts developed.  The 
analysis of the script concentrated on points and stages within the script that seemed to 
offer facilitating circumstances for the offender.  These facilitating factors were then 
considered and after an examination and consideration of the twenty-five techniques of 
SCP, situational prevention strategies were generated.  A similar model was used to 
determine facilitating factors within the Syria case study, as well as SCP strategies for 
potential future conflicts.   
4.4 Difficulties Faced in the Study of Antiquities 
Trafficking Networks 
Through the information gathered in the process of this project, a more comprehensive 
understanding of the vulnerabilities within ATNs may become more apparent.  The use of 
CSA will provide a detailed understanding of how the market operates, which will 
facilitate the possibility of determining more effective strategies of reduction and 
prevention in this market.  Combatting the illicit antiquities market faces a number of 
difficulties, which have been outlined throughout this paper.  In a background paper 
prepared for a 2009 meeting of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
which included the looting and trafficking of antiquities, Simon Mackenzie outlined that 
significant difficulties were faced: 
(a) A crime problem in poorer ‘source’ countries which provides a source of 
income for local populations;  
(b) Difficulty in enforcing the relevant laws in source countries due to lack of 
resources as well as varying levels of corruption; 
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(c) A ready market for looted objects in rich market countries providing a 
demand for the international transportation of looted [cultural property]; 
(d) Difficulty in telling illicit objects from licit ones once they are mixed together 
in the chain of supply – compounded by a culture of privacy in the antiquities 
market (buyers are reluctant to ask too many searching questions about 
provenance); 
(e) A conflicted law enforcement and policy response to the issue in some market 
countries, since market and free trade principles tend to weigh against restrictive 
control on the cross-border movement of [cultural property]; 
 (f) An existing trade infrastructure (dealers, collectors, museums) which has a 
history and developed culture of dealing in [cultural property] without 
necessarily knowing about its provenance or provenience.  
 (UNODC, 2009, p. 6) 
These six difficulties provide an overview of some of the broader issues that the 
international community faces when attempting to regulate or reduce antiquities 
trafficking.  In this section, some of the more relevant issues will be highlighted in the 
context of this research project. 
4.4.1 Lack of Documentation and Legal Issues  
A distinctive characteristic of the illicit antiquities market is the lack of documentation 
associated with illegal objects (Conklin, 1994; Luke and Henderson, 2006).  The very 
nature of this market provides the first and most difficult issue that is faced in this field: 
antiquities are unknown to the world (and archaeologists), until they are discovered 
(Brodie, 2006; Proulx, 2011b).  This may seem like an oversimplified and rather evident 
statement, but the simple fact is that this presents a serious difficulty when attempting to 
protect these objects from illicit looting or damage.  How is one supposed to protect 
something, when we are not even aware of its existence?  Even in cases where the origin of 
an object may be determined, there is usually no knowledge of when the object was looted, 
who looted the items, or how it was trafficked (Alder and Polk, 2005; Brodie et al., 2006; 
Brodie, 2012b; Campbell, 2013; Hardy, 2016).  
One could think of the illicit antiquities network as a black box.  Often, it is known that an 
object exists, and was likely looted.  It is often known where it turns up but there are few 
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resources available to determine how or when the object was taken from its original 
location to then appear in an auction house, or antiquities dealer’s showroom (Brodie, 
2006; Hanson, 2008; Parcak et al., 2016).  Many times, it is only when an object appears 
on the antiquities market that it becomes apparent (through the diligent efforts of 
academics and experts) that these items have most likely been looted (Proulx, 2011b).  
From there it is often a case of working backward to determine where the object originated 
(Hanson, 2008; Massy, 2008).  Archaeologists can sometimes pinpoint which region an 
item may have originated from, but this is usually only the case in distinctive objects 
(Brodie, 2009).  In order for any legal procedures to take place, there must be definitive 
proof that an object was illegally taken from the ground of an archaeological site, and then 
trafficked and sold illegally (Forsyth, 2007; Gerstenblith, 2008; Ulph et al., 2012).  
Essentially, unless there is documentation of an object existing prior to being looting, there 
can be no legal case associated with the antiquity (Forsyth, 2007; Ulph et al., 2012).  Many 
of the following difficulties that will be discussed are associated with lack of proper 
documentation in some way.  
Another considerable difficulty that this field faces is proving that an antiquity has been 
looted.  While experts may agree that, an object may have an extremely high chance of 
having been looted, without definitive proof, there is little that can be done (Forsyth, 2007; 
Ulph et al., 2012).  Even when there is substantial evidence of an object being looted, it 
can be extremely difficult to win legal cases to return looted objects (Ulph et al., 2012; Gill 
and Tsirogiannis, 2016; C Tsirogiannis, 2016b).  There have been a few instances where 
objects can be repatriated back to their country of origin, possibly the most famous of them 
being the case of Giacomo Medici and the Euphronious Krater (Watson and Todeschini, 
2006).  This case study, which will be discussed later, is a prime example of the 
methodical organization and international scope that often operates in the illicit antiquities 
market (Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  Most illicit antiquities legal cases fail because it 
cannot be undeniably proven that an individual or organization purchased (with intent) an 
antiquity they knew to be acquired illegally. 
4.4.2 Grey Market 
As this network operates in a grey capacity, it demonstrates a lack of regulation of the 
illicit antiquities market as a whole (Bowman, 2008; Mackenzie and Yates, 2016b).  Many 
91 
 
 
 
 
individual countries attempt to regulate the trade, but antiquities market operates on an 
international level (Ulph et al., 2012).  Strict regulations in specific countries simply 
displaces criminal activity to other, less-strict regions.  The lack of provenance is a central 
issue for allowing the antiquities market to continue to operate as a grey market.  Without a 
means of regulating the purchase and sales of antiquities – which is implausible without 
the use of a legitimate provenance – the market will continue to operate as a grey market 
(Alder and Polk, 2002; Bowman, 2008; Mackenzie and Yates, 2016b).  The attitude of the 
antiquities market contributes to this issue, as it is the actors within the network, which 
refuse to regulate or abide by the use of legitimate and well researched provenances.   
4.4.3 Lack of Criminal Association  
An examination of the buyers within the antiquities market demonstrates an evident lack of 
criminal association for purchasing illicit antiquities (Polk, 2000; Mackenzie and Yates, 
2016a).  The eventual disposal (whether it be selling, purchasing, or the donation of 
antiquities) is one that works in a ‘technically’ legal manner (Gerstenblith, 2007; Forsyth, 
2007; Gerstenblith, 2008; Mackenzie and Green, 2008; Ulph et al., 2012).  Typically, 
individuals or organizations can assume that any antiquities that are on the market without 
proper documentation or provenance have a high likelihood of being looted (Brodie and 
Renfrew, 2005; Brodie, 2006; B.T. Hoffman, 2006; Hardy, 2016).  Even with an awareness 
of this issue, there still exists a strong and profitable market for antiquities on an 
international level (Brodie, 2012b).  This most likely stems from the fact that individuals 
and organizations that purchase illicit antiquities can presently do so without serious 
association of a criminal act.  This is the case even when an antiquity is known to lack 
proper provenance or indication of origin.  
 
4.4.4 Nature of the Global Antiquities Market 
A lack of a centralized agency that regulates, enforced, or polices the antiquities market 
provides the last, but still very important difficulty.  It is by nature an international market 
and one, which demands a diversity of items and well as purchasing (Ulph et al., 2012).  
This might explain why major auction houses such as Sotheby’s and Christie’s have 
proven to corner the art and antiquities market with such success (Ulph et al., 2012).  Both 
of these companies have auction houses in market and source countries around the world, 
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and as such, have created an international organization with a huge inventory at their 
disposal, and can then cater to each individual patron’s respective tastes (Ulph et al., 2012; 
C Tsirogiannis, 2016b; Tremain, 2017). 
It is this global aspect of the antiquities market that only proves to make it that much more 
difficult to regulate (Ulph et al., 2012).  Each country has its own regulations regarding 
transportation and purchasing of art and antiquities, with some, like Geneva in 
Switzerland, having extremely lax regulations due to status as a Freeport (Ulph et al., 
2012).  Additionally, while there are UNESCO conventions regarding the protection and 
preservation of cultural heritage sites, these are simply treaties (Ulph et al., 2012).  They 
are effectively meaningless unless upheld and enforced by all countries that have ratified 
the convention.  A lack of worldwide regulations or enforcement of the illicit antiquities 
market simply leads to displacement of these criminal activities to countries with more 
relaxed regulations (Ulph et al., 2012).  Because this network operates on a transnational 
level, it makes it very difficult for policing agencies to work together, or share information, 
which can lead to a complete understanding of the looting, and trafficking processes, 
which occur across borders (Polk, 2000; Christiansen and Erik Jørgensen, 2007; Lobay, 
2009; Vignal, 2017).  One of the most successful cases of uncovering and building a legal 
case against an individual within the illicit antiquities market was the case of Giacomo 
Medici (Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  The success of this case was only able to occur 
because three different countries (Italy, Germany, and Switzerland) worked together to 
build a case against this individual (Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  The cooperation of 
these countries led to one of the discoveries of one of the largest caches of illicit antiquities 
ever discovered.  It was discovered that Medici’s warehouse in Switzerland contained 
approximately 2,000 objects, which took two archaeologists around two years to document 
and identify (Watson and Todeschini, 2006).   
4.5 Limitations 
4.5.1 Nature of Antiquities Market 
This project has endeavoured to provide a serious piece of academic research that will 
contribute to the study of antiquities trafficking.  However, one of the greatest difficulties 
faced in this field, and one of the main limitations of this project, is lack of available data  
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(Polk, 2014).  As the illicit antiquities network is a dark/covert network, it inherently seeks 
to conceal the processes and techniques that make up the illicit antiquities network (Polk, 
1999).  This makes any data collection extremely difficult.  In the case of conflict zones, 
this difficulty is amplified.  As there is already a breakdown of any structure of a 
governing body, it makes any attempt at regulating or tracking reports of evidence of the 
illicit antiquities network are virtually impossible. 
4.5.2 Conflict Zones 
Initially, when considering the use of a case study of a conflict zones that suffered from 
antiquities trafficking, there were a number of concerns related to the amount of data 
available, as well as the quality any data that might be gathered or examined.  These 
concerns are valid and make research within conflict zones all the more difficult as an 
individual’s motivations for their statements or actions may not be completely clear to the 
researcher during the time of the conflict.  This is especially so in cases where the conflict 
is ongoing, there is always the risk that individuals may be giving statements for political 
reasons, for the safety of their families, friends, or acquaintances, or to demonstrate 
support for a political or social group.  As the data that is being used for this research 
project is second hand data, the crime scripts that were generated from the data are only 
being considered in a very general and abstract manner.  However, this specific conflict 
was able to provide something unique – a high volume of media coverage concerning 
specifically antiquities and cultural heritage.  With this media coverage came the 
possibility of data and increased understanding of events occurring within the conflict 
zone.  The overall purpose of creating these crime scripts is to demonstrate the 
effectiveness and possible future implications of using this method of analysis within 
ATNs.   
Additionally, something that has become a rather contentious topic in the field of illicit 
antiquities is the rumour/report that ISIS (Daesh, IS) is being funded by the sale of illicit 
antiquities (Daniels and Hanson, 2015; Willett, 2016).  While there is a photograph which 
shows a document stating that the holder of the paper is granted the right to loot objects 
with a specific tax amount being paid to IS (Daniels and Hanson, 2015; Willett, 2016).  
The result of this photo and additional evidence is that some believe that the illicit 
antiquities network has funded terrorist organizations such as IS (Daniels and Hanson, 
94 
 
 
 
 
2015; Willett, 2016; Brodie and Sabrine, 2018).  This research project will not begin to 
speculate as to the validity of these statements.  In some cases, individuals have reported 
that IS did loot antiquities in an organized and specific manner, but as this area is still in 
dispute, with many layers of political and religious influences at hand, this research project 
will not consider or make any statements about the validity of such statements.  The crime 
scripts have been developed with specific reference to individual statements, but as the 
conflict has included many areas being lost and recaptured by different groups within this 
conflict, the crime scripts will simply refer to ‘organized groups’, as it cannot confirm 
specifically which groups were, or were not responsible for organized looting of 
antiquities.  
An example of this is evident in that there are many journalistic articles detailing the 
looting of antiquities by IS agents, or those paying a tax to IS (Mulder, 2014; Hunter, 
2015; For et al., 2015; Match et al., 2016).  While there are multiple instances of IS 
engaging in the looting of antiquities, there are very few articles which discuss other types 
of looters – likely a result of the nature of the reporting that was occurring at the time 
(Brodie and Sabrine, 2018).  This potentially demonstrates a bias in western media to 
highlight only specific aspects of ATNs.  When consulting with data from these sources, it 
is important to take note of the possible political agenda these pieces may serve, or simply 
the subtle bias that these articles represent. 
4.5.3 Inherent Data Bias 
When using secondary data, a concern is that the data may be somewhat biased or have 
different goals from the research for which it is being applied.  In the case of using 
journalistic articles, there runs the risk of political or nationalistic bias.  The dataset used to 
construct the Syria scripts is likely politically biased, as there are a number of international 
agendas on the table when it comes to the Syrian conflict.  The majority of articles that 
ended up being used to develop crime scripts dated from late 2013 to the end of 2016 from 
English speaking publications.  During these times, there was American and other Western 
nations’ involvement in Syria, with the US backing the rebels (BBC News, 2018).  
Airstrikes and aid were being supplied to the rebels, and with the exception of Russia, 
many western countries were also backing anti-regime forces at this point (BBC News, 
2018).  As a researcher, it is important to be aware of this bias, but also to draw attention to 
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the potential bias incorporated into the results of research project as a result of making use 
of this data.  Additionally, there is a media bias as this dataset was created with the intent 
of media consumption and/or promotion.  A journalistic article has very different goals 
from an academic article, and as such, it can create complications when journalistic articles 
are used within academic research.  A journalist, who is already likely placing themselves 
in a dangerous situation for the purposes of these articles, is unlikely to be as concerned 
about potential bias within their interviewees, but are more concerned with finding people 
who are willing to talk to them.  A result of this may be that the journalist is only reporting 
certain types of individuals – certain types of smugglers or brokers – and the danger (from 
a research perspective) is that a vitally important aspect has been overlooked.    
This research project never intended to produce data-heavy analysis or practical results; it 
is methodological in nature and seeks to explore and demonstrate the efficiency of a 
particular method of analysis in relation to antiquities trafficking networks.  Rather, the 
scripts that were developed here were intended to provide a starting point.  As the data 
sources used for the development of these scripts are based in digital media reporting, they 
cannot be considered as having the same empirical standards as projects which make use of 
case reports or interviews.  However, as has been stated previously, has this project never 
sought to produce ground-breaking new research to tackle ATNs, but instead provide a 
framework which allow such research to be developed effectively and efficiently.    
4.5.4 Language  
As has been stated, the search parameters for the data that were used to construct the crime 
script were limited to English speaking publications.  However, there was a strong attempt 
to include media and news articles from sources all over the world, the reality of finding 
and accurately translating foreign news articles proved to be too difficult.  In some 
instances where international media outlets (BBC, Aljazeera, etc.) have stations on an 
international level, translations of foreign articles would be available, but as this was not 
the case for every media outlet agency it should be noted that this data considers English 
based news organizations and articles.  A failure to include foreign press will likely result 
in a political bias when considering the data, though perhaps less significant as the data 
represents a general understanding how the network operates.  Especially different 
countries and regions, based on how the conflict affects them, will have different 
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perspectives on the situation, and will likely report or discuss events with a different 
context or perspective.  Because of a language barrier, these perspectives cannot be 
considered or included in this research project, resulting in a less comprehensive 
understanding of antiquities trafficking.   
4.6 Intended Goal/Consequences 
The purpose of this project is to provide better insight into the operational aspects of the 
illicit antiquities looting and trafficking.  Its primary focus is on the use of SCP theory and 
CSA as an effective method to analyse and extract information concerning the structure 
and methods of ATNs.  Tackling the issue of reducing the looting and trafficking of 
antiquities is best attempted when there is first a thorough understanding how the network 
operates.  Preventative measures, which operate under inaccurate or misleading 
information, can prove to do significant damage instead of good.  There is always the 
possibility of creating new networks/routes/method, new crimes, or simply displacing the 
crimes – consider the United States and Prohibition in the 1920s (Polk, 2000).  One of the 
larger concerns that should be discussed in this field is: what exactly is being accomplished 
and what are the best ways of going about doing it? 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to provide a broad outline of the methodology and research design, 
while also discussing a number of significant factors such as difficulties faced, limitations 
to the project, and the relevance of this project and its findings.  An effort has also been 
made to articulate why the approach employed in this study is an effort to break new 
ground in the field of evaluating illicit antiquities.  This would provide not only a 
potentially useful and working analysis of ATNs, but also this methodology and method of 
analysis could have a positive impact upon both future research in the field of antiquities 
trafficking, and the broader application of SCP in conjunction with CSA.  The following 
chapter will begin this process by presenting the crime script for ATNs.   
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5. Using Crime Scripting in Antiquities Trafficking 
Networks 
5.1 Introduction 
As was outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the following chapter will focus on 
introducing and discussing the crime script that has been generated for ATNs and consider 
the facilitating circumstances and factors that occur within these scripts.  Understanding 
the opportunity structure that allows ATNs to sustain themselves through the framework of 
CSA and SCP is a main aim of this thesis and will help determine potential preventative 
techniques or procedures for ATNs.  This chapter demonstrates and explains CSA broadly, 
in the case of ATNs, showing its efficiency in highlighting relevant and necessary 
components of a crime.  It begins by engaging in a detailed examination of the crime script 
that has been generated for ATNs.  To achieve a thorough understanding of this crime 
script, a consideration of the complete script will occur, during which the versatile nature 
of the design of the script will be discussed.  The focus will then turn to the three distinct 
phases of the overall script, which is comprised of the looting, transit, and market phases.  
Special consideration will also be given to how these phases operate, the types of methods 
employed at each stage, and specific examples will be given to demonstrate the versatility 
of how the illicit antiquities network operates. 
The crime script that has been generated for ATNs additionally operates as a model of how 
these networks occur (A full version of this script can be seen in Appendix 9).  Within this 
model, these three phases of ATNs can be examined, and its application considered by a 
variety of fields or expertise including criminological, law enforcement, or policy 
perspectives – depending on the needs of the user.  This allows for more targeted and 
focused application and analysis of local issues if needed, rather than attempting to 
consider the network as a whole.  So, while a complete master script is presented here, the 
reality is that countries or local communities will likely only be faced with a particular 
phase of the overall network and as such each phase of the network is also being 
considered separately.  In short, this script has been designed in such a way that the 
separate phases can be used independently from the overarching script, allowing for more 
targeted and local interventions.  The use of crime scripting in this chapter is ultimately 
intended to highlight and demonstrate common and broad opportunity structures which are 
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evident in ATNs.  This analysis will identify and allow for close examination of the factors 
which ATNs thrive upon and will ultimately assist and help inform the efficient application 
of SCP in relation to ATNs.     
5.1.1 Crime Script/Model of Antiquities Trafficking Networks 
The crime script that emerged from this thesis’ analysis of ATNs consists of eleven distinct 
stages, which in turn make up three phases.  Each phase and the corresponding stages will 
be examined in detail, with examples given of particularly important or relevant stages.  To 
begin, a considering the script in its complete form will take place, followed by an 
examination and discussion of the elements of the script separately.  
Antiquities Trafficking Networks Crime Script 
 L O O T I N G  T R A N S I T  M A R K E T  
STAGES/ROLES 
S u b s i s t e n c e  
P r o f i t  
L e i s u r e  
S m u g g l e r  M i d d l e m a n  B r o k e r  
ENTRY Access Site Obtains Object Purchases Object 
Purchases 
Illicit 
Antiquity 
 
INSTRA.INIT. 
AND ACTUA. 
Search and Find 
Objects 
Decides how to transit 
object 
Contacts Buyer 
 
Research/ 
Assesses 
Object 
DOING 
Loot Objects 
(Remove from 
location) 
Smuggles/Transports 
object across border 
Sells Object to 
Buyer 
Provenance 
Decision 
 
POST-
CONDITION 
AND 
EXIT 
Transport from Site 
 
Dispose of Object 
Delivers OR sells 
object 
 Sell Object 
Fig. 5-1: Antiquities Trafficking Network Crime Script 
 
5.1.2 Antiquities Trafficking Network Crime Script Example 
As was discussed above, this script was created as an analysis tool for the looting, transit, 
and market phases of ATNs.  This script model can be applied to individual phases, or the 
entire process of antiquities trafficking from looting to market.  The aim was to allow for a 
versatile tool which would be able to accurately and efficiently reflect the types of scripts 
that exist within ATNs.  This crime script or ATNs model is intended as a tool for analysis 
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by academics and those working within or studying the antiquities market.  The phases 
themselves have also been created in such a way that the stages may also be re-arranged 
and consider previously unprecedented methods or techniques that may be encountered 
within the network.  The type of script presented in this chapter is a situational script – 
indicating it is scripting the specific situation in which the action occurs (versus a personal 
or instrumental script), and further, it is a potential script – indicating that it presents a 
hypothetical scenario, rather than describing an actual case of trafficking (Cornish, 1994b; 
Borrion, 2013).  Mapping a ‘hypothetical’ network allows for the depiction of a broad 
framework of ATNs, that can account for all aspects of any given network, from sourcing 
antiquities to selling them.   
The crime scripts presented in this thesis will represent the most skeletal and necessary 
elements that are necessary for the crime to occur.  Case specific scripts are presented in 
chapter 8, and will reflect elements necessary to the specific situation or example of 
antiquities looting.  This broad, master script has been generated to provide an empirical 
breakdown of the operational structure of ATNs.  While a basic understanding of how the 
networks function has been established, most of this understanding originate from a narrow 
collection of case studies from a wide time range.  This script not only provides a basic 
premise from which future research can be conducted, but also provides a model which has 
considered all potential methods or steps necessary. 
While traditional models are reactive – using known examples – this model attempts to be 
predictive, considering all possibilities for future research.  The scripts in this chapter are, 
at the most basic level, applicable to any occurrence of antiquities trafficking.  These 
condensed crime scripts will allow for important points of intervention to be highlighted 
and discussed in greater detail.  It will also demonstrate the importance and the practical 
use of CSA – especially when later paired with the SCP framework.  The following script 
examples in Figure 5-2 (below) display the looting phase of two separate examples of 
antiquities looting.  The script on the left is for the case of the Salisbury Hoard (discovered 
in the United Kingdom), while the script on the right demonstrates the complicated case of 
the Fano (Getty) Bronze (Stead, 1998; Felch and Frammolino, 2011). 
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LOOTING PHASE 
Mini-Shields - Salisbury 
Hoard 
United Kingdom 
Fano (Getty) Bronze 
Italy 
Stage 1: Access Site 
James Garriock & Terry 
Rossiter are metal 
detecting enthusiasts 
Fisherman access site (ocean) 
through normal process of their 
workday. 
Stage 2: Find Object 
The two discovered an 
ancient hoard while 
nighthawking (Feb. 1985) 
without permission from the 
landowners. 
(1964) Fishermen off Italian Coast 
catch a bronze statue in their nets 
while fishing 
Stage 3: Source 
(Loot) Object 
Garriock and Rossiter loot 
the objects 
The crew decided: “Rather than turn 
the figure over to local authorities, 
they would sell it and divvy up the 
profits” (Ibid: 10) 
Stage 4: Distribution 
(Looter(s) to Dealer) 
Garriock & Rossiter sell the 
objects to a number of 
antiquities dealers (in 
person and at fairs) 
The crew sell the bronze to Giacomo 
Barbetti (local antiquities dealer) for 
3.5 million lire (approx. $4,000 USD). 
Fig. 5-2: Looting Phase Crime Script Examples – Salisbury Hoard and Fano Bronze 
 (Felch & Frammolino, 2011, p.10; Stead, 1998) 
 
5.1.2.1 Salisbury Hoard  
The Salisbury Hoard refers to the discovery, excavation and selling off of one of the largest 
finds of prehistoric metals ever discovered within the United Kingdom (Stead, 1998).  This 
hoard and the network of excavators and dealers involved in its trafficking was only 
discovered thanks to the work of Ian Stead, deputy keeper in the department of Prehistoric 
and Romano-British Antiquities at the British Museum.  His subsequent book The 
Salisbury Hoard (1998) details the discovery and consequent journey of the hoard, as well 
as his own (and others) efforts to determine the origin of the objects.  The hoard comprised 
approximately six hundred objects discovered by James Garriock & Terry Rossiter while 
engaging in illegal metal detecting (Stead, 1998).  Without reporting their find to 
authorities the two sold off pieces of the hoard to various dealers, though the majority was 
sold to local antiquities dealer John Cummings (Stead, 1998).  The objects passed through 
a number of dealers, but eventually Lord Alistair McApline, and antiquities dealer, came 
into possession of one.  Through a fellow colleague Ian Stead, was introduced to 
McApline, who thought the he might be interested in such an object for the museum’s 
collection (Stead, 1998).  Upon Stead expressing interest in the shield, Lord McAlpine 
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brought together (from market) twenty-two mini-shields whereupon they were purchased 
by British Museum in 1988 for £55,000 – without a provenance (Stead, 1998). 
5.1.2.2 Fano (Getty) Bronze 
Chasing Aphrodite, written by Jason Felch and Ralph Frammonlino (2011) is a book that 
explores the journey of looted antiquities, including The Fano Bronze (sometimes referred 
to as the Getty Bronze).  This bronze statue was looted off the coast of Italy in 1964 by 
fishermen (Felch & Frammolino, 2011, p.10).  The bronze was taken ashore and was 
moved to various locations in an attempt to keep it hidden before being sold to Giacomo 
Barbetti, a local antiquities dealer in Gubbio.  Once purchased, Barbetti hid the bronze in a 
church, with assistance from Father Giovanni Nagni, who disguised the statue (Felch & 
Frammolino, 2011, p. 11).  It was later transported to Brazil though the specifics of this are 
still unclear.  The statue was then stored for three years at a monastery in Brazil before the 
bronze was sold to an art consortium (Artemis – based in Luxembourg) for $700,000 in 
1970s.  Heinz Herzer, a member of Artemis and an antiquities dealer, recognised the value 
of the statue and after transporting it to Munich, began a long process of restoration (Felch 
& Frammolino, 2011, p. 11) Herzer sent photographs to Bernard Ashmole (curator of 
Greek and Roman Art at the British Museum) to appraise the statue.  Ashmole then 
approached J. Paul Getty as a potential buyer (Felch & Frammolino, 2011, p. 11).  
Ultimately the Getty Museum purchased the Fano Bronze for $3.95 Million in 1977 (Felch 
and Frammolino, 2011).  The statue did not have a provenance, but an Italian court case in 
1968 determined that there was not substantial proof that the fishermen who discovered the 
statue were in Italian waters (potentially being in international water instead) at the time of 
the discovery (Felch and Frammolino, 2011), therefore denying the Italian government a 
claim of ownership and allowing this legal precedent to apply.  It is on the precedent of this 
case that the Getty museum therefore refused to return the statue (Felch and Frammolino, 
2011). 
Figure 5-2 (above) presents these cases in the format of individual scripts.  Only the 
looting phase has been displayed, in order to concisely and quickly demonstrate the 
practical and realistic use of this crime script.  When comparing the two scripts the order of 
the initial stages differs, as the Salisbury Hoard is initiated by motivated looters, while the 
Fano Bronze script is initiated by a chance find of the object (Stead, 1998; Felch and 
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Frammolino, 2011).  The different initiating circumstances of the two examples have 
distinct crime prevention implications.  Effective measures to deter or reduce metal 
detecting enthusiasts, in comparison to individuals who happen upon antiquities, will vary 
greatly.  The goal of this crime script model which has been developed and examined in 
this chapter is to provide an efficient and useful tool for analysts that is adaptive and 
responsive to the many challenges that ATNs poses.  The wide variety of methods, 
techniques, and actors which are represented in this network can be accurately and 
effectively portrayed in the crime script that has been developed, while also providing a 
tool that can be used within the framework of SCP. 
Having now examined the overarching and complete script, consideration can now turn to 
individual phases and stages.  This comparison between examples has sought to emphasise 
the purpose and aim of crime scripts.  It has demonstrated not only how these networks 
operates, but also described important and necessary components which could inform 
crime prevention methods.  As the following portion of this chapter will demonstrate, 
ATNs crime scripts provides a more focused and targeted form of crime prevention 
analysis than has been previously explored in the field of antiquities trafficking.  The script 
works to highlight facilitating circumstance or opportunity structures which are present 
within the network, and SCP then provides a framework with which appropriate and 
effective prevention strategies can be developed. 
5.2 Looting Phase   
STAGES P r o f i t ,  S u b s i s t e n c e ,  O r  L e i s u r e  
ENTRY 
Access Site 
(Intentionally, unintentionally) 
INSTRA.INIT. 
AND ACTUA. 
Search and Find Objects 
(Chance, Anticipated, Certain) 
DOING 
Loot Objects (Remove from location) 
(Overtly, Clandestinely) 
POST-CONDITION 
& EXIT Dispose of Object 
Fig. 5-3: The Looting Phase Crime Script of Antiquities Trafficking Networks 
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The looting phase of these networks, as is the most vital and necessary phase of the 
networks, as without an object, or antiquity, there can be no ATNs.  This phase breaks 
down the looting processes into four necessary stages (as seen in Figure 5-3, above). These 
include: access site, search and find objects (discovery), loot objects, and dispose of object.  
As this script has been developed as a potential script – meaning it considers the potential 
ways in which the crime is committed – the order of the stages is not intended to be rigid 
or static.  The stages can be moved or omitted to accurately reflect the available data or the 
manner in which the crime occurred. 
Each stage of the looting phase is a requirement for the crime to take place, with the end 
result of the object being looted.  The methods employed and ordering of stages can vary 
depending upon the circumstances of the looting and geographical location of the looting 
site.  Each stage will be dissected and discussed in the following section, with particular 
focus on the methods employed by actors within ATNs.  Additionally, within this phase 
the roles which actually participate in the looting of objects must be considered.  In order 
to better understand the different ways or methods by which objects are looted, a 
consideration of who is doing the looting must first be explored.  An understanding of the 
motivation behind this criminal activity will provide insight not only into how the actor 
views criminal opportunities, but also can help determine the most effective preventative 
methods to employ.   
5.2.1 Types of Looters 
In order for looting to occur, there must first be an individual who is motivated to loot.  As 
such, the motivation or driving force behind an individual’s action must be examined.  The 
ability to deter or prevent an individual from engaging in a crime is vital component of any 
crime prevention theory (Lab, 2016).  One of the primary concerns of this research project 
is related to the effective consideration and application of the SCP framework.  Therefore, 
to understand the motive of the looter it is vital to understand the most effective forms the 
crime prevention strategies or techniques.  It is then necessary at this stage, to consider 
why an individual chooses to engage in the looting of illicit antiquities.  
When considering the different types of looters who are commonly found to exist within 
the illicit antiquities network, three categories can be discerned: subsistence, profit, and 
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leisure.  These terms were defined in chapter 2, but will be briefly reiterated here to ensure 
a thorough understanding of the types of looters.   
• Subsistence looters: individuals, groups, or communities which engage in (illegal) 
looting as a means of survival (Kersel, 2007; Lundén, 2012). 
• Profit looters:  any type of individual, gang, or organised group of criminals who 
systematically loot cultural sites for a profit (Kersel, 2007; Lundén, 2012).  
• Leisure looters: describes an individual who engages in looting because of a 
personal enthusiasm for objects or the processes of discovering them (Kersel, 2007; 
Lundén, 2012).  
While these distinctions have been addressed in various articles or research, few studies 
have organised or analysed the motivation or types of looters in such detail (Kersel, 2007; 
Kersel, 2011; Lundén, 2012; Saad El-Gendi, 2012; Fabiani, 2016).  This is likely because 
most previous research is focused specifically on case studies, and not as part of a broader 
category of networks of a specific criminal type.  Determining the type or motivation of the 
looter for a particular script is a necessary element to consider as an individual has a 
specific motivation to engage in potentially planning and engaging in the activity of 
looting.  Understanding what has motivated this individual to participate in the activity is 
necessary to better understand and inform research as to common patterns or trends among 
similar motivations/types of looters.  This in turn will allow for more appropriate forms or 
types of crime prevention techniques to target offenders effectively.  If motives are 
identified, then correlative preventative measures can be identified.  Additionally, being 
able to understand the process of analysing risk versus reward, and to determine the point, 
motives, or factors by which the risk becomes too great, the reward too small, is an integral 
part of SCP.  This ties into a primary element of SCP, increasing the risk or effort while 
reducing the reward, so as to make the activity unattractive to the actor.  In understanding 
an actor’s motive this threshold of risk/reward/effort can be better understood and therefore 
result in more effective crime prevention.  
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5.2.2 Access Site 
Whether deliberate or not, accessing a site or area where cultural heritage may be located is 
the first necessary step that is required to loot an object.  Deliberately accessing a site 
would most likely include trespassing on either private or national property, unless you are 
on your own land.  Generally, there are two options for how an actor accesses a site: 
intentionally or unintentionally.  Intentionally would refer to deliberately trespassing or 
accessing a site in order to loot.  While unintentionally accessing a site would typically 
occur when a site was unknown.  The relative risks/effort/reward for these options offer 
contrasting outcomes to intentionally, or deliberately accessing a site indicated criminal 
intent from the start, whereas unintentionally accessing a site is not necessarily a criminal 
action.  This would indicate that preventative measures for these two options would likely 
be quite different.   
5.2.3 Search and Find (Discovering) Objects 
This stage presents one of the most versatile in the entire network script.  The discovery of 
antiquities often occurs in sporadic and unusual ways – rain reveals ancient monuments or 
fishermen catch an ancient bronze in their net (Felch and Frammolino, 2011; Yates, 2014).  
This stage is necessary to distinguish the manner by which an object is found, as it will 
dictate the corresponding crime prevention technique or method.  Discovery is not an 
inherently criminal act, similar to accessing a site.  These could simply be construed as 
activities – unbeknownst to the actor that any additional actions may result in criminal 
activity (i.e. looting).  However, if there is criminal intent, such as when tombaroli search 
graveyards for loot, this stage proves to reveal more (Atwood, 2004; Kersel, 2006a; 
Panella, 2014).  Undoubtedly criminal or not, the discovery of the object is still a necessary 
stage.  It should be noted that crime scripts depict the necessary actions for a crime to 
occur, but not necessarily every action is criminal.  Prior to this stage, there has been no 
risk associated with any activity.  The ultimate motives of the individuals or group are 
(likely) not known beyond themselves, and there is little-to-no risk for this stage or the 
previous one.     
This project will further detail the most common ways in which antiquities are discovered 
by classifying them as chance, anticipated, or certain finds.  Objects found by chance are 
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the result of an unexpected discovery of an antiquity.  As mentioned previously, this can 
include instances where heavy rains unearth archaeological objects or monuments – as was 
the case in Guatemala in 2001 when a six hundred-pound ball court marker was discovered 
and looted (Yates, 2014).  Anticipated finds describe locations with a likely chance of 
finding objects, including areas known to be culturally rich (graveyards or digging near 
other cultural monuments).  While the looters do not know exactly where to loot, it is 
probable they will unearth some objects.  Certain finds refer to looting in specific locations 
where known objects or antiquities are looted.  This can include looting from current 
excavations, or from established and popular sites (such as religious temples in India, or 
Valley of the Kings in Egypt) (Weeks and Hetherington, 2006; Kumar, 2018).  This 
demonstrates a common occurrence expert’s face when attempting to excavate.  When a 
community is alerted to the fact that objects of importance or value have been found, the 
likelihood of looters targeting the site increases (Brodie, 2012b).  Analysing the method by 
which looters find objects and antiquities presents ample opportunity to consider the many 
crime prevention methods and techniques to find the most effective deterring or 
preventative measures.  
5.2.4 Source Object (Loot) 
The looting of an object represents the first stage where a criminal activity actually takes 
place.  Prior stages have been preparatory, with the individual not engaging in a criminal 
action.  Once engaged in this stage, the looters are likely to continue progressing through 
the script, as the stage with the highest associated risk has already occurred.  The looting of 
the object also represents the stage where, culturally the most damage is inflicted 
(Mackenzie, 2005; Brodie et al., 2006; Hanson, 2008; Proulx, 2011b; Kersel, 2012).  Once 
the object has left its location of origin, it has lost all cultural and contextual value.  As a 
result, the object is virtually useless to archaeologists or anthropologists who may have 
been able to understand its importance or use within the context of where it was originally 
found (Brodie, 2006; Kersel, 2012).  The physical action of looting occurs either as: (1) 
overt looting – which refers to looting that takes place openly, or otherwise in a manner 
where no precautions are taken to disguise the activity of looting, or (2) clandestine looting 
in which an attempt to conceal their activity takes place.  Overt looting indicates that the 
looters see no risk or threat to themselves when openly looting.  This may be more typical 
in area where there is a lack of formal infrastructure or conflict zones (Alder and Polk, 
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2005).  Clandestine looting would then be more common for areas where looting is seen as 
a criminal and punishable offense, with increased levels of risk for the looters (Alder and 
Polk, 2005).  These two methods for looting represent contrasting levels of risk and as 
such, the ability to identify the method of looting would provide valuable information for 
prevention measures.  
5.2.5 Distribution 
There are a wide variety of ways in which the antiquity can proceed through a network at 
this point.  This final stage relates to the initial transfer of the antiquity from the hands of 
the looter to those who will move it beyond the discovery site and eventually onto a wider 
market – which will transition the object from the looting phase into the transit phase.  It 
may change hands multiple times, resulting in a complex network of transit and ownership, 
or result in a simple network with one individual acting as both trafficker and dealer of the 
object (Stead, 1998; Yates, 2015).  
Simply put, some of the more prevalent options include the looter selling the object (or 
objects) to: a smuggler, a middleman, a broker, a dealer, or buyer/collector (including an 
institution such as an auction house, gallery, museum, or university) (Fuenzalida V., 1957; 
Kersel, 2006a; Kersel, 2011; Campbell, 2013; Mackenzie and Davis, 2016).  Some likely 
options which will not be discussed in great detail at this time could include the looters not 
selling the objects - but keeping them, or the antiquities being forcibly taken from the 
looters.  It is unusual for looters to sell items directly to a museum – examples of this tend 
to be historical rather than modern day examples (Fuenzalida V., 1957). 
For the purposes of this thesis, the distinction between a middleman and a broker actor is 
necessary, as it indicates two separate entities.  These terms tend to be used 
interchangeably within most literature, and so it is important to review this distinction, so 
as to better understand the following analyses.  A diagram (Figure 5-4, below) has been 
provided, not only as an aid to understanding the actors being discussed within this section, 
but also to assist in understanding the following sections. 
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This diagram visually demonstrates the actors of middleman and broker, and their 
involvement in the market.  The middleman, as is apparent typically operates within the 
looting and transit phases, though he/she may also have contact with the market or a 
broker.  In contrast, the broker figure typically operates within the transit and market 
phase, though again, he/she may also interact with the looting phase and with middlemen. 
This stage may seem to have a myriad of potential options, but it reflects the very real 
versatility of the network and avenues which looters may take to distribute and sell their 
illicit antiquities: 
• Looter to Middleman: the looter sells, barters, or trades their illicit antiquities to a 
middleman.  This type of actor operates as an in-between actor, essentially 
introducing two entities for a cut of the profit.  A middleman would not necessarily 
be involved in the transit phase but would simply purchase the object as a means of 
turning it around and selling it onto a dealer, or buyer.  Middlemen operate solely 
within the illicit end of antiquities networks, and do not attempt to operate within 
the licit network. 
• Looter to Broker: This indicates that the looter is selling directly to a broker figure, 
who may or may not work to legitimize the antiquity.  Some brokers will operate in 
the illicit network, selling the illicit object to other dealers or buyers, while others 
Middle 
man 
 
Broker 
 
MARKET 
 
LOOTING 
 
TRANSIT 
 
Fig. 5-4: Middleman/Broker Network Diagram 
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will work to provide documentation of a history of ownership to then sell a 
‘legitimized’ object.   
• Looter to the Market:  When a looter sells an object directly to the market, this 
usually indicates that they (the buyer) are knowingly purchasing an illicit antiquity.  
For an institution, this type of transaction tends to be increasingly uncommon, as 
more often these institutions are at least attempting to demonstrate legal and ethical 
purchasing standards.  But there have been examples where this has occurred, such 
as the case of the Cerro El Plomo Child and the Museo Nacional de Historia 
Natural in Santiago, Chile (Fuenzalida V., 1957).  A child mummy was illegally 
excavated by looters in the Chilean Andes during the 1950s, and they ultimately 
sold the body and objects found with the body to the Museo Nactional de Historia 
Natural for 45,000 pesos (Fuenzalida V., 1957).  
Other considerations that can be made regarding how the object is sold, includes factors 
such as should be made as how the exchange took place (in person, electronically, etc.), the 
relationship between the looter and the purchaser (known associate, or new unknown 
contact) and whether this is a one-time exchange or an ongoing business transaction.  This 
is a complex stage and demonstrates the important interactions and the necessity for the 
various stages of the script.  As this is the final stage within the looting phase, the 
distribution of the object (or objects) begins to transition to the transit phase, where the 
object is transported.  This provides an opportunity for those analysing the script to 
consider the phase looting (both in its entirety, and as separate stages) as well as how the 
object will continue through the other phases of the script.   
5.3 Transit Phase 
STAGES S m u g g l e r  
ENTRY Obtains Object 
INSTRAMENTAL & 
ACTUAL INITIATION Transit Decision 
DOING Smuggles/Transports object across border 
POST CON. & EXIT Delivers OR sells object 
Fig. 5-5: Transit Crime Script (ATNs) 
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The transit phase represents the stage of the script which has the least amount of data or 
information available concerning the methods and techniques used by the actors within the 
network (Mackenzie and Davis, 2016).  While there is evidence when looting occurs, and 
evidence of when an object enters the antiquities market, it is much more difficult to 
determine how these objects progress from their site of origin to the antiquities market 
(Proulx, 2011b).  From previous case studies that document the trafficking aspect of the 
illicit antiquities market, it seems that the methods employed at this stage can vary 
depending upon the quantity and intent of the transit actors (McCalister, 2005; Bowman, 
2008; Proulx, 2011b).  As such, it should be noted that the order of the stages within this 
phase are not necessarily indicative of the most prevalent form or method of transit, but 
simply reflect the most logical order.  Depending on the specific transit script, these stages 
may be reorganized to better reflect the activity at hand.  The order of the script is largely 
dependent on if and when the object is purchased, as well as the manner in which the 
trafficker decides to transport the object.  The script also has the ability to repeat various 
stages or phases, or reorganize itself to better reflect the reality of the situation.  An 
integral part of these decisions will be based upon the object being trafficked either as an 
illicit object, or with the intent of creating a licit antiquity.   
5.3.1 Obtains Object 
This stage considers the immediate destination and transit of the antiquity.  The scope of 
travel for the object will have a considerable impact on the method or techniques used to 
traffic the object.  The two main considerations for the transit of the object relates to the 
destination of the objects and the method of transit that will be used.  Moving or 
transporting objects within a nation’s borders would typically present less of a risk, than 
international travel, but this is dependent on the country.  For example, in the case of the 
smuggler/broker figure of Val Edwards, who successfully smuggled hundreds of objects 
from Mexico to the United States, and who would sometimes encounter check points 
within Mexico to target drug trafficking (Honan, 1995). This is a result of international 
transit typically faces more scrutiny such as border patrols, immigration or passport 
control, and the need for documentation as a result of needing to pay duty on objects or 
goods (Schneider, 2008; Lobay, 2009; Vignal, 2017).  In transnational regions with open 
border policies – particularly the European Union – this promotes difficulties in regulating 
the trafficking of illicit goods, including illicit antiquities (Tijhuis, 2011).  International 
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destinations also present some difficulties, as a technique often used by traffickers is to 
traffic the object through multiple countries – either as a necessary part of the object 
reaching its ultimate destination, or as a means of camouflaging or distracting from its true 
destination (Alder and Polk, 2002; Alder and Polk, 2005). 
The transit of an object is a primary concern of the transit phase.  In order for ATNs to 
operate at such a successful level, the ability to move and traffic illicit antiquities is a 
necessary component (Alder and Polk, 2002).  This is especially true on a global level.  
The market for antiquities centres on specific cities and regions.  Typically, these tend to 
be areas with high levels of wealth, as is necessary for the art and antiquities market to 
operates (Merryman, 1986; Murphy, 1994; Alder and Polk, 2005).  The ability to supply 
such objects to these markets is vital for the survival of ATNs (Brodie, 1998; Polk, 2000; 
Kersel, 2006a; Mackenzie and Davis, 2016).  Analysis of the transit of illicit antiquities 
includes the consideration of common routes used by traffickers, as well the type of 
vehicle that may be used to transport objects.  Matters such as the number of countries an 
object may pass through, or the use of multiple and different types of vehicles are all 
considerations that must be examined in order to understand how traffickers are able to 
successfully move illicit antiquities transnationally.  
The destination and transit stage is a necessary component of the overall script, as it 
indicates the scope of the traffickers and highlights potential transit routes.  For example, it 
has been established in the field of illicit antiquities that free ports are commonly used by 
traffickers as a means of disguising and legitimising illicit antiquities (Alder and Polk, 
2005; Rose-Greenland, 2016).  This was highlighted after the analysis of prominent 
examples of illicit antiquities trafficking operations such as the complex network 
implemented by Giacomo Medici during his years active as an illicit antiquities trafficker 
(Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  The use of free ports such as Geneva, Switzerland served 
as an important trafficking tool in one of the better known examples of antiquities 
trafficking – that of Giacomo Medici (Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  Medici was 
responsible for the trafficking of such objects as the Euphronious Krater, and the Fano 
Bronze (Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  His trafficking network was exposed in the early 
2000s, when his warehouse in Geneva was raided by authorities and revealed over 2000 
illicit antiquities and photographic evidence of looting (Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  
The analysis and consideration of the particular destination (or destinations) and transit of 
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objects within ATNs is important in understanding how these networks operate, and 
therefore is vital to determining the most effective means of preventative measures or 
initiatives.  
5.3.2 Transit Decision 
The smuggling or transportation of an antiquity may require the use of a number of 
techniques in order to successfully deliver the object at its intended destination.  These 
techniques may include concealing, bribing, forging, or falsifying an object.  Once again, 
the intent of the actor – to pass the item off as a legitimate object or to attempt to conceal 
the object completely - is important in determining which technique will be used.  To 
conceal or smuggle the object might indicate that the antiquity being trafficked is relatively 
small.  Attempting to hide or conceal a large, heavy stela (a large stone or wooden slab, 
often used as a grave marker) would be impractical, but smaller objects such as pottery or 
textiles would not prove to be difficult (Alder and Polk, 2002).  However, there are cases 
where larger objects have been broken down into smaller pieces for the sake of 
transportation (Coggins, 1969).  The techniques described in this section detail some of the 
more common methods employed by traffickers, though these techniques may vary widely 
depending upon the size, quantity and destination of the object.   
• Concealing an antiquity for the means of transit is a more traditional form of 
trafficking.  When concealing an object, the trafficker may actively hide the object 
in the vehicle or method of transportation, or may not disclose the object at all 
when questioned as to the contents of the transport.  
• Bribing border agents or authority figures is another technique which is fairly 
traditional for traffickers of any illicit network.  This is generally quite effective in 
certain regions where bribery or corruption is part of the infrastructure of a nation 
or state (Dietzler, 2013).  It could also be effective if the relevant authority figure 
does not consider the trafficking of antiquities to be a harmful or dangerous type of 
crime.  This is a stigma that ATNs face at all levels and stages of these networks.  
Generally, people do not consider illicit antiquities to be on the same level of 
criminality as drug or weapons trafficking (Mackenzie, 2011).  This attitude could 
be exploited by traffickers to facilitate the illicit movement of objects.   
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• Forging documentation relevant to the object may include creating a false 
provenance (title of ownership), or forging papers which indicate that the object is 
legal.  As there is no universal system or documentation by which antiquities can 
be registered or regulated, being able to forge such documentation does not pose as 
great a hurdle as someone attempting to demonstrate legal ownership of potentially 
criminal objects such as weapons or vehicles.   
• Falsifying the object itself, or documentation pertaining to the object is another 
technique which may be used by traffickers.  There have been examples of the 
antiquities themselves being altered so that they appear to be something other than 
an antiquity (Atwood, 2004).  An example of this is evident in the case of a 
significant smuggling ring which was involved with the looting and trafficking of 
object from Sipan, Peru.  This network of traffickers “took the ceramics that 
Johnson [the buyer] had indicated he liked and sent them to a workshop in Lima, 
where craftsmen used mud and latex to add a false bottom to each pot, stamping it 
with the words Hecho en Bolivia (Made in Bolivia)” (Atwood, 2004, p. 83). This 
technique allowed the objects to be disguised as simple local crafts and not the 
reality of being ancient and precious objects. 
This stage represents an important part of the overall network as it has the potential of 
being one of the main points of intervention for crime prevention techniques and methods.  
Many illicit antiquities are discovered at border crossings, and with a more targeted form 
of intervention – as a result of analysis of type of objects, established routes, or common 
trends of trafficking in geographic areas – there is the potential of creating even more 
effective detection methods (Brodie, 2010). 
5.3.3 Smuggle/Transport 
In transporting an antiquity, it can occur at two different points in the process of trafficking 
an antiquity: either as an illicit object or as having gained some sort of provenance or 
legitimacy and being transported as a legal object (Polk, 2000; Massy, 2008; Hardy, 2016; 
Hauser-Schäublin and Prott, 2016; Mackenzie and Yates, 2016b).  The previous stage was 
concerned with determining specifics of how the object would be smuggled.  This stage is 
more concerned with when the object is in transit.  As noted at the beginning of this 
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chapter, the basic format of the script does not necessarily reflect every method by which 
an antiquity is trafficked or smuggled.  Consider the possibility that an object is looted.  A 
false provenance is created for it, and is then sold and transported to the purchaser.  In this 
instance, the order of the phases would be: looting, market, transit (in contrast to the 
typical format which is: looting, transit, market).  This stage is a necessary component for 
any market, and is particularly relevant for ATNs.  A more thorough understanding of 
when and how these objects are transported or smuggled can have extensive preventative 
implications.   
5.3.4 Deliver/Sell Object 
The sale of the antiquity after transport can potentially represent a transitionary moment 
for the object – depending on the type of sale that takes place.  It should be noted that this 
stage is dependent upon the needs of each specific script, as some scripts will not include a 
sale of the antiquity at this point in time.  For example, some traffickers will have already 
secured a buyer prior to transporting the object and would therefore not need to include 
this stage in that particular script.  When considering this stage in the context of crime 
prevention, the distinction of if the object is legal or illicit is important, as it allows for 
analysis of how and when the object transitions from an illicit antiquity, to a legal 
antiquity.  The main concerns of this script, and its relevance to future preventative 
measures lies in where the object or sold or delivered.  From a research perspective, this is 
a fundamentally important aspect of a trafficking network, as it presents insight into not 
only how these objects move, but the complexity of the network (i.e. does it pass through 
multiple hands, or go directly to a purchaser?). 
5.4 Market Phase 
This phase is comprised of different roles: that of the middleman and the broker.  These 
two roles are distinctly different, and can operate either in tandem or independently of each 
other.  A most significant difference between the two would be that the middleman deals in 
illicit antiquities, whereas a broker operates with objects either in transition from illicit to 
licit or fully licit objects.  The goal of both of these roles ultimately, is to sell their 
products.  In the case of antiquities this usually means onto either dealers, or collectors or 
institutions (Brodie et al., 2006; Proulx, 2011b; Campbell, 2013).  In this process, there are 
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a number of combinations as to the order of the script.  What is depicted in Figure 5-6 
represents a typical script, but not necessarily a standard one.  For instance, the role of the 
middleman could be completely omitted from the script in the case that a smuggler sold 
directly to a dealer or broker. 
STAGES M i d d l e m a n  B r o k e r  
ENTRY Purchases Object Purchases Illicit Antiquity 
INSTRAMENTAL 
INITIATION Contacts Buyer 
Research/Assesses Object 
ACTUAL INITIATION  Provenance Decision 
DOING 
 Sells Object to Buyer Sell Object 
Fig. 5-6: Market Crime Script (ATNs) 
 
5.4.1 Middleman 
The role of the middleman represents the final fully criminal actor within the network.  
This individual manages illicit transactions.  Other terms for this role include trafficker – 
this individual is someone who can connect illicit sellers with illicit buyers, and antiquities 
with collectors.  This role is a driving force behind antiquities trafficking - they often take 
on the greatest amount of risk, but also the largest profit (Brodie, 1998). 
5.4.1.1 Purchase/Hire 
Middlemen are not necessarily interested in keeping antiquities, but in selling them onto 
dealers, collectors, or institutions.  They may – as in the case of the Empress Dou figurines 
– seek out specific objects for a client, but more often it seems that they work more in a 
manner of trying to obtain objects they know they will have buyers or dealers purchasing 
(Brodie, 2016).  In some respects, this indicates that middlemen are likely to specialise in 
particular types, regions, or eras of antiquities, as they can then target a particular clientele.   
5.4.1.2 Contact Buyer 
How does a middleman contact or find a buyer once they’ve attained an antiquity?  A 
relevant and important question.  There seems to be a wide range of possibilities for this, as 
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middlemen can operate by having a buyer already in place, thereby conforming to market 
demands and producing objects which are trendy and profitable, or find buyers based on 
the supply that is available to them (Brodie, 2012a; Yates, 2015; Brodie, 2016).  This is 
highly dependent upon how involved the middleman is in the network.  For example, a 
middleman could operate as simply a link in a chain, organising the movement of an 
antiquity, or they can manage and operate vast networks of looters and brokers or dealers.  
While a vital part of how the overall network operates there is limited data concerning 
purely criminal actors.  Brokers are typically more visible as they interact with the legal 
sector of the market, while middlemen stay within the criminal sector.  As such, what can 
be determined is that the middleman can operate either with a buyer already established, or 
the need to find a buyer.  In both cases, determining how these two individuals became 
acquainted would provide valuable insight into how these networks function.   
5.4.1.3 Sell to Buyer 
Once a buyer has been established, the broker then transfers the object to the ownership of 
another middleman, a dealer, or a collector who knowingly purchases an illicit antiquity.  
Depending on where the object originated, as well as the type of object, there could 
potentially be multiple middlemen or brokers in the process of an antiquity reaching a 
collector or institution.  For example in the ground-breaking study conducted by 
Mackenzie and Davis (2016) on antiquities trafficking in Cambodia, they detail a network 
of middlemen, who facilitate the progress of an object from the site where it was looted, to 
eventually reaching collectors in Western and Asian markets.  There can be a varying, 
almost hierarchical levels of middlemen within the network, who operate within different 
markets (Bowman, 2008; Proulx, 2011b; Mackenzie and Davis, 2016). 
5.4.2 Broker 
This broker plays the instrumental role of transitioning an object from illicit to licit.  It has 
been established that the antiquities market is a grey (rather than white or black market) 
and unregulated market, but operates a fully legal market in countries across the globe 
(Bowman, 2008; Bland, 2009).  The antiquities market is an old market, and one that can 
be rather slow to move with the times.  It is an industry built on tradition, history (literally), 
wealth, and often social status.  Brokers (and dealers) traditionally had to rely on personal 
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or business connections to establish clients.  Consider individuals such as Giacomo Medici.  
As previously mentioned, Medici was notorious antiquities trafficker, who prior to the 
exposure of his criminal activities, was an individual well known within the antiquities 
community (Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  Medici often operated as a dealer, but on rare 
occasions also played the role of broker.  In the case of the Euphronious Krater, Medici 
was responsible for purchasing the krater off the Italian looters, transporting it to his 
warehouse in Geneva, and ultimately selling the krater onto the dealer Robert Hecht 
(Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  Hecht would go on to sell the ‘hot pot’ to the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1971 for the (at the time) shocking amount of 1 million 
USD (Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  In this example Medici operated as a broker – 
bridging the gap between looters and dealer (Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  Medici was 
able to do this as a result of his business connections within the antiquities world, and was 
able to make a significant profit as a result (Watson and Todeschini, 2006). 
5.4.2.1 Purchase 
The broker will likely come into possession with an antiquity through one of three ways: 
either directly from the looters, from a middleman, or from another dealer.  This is entirely 
dependent upon the progression of the object from its location of origin, coupled with the 
working connections and relationships of the dealer.   
5.4.2.2 Research/Assess Object 
In order for a broker to fully understand the worth of the object, or even any potential legal 
issues or difficulties, they must assess or research the object (Alder and Polk, 2005).  This 
can be done in a more structured sense – by researching for evidence of an object within 
the antiquities market, or previous research in situ of the object by archaeologists or 
academics.  Alternatively, a broker can independently assess and value the object to 
determine its potential worth.  This stage not only assesses the value of the object, but also 
provides an opportunity for the broker to evaluate the potential risks that may be 
undertaken by attempting to sell this object.  
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5.4.2.3 Provenance Decision 
As has been discussed, the antiquities market operates as a grey market, meaning that 
portions of it are unregulated (Brodie, 2014b).  In particular, the use and requirement of 
provenance is an unregulated aspect of the antiquities market, as there are still many sales 
and purchases of objects that lack proper provenances (Alder and Polk, 2005).  Even when 
an object has a provenance, it may not have been properly researched to determine the 
validity of the provenance.  As a result of this lack of regulation, the manipulation of 
provenances is an important aspect that dealers use in ATNs to transition objects from 
illicit to a seemingly legal object (Alder and Polk, 2005). 
Actors within the network will create and establish provenances to lend an illicit antiquity 
a sense of legitimacy.  The case of the Dancing Shiva demonstrates the ease with which a 
provenance can be created or falsified.  In 2013, investigative journalist Jason Felch 
(Felch, 2013a) broke news of a looted statue which was sold to the National Gallery of 
Australia (NGA) by New York antiquities dealer Subhash Kapoor.  The bronze statue had 
been looted from a temple in India, and then trafficked to New York, where Kapoor then 
sold the item for five million dollars (AUS) to the NGA under the guise of having 
purchased the object from a Washington D.C. diplomat and presented the NGA with an Art 
Loss Register (ALR) certificate (ALR is a company which operates a database of known 
looted or stolen objects) stating that according to the ALR, the statue was not looted 
(Felch, 2013a). 
Kapoor provided the museum with a document stating that he had purchased the bronze 
from a Washington D.C. man in October 2004.  He also signed a warranty prepared by the 
museum that transferred title to the NGA and indemnified the museum in case of a breach 
(Felch, 2013a).  With only this information, the National Gallery of Australia purchased 
the object (along with a variety of other objects from Kapoor) only for photographic 
evidence to appear demonstrating that the object had been looted and trafficked (Felch, 
2013a).  Had it not been for the efforts of individuals within India seeking to protect their 
cultural heritage, Kapoor’s illicit dealings may not have been discovered for some time.  
Vijar Kumar of the India Pride Project was responsible for alerting authorities to the 
likelihood that that object had been looted, which resulted in an investigation by the Tamil 
Nadu police into the issue (Kumar, 2018).  This represents just one example of creating a 
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false sense of legitimacy for an object.  Ultimately, the decision to create a provenance is 
dependent upon the type of sale that the middleman or broker is hoping to achieve.  Large 
institutions (museums, universities, auction houses) may prefer for objects to have 
provenance, but without clear evidence of an object being looted (such as the photographic 
evidence provided in the Kapoor case), there is little legal action that can take place 
(Proulx, 2011a).  The use of provenance as a tool to facilitate the illicit antiquities network 
demonstrates the importance of analysing the frequency of use, type of provenance, and 
market practices related to provenance in order to determine effective crime prevention 
interventions.  
5.4.2.4 Sell Object 
The final stage of the script is concerned with how the antiquity enters the legal and 
accepted antiquities market.  It is assumed that at this stage the antiquity has, through 
various techniques gained the appearance of legitimacy to the point that it is able to be 
offered for sale on the antiquities market.  The broker has a number of options for actually 
selling the object.  This includes selling it to: an antiquities dealer, a private collector, an 
institution (museum, university or auction house), or not selling, but donating the object.  
Once this stage has occurred, the script is complete, as the antiquity is now considered a 
legal object within the antiquities market.   
Without buyers such as internationally renowned museums willing to purchase somewhat 
questionable items (National Gallery of Australia – Dancing Shiva), or private collectors 
willing to overlook the origins of an object in order to round out their collection (Yates, 
2015) the market for illicit antiquities would not exist.  With the sale of the antiquity, the 
individual who takes the largest cut of the profit will be the actor who operates as a link 
between the looting and sale of the object (Davis and Mackenzie, 2015). This is typically 
the middleman or brokering actor, and, as they take on the largest risk (transitioning the 
object from illicit to licit), they reap the largest reward  (Davis and Mackenzie, 2015).  As 
a result of this, the market phase of the script is essentially directly funding the transit 
phase – meaning it is funding and facilitating ATNs.  
By analysing these stages and phases, a better and more specific understanding of how 
ATNs operates and is structured can be appreciated.  The opportunity structure of the 
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crime is more evident, and the network of individuals and actors within the script become 
more apparent and understood.  This final stage provides the ability to analyse where and 
by whom these objects ultimately come to settle.  Understanding the flow and destination 
of the market can help determine effective campaigns and strategies to help prevent and 
reduce ATNs.  
5.5 Conclusion: The Value of Crime Script Analysis for 
Crime Prevention 
This chapter has focused on presenting a crime script model for ATNs to allow for further 
analysis within a SCP framework.  CSA requires one to breakdown in quite detailed ways 
structure and organization that can support development of specific and focused crime 
prevention strategies.  Classic SCP theory gives us the crime triangle, which dictates that in 
order for a crime to occur, there are three necessary elements: a likely offender (offender), 
a suitable target, and a time and place (Clarke and Eck, 2016).  In parallel to the three 
necessary elements, there are three controllers which work to prevent the crime from 
taking place: a handler, a manager, and a guardian (Clarke and Eck, 2016).  The scripts 
discussed here for ATNs, make clear the elements of the crime triangle within the varying 
stages of each phase.  While the crime triangle presents a simple concept for understanding 
the necessary component for a crime to occur, crime scripting expands upon this concept to 
create a more detailed and targeted form of crime prevention analysis (Borrion, 2013).   
This chapter has demonstrated the convenience and practicality which crime scripts can 
provide for studying and combating ATNs.  The creation of this crime script model will 
allow for further versatile and efficient analysis of specific case studies of illicit antiquities 
looting, while providing a framework which easily translates to creating and developing 
crime preventions strategies (this will be demonstrated in chapters 7 and 8 with an analysis 
of the case study the antiquities network within the ongoing conflict in Syria).  This 
chapter has sought to highlight the importance and advantageous nature of CSA as it 
provides a much-needed analysis tool to the study of illicit antiquities.    
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6. Facilitating Factors of Antiquities Trafficking 
Networks 
6.1 Introduction  
Having examined the crime script that was generated for ATNs and considered the various 
phases and stages that are necessary for these networks to exist, this chapter will offer a 
critical view of the factors which facilitates the actors and activities within this illicit 
network.  By determining what these factors are, there can be a better understanding of what 
preventative actions or strategies will be effective.  Ultimately, this chapter will provide the 
necessary components to inform the following chapter, which will consider the appropriate 
crime prevention techniques and strategies for ATNs.  Within this chapter, each phase will 
be examined in turn, with a final section considering the network as a whole.  This will help 
to highlight important factors for each phase of the network, while still considering broader 
factors or circumstances which affect all phases of the network.  The chapter can be 
introduced with the simple question: how do looters use or create opportunities which allow 
them to loot illicit antiquities?  After a close study of the crime scripts, along with an 
examination of the dataset of previous examples of antiquities looting and trafficking, 
important factors can be derived which helped to ease or allow the criminal action of looting, 
transit or marketing of illicit antiquities.  This will ultimately demonstrate the targeted 
analysis which crime script allows, while also establishing a framework upon which 
situational prevention strategies can be considered.   
6.2 Facilitating Factors of the Looting Phase 
In the process of looting an antiquity, there are four main components which help an 
individual or group of individuals to (generally) facilitate successful looting of an object.  
This section will examine the four factors or circumstances which directly help actors to 
physically remove an object or antiquity from its location of origin.  These include a lack 
of formal infrastructure, known archaeological sites, access to equipment, and the nature of 
antiquities. 
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6.2.1 Lack of Formal Infrastructure  
Subsistence looting typically occurs in smaller regions or communities, where public 
services (healthcare, policing, community infrastructure, economic aid/development) are 
either suspended, non-existent, or failing (Merryman, 1986; Lundén, 2012; Brodie, 2014b).  
These are usually regions which face extreme poverty or economic distress and as a result, 
resort to looting illicit antiquities to survive or provide for themselves and/or their families 
(Merryman, 1986; Lundén, 2012; Brodie, 2014b).  
This lack of formal infrastructure can result in less policing or less possibility for the 
protection or surveillance of archaeological sites (Chappell and Polk, 2011).  The lack of a 
formal infrastructure presents an opportunity for these looters, due to the relative ease with 
which they can take advantage.  Regardless of specific cases, the lack of infrastructure is 
(usually) not a direct result of any action taken by subsistence looters, but a result of 
circumstances (Saad El-Gendi, 2012).  As a result, this type of situation provides the 
opportunity for locals to engage in looting antiquities at a lower level of risk and provides 
them with the opportunity to survive (Merryman, 1986; Lundén, 2012; Campbell, 2013).  
By engaging in more analysis and examinations of crime scripts developed for specific 
cases of subsistence looting, a better understanding of how subsistence looting manifests 
itself in different communities can be gained.  Ultimately, this could provide more 
effective and targeted crime prevention strategies. 
6.2.2 Known Archaeological Sites   
It might seem counter-intuitive to consider archaeological sites as facilitating 
circumstances, but not when one considers the geographic area of many sites, an inability 
to property enclose or surveil sites, and the fact that the public is well aware of its location 
and antiquities.  Archaeological or cultural heritage sites usually operate as touristic or 
educational facilities, and act as legitimate economic resources for communities or nations 
(Brodie, 2010).  These public and publicized sites provide significant opportunity for 
looters to easily find valuable antiquities.   
Pompeii in Italy or the Valley of the Kings in Egypt represents significant cultural and 
archaeological sites which are well known and publicised to the public (Weeks and 
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Hetherington, 2006; Wallace, 2013).  Both areas are expansive and receive thousands of 
visitors each day (Weeks and Hetherington, 2006; Anon, 2018a).  These types of 
archaeological and cultural sites provide an easy way for looters provide almost a 
guarantee of finding antiquities.  While some of the more prestigious sites may have 
formal means of surveillance and protection, many sites do not (Alder and Polk, 2002; 
Alder and Polk, 2005).  As such, there is little in the way of formal protection (fences, 
guards, cameras, etc.), meaning that many of these sites are left relatively insecure to 
looters (McCalister, 2005).  There are also many archaeological and cultural sites which 
are known to the local community or have been discovered, but lack the appropriate 
funding to complete a proper excavation – and as such are left unattended (McCalister, 
2005; Kersel, 2007; Bowman, 2008; Kersel, 2011).  These types of sites are particularly 
attractive to looters and they face little formal means of surveillance or protection, and thus 
present an easy and rewarding opportunity.   
6.2.3 Access to Equipment  
The looting of antiquities can be a relatively simple activity or can be one which includes 
sophisticated equipment and tools (Bowman, 2008).  Situations or sites where specialised 
equipment for looting – such as bulldozers, heavy digging machinery, and metal detectors 
– are readily available creates the perfect opportunity for the looting of illicit antiquities.  
For example, there are times archaeological sites or cultural heritage sites are unearthed 
and discovered during the course of construction (Povoledo, 2017).  Normally, the official 
process when this occurs would be to notify the appropriate departments or ministries and 
have trained archaeologists or specialists visit the site and determine if any action need be 
taken to protect or preserve items of interest (Anon, 2018c).  If this normal procedure is not 
implemented, or if the construction is being done by private individuals they may ignore 
preservation procedures, and instead choose to make use of the equipment that is readily 
available and unearth the antiquities or site themselves.  Such was the case when General 
Electric (GE) workers in the United States unearthed archaeological object (Munson et al., 
1995).  These remains were neither reported to state authorities nor to GE (the landowner) 
and for three months starting in June 1988, and the GE Mound was looted (Munson et al., 
1995).  This represents one possible example of how access to specialised types of 
equipment could act as a facilitating circumstance. 
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The ability to access such equipment easily poses an important factor, as the ability to 
move easily large quantities of earth – and potentially find valuable antiquities – 
demonstrates a low effort and high reward aspect of this network.  If an individual has easy 
and low-risk access to specialized looting equipment, this serves as a facilitating factor for 
engaging in the looting of antiquities.  The actor would likely have access to the equipment 
regardless of whether the antiquity was discovered – demonstrating that this can be 
classified as an advantageous factor.  This type of situation presents the type of opportunity 
that allows the individual or group of individuals to very quickly determine the risk, effort, 
and reward levels, and is therefore relevant for consideration of crime prevention 
strategies.  
6.2.4 Nature of Antiquities  
Antiquities have been treated as analogous to natural resources as a non-renewable cultural 
resource (Cameron, 1994).  There exists a finite amount of antiquities in the world, and 
many of them lay, as of yet, undiscovered (Cameron, 1994).  In the case of an 
archaeological or cultural heritage site that has not been discovered, there is a significant 
advantage for looters should they find it first.  If it is unknown, it cannot be guarded, 
protected, or identified in any manner, and this also provides the additional difficulty of 
authorities not being able to prove from where the object originated (McCalister, 2005).  
These types of opportunities usually occur when someone haphazardly stumbles upon a 
site or antiquities during the course of construction, general maintenance, farming, or 
simply from sheer coincidence.  In such a case, when an individual comes upon this 
potential opportunity, there is little to deter him/her from engaging in the activity.  Once an 
antiquity has been removed from its place of origin, it is very hard to prove from where it 
originated (Alder and Polk, 2002; Alder and Polk, 2005; Brodie, 2014b).  While experts 
may be able to place which region or general area an object originated from, it is highly 
unlikely that experts could pinpoint the exact location (Brodie, 2006; Brodie et al., 2006; 
Hanson, 2008; Parcak, 2017).  As such, if a looter is confident that experts of authorities 
would not be able to identify who looted the object, or where it originated from, the risk 
associated is lowered and therefore facilitates the looting.  
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6.3 Facilitating Factors of the Transit Phase 
This phase is concerned with the transporting or smuggling of an antiquity.  It is not 
uncommon that an antiquity, at some point during its existence, will cross a national 
border, either as a ‘legal’ object, or as an illegal object.  A number of factors contribute to 
this transnational movement including the use of previously established 
smuggling/trafficking routes, national borders, the ability to easily disguise or conceal an 
object, and corrupt actors.   
6.3.1 Previously Established Smuggling/Trafficking Routes  
The types of individuals who engage in smuggling antiquities are potentially also involved 
in additional smuggling networks.  As it is a smuggler’s or trafficker’s business to know 
and exploit the weaknesses of borders, border agents, or checkpoints, it would make sense 
that smugglers would operate within many various networks, as this would provide 
additional profitable opportunities (Alder and Polk, 2002).  Previously established 
smuggling routes, including weapons or drug networks, could easily translate to the illicit 
antiquities network (Campbell, 2013). This demonstrates the potential (especially for 
criminal organisations with expansive networks) to take advantage of already established 
routes and illicit networks, and simply expand upon them to include illicit antiques (Alder 
and Polk, 2002; Campbell, 2013).  Using these routes would provide a simple way of 
increasing profit in exchange for little increase in effort.  Equally, there would be little to 
no increase in risk on the part of existing smugglers, and as such represents an ample 
opportunity for actors.  
6.3.2 Easily Disguised/Hidden 
A significant difficulty faced when studying ATNs is that unlike other illicit networks, 
antiquities are not considered inherently illegal (Polk, 2000; Alder and Polk, 2002; 
Mackenzie and Graycar, 2002; Mackenzie, 2011).  Unlike a gun or packet of drugs, a 
border agent or authority figure may not necessarily suspect the object to be illicit (Proulx, 
2011b).   This facilitates the actor’s ability to conceal or disguise illicit antiquities as either 
local handiworks, or legal objects.  The size and variety of many antiquities also allows 
antiquities to be easily concealed (Alder and Polk, 2002).  As an antiquity can take shape 
in almost any form or any material, it is hard to target specifically these objects.  
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In contrast, there would likely be distinct signs or patterns to identify when attempting to 
detect weapons (shape, size, ammunition or explosive particles, etc.).  Concealing ancient 
coins or smaller works of pottery among similar but modern objects (often en-masse) 
would be difficult to identify unless examined by an expert (Alder and Polk, 2002).  
Additionally, passing off antiquities as a fake, or trinket is an easy method, and one used 
by a number of smugglers (Alder and Polk, 2002).  Many forms of antiquities lend 
themselves to often being overlooked, concealed, or disguised easily, which in turn allows 
actors to traffic them without much difficulty.  
6.3.3 National Borders  
Many countries have expansive borders, which are difficult to patrol or fence.  As a result, 
national borders are rarely completely secure – providing opportunity for traffickers and 
smugglers to move wares across the weaker sections (Lobay, 2009; Tijhuis, 2011; Vignal, 
2017).  This is also the case for antiquities looting and trafficking.  Many source countries 
are developing nations, which may lack the necessary resources to adequately protect or 
police their borders.  This allows for antiquities to be smuggled or trafficked with relative 
ease and low risk.  Other borders which facilitate the illicit antiquities network are open 
borders, such as many countries within the European Union (Benyon, 1994; Christiansen 
and Erik Jørgensen, 2007; Kersel, 2007).  As the EU has an open border policy – meaning 
that people and vehicles can cross national borders with fewer immigration or custom 
checks – this also allows for the open movement of illicit objects, including antiquities 
(Tijhuis, 2011). 
6.3.4 Corruption  
There are many aspects of preparing an object for transit which are made easier through a 
network of contacts of illicit actors.  Bribery of border officials or other authority figures 
within the market help to facilitate the trafficking of illicit antiquities (Alder and Polk, 
2005; Dietzler, 2013).  This can include individuals susceptible to bribery at some point in 
the journey of the object or be a systemic issue that is an ingrained custom within a nation 
or region (Alder and Polk, 2005).  Corruption of states or individuals pose a significant 
facilitating circumstance, as it provides actors within the network the ability to remove 
evidence of an object’s transit, or even existence (Dietzler, 2013).  This also inducts further 
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corrupt actors with a stake in the object into the network as, if the object is exposed to 
someone in the network; it is likely that the corrupt actor may be implicated in the crime as 
well.  Additionally, if these actors do not necessarily view illicit antiquities as a dangerous 
commodity, or threatening object, they may be more susceptible to ‘looking the other 
way’. 
6.4 Facilitating Factors of the Market Phase 
The final phase of the network, the market phase, presents many interesting opportunities 
for those hoping to engage with the illicit antiquities network.  Of all the phases, the trade 
phase poses the most complex in terms of actors operating within the grey area of legal and 
illegal or illicit within the network (Alder and Polk, 2005).  This grey aspect of the network 
allows for actors to take advantage of specific factors within networks including 
unnecessary provenance, profit, and long-term investments.  This section will focus on 
examining and discussing how these factors occur within the market, and opportunities 
they provide. 
6.4.1 Provenance Unnecessary  
When considering other high-value markets, it is vital to consider the measures that must 
be taken to sell or purchase an object (such as a car or a house).  Paperwork of some sort – 
usually demonstrating ownership – is usually exchanged or reviewed, and if you attempt to 
sell or purchase one of these objects without the appropriate paperwork or registrations, it 
is likely to be considered a slightly suspicious transaction.  Within the antiquities market, it 
is becoming more common for buyers or sellers to attempt to have a provenance (title or 
history of ownership) for objects, but typically it is not required of objects which had been 
purchased or owned prior to 1970 (as a result of the 1970 UNESCO Convention) (Brodie, 
2006; Ulph et al., 2012; Brodie, 2014a; Hardy, 2016).  Additionally, as the 1970 UENSCO 
resolution is dependent upon each member state enforcing the regulations and practices 
indicated in the convention, not every state or even auction strictly abides by the 
convention (Brodie, 2006; Ulph et al., 2012; Hardy, 2016).  This casual attitude allows the 
market to remain unregulated, and as a result, it easily facilitates the selling and purchasing 
of illicit antiquities. 
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There are instances within the market whereby individuals claim objects are from ‘an old 
family collection’ and consequently no receipt or proof of purchase exists (Gill and 
Chippindale, 1993; Renfrew, 2000; Ulph et al., 2012).  This claim is technically plausible 
as it represents one of three possible alternatives for the appearance of an object not legally 
excavated: “[t]here are essentially three sources for this: the illicit excavation of 
archaeological sites; the modern creation of objects; and the re-emergence of figures from 
the obscurity of ‘old collections’ where they had been forgotten” (D. Gill & Chippindale, 
1993, p. 10).  The validity and ethical nature of the object must be determined with 
significant research into its acquisition.  The market allows such behaviour and practices, 
as it nevertheless profits from them (Polk, 2009).  As the lack of regulation of provenance 
does not affect the profit or overall market in any particular way, there is little motivation 
for the market to embrace any regulating policies or mandates.   
While some dealers or brokers may choose not to provide a provenance for their object, it 
is becoming more common to see at least an attempt at inquiring about provenance from 
auction houses and dealers.  This may be a result of the increase in cases from nations or 
communities requesting illicit objects be returned – as evidenced by the multiple examples 
of the Getty Museum returning large quantities of items to Italy (Watson and Todeschini, 
2006; Brodie, 2012b; Brodie, 2015c).  In some cases, efforts to ascertain provenance are 
cursory at best – such as the National Gallery of Australia’s lack of research when 
purchasing the Dancing Shiva from Subhash Kapoor in 2013 (Felch, 2013a).  Accordingly, 
ATNs have used this glaring oversight by the market as a means of legitimising their 
products, using forged or falsified provenance (as evident from famous traffickers such as 
Medici, Kapoor, Hecht, and Drew and Swetnam) (Kaiser, 1990; Watson and Todeschini, 
2006).  The case of the Euphronious Krater represents a prominent example of a faked 
provenance causing controversy in determining the legitimacy and authenticity of an object 
(Watson and Todeschini, 2006).  Robert Hecht was able to provide a legitimate provenance 
for a Krater that was attributed to Euphronios but was ultimately revealed to belong to a 
different Krater: 
Hoving [director of the Met] resigned from the Metropolitan in 1977, but by 
1993 he had come to believe that there were in fact two Euphronios kraters: one 
that had been illegally excavated in 1971 and subsequently acquired by the 
Metropolitan, and a second less-well-preserved one that had been in the 
possession of Sarrafian as claimed and documented, but that had subsequently 
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turned up the collection of Bunker Hunt (Hoving 1993: 338-9, 2001e).  Hecht 
had simply taken the provenance and documentation from the Sarrafian/Bunker 
Hunt krater and attached it to the illegally-excavated and better-preserved 
Sarpedon krater bought by the Metropolitan.  (Brodie, 2012b)  
 
This example demonstrates not only the facilitating role a provenance can provide for an 
illicit antiquity, but also the difficulty in regulating provenances and the market overall.  
As many antiquities do not have photographic evidence of their existence, let alone their 
excavation, the ability to create or forge a provenance remains quite easily done.  Through 
the use of transit countries, traffickers can also strengthen the provenance of an object, 
especially through countries which have free ports (Alder and Polk, 2005; Casey, 2017).  
Free ports also provide strategic opportunity for antiquities smugglers, as the risk of 
objects being detected is small, and the ability to transport objects through multiple 
countries affords them greater legitimacy – and increasingly less scrutiny as a result (Alder 
and Polk, 2005; Casey, 2017). Therefore, the manufacturing of provenance for antiquities 
demonstrates a deliberate factor for actors within the network, and one that helped to cloud 
the issue of legitimate antiquities.  Because of the lack of regulation within the antiquities 
market, traffickers can use this system to imbue objects with a sense of legitimacy through 
a process which would ideally seek to combat ATNs. 
 
6.4.2 Profit  
While this may seem to be an obvious factor, the largest profit for these objects will be 
taken by the dealers, or indeed middlemen in this network (Brodie, 1998).  These are the 
individuals who typically work to legitimise an object and can sell it on the open 
antiquities market (Mackenzie and Davis, 2016).  As such, they tend to take on the greatest 
risk, but also the greatest profit (Brodie, 1998).  It must be noted that at some point in this 
process, these individuals are being significantly rewarded by the market for engaging in 
illicit activities  (Brodie, 1998).  The market – and mostly the buyer’s end of the market – 
gives great incentive for dealers to acquire illicit objects and sell them on to buyers who 
don’t thoroughly question their origin (Alder and Polk, 2002; Alder and Polk, 2005; 
Chappell and Polk, 2011).  This is one of the most significant facilitating opportunities in 
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this network, as the market rewards those who participate in it – and with little 
consequences for those who may engage in the illicit aspect of the market. 
6.4.3 Long-Term Investment  
Antiquities, whether illicit or licit, can be considered to be a long-term investment (Alder 
and Polk, 2005; Lundén, 2012; Graham, 2014).  Many wealthy individuals invest in art as 
it is a safe way of insuring and distributing money as assets (Graham, 2014).  This is 
because antiquities do not (typically) lose value in any significant way; once appraised, 
their value will remain steady except in circumstances where certain object’s market value 
may increase or decrease slightly depending on purchasing or collecting trends (Alder and 
Polk, 2005; Graham, 2014).  When considering illicit antiquities, actors may take 
advantage of the ability to store antiquities long-term and bring them to market at a more 
appropriate time.  This is a tactic that was evident in the decades following the looting of 
archaeological sites during the Gulf War and the Iraq War of 2003 – which also included 
the looting (theft) of the Baghdad Museum (Brodie, 2008).  Neil Brodie (Brodie, 2011) 
focused on tracking the sales and purchases of unprovenanced cuneiform cylinders: 
Between 1997 and 2002, for example, eight cuneiform inscribed clay barrels, 
dating to about 1900bc and celebrating King Sîn-iddinam’s dredging of the 
River Tigris, appeared for auction. Not one had any indication of provenance. 
The first to appear was at Sotheby’s New York in May 1997. The catalogue entry 
stated correctly that at the time only three similarly inscribed barrels were known 
– one each at the Louvre, the Ashmolean Museum, and Chicago’s Oriental 
Institute….  Nor were any questions asked over the following five years when a 
further seven unprovenanced barrels turned up at auction. It is hardly credible 
that so many of these barrels should have been in circulation since before 1974, 
eluding scholarly and public view, only to appear en masse at a time when there 
was widespread looting of archaeological sites in southern Iraq. A more 
parsimonious explanation for their sudden appearance is that, in fact, they were 
looted after 1990 and illegally traded.  (Neil Brodie, 2011, p. 120) 
 
 
This highlights this issue perfectly, while also detailing the facilitating aspects of 
unprovenanced objects (Brodie et al., 2013; Brodie, 2014b).  It demonstrates the ease with 
which actors within the network can wait to introduce the objects to the market until an 
advantageous time presents itself.  Storing an antiquity, either on a short-term or long-term 
basis, does not require extensive equipment (Mackenzie, 2011).  All that is typically 
needed is a room or space which remains at a consistent temperature and level of humidity, 
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to help preserve the object.  This may not be the case with all antiquities, as they are made 
of a number of diverse materials and in many forms and sizes.  The ability to store an 
antiquity (without it losing value) for a significant period of time allows actors within the 
network to operate on a long-term basis.  This helps to facilitate the illicit antiquities 
network as it increases the window (or timeline) of profit. 
6.5 Entire Antiquities Trafficking Networks 
There are some factors and circumstances which are applicable to more than one phase, 
and as such they will be examined in this section.  The three factors listed here represent 
more complex issues than any previously discussed in this chapter.  They represent 
fundamental facilitators which allows ATNs to continually survive. 
6.5.1 Criminal Networks (Organised Crime) 
Profit motivated looters represent actors choosing to engage in looting as a source of 
income, or as part of a criminal lifestyle.  In such cases, it is highly likely that a criminally 
motivated looter would be a part of (or is familiar with) other criminal actors.  Such a 
network can be referred to as a criminal infrastructure or network.  This criminal 
infrastructure, in relation to facilitating the looting of antiquities, refers to a network of 
criminal actors who may provide support or funding, or otherwise encourage the process of 
antiquities looting.  This could include both local and international-scale criminal 
infrastructures and demonstrates an opportunity structure which facilitates individuals to 
engage with this criminal activity, but at an acceptable level or risk and effort.  With the 
backing and support of a criminal group, individuals may be more likely to engage in 
looting – especially if they can trust to be protected by the organisation or offered 
additional help as a result of the organisation (Polk, 2009).  For example, if looters are 
aware that working for a criminal organisation means that any objects found will be further 
dealt with by the organisation, resulting in quick profit, the criminal network is providing a 
low risk and high reward situation. 
In this capacity, it is also important to note that criminally motivated type looters typically 
create facilitating circumstance, by actively seeking out objects or buyers.  Criminal 
networks help to create a criminally facilitating environment by making it easier for looters 
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to gain access to resources and information regarding antiquities looting.  Such an example 
of effective criminal infrastructures is evident in the looting network that helped to supply 
the Dancing Shiva statue to Subhash Kapoor in the early 2000s: 
Kapoor had travelled to Tamil Nadu and met with Sanjivi Asokan, the alleged 
head of a ring of idol thieves in the region.  Kapoor asked for Chola-era bronzes, 
which were in high demand on the art market.  Over the next several months, 
Asokan allegedly hired thieves who — for 700,000 rupees, or about 
USD$12,000 — broke into the Sivan Temple and stole the eight idols shown 
below (Shiva at top left.).  (Felch, 2013a) 
 
This example demonstrates a type of facilitating circumstance which is a product of an 
actor’s actions from within the network.  It seems unlikely that these thieves, or looters, 
would have engaged in this specific activity if the circumstances had not been facilitated 
by Asokan’s criminal network.  Asokan’s network represents a rather large and well-
organized operation, but a criminal infrastructure can also refer to small, local criminal 
groups as well.  This is not necessarily true for every criminally motivated actor, but 
criminal infrastructures represent a trend which can be found in many examples of criminal 
looting (Watson and Todeschini, 2006; Brodie, 2014b).  
6.5.1.1 Terrorist Organisations 
Terrorist organisations differ from criminal networks in that they are generally bound by 
an ideological, religious, or political belief (Clarke and Newman, 2006; Rutelli, 2016).  In 
contrast, generally criminal networks are typically profit motivated.  As international 
organisations, terrorist groups have, since the early 21st century, altered the manner by 
which terrorism is conceptualized.  In the Middle East, extremist groups have openly 
attacked and even destroyed cultural heritage – such as destruction of the Buddhas of 
Bamiyan by the Taliban in 2001 (Francioni and Lenzerini, 2006; Ulph et al., 2012).  The 
ability for modern terrorist organisations to operate on an international scale has allowed 
them to engage in antiquities trafficking in a manner never seen before.  Following the Iraq 
War of 2003, there were reports of wide-spread looting, and in the following year it was 
evident that groups such as Al-Qaida, or the Taliban may have profited for the illicit sales 
of antiquities (Bogdanos, 2008).  This issue will be more thoroughly examined in the case 
study of Syria and the ongoing civil war.  
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6.5.2 Non-Criminal Association  
This section concerns the common public perception that the trafficking of antiquities 
looting is not necessarily a damaging or harmful activity.  Three factors play into this non-
criminal association that most individuals share: the activities of leisure looters, tourist 
looting, and the lack of a victim or injury.   
6.5.2.1 Leisure Looters 
Individuals who engage in searching and looting objects as a hobby are a very specific type 
of looter, here referred to as ‘leisure’ looters.  Different regions face this particular type of 
looting to varying degrees, but what distinguishes these looters from criminally motivated 
looters is the attitudes associated with the act of looting.  For example, while some leisure 
looters may ultimately sell their objects for a profit, there is usually a special regard for the 
objects or for the act of discovery (Lundén, 2012).  For example, in the United Kingdom 
there is an extensive culture of ‘night-hawking’ or illegal metal detecting.  There have been 
many campaigns to try to incentivize these individuals to work with archaeologists and 
researchers to protect and unearth antiquities in an ethical manner (Nighthawk, 2012).  
However, what makes this particular type of looter able to loot easily and with low risk or 
effort is the fact that their activities are fairly normalised.  If an individual walking 
outdoors with a metal detector is observed, it is highly unlikely that anyone would consider 
the person to be engaging in an illegal activity.  Indeed, in many cases, simply attempting 
to find metal objects is not illegal, but when the individual’s agenda is that of trying to find 
antiquities to loot, this is engaging in illicit looting. 
The specifics of this are also dependent on the particular country and the monetary value of 
the objects.  For example, Italy has very strict laws regarding antiquities and essentially 
any historical or cultural items which are discovered within the country (or its waters) is 
considered property of the state, while in the UK for example, only objects of a certain 
value (over £10,000) is considered to be ‘treasure’ and property of the Crown (Polk, 2009).  
As such, in many countries it is not seen as ‘hard crime’ or particularly illegal for 
individuals to go and dig or search for antiquities on private or public land (Polk, 2009).  
This allows this type of looter to operate openly and with little suspicion.  With an entire 
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culture of people behind this activity, it allows an illicit activity to pass as legal, and even 
at times ‘educational’.   
Leisure looters can typically be classified as deliberately engaging in – or creating 
facilitating factors of – looting antiquities.  Though highly dependent upon the country or 
region where an actor is based, an actor may be able to take advantage of social attitudes 
regarding looting.  Leisure looters can operate in a wide variety of ways, and as such, it is 
difficult to broadly categorize them as one entity.  Nevertheless, broadly speaking, leisure 
looters represent individuals who engage in these activities for their own pleasure, and as 
such, they are likely deliberately engaging. 
6.5.2.2 Tourist Looting 
When presented with an illicit antiquity, one does not immediately identify it as an illicit 
object.  It simply appears to be an object in various states of condition.  Taking an 
arrowhead from an archaeological site or even small stones from a site may seem harmless 
enough to tourists, but these actions are still acts of antiquities looting (Lundén, 2012).  
Many of the individuals who engage in this network do not consider it to be a morally or 
socially objectionable activity in the same way as murder, robbery, or vandalism. 
Due to this, if an individual or community does not consider the rules or regulations in 
place to be necessary (or demonstrate a clear purpose), then they are more likely to ignore 
such regulations.  This is most often seen in cases where tourists will take artefacts or 
objects (typically objects such as fossils) from important sites as a ‘souvenir’ because they 
do not feel that this is causing any direct damage (Lundén, 2012).  As the site is so large, 
much of it cannot be monitored.  This causal attitude towards antiquities looting represents 
a crucial facilitating factor, as it allows actors within the illicit antiquities network to take 
advantage of and operate within a grey space of moral and immoral – and more pivotally – 
legal and illegal. 
6.5.2.3 Lack of a Victim/Injury 
Within criminology there are five techniques of neutralisation (or a means of justifying 
criminal or illicit actions to oneself) as identified by Sykes and Matza (1957).  These five 
techniques includes: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, 
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condemnation of the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes and Matza, 1957).  
Antiquities trafficking often faces two of these techniques (denial of injury and denial of 
victim) when individuals actions or activities within the network are challenged.  This is 
because there are often no clear guardians of the antiquity, resulting in actors within the 
network being able to justify their looting, trafficking, or marketing of these ‘ownerless’ 
items (Sykes and Matza, 1957).  Mackenzie explores this phenomenon within market 
dealers in his paper Psychosocial Balance Sheets: Illicit Purchase Decisions in the 
Antiquities Market, where by dealers on the antiquities market are able to sell or trade these 
objects by wilfully ignoring the suspicious conditions by which they received it 
(Mackenzie, 2007).  A common defence people use is that by purchasing or bringing an 
antiquity to market, they are actually helping protect and preserve such object.  Because 
illicit antiquities are taken from not from someone, it seems this facilitates people’s ability 
to rationalise their criminal actions.  
6.5.3 Online Antiquities Market  
6.5.3.1 Social Media/Messaging Services 
Finding and getting in contact with buyers is one of the main difficulties with selling illicit 
antiquities – as with any illicit network where you are attempting to sell something illegal.  
However, a facilitating factor for this network is that illicit antiquities are not seen as 
dangerous or readily associated with violent crime, and are therefore not necessarily a high 
priority for law enforcement (Chappell and Polk, 2011).  This reflects similar attitudes 
within the general public, and as a result, there is a significant lack of community policing.  
As such, it is fairly easy for a looter to post photos of illicit objects on auction websites, or 
social media platforms, and gather attention and potential customers who may be interested 
in the objects (Brodie, 2015d). 
Once a potential buyer has been found, private communication can take place regarding the 
purchase of the object (Brodie, 2015d).  This means that auction sites or social platforms 
can legitimately claim that no transaction ever occurred on the actual site, despite business 
relationships being established which might later facilitate the selling of such antiquities.  
The internet operates as a virtual antiquities marketplace and creates vast facilitating 
opportunities.  This is largely a result of the fact that much of international and even 
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national law is still being developed when it comes to online purchases, security, and 
jurisdictional issues (Brodie, 2015d).  This provides a relative grey area of international 
internet regulation and jurisdiction that can provide the perfect amount of ambiguity for 
looters to display and sell their illicit objects to considerable, global audiences at no cost.  
6.5.3.2 Online Auction Sites 
The internet facilitates the market standard of buying and selling antiquities without a 
provenance, as well as allowing buyers and sellers to remain anonymous (Chippindale and 
Gill, 2001; Lidington et al., 2002; Fay, 2011; Brodie, 2015d).  This might be a major factor 
in why the antiquities market translates to a virtual market so easily.  The physical market 
translates easily to the online market, with the only major differences being: the expertise 
of the auction houses or galleries provide (versus the mix of expert and amateur sellers 
online), the experience of shopping (in person, or online), and the ability to physically 
view and examine an antiquity (as opposed to seeing a picture or photo) (Lidington et al., 
2002; Fay, 2011; Brodie, 2015d).  In terms of providing more ‘authentic’ pieces or 
antiquities, an auction house such as Sotheby's or Christie's is no different from an 
anonymous seller on eBay when it comes to the details of the auction.  An eBay seller can 
create a profile which is not verified and so can project any type of persona (Brodie, 
2015d).  Someone wanting to sell an object at an auction at Sotheby's can do so with his or 
her name listed simply as ‘anonymous’ (Brodie, 2015d).  In both cases, the seller dictates 
the price, and eBay and Sotheby's take a cut of the margin.  The object is then sold to a 
buyer, who in both cases can be listed publicly as anonymous. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on determining factors or circumstances which help to facilitate 
ATNs, as identified by the crime script developed and examined in chapter 5.  In order to 
comprehend and formulate effective crime prevention strategies for this network, an 
understanding of the specific opportunities which allow the crimes to occur in the first 
place must be ascertained.  Throughout this chapter there has been a focus on these 
opportunities and on identifying key factors which not only allow, but facilitate a crime to 
occur.  In total seventeen factors – either for individual phases or relevant to the entire 
process – were identified as prominent facilitating factors within existing ATNs, which 
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allow them to continually exist and sustain.  With these factors now identified, the 
following chapter can proceed to the situational analysis of ATNs, and provide a more 
thorough and empirical understanding of how this network structured and operates.  
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7. Situational Analysis of Antiquities Trafficking 
Networks 
7.1 Introduction 
The two previous chapters have provided a rudimentary conception of the necessary 
elements for antiquities trafficking to occur, as well as major facilitating aspects of this 
illicit network.  The goal of the crime script generated for ATNs is not only the 
development of comprehensive understanding of how these networks operate on a broader 
level, but it is also intended to provide a preliminary script upon which more detailed and 
specific scripts can be generated.  Additionally, the discussion and examination of 
facilitating factors allows for a more thorough understanding of the opportunities and 
circumstances which allow these networks to continue to operate. 
This chapter will apply the information gained from both the crime script and facilitating 
factors presented in chapters 5 and 6 and use them to consider and determine a set of 
potentially effective crime prevention measures.  This will also include a demonstration of 
the potential insight that SCP coupled with the use of CSA can provide into the complex 
illicit networks found within antiquities trafficking.   
This chapter begins by first considering the crime triangle – a concept within routine 
activity theory, and relevant to the SCP analysis of ATNs.  After having briefly discussed 
this in chapter 5, this chapter will go further, providing a more thorough understanding of 
the implications of the SCP framework and contextualise the difficulties crime prevention 
faces within illicit networks.  From this, strategies will be formulated and presented within 
five categories of SCP’s techniques. The intended goals of these strategies will be 
discussed, providing a broader perspective of strategies for the entire network.  Further 
analysis of the influencing factors for these strategies will be considered – specifically the 
role of controllers and super controllers.  These elements of the analysis will be discussed 
within the context of the application of the crime triangle.  Ultimately, this chapter 
represents the final product of the previous two chapters’ efforts and will demonstrate the 
usefulness, efficiency, and resultant necessity, of the application of the SCP framework to 
ATNs.   
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7.2 The Crime Triangle  
The crime triangle is based upon integral elements of routine activity theory, wherein a 
crime is likely to occur when an offender is faced with a place that has a vulnerable target 
(Cornish, 1994a; Clarke and Felson, 2004; Wortley and Mazerolle, 2013).  The crime 
triangle was originally developed by John Eck, and discusses the need of three elements in 
order for a crime to occur: a target, an offender, and a place (Cornish, 1994a; Wortley and 
Mazerolle, 2013).  The crime triangle, or problem triangle as it is sometimes referred to, is 
used to analyse the point where these three elements meet – resulting in a crime occurring 
(Cornish, 1994a; Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008; Wortley and Mazerolle, 2013). 
7.2.1 The Triangle 
The crime triangle and its components are shown in Figure 7-1.  The inner triangle presents 
the necessary elements for any crime to occur which includes: target/victim, offender, and 
place.  The centre of the triangle is the criminal act – this represents the space where all 
three elements meet and a crime takes place (Clarke and Eck, 2016).  The outer triangle 
represents the three actors responsible for the accompanying inner elements: guardian, 
manager, and handler (Clarke and Eck, 2016).  The outer triangle often is the most relevant 
part in determining crime prevention methods or techniques (Clarke and Eck, 2016).  
These components will now be examined in more detail. 
 
Fig. 7-1: Crime Triangle (Clarke and Eck, 2016).  Sourced with permission from Center for Problem 
Oriented-Policing.  
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7.2.1.1 Targets/Guardian 
This side of the triangle represent the individual or objects that are the target of the 
criminal action.  The controller for the target/victim would be the guardian (Clarke and 
Eck, 2016).  The guardian is the person responsible for the protection and safety of the 
target/victim.  This typically refers to either individuals or more formal positions such as 
security guards or the police (Sampson et al., 2010).  A simple example of a target could be 
a bike, with the guardian being the owner of the bike.  The guardian is the individual most 
directly responsible for the target or victim.   
7.2.1.2 Place/Manager 
This refers to the place where the crime takes place, usually the physical space, though this 
can refer to virtual crimes as well (Clarke and Eck, 2016).  The controller of the place is 
the manager, which often refers to the individual or establishment which are responsible 
for the place (Clarke and Eck, 2016).  They are often concerned with the management of 
the space, and as a result are the manager of the place, in the context of the crime triangle.  
An example of a place and manger could be a store where someone shoplifts or a school 
principal if a crime occurred within a school. 
7.2.1.3 Offender/Handler 
Lastly, there is the offender – the individual who is engaging in the criminal act.  When 
referring to the controller for the offender, this is not referring to a specific person meant to 
control the offender.  This usually refers to important or valued relationships.  Social ties 
which could affect an individual’s decision to engage in criminal activity – essentially 
positive peer pressure.  Handlers represent the people who the criminal are closest with 
emotionally (Clarke and Eck, 2016).  This can refer to family members, friends, mentors, 
religious figures, or authority figures in their lives.  The term handler does not literally 
mean that these figures attempt to physically stop an offender from acting, but instead refer 
to the social pressure they can place upon an individual to not engage in criminal activity 
(Clarke and Eck, 2016).   
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7.2.1.4 Crime Prevention  
The crime triangle has been discussed at this point in the thesis because it will be used 
directly with SCP to provide insight into potential crime prevention techniques or 
recommendations.  In the latter part of this chapter, the SCP techniques that are relevant 
and potentially necessary for ATNs will be discussed, but as these techniques are 
indicative of a broad, aggregate understanding of ATNs, they do not represent specific, 
targeted recommendations such as the ones which will be explored and discussed in 
chapter 8.  The purpose of this triangle is to help identify situations or opportunities where 
these three elements meet, and once identified, work to prevent the crime from taking place 
(Sampson et al., 2010; Clarke and Eck, 2016).  In this respect, the crime triangle allows for 
an analysis not only of the elements required for the crime, but also the actors and elements 
that may have contributed to the crime occurring – the controllers.  This manner of analysis 
will provide a more comprehensive analysis of not only SCP measures relevant to the 
crime elements, but also the controllers and (as will be discussed now), super controllers.  
From a crime prevention perspective when analysing a criminal act, it would seem logical 
to target these elements (ideally all three) to help prevent the crime from occurring.  Scripts 
have been developed that take into account the crime triangle, in that they are victim or 
place-based scripts such as a victim script for carjacking developed by Copes, Hochstetler, 
and Cherbonneau (Copes et al., 2012).  Taking this concept even further Leclerc and 
Reynald (2017) proposed creating controller-based scripts to consider preventative actions 
that controllers (guardians, handlers, or managers) might take to deter or prevent a crime 
for taking place.  The main goals of their article were to use script analysis to interventions 
which could be taken by the guardian in particular crime settings, while also considering 
SCP measures (Leclerc and Reynald, 2017).  They essentially proposed a script that 
instead of looking at direct interventions to deter the criminal, focused on interventions that 
could be made specifically by the guardian (Leclerc and Reynald, 2017).  This concept is 
relevant to the SCP analysis of ATNs that will take place in this chapter.  Because of the 
broad nature of this analysis, additional focus will be placed on the guardians and super 
controllers, as a way of determining institutions and organisations which are likely 
responsible for implementing the strategies that have been developed in this chapter for 
ATNs.  This following section will examine the role of super controllers, and their 
relevance and use with CSA and SCP.   
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7.2.2 Super Controllers 
Sampson, Eck, and Dunham introduce the concept of super controllers (2010), whereby the 
three levels of controllers are further influenced by formal, diffuse and personal types of 
super controllers.  
 
Fig. 7-2: Super Controller Crime Triangle (Sampson et al., 2010).  Sourced with permission from Center for 
Problem Oriented-Policing. 
 
“We call the people, organizations and institutions that create the incentives for controllers 
to prevent or facilitate crime ‘super controllers’…” (Sampson, Eck, et al., 2010, p. 40).  
Through their influence, super controllers are the driving forces behind the controller’s 
efforts to prevent crimes (Sampson et al., 2010).  “Super controllers do not have a direct 
effect on the necessary conditions for crime, but influence them indirectly through 
handlers, guardians and managers.” (Sampson et al., 2010, p. 20).  The concept of super 
controllers presents a further level of analysis and practicality to crime prevention, as often 
the controller’s ability to be effective at being a guardian, manager, or handler is dependent 
on the influence, finance, motivation, or ability of the super controller.  
Super controllers are made of ten types, which are further broken down into three categories: 
formal, diffuse, and personal (Sampson et al., 2010, p. 20). Formal super controllers are 
organisations, contractual, financial, regulatory, or the courts.  Diffuse are political, markets, 
and/or media, while personal is made up of groups and family (Sampson et al., 2010). 
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Category Type 
Formal • Organisational 
 • Contractual 
 • Financial 
 • Regulatory 
 • Courts 
Diffuse • Political 
 • Markets 
 • Media 
Personal • Groups 
 • Family 
Fig. 7-3:Typology of Super Controllers (Sampson et al., 2010). Permission to reproduce this figure has been 
granted from the publisher.  
 
Diffuse and formal super controllers can be influenced and influence each other, as for 
example, the media may influence a regulation by reporting on controversial changes to the 
regulation (Sampson et al., 2010).  Analysing the influence these super controllers have 
upon controllers can provide an insight into effective and practical crime prevention 
strategies.  Bichler and Malm (2015)  proposed using a specific transnational crime 
triangle, with targeted super controllers relevant to transnational crime.   
 
Fig. 7-4: Crime in Context of Global Market Systems and Intersecting Super Controllers (Bichler and Malm, 
2015b).  Permission to reproduce this figure has been granted from the authors. 
 
Within this crime triangle Bichler and Malm assigned super controllers to specific 
sides/elements of the triangle (2015b).  They indicate in their research that this is still a 
preliminary understanding of their crime triangle, and may be subject to change (Bichler 
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and Malm, 2015b).  However, this triangle presents the possibilities that the crime triangle, 
in conjunction with super controllers may have a better understanding of criminal 
networks.    
The strength of considering super controllers is that it takes into account another level of 
accountability, and considers the feasibility of implementing crime prevention techniques.  
This is highly useful in the context of ATNs and will provide more realistic 
recommendations.   
7.2.3 CRAVED 
It should be noted that a product-based model is often used in conjunction with the crime 
triangle.  While this model will not be used within this thesis, it is helpful to understand the 
basic concept behind the CRAVED (Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, 
Enjoyable, and Disposable) model, as it often pairs well with both the crime triangle and 
SCP (Clarke, 1999).  
The CRAVED model was a product-based model that was proposed by Ronald Clarke in 
the early 1990s as a means of better understanding why thieves ‘craved’ certain types of 
objects/targets (Clarke, 1999).  CRAVED was developed out of an initial framework 
VIVA (Value, Inertia, Visibility, Accessibility), which was proposed by Cohen and Felson 
(Cohen and Felson, 1979).  Often used in conjunction with SCP this model demonstrates 
the qualities of a target (object) which make it attractive to criminals (Clarke, 1999).  
Typically, this model is used to either work to make the target less attractive, or to 
determine which targets will most likely be the target of criminal actors Clarke, 1999).   
Further models have been developed from the CRAVED model, with Clarke and Newman 
(2006) proposing the EVIL DONE (Exposed, Vital, Iconic, Legitimate, Destructible, 
Occupied, Near, and Easy) model for suitable targets for terrorism.  Additional research 
includes Ekblom and Sidebottom’s (2008) focuses on personal electronic goods, Pires and 
Clarke’s (2012) analysis on parrot poaching Mexico, Petrossian and Clarke’s (2014) paper 
on illegal commercial fishing, and Piers’ (Pires, 2015) further study of multiple parrot 
markets in both Bolivia and Peru.  More recently, Moreto and Lemieux (2015) introduced 
the CAPTURED framework designed specifically for illegal wildlife markets.  
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CAPTURED (Concealable, Available, Processable, Transferrable, Useable, Removable, 
Enjoyable, and Desirable) was designed to reflect the specific nature of products of the 
illegal wildlife markets.  The most relevant study concerning product-based model focuses 
on metal detectorist, and site risks (Grove et al., 2018).  This proposes a risk assessment for 
potential metal detecting site, based upon the model of HOPPER – History, Open, 
Protection, Publicity, Evasion, and Repeat Victimisation (Grove et al., 2018).  For ATNs, 
the CRAVED model is appropriate, and works well to help analyse the underlying reason 
behind certain antiquities claiming higher market values or popularity over other 
antiquities.   
7.3 The Antiquities Trafficking Triangle 
Now that a basic understanding of the crime triangle has been established, the difficulties 
of the antiquities trafficking triangle can be better appreciated.  In comparison to traditional 
types of property crime, antiquities looting, and trafficking have always faced a singular 
and unique difficulty, which is evident in Figure 7-5.  The three elements of the crime 
triangle present difficulties when it comes to antiquities, as for most illicit antiquities their 
whereabouts are unknown.  This has the result of the bottom side of the triangle, consisting 
of the target, the guardian, and the super controller, being unknown.  This in turn, makes it 
difficult to determine or analyse the central part of the triangle: the criminal act.    
 
Fig. 7-5: Antiquities Trafficking Crime Triangle, modified from: (Sampson et al., 2010).  Permission to 
reproduce this figure has been granted from the publisher.  
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The ATNs crime triangle depicts a central difficulty for studying ATNs in relation to the 
recovery, documentation, or prevention of illicit antiquities.  These next three sections 
examine each side or element of the crime triangle in more detail, and discuss the 
relevance of the crime triangle to SCP. 
7.3.1 Antiquities Trafficking Elements, Controllers, and Super 
Controllers 
When considering crime prevention strategies, some thought must be given to the ‘who, 
what, why, where and how’ of the implementation of any procedures or techniques.  
Product-based models such as CRAVED demonstrate how objects can be made less 
desirable to criminals through understanding why these objects were craved (Clarke, 
1999).  SCP uses all three elements of the crime triangle, to better conceptualize and 
review the ways by which criminals can be deterred or prevented through increasing risk, 
increasing effort, reducing reward, removing excuses and reducing provocation (Clarke, 
1997b; Clarke and Felson, 2004; von Lampe, 2011) .  When one aspect of crime 
prevention analysis is missing (such as in the case of the antiquities trafficking triangle) it 
makes crime prevention techniques or strategies all the more difficult to implement or 
consider. 
7.3.1.1 Guardians 
An antiquity presents a difficult scenario for the crime triangle, as unlike a car or a house 
its location, even its existence is often unknown to anyone until such a time as it is 
discovered.  This fundamentally alters the crime triangle, as the target/victim has no 
guardian.  This best describes one of the fundamental issues with antiquities trafficking, as 
the nature of the crime significantly limits potential crime prevention techniques or 
strategies.  The result then being that any preventative consideration must target the 
offender/handler or place/manager.  The use of the CRAVED model helps provide some 
insight into what types of objects actors will seek to loot and traffic and helps to provide an 
additional layer of scrutiny to an aspect of the network which has proven difficult to 
analyse to research.  For example, a large Assyrian relief recently set a new sale record 
after being sold at a Christie’s New York auction for 31 million USD (Lazarus, 2018).  
147 
 
 
 
 
This sale has now caused those within the antiquities and archaeological fields to worry 
that this will incite more looting of similar types of objects (Arraf, 2018).  This relief was 
looted historically, during the 1840s by a private individual, Austen Henry Lavard, who 
took the piece (and many others) from Iraq with the permission of the Ottoman Empire, 
which controlled Iraq at the time (Lazarus, 2018).  The worry now, is that as this piece 
fetched such a high and record breaking price at market, that similar reliefs will also be 
illegally excavated – as there is clearly a market for such items (Arraf, 2018).  This 
example demonstrates the relevance of models such as CRAVED, and with further study, 
could be used to help identify specific types of antiquities that are especially at risk of 
looting or damage.  In tandem with SCP, it could help to provide targeted prevention 
methods or techniques or these CRAVED objects.  
7.3.1.2 Place/Managers 
The place, or setting in relation to the antiquities trafficking triangle broadly refers to the 
physical places which an antiquity passes in the process of being trafficking.  When looted, 
this refers to the physical spot where it was removed from its location of origin.  Generally, 
this would include: archaeological sites (both known and unknown), graveyards, active 
cultural heritage sites, and further unknown location.  Then, in the transit phase, the place 
would shift and could include entry points, methods of transit, and/or shipping/postage.  In 
addition, for the market phase this would entail auction houses, antiquities galleries, 
museums, and antiquities fairs (Hardy, 2016).  The super controllers of many of the 
managers will likely represent larger institutions or governments, mainly as much of the 
world’s cultural heritage is under the protection or supervision of a Department or Ministry 
of culture – meaning a branch of the nation’s government.   
7.3.1.3 Offenders/Handlers 
The offenders within the antiquities trafficking triangle refers to actors that were identified 
in the crime script presented in chapter 5.  This includes subsistence diggers, profit and 
leisure looters, smugglers, middlemen, and brokers.  Any individual who is seeking to loot, 
transport, or market an illicit antiquity would qualify as an offender.  Accordingly, the 
controllers for such actors would include: personal relationships, community figures, the 
community at large, religious leaders, authoritative figures (such as bosses, leaders), and 
clubs or societies. 
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The super controllers for handlers would therefore be employers, or other, more serious 
criminal actors.  As noted this network operates as a grey market, with a mix of offenders 
committing traditionally criminal activities (looting, smuggling), and others engaging in 
traditionally white-collar type activities (falsifying documents or laundering).  
Now, with a basic understanding of both the crime triangle and the basic concept of super 
controllers has been discussed, these two elements can now be considered within the 
framework of SCP.  The following section presents the SCP analysis of the ATNs crime 
script and facilitating factors, to ultimately identify prominent areas where crime 
prevention techniques or procedures could be implemented.   
7.4 Situational Crime Prevention Strategies for 
Antiquities Trafficking Networks 
The following section now focuses on discussing the thirteen SCP strategies which have 
been developed from the crime script and facilitating factors presented in chapters 5 and 6.  
As has been noted, typically, SCP techniques and strategies are intended for highly specific 
types of crime (Clarke, 1995; Clarke, 1997b).  As has been established, the focus of this 
chapter (and the previous two chapters) is on an aggregate perspective of ATNs.   
1. Restrict Access to Equipment 
2. Secure Borders 
3. Identify Criminal Networks 
4. Monitor Archaeological Sites 
5. Assist in Detection of Objects 
6. Reduce Profit 
7. Deny Long-term Investments 
8. Create infrastructure 
9. Reduce Corruption 
10. Require/Establish Provenance 
11. Criminalise Antiquities Trafficking Activity 
12. Address the Nature of Antiquities 
13. Internet 
Fig. 7-6: 13 SCP Strategies for ATNs 
 
SCP is employed in a manner for which it was not intended, but which will still be 
effective in demonstrating the potential and value of this framework with ATNs.  The 
following strategies will demonstrate SCP techniques and strategies, focusing on the types 
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of super controllers which can influence or manipulate the controllers of ATNs.  This will 
help to demonstrate a top-down approach of what types of institutions, organisations, or 
other elements are necessary to enact and execute effective crime prevention measures.   
Each corresponding subsection will consider the strategy presented, discussing possible 
implementation or techniques that might be employed as part of the strategy, and will 
evaluate the types of controller and super controllers that may be tasked with the 
implementation of such a strategy.  This will allow crime prevention strategies to be 
considered in a network comprehensive manner, while still providing insight into 
preventative, rather than reactionary policies, techniques, or programs.  Additionally, it 
will identify key preventative (not reactionary) strategies for antiquities trafficking, but 
also identifying contributing factors which can influence the ability to implement such 
strategies.  Taking the key elements from SCP (increase effort, increase risk, reduce 
rewards, remove excuses, and reduce provocation) as proposed by Sampson, Eck and 
Dunham (2010) this can be applied to the super controllers as a means of influencing a 
controller’s ability or motivation to implement crime prevention strategies.  The following 
sections are organised by the five SCP categories with each category having the relevant 
situational techniques proposed by this thesis.   
7.4.1 Increase Effort  
This category of SCP is made up of five techniques which include target hardening, control 
access to facilities, screen exits, deflect offenders, control tools/weapons(Cornish and 
Clarke, 2003).  The two strategies that are proposed in this section broadly draw upon all 
five of these techniques and work to create situations or circumstances which increase the 
amount of effort that the actor must expend in order to engage in antiquities trafficking. 
7.4.1.1 Restrict Access to Equipment (Strategy 1) 
While simple equipment can be used to engage in looting, the use of specialized equipment 
allows ease and increased speed of discovery and removal of objects, as the crime script 
presented in chapter 5 indicated.  This type of looting can prove to be more damaging than 
individuals engaging in looting with relatively simple tools such as shovels and picks – 
evidence of this will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8.  This is because specialized 
equipment allows for large areas to be, rather brutally searched or looted for antiquities – 
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as it the case when bulldozers are employed; or when removing objects from a monument 
– such as when looters use reciprocating saws to remove large panels or mosaics (Nafziger, 
1975; Casana and Panahipour, 2014).  Working to regulate access to such types of 
equipment may provide a way of ensuring that looting on such large levels are reduced.  
This could be achieved by creating community watch programs to inform authorities when 
suspicious activity regarding heavy or specialized machinery takes places, as well as 
regulating the use of such tools to specific times and locations and implementing 
educational campaigns regarding cultural heritage for individuals who have access to such 
tools.   
Community watch programs could be created in more rural areas, where potential looting 
may be more isolated.  Such programs could be aided by websites or mobile apps, allowing 
individuals to easily report suspicious activity or alert individuals as to illegal operations 
taking place locally. 
By designating or regulating specific timeframes during which such specialised types of 
tools could operate, this would aid authorities in tracking and controlling those who have 
access to these tools and ensure they are not being used for illicit means.  While seeming to 
be rather complicated, it could be easily achieved by simply requiring any operations 
which require specialized equipment to register with a local authority and obtain a permit 
to operate the equipment (either at cost, or freely).  This would effectively regulate the use 
of such machinery and allow authorities to easily identify any suspicious operations taking 
place.  For those individuals who have access to specialized equipment, there is also the 
possibility that they – in the course of normal operations – may uncover cultural objects.  
This represents an individual actor (or group of individuals) taking advantage of a 
situation.  Requiring a presentation or course on the importance of cultural heritage objects 
at the time in which they obtain their operating license, may help to educate and alert such 
individuals as to the importance of cultural heritage and deter them from engaging or 
considering looting the object.  While many operations which make use of specialized 
equipment in culturally sensitive areas require an archaeologist to inspect the site or be on 
hand in the case of any discoveries, this is an additional precautionary strategy which may 
help deter individuals in case the strategies in place fail. 
151 
 
 
 
 
There is currently a lack of data concerning how looters access specialized equipment, and 
as such, the strategies produced for this facilitating factor are rather broad.  With further 
research into the types of equipment used, the source of such equipment (stolen, accessed 
through work, rented, etc.), more targeted forms of strategies can be considered.  At the 
moment, the strategies developed represent general steps that can be considered when 
facing the looting of object with specialized equipment.   
Facilitator SCP Strategy 
Ease of access to specialized equipment which 
is helpful or necessary for looting. 
Community watch programs to alert authorities 
when specialized equipment is operating at 
unusual times. 
Regulate use of specialized equipment or heavy 
machinery. (GIS, Keyless Start/Stop). 
Educational Campaigns. 
Controller Controller 
Type 
Super Controller Category 
Individual/company/organisation 
that owns the machinery/ Manager 
Financial 
Government 
(Organisation) 
Rewards 
Risk 
Fig. 7-7: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies to Restrict Access to Equipment 
 
Incentives for companies or individuals to engage in such a program could include 
financial, as well as the personal benefit of being able to track or recover an item if it is 
stolen or taken.  Consider a program such as the one outlined above.  In order to help 
companies or organisations abide by such programs financial incentives could be promoted 
for those who actively engage and promote the program.  Insurance companies could offer 
lowered rates for those companies who enabled objects to be tracked, or even those who 
ensure all their workers have the correct permits to operate such machinery.  Additionally, 
tax incentives could be offered by the government to companies/employees who 
voluntarily take part in such a program.  This is clearly an area that would benefit from 
further research and has the potential of being able to prevent or at least limit the ability of 
individuals or groups to engage in the mass looting of antiquities.   
7.4.1.2 Secure Borders (Strategy 2) 
As with many illicit networks, the illicit movement of goods across border is a challenge 
that is always faced.  ATNs is no different, and the ability to smuggle or transport objects 
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across national borders proves to be a significant difficulty in working to stem the flow of 
objects from source countries to transit and market countries.  As the crime script and 
facilitating factors from previous chapters identified, borders are a particularly relevant 
factor the antiquities trafficking.  As these networks shares similarities to other illicit 
networks, it only makes sense that any crime prevention strategies proposed would work in 
conjunction or alongside existing strategies for stopping or reducing the illicit movement 
of goods across borders.  Three of the strategies that are proposed in this section, are then 
applicable to any illicit network, or could be used in tandem with existing strategies.  They 
include: determining potential weak points at border crossings, determining the most 
effective means of strengthening such points, and working to create an anti-corruption 
environment among border personnel.   
Facilitator Situational Crime Prevention Strategy 
Large and expansive geographic 
borders make it difficult to police, 
patrol, or secure all potential border 
crossings.    
Open borders allow for less strict 
scrutiny of persons or objects entering 
different states 
Corruption 
Determine potential weak points for illegal border 
crossings. 
Increase formal surveillance for weak border points. 
Control for corruption among border personnel 
Controller Controller 
Type 
Super Controller Category 
Border 
Agents/Personnel Manager 
Government 
(Organisation) 
Provocation 
Excuses 
Effort 
Fig. 7-8: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies for Secure Borders 
 
This section cannot provide very detailed strategies, as each border faces its own 
difficulties, and resources.  Generally, the three strategies proposed offer an extremely 
broad view of the issue of securing borders.  As this is already a significant issue of other 
types of crime, what this section hopes to highlight is the prevalence of corruption in 
helping objects to illegally cross borders.  Corruption was highlighted as a facilitating 
factor in chapter 6, though within the field it has long been identified as a problematic 
facilitator.  Tackling the issue of corruption within a community or nation poses a difficult 
task, as if a local or national government’s infrastructure has become corrupt, it can be 
difficult to correct.  That being said, a target study of the types of individuals who have 
153 
 
 
 
 
traditionally engaged in antiquities trafficking could offer more specific insight into the 
specific roles and types of individuals likely to indulge in corrupt actions. 
7.4.2 Increase Risks 
Seeking to increase the risk for the actor, this category within SCP includes: extend 
guardianship, assist natural surveillance, reduce anonymity, utilize place managers, and 
strengthen formal surveillance.  There are four strategies presented here, which propose to 
increase the risk, to the point that the activity is deemed too risky.  These include: 
identifying criminal network, monitoring archaeological sites, monitoring or eliminating 
smuggling routes, and detection of objects (Cornish and Clarke, 2003).  While these four 
strategies represent difficult and broad issues, these following sections consider relevant 
SCP techniques which may help to reduce ATNs.   
7.4.2.1 Identify Criminal Networks (Strategy 3) 
The ATNs crime script identified the issue of criminal networks working either within the 
confines of one or multiple phases, and the infrastructure provided by such a criminal 
network can prove to be an important facilitating factor.  The main strategy of tackling 
such criminal infrastructures in any illicit network is first to work to identify the actors 
who make up the network, and then designate important actors within the network, to 
determine the more effective means of disabling or dismantling the overall network.  For 
example, social network analysis is a potentially useful tool in analysing such networks, 
and has been used successfully in a number of illicit markets, including terrorism, illicit 
drugs, and illicit weapons (Morselli, 2010; Berlusconi, 2017).  However, more research 
could focus on determining effective strategies for specific networks. 
Strategies for combating them [dark networks] are poorly documented in the 
literature, and with one exception (Lempert et al. 2008), little or no research 
compares alternative strategies with a view of balancing potential gains and 
costs.  Moreover, it appears to be almost an article of faith that once a dark 
network’s structure has been mapped and its key members identified one is 
supposed to capture and eliminate designated high-value targets. (Evereton, 
2012, p.32) 
Further study could explore a more thorough understanding of the types of individuals who 
make up these networks, and the most effective means of dismantling them.  Social 
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network analysis could prove to be effective for both, smaller criminal networks and larger 
international networks.  
An additional strategy focuses on deterring such criminal networks, and consequentially 
criminal infrastructures.  Different regions of the world have different types of penalties for 
crimes associated with illicit antiquities looting (Polk, 2000; B.T. Hoffman, 2006; Ulph et 
al., 2012).  For example, China is famously quite strict about illicit antiquities activities, 
and has even executed individuals for their involvement in such crimes(Polk, 2000; 
Greenfield, 2007, p. 275).  This is evident in the penalties in relation to source countries 
and market countries.  Source countries tend to exhibit more serious repercussions for 
individuals engaged in illicit antiquities, while market countries face less serious 
consequences.   
While the peasant tomb robber in China may be executed by the state for his role 
I the initial acts which result in the availability of the artefacts on the market, the 
ultimate purchaser of Tang or Han Dynasty material at Sotheby’s or Christie’s, 
or even in the venerable premises of Fortnum and Mason (where terracotta 
objects from China were recently available in their Gift Department) does so 
openly and without feat of arrest.  (Polk, 2000) 
This may be a result of the fact that many of the criminal actions which take place in 
market countries are typically considered to be white-collar crimes, in contrast to the 
physical looting or smuggling of an object in source countries (B.T. Hoffman, 2006; 
Mackenzie and Green, 2008; Ulph et al., 2012).  By strengthening regulations and policies 
which target and penalise the entire network – and not simply less important actors, such as 
the looters – criminal networks may be deterred by the complicated and potentially 
consequential engagement with illicit antiquities.  This is especially relevant for networks 
which engage in the transit and illicit-to-licit transformation of an object.  Once networks 
or members of networks are identified, there is the ability to increase the risk associated 
with the activity to the point they reach the risk threshold.  Determining that risk threshold 
is paramount to for crime prevention techniques, and if better understood could help to 
inform effective crime prevention procedures.  
It has long been the practice of law enforcement to attempt to track and reveal the network 
of criminal organisations.  This is evident in studies which focus on organized crime, 
gangs, and terrorist organisations (de Bie et al., 2015; Lehr and Chamberlin, 2015; Bichler 
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and Malm, 2015a; Berlusconi, 2017).  Typically, “[l]aw enforcement interventions can 
have two broad types of impact on criminal networks: (1) Network dismantlement and (2) 
network disruption” (G Bichler and Malm, 2015, p. 68).  The aim of analysing criminal 
networks is to typically determine the network structure of a criminal organisation to 
achieve either of these ends.  In considering which tactic would be more effective – 
dismantlement or disruption – the role of super controllers has the potential to accomplish 
either tactic.  Consider the disruption of a criminal network.  Once the network has been 
identified, super controller such as financial, regulatory, or organisational institutions could 
place significant pressure on these networks.  For example, Al Capone, one of America’s 
most famous gangsters, and arguably organised crime syndicates, was taken down for 
failing to pay his taxes (Papachristos et al., 2013).  Besides the obvious action of making 
arrests, there are at times, more effective ways of dismantling networks, and with less 
casualties.  A closer analysis of not only constructing social networks within ATNs, but 
also an analysis of the most effective means of ultimately combating these criminal 
networks could help to reduce the impact of these networks.  
Facilitator SCP Strategy 
Criminal networks allow for the 
easy organisation, looting, and 
possible trade of illicit antiquities. 
Work to identify actors within criminal networks (reduce 
anonymity). 
Implement and enforce strict and consequential sentences 
for crimes associated with illicit antiquities looting as a 
form of deterrence. 
Controller Controller 
Type 
Super Controller Category 
Law Enforcement 
Border Agencies Handler 
Regulatory 
Political 
Media 
Organisations 
Increase Risk 
Reduce Reward  
Fig. 7-9: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies for Identifying Criminal Networks 
 
7.4.2.2 Monitor Archaeological Sites (Strategy 4) 
As was discussed in chapter 6, facilitating factors for archaeological sites can be 
categorized as factors for known and unknown sites resulting in prevention strategies also 
following such categories.  Strategies for known archaeological sites include increasing 
security and surveillance for the sites, and thoroughly documenting the site and tagging 
items if possible.  Recruiting the public to act as additional security would provide an easy 
and cost-efficient way to help monitor a site and alert authorities to potential looting 
occurrences.  Providing a mobile app to allow guests to easily and quickly record or 
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document any suspicious activity would allow for a community watch type of approach to 
help prevent antiquities looting.  A campaign which included such an app, but also 
provided signage similar to ‘See something, say something’ could make this an effective 
strategy.  Additionally, posting anti-looting signage and information regarding the 
contextual importance of cultural objects may help to dissuade the casual looter (Gruber, 
2013).  These are rather abstract concepts, but they have the potential to be customised to 
the needs/requirements of various sites.  Consider the possibility of UNESCO developing 
such an app, to be used at UNESCO world heritage sites around the world, or even 
important or at-risk sites on a global level.  For known archaeological sites, the ability to 
have the public self-regulate or police themselves seem to be an effective and cost-
effective way by which to help prevent the looting and trafficking of antiquities.   
Tagging cultural objects also poses an interesting new strategy for preventing or deterring 
individuals from looting.  Water tagging in a new phenomenon that is currently being 
explored in this field, and would provide not only a deterrence factor, but an ability to track 
and recover objects (Amos, 2017).  It allows a simple liquid to be applied to the surface of 
an object and allow it essentially to be tagged – easier to track and identify – using 
nanotechnology.  It is also virtually impossible to remove (Amos, 2017).  Again, an 
abstract concept is presented here, but one that has the potential to provide a means of 
identifying and recovering looted objects.   
Unknown sites or objects pose more of a difficulty.  The main strategy for combating this 
factor requires specific resources and is therefore impractical for certain regions or 
circumstances.  For areas with resources available to them, there is the potential strategy of 
using satellite or drone technology to document and surveil areas prone to antiquities 
looting.  Neil Brodie and Daniel Contreras explored the feasibility of using Google Earth 
to monitor and document the extent of looting in their (2012) paper which focused on the 
site of Bân edh-Dhrâ in Jordan.  The resolution of the photos (and availability) from 
Google Earth at the time that the paper was published was less than optimal.  Considerable 
advances have been made since then, and further research on the potential use of this type 
of technology has been conducted and the use of satellite imagery has already worked to 
great effect in document the systematic looting of conflict zones in recent years (Contreras 
and Brodie, 2010; Brodie and Contreras, 2012; Jesse Casana, 2015; Parcak et al., 2016; 
Parcak, 2017).  Looting pits can be identified from satellite imagery, which has provided 
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evidence of looting in areas such as Apamea (Syria), and regions in Iraq during the Iraq 
War of 2003 (Jesse Casana, 2015; Tapete et al., 2016).  With the ability to identify looting 
pits from simple satellite photos, programs could be developed to analyse satellite imagery 
en-masse, and then be able to detect new or emerging instances of looting pits.  The same 
type of process could also be employed with the use of drone, which can be acquired 
relatively simply, and be remotely controlled – providing a less risky way in which to 
surveil sites within conflict zones.  Advances in recent technology have allowed for more 
realistic and practical means of surveillance and documentation of antiquities sites.  With 
technology such as facial recognition, there may even be the ability to pinpoint particular 
changes to a landscape or site which may indicate antiquities looting, altering authorities to 
real-time occurrences of looting.  
Facilitator SCP Strategy 
Large geographic areas and/or high 
volume of visitors. 
 
The objects or site is unknown to 
authorities resulting in no 
preventative or surveillance 
measures. 
Documentation or tagging of objects, to aid in identifying 
or tracking objects if looted. 
 
Educational and anti-looting campaigns could be 
implemented to dissuade or deter possible looters. 
 
Increase formal and informal surveillance for popular 
cultural heritage sites. 
 
Satellite or drone technology to document and analyse 
looting ‘hot-spots’. 
Controller Controller 
Type 
Super Controller Category 
Archaeological Site 
Managers Manager 
Organisation 
Group 
Media 
Government  
Excuses 
Provocation 
Risk 
Fig. 7-10: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies to Monitor Archaeological Sites 
 
7.4.2.3 Assist in Detection of Objects (Strategy 5) 
As illicit antiquities present the difficulty of often being easy to disguise or hide as was 
highlighted by the ATNs crime script from chapter 5, three strategies are proposed to help 
either detect such objects, or to educate the public about common practices when 
concealing illicit antiquities.   
…unlike the wildlife trade where it is possible to forge paperwork to make a 
shipment appear legal, this is not possible in the case of illegal drugs – at least 
certainly not in the same way.  Paperwork can transform some visible 
commodities such as wildlife or plant species from illegal to legal status and the 
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items(s) can be physically inspected, whereas illegal drugs cannot be smuggled 
in any form open to inspection… (South and Wyatt, 2011, p. 545) 
For border crossings, making additional resources available to border personnel, such as x-
ray machines or relevant technology, would be a first stage towards increasing the 
detection of illicit antiquities.  New antiquities detection methods are being tested at 
present, including the use of sniffer dogs to detect illicit antiquities.  The current program 
is considering the potential of training dogs to be able to detect specific types of dirt in 
order to alert handlers to the presence of illicit antiquities (Anon, 2018b).  If successful, 
these dogs would prove to be a valuable assent in detecting illicit antiquities, as at the 
present, even with the use of relevant technology, illicit antiquities can be difficult to 
detect.  However, this would only be relevant to known areas of looting, as the dogs would 
likely have to be trained to identify dirt from specific regions.  An additional strategy 
includes providing more specialized training regarding identifying antiquities, which could 
be made possible by partnerships between local universities or colleges and border 
agencies (Gruber, 2013).  Providing border personnel with the appropriate training to help 
them detect legitimate objects could prove to be effective in discovering potentially 
suspicious objects.  
Facilitator Situational Crime Prevention Strategy 
The nature of an antiquity typically 
lends itself to easy concealment or 
disguise, as antiquities inherently, 
are not necessarily criminal objects. 
Ensure appropriate equipment is available to border 
personnel to be able to identify illicit antiquities. 
Provide specific training or seminars for border personnel to 
help them identify potential illicit antiquities. 
Controller Controller 
Type 
Super Controller Category 
Border 
Law enforcement 
Authorities 
Manager Government (Organisation) 
Risks 
Effort 
Excuses 
Fig. 7-11: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies to Assist in Detection of Objects 
 
7.4.3 Reduce Rewards 
Removing or reducing rewards to the point that the risk outweighs the final pay-out is a 
fundamental aspect of SCP.  It includes the following five techniques: conceal targets, 
remove targets, identify property, disrupt markets, deny benefits, and there are two relevant 
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prevention strategies have been identified for ATNs, including reducing profit, and 
denying long-term investments (Cornish and Clarke, 2003). 
7.4.3.1 Reduce Profit (Strategy 6) 
These illicit networks could not exist, let along sustain themselves, if there was not a 
significant profit to be made at various points long the network.  Profit was identified as a 
facilitating factor in chapter 6, and as such, the elimination of a profit would likely prove 
effective in preventing further antiquities looting and trafficking.  Criminal networks are 
motivated by profit (in contrast to terrorism which is typically motivated by 
ideals/beliefs/religions), and criminal aspect of the illicit antiquities market occurs as a 
result of the profit that can be achieved through these objects.  Though antiquities 
themselves are not inherently criminal (as opposed to illegal drugs), they are made criminal 
by the actors who engage in the market. 
Fig. 7-12: Profit Difference Between Start and End of Market - *adapted from (Brodie and Contreras, 2012). 
Permission to reproduce this figure has been granted from the author. 
 
The table above demonstrates the potential monetary value of objects which motivates 
actors within this network.  This figure represents high-end antiquities, and are therefore 
not indicative of the overall nature, but demonstrates the potential for top quality objects in 
Year Artifact Initial Price 
Final 
Price 
Time 
Lapse 
(Yrs.) 
Middle 
Profit* References 
1980 Achyris (Steinhardt) phiale (Italy) $20,000 
$1.2 
million 11  
Slayman 
1998 
1979 Morgantina acroliths (Italy) $1,100 $1 million 1 998,900 
Robinson 
1998 
1988 Statue of Marsyas (Turkey) $7,400 $540,000 <6 532,600 
Rose and 
Acar 1995 
1971 Euphronios krater (Italy) $8,800 $1 million 1  
Slayman 
1998 
1996 Yongtai head (China) $840 $125,000 1 124,160 Maggio 1998 
1991 Amenhotep head (Egypt) $6,000 
$1.4 
million <3  
Watson 2002, 
26; Tokeley 
2006, 202 
1970 Asteas krater (Italy) A pig(!) $275,000 <10 ? Slayman 2006 
1982 Nataraja (India) £12 £250,000 6 249,988 
O’Keefe 
1997, 19 n. 
35 
 Morgantina silver (Italy) $27,000 $3 Million  2,973,000 
Watson and 
Todeschini 
2007, 106 
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the market.  This table originally appeared in the article The Economics of the Looted 
Archaeological Site of Bâb edh-Dhaa by Neil Brodie and Daniel A. Contreras, though the 
figure below has been altered to include the Middle Profit Column (2012). 
In considering appropriate strategies for this facilitating factor, a complete market 
approach must be considered.  The simple solution would be to eliminate or reduce the 
reward, or profit for the criminal actors.  However, in order to achieve this, one must 
essentially eliminate or regulate all ATNs, which is not a practical strategy.  Nevertheless, 
when considering the market from the perspective of the crime triangle, there may a more 
effective manner.  The largest profit, as has been establish previously, is gained by the 
middleman or broker, usually as a result of a sale from the antiquities market.  As such, the 
place where this transaction is occurring is, essentially both the licit and illicit antiquities 
market.  As the antiquities market operates as a grey market, this means that the managers 
of such a place would likely be prominent figures within the antiquities market (i.e. auction 
houses, collectors, and dealers).  Super controllers for these individuals and institution 
could take many forms.  Regulatory restrictions clearly indicating the need for a 
documented and regulated market would likely have a significant impact.  Alternatively, 
providing a financial incentive for the ‘manager’ to cooperate or regulate themselves seem 
like the most viable option.  Creating tax breaks for those auction houses that do abide by 
ethical practices would provide the financial incentive that could being to regulate the 
antiquities trade.   
Facilitator Situational Crime Prevention Strategy 
The profit for trafficking actors helps to 
sustain and encourage the market to allow 
the illicit antiquities network to continue to 
exist. 
 
The demand for such objects drives market 
Attempt to reduce the overall profit of an object by 
devaluing the antiquity within the antiquities market.  
Controller Controller 
Type 
Super Controller Category 
Actors within 
Antiquities Market 
(Auctioneers, dealers, 
collectors) 
Handler 
Regulator 
Financial, 
Courts 
Organisation 
Political 
Markets 
Media 
Rewards 
Fig. 7-13: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies for Reduce Profit 
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7.4.3.2 Deny Long-Term Investment (Strategy 7) 
There is, on a fairly regular basis, occasions when archaeologists or experts in the 
antiquities or cultural heritage field spot an object that is being advertised for an upcoming 
sale (Gill and Tsirogiannis, 2016).  When this occurs, typically an auction house or dealer 
will only remove an item from a sale if there is proof that the object was in fact illegally 
obtained (Gill and Tsirogiannis, 2016).  This can cause immense legal issue which 
sometimes up to a number of years to resolve, as the burden of proof rests upon the nation 
of origin.  One of the facilitating factors that was discussed in the previous chapter was the 
ability to store an antiquity until such times, as it was not considered as risky of an item to 
attempt to sell on an open market.  The ability to do so is helped by the immense burden of 
proof set upon those who believe an object has been looted, as well as what strategies 
might allow such claims to be taken more seriously. 
At present, there does not seem to be a formal mechanism by which member of the public, 
or experts in the field can report either potential looting which is occurring, or objects 
which they believe have been looted.  There is, of course the option of reporting such an 
instance to local authorities, but often, as the nature of antiquities trafficking is so 
specialised these instances are categorised as ‘theft’, ‘vandalism’ or some other standard 
form of crime.  This is actually an issue in trying to generate statistics on art and antiquities 
crime.  It is therefore recommended that value strategy for ATNs, would be to create a 
system by which such reports could be recorded in an official capacity, but also might 
allow for a formal investigation or halting of the sale.  If the government or a regulatory 
body of some sort where able to enforce a regulation which required that such claims be 
investigated, this could create somewhat of a hassle for auction houses, dealers, or 
collectors.  Many individuals who work with cultural heritage or antiquities may not report 
illicit antiquities when they witness it, or their reports are lost in local agencies.  In fact, in 
Simon Mackenzie and Penny Green’s article about the Dealing in Cultural Objects 
(Offenses) Act of 2003 (UK), they indicate that collectors, when faced with known illicit 
objects, often simply refuse to purchase the object, and do not report such an object to 
authorities (Mackenzie, 2005; Mackenzie and Green, 2007). 
A formal system of reporting – even a website – would facilitate recording and reporting 
such instances and provide the ability to ensure that manager elements within the network 
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would have to face these suspicions.  Additionally, enforce eliminating the ability for 
dealers, buyers, or sellers to remain anonymous when participating in the antiquities 
market. 
 
Facilitator Situational Crime Prevention Strategy 
Antiquities rarely lose significant 
value over time, and as such are 
quite easy to store – allowing illicit 
objects to run out legal statutes or be 
forgotten from the public’s memory. 
Keep accurate databases of known illicit antiquities or 
reports of illicit antiquities 
Update policy and legislation which makes it harder for 
object to resurface with no provenance 
Attempt to regulate the market  
Controller Controller 
Type 
Super Controller Category 
Auction Houses 
Dealers 
Collectors 
Manager 
Media 
Political 
Market 
Groups 
Risks 
Rewards 
Excuses 
Fig. 7-14: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies to Deny Long-Term Investment 
 
7.4.4 Reduce Provocation  
This section focuses on reducing individuals or circumstances which may provoke 
individuals into engaging in criminal activity.  This category within SCP consists of five 
techniques including: reduce frustration and stress, avoid disputes, reduce emotional 
arousal, neutralise peer pressure, discourage imitation (Cornish and Clarke, 2003).  Two of 
these techniques are not very relevant to the broad perspective of ATNs that is taken in this 
chapter.  Avoiding disputes, and reducing emotional arousal are not considered in this 
section, and they are not directly relevant to the types of crimes being committed by 
individuals within ATNs.  The other three techniques will instead focus on reducing 
frustration and stress, neutralising peer pressing, and discouraging imitation.  This will be 
done through the three strategies presented here, and include: create infrastructure, reduce 
corruption, and require or establish provenance. 
7.4.4.1 Create Infrastructure (Strategy 8) 
Sada Mire (2011) presents an interesting framework for working with local communities to 
protect heritage, and help communities sustain themselves in the specific context of 
Somaliland.  She advocates a knowledge-centred approach, and discusses important 
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elements of a cultural resource governance and development in a post-conflict context, 
which include: empowering heritage stakeholders, a local education and safeguarding 
programme, a national inventory list, public education and heritage awareness media 
programmes, a national museums and cultural-educational centres, locating Somali 
antiquities collections, repatriation campaigns for looted artefacts, and tourism. 
Cultural property in Somaliland is disappearing systematically due to 
uncontrolled development (new roads and growing cities) and continued severe 
looting.  Severe poverty triggers the latter activities.  The solution to the problem 
needs to be multiple, not only addressing education and awareness but heritage 
work also must aim to create economic opportunities for local people. (Mire, 
2011, p. 82) 
This demonstrates a national approach to working to eliminate subsistence looting, while 
also providing beneficial infrastructure within the nation.  The elements that Mire suggests 
are specific to Somaliland at the time of the article but represent a holistic approach that 
provide a good basis for other nations or communities.  
Looting (including subsistence looting) which occurred in Mali resulted in wide-spread 
and mass looting of archaeological sites.  Numbers indicate anywhere from 45% - 90% of 
known sites in Mali have been looted, including UNESCO world heritage sites as of 2001 
(Hardy, 2015a). 
There is some hope: a combination of economic development, community 
education, political commitment and law enforcement has had remarkable 
success in reducing illicit digging.  Communities have established local 
museums, and thus protected their cultural patrimony, build community pride 
and local education, and provided the infrastructure for a sustainable economy 
of cultural tourism (Hardy, 2015, p.234). 
Sam Hardy’s article (2015), which focuses on the human rights of subsistence diggers, 
details a similar structure to the one presented by Mira (2011), which places focus on 
providing economic alternatives to looting, while also focusing on educating the local 
community.  
In order to achieve an effective alternative to the situation an analysis of the ultimate root 
cause of a lack of infrastructure must be determined:  “Studying the economic conditions 
in the countries of origin where such subsistence looting occurs is the first step in 
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understanding why local farmers and villagers are motivated to turn to looting.” (Saad El-
Gendi, 2012, p.120)  Each case will be specific and dependent on the needs of the 
community and the nature of the underlying infrastructure issue (political, religious, 
genocide, etc.).  Any type of solution will additionally be dependent upon the reality of any 
resources that can be provided from either within or outside the state.  There are, generally 
two options available concerning potential resources: funding (provided from the state, or 
from an independent party) or heritage/cultural tourism.  
 No matter what strategy is ultimately determined, a most important factor, and one 
stressed by Mire’s knowledge-based approach, is to ensure that the community has input 
and is consulted a part of any initiative.  “Successfully combating subsistence looting must 
involve not only educating the local population…but must also demonstrate respect for the 
local community.” (Saad El-Gendi, 2012, p.124)  This strategy provides a framework 
which allows for the close and contextual consideration of each particular instance of 
subsistence looting and proposes a method to establish effective outcomes and uses 
elements of SCP.  This strategy is being implemented with consideration as to current 
practices in cultural sites, as well as potential techniques or strategies employed by other 
illicit networks.  Examples include the Community Markets for Conservation (COMACO) 
program which operates in Zambia and works to prevent illicit poaching through 
alternative skills and product training, whose products are then bought by COMACO at 
higher market price; or Guanacaste National Park in Costa Rica, which through 
compensation and skills training helped to reduce deforestation, and instead create a tourist 
resource  (Saad El-Gendi, 2012). 
Facilitator SCP Strategy 
A lack of a formal 
infrastructure on a local or 
national level results in 
individuals or communities 
engaging in subsistence 
digging as a means of 
surviving. 
Identify areas and characteristic of communities most prone to 
subsistence looting and determine source of lack of infrastructure. 
Reduce frustration or stress of communities by working with the 
community to provide alternative economic solutions for the 
community. 
Controller Controller Type Super Controller Category 
Communities 
Employment 
Family 
Education 
Handler 
Government (Organisation)  
Financial 
Political 
Media 
Effort  
Excuses 
Rewards 
Fig. 7-15: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies to Create Infrastructure 
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Mire and Hardy’s example demonstrate that these types of initiatives and strategies require 
funding, organisation, and support from governments.  Table 7.15 observes this in the 
controllers and super controllers, where the controllers in this situation would be the 
community where the subsistence diggers originate.  It can then be concluded that the 
super controller responsible would be the community’s government.  With influence from 
financial, political, and media institutions or outlets, it seems likely that a government 
(Organisation) would at least consider potential strategies such as enforcing or developing 
local infrastructures to help reduce the possibility of subsistence digging.  This includes 
increasing the ability (effort) and removing the excuses for the controllers – the community 
and families – to engage, participate, or organise local infrastructure through funding, as 
well as increasing the rewards of those that do participate – by providing employment or 
financial benefits to those that do engage with the strategies. 
7.4.4.2 Reduce Corruption (Strategy 9) 
ATNs faces the common place issue of corruption, which facilitates and sustains all 
manner of illicit networks on an international level (Dietzler, 2013).  Typically, corruption 
will occur at some point in the transit phase, but occasionally can occur in the looting and 
market phase (often evident in bribery of officials for site access or entry to a market) 
(Dietzler, 2013).  Strategies to combat corruption include: reducing corrupt opportunities 
for actors, providing an infrastructure that inhibits corrupt activities or opportunities, and 
educating or providing training on anti-corruption.  Removing immediate opportunities for 
engaging in corrupt activities could be prevented by implementing new regulations, such 
as requiring pairs of individuals to work together, or establishing regular audits or random 
inspections of employees to ensure no corrupt activity has taken place. 
Ensuring that corruption is removed from the infrastructure of an agency could include 
financial background checks for employees to determine if they may be at risk of engaging 
in criminal behaviour.  Additionally, ensuring that personnel are being paid living wages 
and provided with adequate benefits could help to lower the risk of corrupt personnel 
(Gruber, 2013).  A final strategy could be to incorporate anti-corruption training, seminars, 
and campaigns as consistent reminders of the dangers of engaging in corrupt activities.  An 
example, witnessed first-hand by the author, were posters displayed in the reception area of 
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prisons within Ohio (USA).  These posters displayed side-by-side photographs of 
Correctional Officer’s official photos from their first day of work, next to their mug shot.  
Additional information indicated what their crimes were – and all were relevant to illegal 
activity within the prison (i.e. smuggling contraband, etc.)  This worked to highlight 
corrupt activities of correctional officers and highlight the consequences of such actions. 
Facilitator Situational Crime Prevention Strategy 
The corruption of either an individual 
or state allows for increased ability to 
traffic or smuggle objects into or 
from nations. 
Reduce opportunities for actor to consider corrupt actions. 
Provide proper infrastructure for personnel. 
Educate potential corruptors as to danger and harm illicit 
antiquities poses. 
Controller Controller 
Type 
Super Controller Category 
Border Agents, 
antiquities dealers, 
archaeologists, shipping 
industry 
Handler Organisations Groups 
Provocation 
Excuses 
Fig. 7-16: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies to Reduce Corruption 
 
7.4.4.3 Require/Establish Provenance (Strategy 10) 
By far, the largest contributor for the ongoing existence of ATNs centres on issues 
concerning provenance.  If the antiquities market were able to enforce and require the need 
for a legitimate and authorized provenance for every object sold on the antiquities market, 
these illicit networks would radically transform from a grey market to a black market.  It is 
because of the lax attitude towards provenance that ATNs is a grey, and not fully illegal 
market, but instead straddles the border of legal and illegality (Mackenzie, 2005; Alder and 
Polk, 2005; Bowman, 2008; Campbell, 2013; Mackenzie and Yates, 2016b).  All strategies 
for this factor of ATNs are therefore focused solely on working to regulate the market by 
creating stricter policies concerning provenance – such as enforcing and requiring a 
legitimate (and researched) provenance in order for a sale to occur.  Another broad, but 
important strategy to consider would be working with the market to regulate itself. 
…as long as the trade in antiquities may be conducted openly in the auction 
houses and dealers’ galleries in the market centres, not only will the flow of 
material out of the poorer source nations continue, there is likely to be the 
additional social costs that result from the creation of organised criminal activity 
to carry out the organisation of the supply of material and its smuggling across 
borders, including the disastrous effects of corruption of the political process in 
the source environments. (Alder and Polk, 2002, p. 44) 
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This market has proven to be extremely difficult to research and police as a result of the 
antiquities market itself being averse to any changes that would ultimately result in a loss 
of profit for the market.  This would usually include many of the policy and legislative 
actions.  Providing a monetary incentive for the market to regulate itself would seem to be 
the clearest option.  In this respect, providing tax cuts or incentives to large auction houses 
that enforce provenances for sales, and eliminating anonymous buyers, could have a 
significant impact.  Additionally, establishing ‘lending programs’ for collectors or buyers 
to temporarily ‘rent’ objects from a university of museum’s collection could provide a way 
in which collectors have access to important items that might otherwise be in storage.  The 
current culture of the antiquities market is an antiquated sentiment from an older age 
(Lundén, 2012). 
In 2007 I posed to these auction houses [Bruun Rasmussen, Ellekilde and 
Lauritz.com] the same question which I had earlier asked at the Swedish auction 
houses: whether I could consign Chinese archaeological objects which had left 
China illegally to their auctions.  All three auction houses replied that they had 
no restrictions against selling recently smuggled objects.  (Lundén, 2012, p. 116) 
Few courses of art history or museum studies offer classes which discuss the illicit 
antiquities market or provide classes regarding ethical purchases or collection habits.   
Facilitator Situational Crime Prevention Strategy 
The antiquities market that does not 
require or enforce the need for proof of 
authenticity or proper ownership 
documentation. 
 
The ability to (usually quite easily) create 
a fake provenance, allows an actor to use 
the fake provenance to then establish a 
“legitimate” object with which to sell upon 
the antiquities market. 
Attempt to have the market enact self-regulating 
habits.  
 
 
Encourage and fund more course and training 
availabilities concerning provenance research and 
authenticity. 
 
 
Controller Controller 
Type 
Super Controller Category 
Auction Houses, 
Museums, Universities, 
Collectors Handler 
Market 
Political 
Media 
Regulatory 
Financial 
Organisational 
Effort 
Rewards 
Excuses 
Fig. 7-17: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies to Require/Establish Provenance 
 
A final strategy to combat the current attitudes of the antiquities market is to provide the 
next generation with a more complete perspective of how the antiquities market operates – 
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including the illicit antiquities market.  “One of the greatest challenges is to involve the art 
market in developing effective strategies and to convince art dealers and auctioneers to be 
part of the solution rather than the problem.” (Gruber, 2013, p. 231) 
The strategies recommend above, in Figure 7-17 may seem a daunting process, but there 
are additional ways of considering to regulate the sales (and in some sense the provenance) 
of auction house sales, and is one that an expert in the field has been attempting to enact.  
Christos Tsirogiannis is an archaeologist who has been working on recovering the large 
volume of antiquities which were trafficked by Giacomo Medici throughout the 1980s and 
1990s (Gill and Tsirogiannis, 2016).  He has proposed that auction houses submit 
antiquities to relevant governments, so as to allow these governments the ability to 
determine if any of the item’s origins or provenance are contested (Silver, 2018).  
Specifically, Tsirogiannis, who is Greek, has in the past worked for the Greek government 
in working to return cultural items to Greece.  However, auction houses hold fast to their 
insistence that buyers and purchasers remain anonymous within the market.  This process 
which Tsirogiannis proposes would essentially allow for a background check of an object, 
and would likely be very effective in helping to recover illicit objects – but from the 
market’s perspective would create a negative atmosphere for such sales.  An interesting 
concept, and one which would benefit from further criminological study, though it should 
be noted that this could ultimately result in the creation of a black market for such objects, 
as an alternative to the legal antiquities market.  The ability to determine the effect such a 
process could have upon the market demonstrates why criminological and specifically 
crime prevention research could prove beneficial to the study of antiquities trafficking.   
7.4.5 Remove Excuses 
The final category of SCP, removing recuses consists of: set rules, post instructions, alert 
conscience, assist compliance, control drugs and alcohol (Cornish and Clarke, 2003).  
Similar to the previous section, it is clear that not all of these techniques will be applicable 
to ATNs.  Specifically, controlling drugs and alcohol is unlikely to have any effect on 
antiquities looting or trafficking.  The three strategies presented in this section use a 
combination of the remaining four techniques to develop strategies for ATNs.  The 
strategies that examined in this section are: criminalise antiquities trafficking activity, 
addresses the nature of antiquities, and the internet. 
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7.4.5.1 Criminalise Antiquities Trafficking Activity (Strategy 11) 
Archaeology as a science, is concerned with the excavation of objects in order to better 
understand the context of the objects or remains, and attempt to extract data concerning the 
lives, culture, and society of ancient civilizations and peoples (Renfrew, 2000).  This has 
not always been archaeology’s focus, and its origins often lie in tomb raiding, treasure 
hunting, or the theft of cultural object for the purposes of acquiring objects for museums 
(Renfrew, 2000; Brodie, 2006).  Modern day looters who engage in antiquities looting as a 
hobby tap into a similar vein when searching for objects (Lundén, 2012).  There may be a 
number of reasons behind such as hobby (including greed, profit, or glory), though two 
main strategies may help to combat leisure looters through both educational campaigns, 
and community programs. 
Working to establish the importance of cultural heritage in varying levels within a 
community may help to either deter an individual from engaging in such an activity or alert 
the community as to the risks and damage illicit looting can cause, resulting in looting 
becoming an anti-social and unacceptable behaviour within the community (Gruber, 2013).   
Facilitator SCP Strategy 
Participating in looting is not seen 
by the public as an overtly criminal 
or anti-social act. 
 
Lack of education concerning 
cultural heritage and of criminal or 
anti-social stigmas concerning illicit 
antiquities aids individuals in 
enacting techniques of neutralisation 
and engage in antiquities looting 
 
Incentivise leisure looters to report any finds to local 
authorities. 
 
Promote ethical standards and educate the general public 
about the illicit antiquities network (Education campaigns). 
 
Reaffirm the state regulations concerning the removal of 
illicit antiquities in communities and regions susceptible to 
looting. 
Controller Controller 
Type 
Super Controller Category 
Friends, 
Family, 
Hobby/Club Culture 
Handler 
Groups 
Media 
Regulatory 
Organisations 
Excuses 
Rewards 
Effort 
Fig. 7-18: SCP Strategies to Criminalise Antiquities Trafficking Activity 
 
An educational campaign could operate as a multi-faceted type of operation, targeting 
children, teenagers, parents, and retirees.  This could be accomplished with programs 
dedicated to learning and teaching of the importance in cultural heritage in schools of all 
levels, as well as local programs available at community centres and libraries.  Posters, 
170 
 
 
 
 
social media posts, and television or radio announcements would additionally ensure that a 
wide range of the population was exposed to the campaign.  These strategies may prove to 
be effective in education the community about illicit antiquities looting and help to deter 
those who engage with it.   
7.4.5.2 Address the Nature of Antiquities (Strategy 12) 
This matter proves to be one of the more prominent issues when attempting to regulate this 
illicit market, as unlike other criminal or illicit markets, authorities are often unaware of an 
antiquities’ existence until the moment it is removed from its original location and appears 
on the market (Alder and Polk, 2005; Brodie, 2009; Hardy, 2016).  In comparison, within 
the drug or weapons networks, there is a clear source of manufacturing necessary in the 
creation of these illicit goods.  Specific materials are needed for these objects, and as a 
result this makes it somewhat easier for authorities to track/control the allocation or use of 
specific resources – such as the widespread availability of cough syrup containing 
pseudoephedrine in the United States, until such time as authorities were made aware that 
the pseudoephedrine could be used to create methamphetamine, resulting in the regulation 
of purchases of such cough syrup (McKinley and Fink, 2006). 
Because the nature of antiquities makes it impossible to regulate the source of objects, 
alternatives to prevent the looting of antiquities must be considered.  Such strategies 
include working to document and record known archaeological object or sites, alerting the 
public and local community as to a region’s law and restrictions regarding illicit 
antiquities, as well as educational campaigns to inform the public about the importance of 
cultural heritage (Gruber, 2013).  One of the few ways to prove an object has been looted 
is to have photographic or video evidence of the object in situ (its original location).  
Ensuring that a site is thoroughly documented could potentially deter individuals from 
looting, but more importantly establish the original location of the object in the case that it 
is looted. 
The development or creation of mobile apps could allow anyone to photograph or video a 
site and upload it to a central database (Constantinidis, 2016).  This could be particularly 
useful in times of conflict.  Additionally, creating online and public campaigns (including 
television, radio and posters) to alert the public to the specific illegality of antiquities 
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looting, as well as the importance of cultural heritage, could help create an anti-looting 
culture within communities (Constantinidis, 2016).   
Facilitator SCP Strategy 
The nature of antiquities is such that a 
large majority of antiquities are yet 
unknown, discovered, or lack 
significant photographic or video 
documentation. 
Work with communities or states to provide ongoing 
documentation of known antiquities. 
Alert and inform public as to law and restrictions 
regarding cultural heritage. 
Provide educational campaigns to raise awareness for 
protecting cultural heritage. 
Controller Controller Type Super Controller Category 
Communities 
Site managers Handlers/Managers 
Organisation 
Groups 
Media 
Political 
Regulatory 
Excuses 
Effort 
Rewards 
Fig. 7-19: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies to Address the Nature of Antiquities 
 
7.4.5.3 Internet (Strategy 13) 
The emergence of the internet as an online market has drastically changed how illicit 
antiquities are sold and bought (Chippindale and Gill, 2001; Fay, 2011; Brodie, 2015c).  
Recommended strategies to combat this include having websites and platforms impose 
stricter guidelines or regulations concerning individuals registering and utilising their 
product.  Additionally, international regulation related to online antiquities sales or 
exchange of information pertaining to illicit antiquities must be more thoroughly explored 
– especially in relation to jurisdiction as the internet poses the difficult of creating a non-
physical marketplace.  As the internet has allowed for the middleman or broker type actor 
to essentially be cut out, this presents a situation where those sourcing illicit antiquities are 
able to sell directly to buyers or dealers through an online platform or website.  Many 
website or online platforms may have stipulations concerning the sale of illegal goods, but 
as illicit antiquities often fall into the grey space of not fully illicit or licit, this is often 
overlooked.  Requiring users to verify their identity, and potentially enforce the use of a 
provenance (verified provenance ideally) in order to sell or purchase objects may be one 
way in which to tackle this issue.   
The issue of international policy and regulation in relation to illicit antiquities is more 
complex and will require extensive research and politics in order to be achieved.  Because 
of the difficult issue of international jurisdiction that would be necessary to overcome, this 
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is a strategy that will likely take many years to achieve.  Each state may consider the need 
for specific online legislation or regulations concerning illicit objects such as illicit 
antiquities.  The type of legislation or regulation that is necessary will likely be a result of 
if the state at hand can be classified as a source, transit, or market country for illicit 
antiquities.  This distinction will likely have a significant impact on the most effective 
policies that could be implemented.  A source country, for example would likely seek to 
restrict the selling and/or transit on antiquities via an online venue, whereas a market 
country would seek to restrict the import or purchasing of illicit objects through an online 
venue.  As the internet is still a relatively new phenomenon, the understanding of the ways 
in which criminal actors engage with it is ever-changing – as are any attempts to prevent 
them. 
Facilitator Situational Crime Prevention Strategy 
Allows actors complete anonymity 
during transactions. 
Allows for a larger audience to be 
reached with relatively low costs. 
Allows for the market standard of 
buying and selling antiquities 
without a provenance. 
There exists a lack of national and 
international regulation in regard to 
online sales. 
Require actors to identify and verify their accounts and 
themselves. 
 
Attempt to regulate/enforce illicit actors by defining and 
stating illicit actions in the terms of agreements for users.  
Work to develop national and international regulations 
concerning purchasing or selling illicit objects in an online 
venue.  
Controller Controller Type Super Controller Category 
Nations 
Owners of Sites Manager 
Regulatory 
Financial 
Courts 
Organisation 
Groups 
Political 
Media 
Effort 
Risk 
Rewards 
Excuses 
Fig. 7-20: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies for Internet 
 
7.5 Criticism of Situational Crime Prevention 
Throughout its history, SCP has encountered many criticisms or misconceptions.  Most 
prominent for SCP is that it displaces crime instead of preventing or deterring crime 
(Clarke and Bowers, 2017).  This contention demonstrates a lack of understanding as to the 
underlining focus and premise of SCP, which is to reduce the opportunities that allow a 
crime to occur by the 5 categories of situational techniques (increase effort, increase risks, 
reduce rewards, remove excuses, and reduce provocation) (Cornish and Clarke, 2003).  By 
claiming that SCP displaces crime assumes that these techniques are merely gimmicks, and 
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not formidable preventative strategies that are common efforts of most preventative 
measure or practices (Clarke and Bowers, 2017). 
SCP does not claim to have ‘re-invented the wheel’ so to speak, but merely provided a 
framework and empirical manner by which common preventative practices can be applied 
and tested to determine the most effective use.  In a recent article by Clarke and Bowman, 
they efficiently list seven common criticisms that SCP faces. 
 
Fig. 7-21: Seven Misconceptions of SCP (Sourced from Clarke and Bowers, 2017).  Permission to reproduce 
this figure has been granted by Taylor and Francis (Books) Limited UK. 
 
The list of rebuttals which are listed in Figure 7-21 are succinct responses to such 
criticisms and addresses each concern efficiently.  As SCP has evolved over the years, its 
growing popularity speaks volumes to the issues brought up by these criticisms. 
7.6 Discussion  
In considering the thirteen strategies that have been presented in this chapter, it is evident 
that ATNs is a complex and multifaceted network.  The strategies presented include: 
restrict access to equipment, secure borders, identify criminal networks, monitor 
archaeological sites, assist in the detection of objects, reduce profit, deny long-term 
investments, create infrastructure, reduce corruption, requires/establish provenance, 
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criminalise antiquities trafficking activity, address the nature of antiquities, and the 
internet.  
These strategies represent only some of the more prominent challenges that these 
networks, from an aggregate view, face.  The fact that this analysis of ATNs is a broad and 
wide-reaching investigation of how necessary elements of the overall network has been 
stressed, in order to better understand the facilitating factors which, allow these networks 
to continue to operate, and ultimately therefore determine the most effective preventative 
measures available.  Having now discussed and examined these strategies, a consideration 
of how the super controllers may influence or impact actors within these networks to 
initiate prevention measures or strategies can now be considered. 
Figure 7-22 (below) presents a chart of every strategy that makes use of the specific 
situational mechanisms, similar to a chart presented in Sampson, John E Eck, et al. (2010).  
Listed below each mechanism (effort, risk, rewards, excuses, provocations) are the 
corresponding strategies which could make use of these situational concepts to influence 
controllers within ATNs.  The orange coloured boxes represent those strategies which 
pertain to manager type controllers, while the blue coloured boxes represent those 
strategies which pertain to handler type controllers.  There is one strategy that is 
considered to be a combination of both handler and manager (address the nature of 
antiquities) which is represented by the mauve box.  The purpose of this chart is to 
demonstrate which categories are most likely to be used.  As it is stated in Sampson et al. 
(2010), these mechanisms can be used to influence the controllers in a variety of ways:   
• Effort: Influence this by helping to make prevention easier or by 
making it more difficult for a controller to avoid intervening… 
• Risk: Manipulating their risk of penalties for not taking preventative 
actions… 
• Rewards: Change the rewards controllers receive from providing crime 
prevention… 
• Excuses: Controller’s excuses for not taking preventive actions can be 
manipulated by super controllers… 
• Provocation: A super controller might act to remove the effects of such 
[negative] provocation by mandating better training… 
(Sampson et al., 2010, pp. 45-47)  
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From Figure 7-22, it is evident that effort, rewards, and excuses are the most common 
types of mechanisms that could be used for the strategies presented in this thesis.  
Additionally, from those three mechanics (effort, rewards, excuses) the strategies are split 
almost evenly between having controllers be managers and handlers, demonstrating the 
burden of criminal opportunities in this network are evenly divided between opportunities 
created by actors, and by circumstances or situations.  
EFFORT RISK REWARDS EXCUSES PROVOCATION 
Secure Borders  Restrict Access to Equipment  
Restrict Access 
to Equipment  Secure Borders Secure Borders 
Detection of 
Objects 
Identifying 
Criminal 
Networks 
Identifying 
Criminal 
Networks 
Monitor 
Archaeological 
Sites 
Monitor 
Archaeological 
Sites 
Deny Long-Term 
Investment 
Monitor 
Archaeological 
Sites 
Reduce Profit Detection of Objects 
Reduce 
Corruption 
Create/Promote 
Infrastructure 
Detection of 
Objects 
Deny Long-Term 
Investment 
Create/Promote 
Infrastructure  
Require/Establish 
Provenance 
Deny Long-
Term 
Investment 
Create/Promote 
Infrastructure 
Reduce 
Corruption  
Criminalise AT 
Activity 
Internet Sales 
& Online 
Platforms 
Require/Establish 
Provenance 
Require/Establish 
Provenance  
Address the 
Nature of 
antiquities 
 Criminalise AT Activity 
Criminalise AT 
Activity  
Internet Sales & 
Online Platforms  
Address the 
Nature of 
Antiquities 
Address the 
Nature of 
Antiquities 
 
  Internet Sales & Online Platforms 
Internet Sales & 
Online Platforms  
Fig. 7-22: Table of the 13 SCP Strategies for ATNs and Type of Controllers 
(NB - orange refers to manager type controllers, while blue refers to handler type controllers) 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to examine and analyse SCP strategies relevant to ATNs.  These 
strategies were considered and developed in the framework of SCP and thusly focus on 
increasing effort, increasing risk, reducing reward, removing excuses, and reducing 
provocation.  The strategies presented in this chapter represent some fundamental issues 
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within ATNs, and some potential areas (from a network perspective) to target.  These were 
not developed or designed as discretely implantable strategies, but do represent major 
concepts and ideas that must be examined and analysed as part of a discussion concerning 
ATNs.  Chapter 3 referred to a paper written by Marcus Felson (2017) which described 
criminological theory as lacking a paradigm.  Within criminology, he argues, there is no 
master theory, or basic agreement as to what causes crime (2017).  A similar comparison 
could be made to the field concerned with studying and researching ATNs.  In its origins, 
this field of study agreed on a few aspects of the network – mainly that there was a 
significant lack of data or empirical evidence concerning the looting, transit, and marketing 
of antiquities, and that it was occurring on a global scale (Proulx, 2011b; Proulx, 2011a; 
Campbell, 2013).  Additionally, progress has been made within the network including 
establishing ATNs as a grey market, that often operates as organised crime, and that a 
necessary factor of regulating the antiquities market lies in the issue of provenance 
(Brodie, 2006; Brodie et al., 2006; Bowman, 2008; Massy, 2008; Mackenzie, 2011; Ulph 
et al., 2012; Mackenzie and Yates, 2016a).  Where this field is lacking in direction is in 
respect to issues such as defining cultural heritage, heritage crime, illicit antiquities, 
effective policies and legislations that have a lasting impact on reducing or preventing 
antiquities looting or trafficking from occurring.  However, of most concern is the ability 
of this area of study to conduct research within ATNs.   
The nature of an illicit network or market is to remain clandestine or unknown, so as to 
allow the network or market to continue to operate under law enforcement or legal 
authorities’ radars.  Nevertheless, where this field is most lacking is in criminological 
research and methods.  The goal of this thesis is to introduce, demonstrate, and initiate the 
use of a crime prevention theory – SCP – as a constructive and useful method of analysis 
for ATNs.  SCP was developed originally as a tool or framework to be used by law 
enforcement, and has developed into a framework/perspective which is intended to be used 
by both academics and law enforcement (Clarke, 1995; Clarke, 1997b; Clarke, 2009).  Its 
ultimate goal is to provide a framework by which criminal actions can be analysed to 
determine the situations which have allowed crime to occur – and develop effective 
methods to prevention (Clarke, 1995; Clarke, 1997b; Clarke, 2009).  This thesis has 
demonstrated the ability of SCP to produce a crime script with necessary components 
accounting for the looting, transit, and marketing of illicit antiquities, while highlighting 
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significant facilitating factors based upon these scripts – and has provided resultant SCP 
strategies for ATNs.  These methods of analysis will now be seen in action for a specific 
case of antiquities trafficking, to demonstrate the full scope of SCP.  The Syria case study 
will include all of the elements of analysis that have been examined through chapters 5, 6 
and 7, and will ultimately produce SCP measures for potential future ATNs in conflict 
zones. 
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8. Syria Case Study 
8.1 Introduction 
The three previous chapters detailed the rationale behind, and method of applying CSA and 
SCP to the broader ATNs.  This process included creating a crime script, identifying 
prominent facilitating factors, and then conducting an analysis which resulted in the 
presentation of thirteen SCP strategies.  This method of analysis provided insight into not 
only the operations and most basic structure of how ATNs function, but also produced 
crime-specific preventative measures.  This chapter will be focused on applying this same 
method of analysis to a specific case study: The Syrian Civil War.  As SCP was intended to 
be used for specific types of crimes, this case study will help to highlight and demonstrate 
the precise nature of SCP and the efficient and vigorous analysis which it provides.   
This chapter is divided into five analytic sections.  The first section (8.2) will consists of a 
brief overview of the historical context of the Syrian Civil war in an effort to provide a 
better sense of the scope and details of this conflict.  This will provide a better 
understanding of the complexities faced when examining this case study, while also 
highlighting the complexities of the multi-layered political, religious, social and economic 
aspect of this conflict.  With a basic understanding of the background to this case study, in 
the next section (8.3) the specific crime script that has been generated for antiquities 
trafficking within the Syrian conflict will be presented in terms of the three phases of 
looting, transit and marketing.  In the third analytic section of this chapter (8.4) the crime 
script for the Syrian conflict will then be subjected to a more detailed analysis – with a 
focus on the analysis of the script in operation – in an effort to identify those prominent 
facilitating factors which have allowed antiquities looting and trafficking to occur during 
the conflict.  It will follow the same sequence of discussion, beginning with the looting 
phase, and then in turn the transit and marketing phase of the process.  In the fourth 
analysis section of this chapter (8.5) the discussion will turn to the question of how this 
case study can be used to inform and develop SCP measures for future potential conflicts.  
Finally, in the fifth section of this chapter (8.6) the discussion will turn to an overview of 
the focus of this chapter, and indeed the goal of this entire thesis to develop and provide 
methods and strategies that may prove helpful in the prevention of antiquities trafficking.  
Hopefully, what will become clear in this process is that, especially within conflict zones, 
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more focus needs to be placed on preventative measures and responses.  With the current 
Syrian conflict underway, there are clearly limits on what can currently be done.  However, 
this case study provides a valuable opportunity to learn from this and other conflicts, and to 
apply lessons learned to help prevent or lessen potential damage inflicted by future 
conflicts.  
8.2 Historical and Conflict Background 
As this project is focusing on the current conflict in Syria, a broad understanding of the 
conflict itself is necessary to better understand the context of the situation.  The following 
discussion is in no way thorough or encompassing of the full complexity of the conflict at 
hand. 
To begin, it is important to note that the conflict in Syria is also been a long-standing 
conflict, which is currently still in process with no clear end in sight (Hokayem, 2013; 
Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  The conflict had its start in the Arab Spring, which 
took place in the spring of 2011 (Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  
The Arab Spring refers to the Spring of 2011, when a number of nations in the middle east 
partook in revolutions, led by Egypt and Tunisia which both overthrew their leaders (Hosni 
Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali) (Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 
2016).  Numerous revolutions and protests took place as a result of the uprisings in Tunisia 
and Egypt (Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  The Syrian outbreak 
came very much as a surprise to both those within Syria, and to the global community 
(Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016). 
Some of the issues which lead to the outbreak of conflict were based in historical events, 
and with the fact that President Bashar al-Assad, and many government and military 
leaders are from a minority religious sect in Syria, the Alawites, whereas the majority of 
Syria is Sunni Muslim (Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  
Additionally, Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, had previously been President of Syria and 
had forcibly suppressed an uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood (a Sunni Muslim political 
party) in 1982, and in which there resulted in the deaths of thousands of Syrians 
(Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  A number of other factors have 
also thought to have contributed to the outbreak of the Syrian war, from a severe drought, 
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Syria was experiencing between 2007-2010, and to general social and economic struggles 
which may have contributed to the dissatisfaction of Syrians (Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-
Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  In March of 2011, fifteen teenagers were arrested, detained, 
and some tortured for rebellious graffiti on a school wall (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 
2016).  The resulting protests that followed started a cycle of: protesters being fired upon 
by officials, and the funerals of those killed taking place in the form of protest, which were 
again fired upon.  The protests continued to grow across the country, eventually leading to 
the outbreak of the civil war (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016). 
The Syrian Civil War has continued and has included a number of rebel groups which are 
fighting against Assad regime forces (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016; Anon, 2018d).  
The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the more prominent forces but IS has also taken hold in 
Syria and a number of smaller groups also have attempted to take control of different 
regions including: The Free Syrian Army, Lebanese fighters (backing the Assad Regime), 
as well as Kurdish groups also seeking independence in northern Syria (Yassin-Kassab and 
Al-Shami, 2016; Anon, 2018d).  The map of Syria changes almost daily, with some forces 
gaining ground and others lose ground (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016; Anon, 2018d).  
As Syria wages a civil war, many countries are throwing their lot behind various groups or 
forces (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016; Anon, 2018d).  This only works to complicate 
the conflict.  With so many nations becoming involved in the conflict, it is further 
important to remember the religious and national undertones which are at play (Yassin-
Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016; Anon, 2018d).  Assad’s regime represents a minority sect, 
which is generally backed by Shia Muslims (Countries such as Iran and Iraq are largely 
Shia), as opposed to Sunni Muslims (Countries such as Turkey, UAE, and Qatar are 
largely Sunni) who are backing rebel forces (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016; Anon, 
2018d).  This conflict very much draws lines along religious ties, but also encompasses 
historical and cultural conflicts or discrepancies (Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al-
Shami, 2016). 
A difficulty of the unrest in Syria is that it has also allowed terrorist organizations such as 
IS to take hold in particular regions (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016; Anon, 2018d).  
One of the incidents which will be discussed in greater detail in the destruction of Palmyra 
by IS forces in the summer of 2016 (Bilefsky, 2017).  Not only has IS used brutal tactics 
(such as public executions), destruction of cultural site and objects, but their use of social 
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media has been used as a recruitment tools with the aim of recruiting new members and 
spreading their message to neighbouring countries or regions, to recruit new members 
possibly helped to spread IS to neighbouring countries and regions (Wagner, 2015; Yassin-
Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016). 
At present, it seems that this conflict does not have an end in sight (Hokayem, 2013; 
Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  Thousands of Syrians have fled to neighbouring 
countries or attempted to make their way to Europe.  This has resulted in one of the largest 
refugee crises in modern history (Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  
The city of Aleppo, once a World Heritage Site, has been all but destroyed, with its 
cultural icon, the Old City Bazaar having been fire bombed (Harkin, 2016).  As mentioned 
before, the ancient city of Palmyra has also suffered extreme destruction and damage  
(Bilefsky, 2017).  Thousands of Syrians have lost their lives as a result of the ongoing 
conflict, and thousands more are left to try and find their way out and create a new life in a 
new country (Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  
8.3 The Syria Crime Script  
In chapter 5, the crime script which had been developed as a model for ATN was examined 
and discussed.  As was established, the script that was presented there provided a more 
abstract and encompassing model for how the network as a whole operates.  In contrast, 
the crime script that will be presented in this chapter follows a more traditional format, as 
it reflects a more constrained focus on a particular time and place for antiquities 
trafficking.  Crime scripts were intended for this type of analysis and will therefore be 
efficient in highlighting trends or patterns for a particular type of crime being committed 
(Cornish, 1994a; Wortley and Mazerolle, 2013).  Using the ongoing conflict in Syria as a 
case study for antiquities looting occurring in conflict can not only determine potential 
intervention points specifically for antiquities looting in Syria, but may also be able to 
identify some common techniques or trends for future antiquities in conflict.  The script 
presented in this chapter was developed from journalistic articles and reports concerning 
the illicit antiquities trade ranging from January 1st, 2005 to December 31st, 2016.  It 
should be noted that these scripts were developed from the only data source available to 
the author, and as such do not represent a complete or encompassing understanding of the 
situation.  A compilation of the Syrian conflict dataset (hereby referred to simply as the 
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dataset) can be found in Appendices 5, 6, 7 and 8.  This case study was chosen mainly 
because of the available data concerning illicit antiquities within the conflict as; research of 
this type would be difficult and dangerous to conduct within a conflict zone.  As such, this 
data represents a snapshot of the most vocal types of looting, trafficking, and marketing 
within Syria, which presents a valuable research opportunity, regardless of its 
shortcomings.  The script that was developed for Syria was a result of the analysis of a set 
of journalistic articles which were selected due to their relevance and quantity and quality 
of data.  A full version of the Syria crime script can be seen in Appendix 10, though the 
individual phases appear in the following sections.    This analysis was dependent upon 
individual scripts being completed with information gathered from the article, with 
particular attention paid to direct quotations from individuals.  As a result, some of the 
scripts are not fully complete, but help to demonstrate a general idea of how specific 
instances of looting occur.  
8.3.1 Syria Looting Phase Script 
The looting script presented in chapter 5, consisted of only four stages: access site, search 
and find object, loot object, and dispose of object.  The script presented in this chapter has 
expanded upon the original script, to produce a seven-stage crime script for the looting of 
illicit antiquities in Syria.  This detailed script provides a more in-depth analysis of the 
steps necessary for looters to take in order to source an illicit antiquity.   
 
                       Subsistence and Profit Looters 
L
o
o
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n
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Stage 1 Select Location 
• Search in culturally rich areas 
Stage 2 
Acquire Tools/Labour 
• Simple 
• Specialized 
Stage 3 
Access Site 
• Openly 
• Clandestinely 
Stage 4 
Search & Find Objects 
• Objects are made visible/Random find 
• Uses advanced knowledge to locate objects 
Stage 5 Loot Objects 
Stage 6 Transport from Site 
Stage 7 
Dispose of Object 
• Sell to Buyer 
• Sell to Broker/Dealer 
• Smuggle 
Fig. 8-1: Syria Looting Crime Script  
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These seven steps represent the minimum actions required for those engaging in illicit 
antiquities looting in Syria.  These include: select location, acquire tools/labour, access 
site, search and find objects, loot objects, transport from site, dispose of object.  The only 
distinct difference between a subsistence looter’s script and a criminal looter’s script is 
stage two, where the criminal script presents the possibility of acquiring labour.  In this 
section, only three of the seven stages will be examined in detail: acquire tools/labour, 
access site, and dispose of object.  These stages will be examined more thoroughly as a 
result of representing conditions or scenarios specific to Syria. 
8.3.1.1 Subsistence versus Profit Looters 
When reviewing the antiquities looting in Syria, a distinction became apparent, 
demonstrating that two types of looters were participating in finding and looting illicit 
antiquities: subsistence looters and profit looters.  The Syrian conflict has left many 
without a means of income as a result of the fighting and instability within the country 
(Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  It could be argued that all non-
profit type looters within Syria are subsistence looters, while some may view the issue as 
more complex.  What is evident from the dataset is that the most prominent perspective of 
looters was that of looting to survive.  “‘They’re probably selling most of it,’ he said. The 
looting itself usually happens in a matter of days. Much of the digging is probably done by 
local people who are ‘just trying to feed their families’, Danti said.” (Drennan, 2014)  This 
dataset also reflected a compilation of reports which detail groups of all natures engaging 
in looting (regime, rebels, terrorists), though many of the journalistic interviews focused on 
highlighting reports specifically of terrorist organisations: 
 
It’s often diﬃcult to definitively determine who is responsible for an instance of 
looting. Both the Syrian government and rebel groups have taken part, as have 
locals in both Syria and Iraq whose livelihoods have been disrupted by the 
conflict. Satellite images and informants on the ground often can’t keep up with 
the pace of looting and of the exchange of territory between various groups. 
Nonetheless, it’s clear that the scale of the Islamic State’s destruction, looting, 
and profits from antiquities traﬃcking is “unprecedented,” Danti said. (Drennan, 
2014) 
As this data is journalistic in nature though, it must be viewed critically, as it may be the 
case that the journalist chose specific looters or individuals because of the appeal of their 
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story or based on the availability of individuals willing to be interviewed – and as such this 
may not necessarily reflect a true account of the reality of the situation.  That being said, 
for the purposes of this crime script, civilian looters will be categorised as engaging in 
looting to provide resources or money for themselves or their family as subsistence looters 
and any individual associated with profit looting. 
8.3.1.2 Acquire Tools/Labour 
There seems to be a rather distinct divide between specialized types of tools (including 
bulldozers, metal detectors, saws, or drills) and simple tools (shovels, buckets, or 
pickaxes).  This distinction tends to reflect the type of looting that is occurring (subsistence 
versus profit), but generally reflects the scale of looting occurring – as specialized 
equipment would typically indicate a large-scale looting effort, while simple tools would 
indicate a smaller operation or scale of looting.  Additionally, as the following quotes 
indicate, even these profit looters employ subsistence looters as a means of acquiring 
labour for large-scale lootings.   
The group issues licenses to looters to dig in their territory.  "If you find an 
artifact, you take 80 percent and ISIS takes 20 percent," he [Abu Walid, 
antiquities trafficker] said.  Or, if the equipment used to unearth the treasure 
belongs to ISIS, they take a 40-50 percent cut instead (CBS News, 2015).  
Fig. 8-2: Types of Looting and Labourers Employed 
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 One such digger, a 36 year old Syrian, works near Apamea with permission from a local 
rebel group, rolling a bulldozer over acres of land to turn up small artifacts or uncover 
clues that might lead to a greater score, such as an ancient burial cave (Giglio and al-Awad, 
2015). 
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The first thing Abu Karim noticed were the machines the extremists owned: metal 
detectors and treasure hunters that scan the ground for buried objects, like the Golden King 
Plus, shown above, which retails online for $5,900. There were also bulldozers, hydraulic 
diggers, and boxes of dynamite. They don’t need an expert like me, Abu Karim recalled 
thinking (Giglio and al-Awad, 2015). 
“The most recent reports I’m getting is that ISIS is actually engaging itself: They’re 
hiring their own people, they’re using a lot of earth-moving equipment — bulldozers, et 
cetera,” Al-Azm said.” (Drennan, 2014). 
 Using information gathered by local Syrian activists, Al-Azm found that Isis initially 
levied 20% taxes on those it “licensed” to excavate. In mid-2014, the group began to 
contract out excavation. But by autumn of that same year, Isis was “starting to hire their 
own archaeologists, digging teams and machinery – and that’s when we saw a peak of 
looting activity” (Shabi, 2015). 
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The table above (Figure 8-2) provides some additional and apt examples from the dataset, 
which discuss the types of looting and labourers which have been employed within the 
conflict. 
8.3.1.3 Access Site 
While there have been reports of looting occurring in the open, it also appears that the 
particular region (or group in control of a region) may have some impact on if looters 
operate in the open, or in a clandestine fashion.  It appears that some groups have outlawed 
looting, with severe punishment for any caught engaging in such activities (Shabi, 2015).  
ISIS allowed civilians with the knowhow to dig on their own, granting them 
special permission and charging a 20% tax, Abu Karim said.  He also said that 
ISIS employed special teams to target high value sites.  Experts and sources on 
the black market supported both of these ideas. (Giglio and al-Awad, 2015) 
There have also been reports that a tax (khums) has been imposed on anyone engaged in 
looting (Giglio and al-Awad, 2015).  This may encourage some to loot clandestinely to 
evade paying the tax.   
8.3.1.4 Disposal of Object 
The last stage of this phase (disposal of the object) is concerned with the next destination 
for the object.  A general trend emerged from the data concerning the types of individuals 
engaging in antiquities looting.  Typically, they fell into one of two categories: those 
looting and selling their objects to international criminal organisations, and those looting 
and selling onto middlemen or brokers.  Either option would likely result in the objects 
being transported outside Syria, with the looters either selling directly to buyers (typically 
through the internet or social media/texting platforms), or selling the object onto a broker 
or dealer (potentially via a smuggler).  As was apparent from the script that was developed 
for the Syria conflict, the most common destination for looted objects seems to be Turkey, 
though other potential destinations include Lebanon, and Iraq.  From this, and additional 
information gathered from the script, it can be assumed that there is a significant criminal 
market for antiquities within these border countries, and therefore are likely high number 
of middlemen and potentially brokers operating in such markets.  “The Islamic State profits 
nearly immediately, selling the goods to middlemen who then smuggle them into 
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neighboring countries such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, according to Al-Azm.” 
(Drennan, 2014)  With an understanding of where or how an object is disposed, further 
insight into the market can be gained, and ultimately help to determine effective prevention 
measure and techniques.  
8.3.1.5 Example 
Figure 8-3 demonstrates an example of a specific script that was developed based upon 
data gathered from a Syria Direct article, published December 8th, 2016.  This example is 
provided to demonstrate a specific example of a script for a looter.  While this example 
does not provide detailed accounts of specific actions, a reasonable amount of data can be 
derived from the sections of texts displayed in Figure 8-2 (above).  It details the specific 
activities and essentially self-reporting of a 30-year old male, Abdelrahman, who resides 
near the archaeological site of Apamea.  This script provides value information, such as 
Abdelrahman’s use of metal detector, and a monetary amount for his wares.  Additionally, 
it demonstrates a common trend with subsistence looters, of searching for objects at known 
archaeological sites.   
Syria Direct (December 8, 2016) 
 Subsistence Looting  Stage Script Script Action Script Example 
L
o
o
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Stage 1 Select 
Location 
Search In 
culturally rich sites 
“In the late hours of the night, 30-
year-old Abdelrahman wanders the 
ancient city of Apamea with a metal 
detector.” 
Stage 2 Acquire 
Tools/Labour 
Specialized Tools 
Stage 3 Access Site Clandestinely “Abdelrahman and his partners to 
work only at night—hidden from the 
watchful eye of both the regime and 
local rebel militias.  If caught by the 
regime, they could face up to 25 
years in prison. If caught by an 
Islamist group, treasure hunters 
could have their hands cut off” 
Stage 4 Search & Find 
Objects 
Objects are 
visible/random find 
 
Stage 5 Loot Objects   
Stage 6 Transport from 
Site 
Unknown Unknown 
Stage 7 Dispose of 
Object 
 “When luck is on his side, 
Abdelrahman can make between 
$300 and $500 a month selling 
buried artifacts,” 
Fig. 8-3: Example of Specific Looting Crime Script from Syria 
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What this example fails to address are important factors such as where Abdelrahman 
acquired his metal detector; did he own it previously?  If so, was that a result of work, or a 
hobby, or did he purchase it specifically for looting? Also, how often he engaged in 
looting, how often he found objects, how he transported them from the site, and ultimately 
how he disposed of them.  While this script helps to provide a snapshot of how looting 
might be occurring, further structured study of such looting activity could help to provide a 
more detailed insight into the specifics of how looting is occurring during the conflict in 
Syria.  
8.3.2 Syria Transit Phase Script 
Similar to the looting phase, this section will explore only a few stages in detail as a result 
of limited data.  Three stages, consisting of preparation of object, smuggling, and 
destination of the object, all prove to be the most relevant and important stages of this 
phase. 
 Smuggler 
T
ra
n
s
it
 
Stage 1 
Entry 
• Contacts seller 
• Arranges Purchase 
Stage 2 
Contact 
• In person 
• Electronic Device 
Stage 3 
Obtains Object 
• Smuggler gets 
possession of object 
Stage 4 
Prepares Object 
• Disguises/conceals 
• None 
Stage 5 Travels to Border 
Stage 6 
Smuggles over Border 
• Openly 
• Clandestinely 
• Forced 
Stage 7 
Destination of Object 
• Delivers object 
• Sells object 
• Stores object 
Stage 8 Obtains Profit • Smuggler is paid 
Fig. 8-4: Syria Transit Crime Script 
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8.3.2.1 Prepares Object 
The decisions of whether an object needs to be disguised or concealed can be indicative of 
much of how a smuggler operates, how they are intending to smuggle an object, and the 
type of object being smuggled.  For cases in Syria, there is a lack of those discussing 
smuggling specifically, but certain deductions may still be determined from the reports that 
do exist.  There have been many cases where antiquities were disguised or concealed in 
order to transport them, but in regards to Syria, there is a distinct lack of evidence that 
smugglers are attempting to hide objects (Hardy, 2016).  This is most likely a result of less 
secure borders from the conflict, which in turn has been exasperated by the migration 
crisis.   
8.3.2.2 Smuggles over Border  
This phase represents the area of the network(s) that typically has the least amount of data 
or information.  In the case of data available from Syria regarding smuggling, this is also 
the case, as there were little references to particular details of how objects were smuggled.  
The few times that references are made to transporting or smuggling an object across a 
border, it is often phrased as: “‘There's three friends in Aleppo we deal with, these people 
move from Aleppo all the way to the border here and pay a taxi driver to sneak it in.’". 
(Cox, 2015)  It can be assumed that lax border control, as well as corruption of border 
personnel likely has played a significant role in objects crossing from Syria into other 
countries.  However, some of the terrorist groups implement stricter laws or regulation of 
antiquities as is evident in the following quote:    
The looter said he had lost the busts to ISIS because he'd used a smuggler who 
flouted the strict rules the militant group imposes on the territory it controls.  The 
smuggler had been smoking a cigarette when he pulled into an ISIS checkpoint 
outside Aleppo, en route to Lebanon.  This caused the militants to become 
suspicious, since they consider smoking a sin, and they decided to search the car, 
finding the busts inside (Giglio and al-Awad, 2015). 
In the same turn, “‘Locals will go out and excavate for antiquities and bring this stuﬀ to 
Isis and get paid, or they’re willing to traﬃc this stuﬀ and pay Isis a tax to smuggle it into 
Turkey.’” (Hunter, 2015)  It appears that at times these terrorist organisations will 
encourage or facilitate the smuggling of items out of the country, as long as they can profit 
from it, and it does not clash with their ideological principles.   
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8.3.2.3 Destination of Object 
The majority of interviews that were conducted by journalists appear to have taken place in 
Turkey and as a result, Turkey seems to be a transit destination for many of the objects.  
Some of the data reveals further destinations such as Europe, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon 
(Shabi, 2015; Cox, 2015; Meyers and Kulish, 2016; Cornwell, 2016).   
‘There appears to be an interesting geographic divide: Pre-Islamic objects go to 
Europe and North America, while Islamic art goes to countries of the gulf,’ said 
Markus Hilgert, director of the Museum of the Ancient Near East in Berlin, who 
is coordinating a research project on the illicit trade.  (Meyers and Kulish, 2016) 
It seems that Iraq and Lebanon are also transit countries for many objects.  As they border 
Syria, this is a clear path for these objects to travel, especially when considering that 
Turkey provides easy access to the European Union.  There were also many reports of 
objects being transported among similar routes by which migrants were making their way 
to Europe (Cox, 2015; Hunter, 2015).   
Looted goods are “coming out through Turkey and Beirut and then containered 
[source typo] to who knows where”.  By the time an object gets to London, he 
[David Gill, professor of archaeological heritage at University Campus Suffolk] 
says, it “has paperwork, internally, within Europe”.  (This a possible scenario for 
higher-value objects for which a paper trail is more desirable, but undocumented 
items still turn up in European markets.)  (Shabi, 2015). 
This demonstrates that objects being looted and smuggled from Syria are destined for 
varied destinations, making the possibility of documenting or recovering such objects even 
more difficult.  
8.3.3 Syria Market Phase Script 
Three of the more prevalent stages within the market phase will be explained, though in a 
similar fashion to the looting phase, two roles represent the market phase.  A middleman 
and a broker represent two distinct roles within antiquities trafficking.  These distinctions 
will be examined in the following section.   
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 Middleman Broker  
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t 
Stage 1 Notified of Object Learns of Object 
Stage 2 Assesses Object Assesses Object 
Stage 3 Purchases Object Purchases Illicit Antiquity 
Stage 4 Finds Objects Researches Object 
Stage 5 
Meets with Buyer Provenance Decision 
• Creates false 
provenance 
• Does not create false 
provenance 
Stage 6 
Sells object to 
buyer 
Arranges Buyer 
Stage 7 
Delivers object to 
buyer 
Sells Object 
• Private Dealer 
• Auction House 
• Museum 
• Dealer 
Stage 8 Obtains profit  
Fig. 8-5: Syria Market Script 
8.3.3.1 Middleman versus Broker 
As stated previously, the fundamental difference between a middleman and a broker is that 
a middleman works primarily with objects that are still considered illicit.  They operate in a 
manner traditionally similar to those who engaged in a criminal network or market.  In 
contrast a dealer represents an individual who works or engages with objects that are (at 
this point in the network) licit objects.  They represent the transformative stage of when an 
object moves into the legitimate market.  In the case of Syria, the majority of the dataset 
reflected the presence of middlemen– individuals who were working in an illegal or illicit 
capacity. 
8.3.3.2 Provenance Decision 
Throughout the available data, there was little mention of provenance.  This is likely a 
direct result of many of the participants representing the role of middlemen – not brokers – 
and as such being able to openly sell illicit objects to other middlemen, brokers, or 
collectors who willingly purchase illicit antiquities.   
8.3.3.3 Arranges Buyer 
Many of the news articles described the use of mobile phones as a means of 
communicating and organizing meetings and transactions in the process of selling objects 
(Giglio and al-Awad, 2015; Hunter, 2015; Meyers and Kulish, 2016).  Not only were 
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phones used as a means of displaying wares to a wide audience, but it also was a manner 
by which deals and transactions occurred.  Using a mobile phone, while commonplace 
now, demonstrates a new form of researching potential clients in connection with a sale, or 
even as a means of presenting or examining an object.  While this data, along with other 
testimonials demonstrate that the use of mobile phones is common among middlemen and 
broker figures, this leads to the question of how then, these figures are arranging buyers.  
Traditionally, this would have been done through personal or business relationships, 
evident in the success of Giacomo Medici, Robert Hecht, and Subhash Kapoor (Watson 
and Todeschini, 2006; Felch, 2013a).  However, with online auction sites, and online 
communities dedicated to antiquities sales and purchases, this offers a new venue by which 
looters, middlemen, and brokers can arrange for the sale of their objects (Brodie, 2015c).  
The method by which middlemen and brokers meet and connect with potential buyers is a 
crucially important aspect of ATNs, and one which would benefit from further, and more 
specific study.  
8.3.3.4 Sells Object 
Much of the data reflected that most of the object that were sold went on to other 
middleman-like figures and remained illicit antiquities.  This was likely a result of the 
source of the data, as well as the manner by which it was collected, but still provides a 
valuable insight into parts of ATNs.  It is very likely that, in lieu of the current embargo on 
Syrian objects, many of these objects will at some later point enter the legitimate art 
market – either having been stored until an appropriate time, or after having been in the 
collection of a private collector (Brodie, 2015b; Brodie and Sabrine, 2018).  
8.4 The Syrian Crime Script Facilitating Factors or 
Circumstances  
The following section concerns highlighting relevant and case-specific factors or 
circumstances which may contribute to the trafficking of illicit antiquities within the 
conflict in Syria.  Each phase comprises prevalent themes relevant to the looting, transit, or 
marketing of antiquities taking place.  These include:  
• Looting: Lack of Infrastructure/Conflict Zone and Culturally Rich Region 
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• Transit: Borders and Criminal Organisations 
• Market: Demand Drives the Market, the Internet, and Brokers 
In contrast to earlier chapters, the facilitating circumstances presented here centre on a vital 
factor: that Syria has been engaged in a civil war since 2011.  This is especially evident in 
the looting phase, with an evidenced and documented increase in looting since the outbreak 
of the civil war (Casana and Panahipour, 2014; Daniels and Hanson, 2015; Jesse Casana, 
2015; Brodie, 2015b; Tapete et al., 2016).  This section will present some of factors which 
pose the greatest threat to antiquities, and which also highlight the specific nature and 
circumstances of this conflict.  
8.4.1 Facilitating Factors of the Syrian Looting Phase 
As is evident from documented evidence, there was a significant surge in looting directly 
following the outbreak of the conflict in May, 2011  (Casana and Panahipour, 2014; 
Daniels and Hanson, 2015; Jesse Casana, 2015; Brodie, 2015b; Tapete et al., 2016).  This 
section will consider some of the facilitating factors which enabled such large-scale looting 
to occur. 
8.4.1.1 Lack of Infrastructure/Conflict Zone 
While this is a rather broad section, it is perhaps the main factor for people or communities 
who engage in subsistence looting.  Without a formal infrastructure, communities are 
vulnerable to factors such as: criminal actors, a lack of emergency services, and economic 
insecurity including loss of jobs or employment (McAllister, 1991).  With the ongoing 
conflict in Syria, there are parts of Syria where resources are limited due to fighting and it 
has proven difficult for people to provide for themselves or their families and to survive 
(CBS News, 2015; Giglio and al-Awad, 2015; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  The 
ongoing fighting has affected many normal services and standards of normal life including 
jobs and business (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  The nature of the fighting also 
complicates the issue, as if an extremist group takes control of a region, they may not 
permit certain normal services or jobs to continue if it fails to adhere to their extremist 
policies (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  These factors contribute to this type of 
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looting as it provides a low risk way an individual or group of individuals may afford the 
resources they need to survive.   
 
Access to Equipment: There are a number of ways to loot antiquities, but perhaps the 
most effective includes using powerful tools or equipment.  The use of metal detectors, 
bulldozers, jack saws, and other types of construction related equipment allows fewer 
individuals to complete jobs fast and more efficiently.  The availability of such tools or 
equipment may be made easier during a time of conflict.  As routine construction jobs may 
be halted as a result of fighting, this leaves useful equipment readily available, and 
possibly unguarded or closely monitored (McCalister, 2005).  Additionally, there is the 
possibility that various groups involved in the conflict may forcibly take such equipment or 
tools for their own use.  There have additionally been reports of equipment crossing 
borders in order to help with looting sites in Syria (Specifically reports of items coming 
from Iraq). 
Now with ISIS on the scene, this has become much much worse.  ISIS has 
instituted the concept of khums, the 20% tax, and said to the locals, you can dig 
on your own land but pay us a fifth of what you make.  On public land, they’ve 
started licensing crews to come in – Turks, Kurds, Iraqis coming with bulldozers 
to get at the few bobbles coming out.  Most of the stuff coming out is not 
priceless artifacts.  They’re pots, a small statue, a tablet or cylinder seals.  This 
stuff is small potatoes economically, so the income is based on bulk more than 
a significant piece of great value. 
JF: What evidence is there to support this? 
AA: The evidence comes from locals who we know who I communicate with 
regularly.  They tell is ISIS representatives are at the archaeological sites to make 
sure the khums is paid.  (Felch, 2014) 
With this information, it must then consider the possibility that specialised equipment is 
being brought into Syria - meaning across borders with permission of IS (or terrorist or 
organised criminal groups).  If that were the case, then this would demonstrate a 
breakdown of normal border procedure, and would also indicate that either lack of enough 
resources or corruption had led to individuals being allowed to bring equipment freely into 
Syria.  The data has also reflected that in some cases individuals ‘rented’ specialised 
equipment from organised crime groups, and as payment these groups would receive a cut 
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of the profit (CBS News, 2015).  It appears that the conflict has facilitated access to 
specialized equipment by means of a number of methods, allowing large scale looting to 
take place. 
Open and Encouraged Looting: With various groups holding control of certain parts of 
Syria, there have been reports of some of these groups either taxing locals who engage in 
looting, or otherwise these groups themselves being involved in the systematic looting of 
objects.  No matter the method used, it cannot be denied that people are openly and widely 
looting areas within Syria causing an incredible loss of cultural heritage along the way 
(Brodie, 2015b; Casana, 2015).  While looting did occur prior to the outbreak of the 
conflict in Syria, it was on a much smaller scale (Tapete et al., 2016).  The site of Apamea 
was mentioned in one of the previous sections, and proves an excellent example of this, as 
there are satellite images of sections of Apamea from prior to the conflict, and after 
(Tapete et al., 2016).  The number of looting pits has clearly increased significantly and is 
likely a direct result of a lack of oversight either in an official capacity or even on a local 
level. 
Criminal Groups/Terrorism: The local and international levels of criminal organisations 
have been combined into one grouping, as the facilitating factors used by these groups are 
similar.  Both levels of criminal organisations are able to operate fairly freely and without 
regulation or restriction as a result of the ongoing conflict within Syria.  The ability of 
these groups to operate at any given time is dependent on their geographic location and/or 
the area which they control, but generally one would assume that the times when they are 
engaged in looting are times when they are in control of a region or are in a region in 
which they are allowed to operate as they wish.  
But Sam Hardy, an archaeologist at University College London, who studies the 
trade in illicit antiquities, notes that insurgents and paramilitaries generally enter 
the trade in at least one of three ways: by running a trafficking network, 
facilitating smuggling through offering a service, or levying a tax on traffickers 
who move looted artefacts through their territory (Pringle, 2014). 
A major factor in their ability to systematically loot areas and sites is that they are free to 
do so without fear of surveillance, police or law enforcement involvement, or 
repercussions.  
195 
 
 
 
 
8.4.1.2 Culturally Rich Areas 
Popular/Known Archaeological Sites: When an archaeological site is known to the 
public, is a popular destination, or even has the status of a UNESCO World Heritage site, 
there is an increased risk of objects being looted from the site.  This was evident in the 
targeted attack on Palmyra by IS in the summer of 2014 which focused on the destruction 
of major parts of the site, as well as the looting of objects (Wagner, 2015; Bilefsky, 2017).  
As a result of this attack, a well-known archaeologist and cultural heritage expert Khaled 
al-Assad was murdered by IS for refusing to provide information as to where antiquities 
were located within the site (Wagner, 2015).  While a great portion of antiquities are yet to 
be discovered or unexcavated, these known sites make it extremely easy for looters, as 
there is an almost guarantee of finding objects (though the value of the objects may vary 
significantly).  Syria in particular has an incredible amount of archaeological sites, some of 
which have not been fully excavated (Casana and Panahipour, 2014; Daniels and Hanson, 
2015).  Apamea was a site that was heavily targeted by looters immediately after the 
outbreak of the Syrian conflict (Tapete et al., 2016).  The number of looting pits after the 
conflict began in 2011 increased significantly (as can be seen in photograph from satellite 
imagery) (Tapete et al., 2016).  Knowing the location of such sites provides looters with a 
profitable and easy manner in which to find illicit antiquities.  
Form of Currency: While many antiquities are recognized as being of value, some 
antiquities - such as those made of gold/featuring gold elements, or those which contain 
precious stones or materials – are more easily identified as valuable.  As such, these 
antiquities can be used as a form of currency and traded or bartered for goods or services, 
or sold to local traffickers (Kersel, 2007).  This is especially important in a case such as 
Syria, where traditional money may not be accepted by all groups – depending on the 
region or the group, which controls the region.  Antiquities fall into the useful category of 
(depending on the object) having intrinsic value, and so are able to be traded or bartered 
practically anywhere, regardless of location (Ulph et al., 2012).  They are also virtually 
untraceable and can be quite small – and therefore easy to transport (Alder and Polk, 2002; 
McCalister, 2005; Sotiriou, 2018).  This means that an individual could hypothetically loot 
the object, and then be able to take it with them if they chose to flee Syria and migrate – 
using the object as a means of currency along the way.  They could then either save the 
object for funds to help them settle or use it as payment in order to reach their ultimate 
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destination.  This makes antiquities an extremely valuable form of currency, especially 
within a conflict zone such as Syria.  Though the sale of Syrian antiquities is currently 
banned, it is clear from the data that those operating purely in an illegal manner are trading 
in Syrian objects – likely in the hopes of selling to private collectors of storing these 
objects until such times as they can sell openly.   
8.4.2 Facilitating Factors of the Syrian Transit Phase 
8.4.2.1 Border 
Increase in Migration: The Syrian refugee crisis has played a role in antiquities 
trafficking, as there have been reports that refugees have transported or sold illicit 
antiquities as a means to fund their journey out of Syria and to new nations (Hunter, 2015; 
Giglio and al-Awad, 2015).  With so many thousands of people leaving a country, there is 
always going to be the possibility that objects will be trafficked or sold abroad.  After 
looting an object, looters are looking for ways to sell on their objects, and as an antiquity 
presents the possibility of universal currency, it is not a far stretch to think that some 
individuals would have purchased such illicit antiquities to take with them on their journey 
– especially if the objects were small and easy to transport (Alder and Polk, 2002; 
McCalister, 2005; Sotiriou, 2018).  The mass of people moving across borders also allows 
objects to be trafficked more easily, and so the possibility of selling illicit antiquities onto 
middlemen or traffickers is also most likely increased. 
Lack of Training: In conjunction with the previous two stages, when border personnel are 
present, they are not necessarily trained specifically to be able to identify an illicit 
antiquity.  Being able to tell the difference between a local handicraft object that was 
recently made, and an antiquity requires a significant amount of skill – which border 
personnel typically lack.  As a result, individuals attempting to deceive border patrol can 
often be successful, as they can claim it to be either a legitimate antiquity, or else a non-
antiquity (i.e. replica, fake, modern day object, etc.).   
Lack of Border Control: As the border in question is involved with a civil war, there are 
bound to be criminal opportunities for traffickers and smugglers, and this is equally true 
for the illicit antiquities network (McAllister, 1991).  Not only is the mass refugee crisis 
having an impact on border control, but the ongoing fighting has also created difficulties, 
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as different groups have had control of different parts of the border over the course of the 
fighting since it started in 2011 (Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016; Vignal, 2017).  From 
reports in the data, crossing the Syrian border – especially into Turkey can be done rather 
easily – as evident of the mass of refugees fleeing the country (Cox, 2015; Giglio and al-
Awad, 2015; Hunter, 2015; Shabi, 2015; Yassin-Kassab and Al-Shami, 2016).  
Considering the scale of people leaving Syria, it seems impractical to attempt to detain 
every group or individual that is found to be crossing an international border.  This lack of 
a prominent border control contributes to criminal activities such as trafficking and 
smuggling as there appears to be no consequence for someone crossing the border – 
especially with such non-threatening objects as an antiquity.  
Easy to Transport/Conceal: While antiquities come in many shapes and sizes, often they 
can be quite transportable – being small pots, coins, statues, or figures (Polk, 2000; 
Mackenzie, 2011).  Therefore, the ability to smuggle an antiquity across a border is a 
relatively easy feat, and one that poses a low risk of detection or punishment.  At worst, it 
seems likely that the object would be seized from the individual.  The situation in Syria has 
led to a weakened border patrol, and therefore an increased opportunity for people to cross 
the border, and potentially transport antiquities (or other illicit objects) to neighbouring 
countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq.  
8.4.2.2 Criminal Organizations/Networks 
A wide-ranging network of criminals allows many illicit objects to be trafficked out of the 
conflict zone within Syria to neighbouring countries where they can be trafficked to further 
markets.  These networks can be made up of a number of smaller gangs or organisations 
and stitched together by middlemen or dealers to get objects out of a country (Herbet, 
2014).  Other times a singular network is effective in being to transport or smuggle an 
object.  There is also the possibility that these networks also traffic other illegal objects 
(such as weapons, drugs, or humans) and simply take on additional objects in the form of 
illicit antiquities (Herbet, 2014).  No matter what the specifics of the network, it typically 
includes a group of individuals who take on a particular level of risk in order to move an 
object across national borders for a profit.  These criminal actors may be connected 
through family relationships, friends, or simply as a means to and end and particular skill 
set.  A network of criminal individuals directly facilitates the illicit antiquities network as 
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without these actors and the role they play within these networks; illicit antiquities would 
never be able to enter the market.  In reference particularly to Syria, these criminal 
networks seem to be fairly well-established traffickers – who take advantage of the chaos 
surrounding the borders in the midst of the refugee crisis and the ongoing conflict.  There 
have been reports of traffickers posing as refugees seeking to flee the country or paying 
refugees to carry objects across the border, in order to move objects across the border with 
little hassle (Giglio and al-Awad, 2015; Hunter, 2015).  There are also strong ties to other 
criminal networks in neighbouring countries such as Turkey, where many Syrians have 
sought refuge. 
8.4.3 Facilitating Factors of the Syrian Market Phase 
8.4.3.1 Demand Drives the Market 
Easy Access to Objects: Obtaining illicit antiquities, for an antiquities dealer, is the most 
important part of their process, as without the object no further sales can be made.  It is 
clear that for many low-level brokers; the process of getting illicit antiquities is made all 
the easier by the fact that many of these objects have been freshly looted.  They are often 
purchasing objects directly from looters or smugglers, or other dealers (Giglio and al-
Awad, 2015; Shabi, 2015; Hunter, 2015; Cox, 2015).  As there is then no previous 
documentation or even knowledge that these items existed (having been freshly looted), 
the ability to find and then sell these objects seem to be made all the easier by the conflict 
within Syria.   
Open Criminal Market: Within the illicit antiquities market, there are essentially two 
types of figures operating: middlemen and brokers.  Middlemen, operate in a purely 
criminal aspect – selling known illicit objects onto collectors, or museums, while brokers 
may seek to make a criminal object appear legal.  This is a major distinction within the 
network and has implications upon the type of actions or methods brokers and dealers use, 
and in turn, the most effective means of attempting to prevent such crimes.  From many of 
the reports from the data, it seems that in neighbouring countries, especially Turkey, there 
exists a market in which dealers openly trade or sell objects that are clearly illicit 
antiquities.  What distinguished these reports from more prominent illicit antiquities cases 
is that there very much seems to be a physical and virtual network of individuals within a 
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contained geographic region (Turkey), and are working to sell objects to other dealers, 
buyers, or collectors further afield (Cox, 2015; Giglio and al-Awad, 2015; Hunter, 2015; 
Shabi, 2015).  This could also be a result of bias within the data, though considering the 
main route refugees have taken to enter Europe, it may also represent a trend within the 
market.  This open criminal market allows for a more effective market and allows for a 
higher volume of objects to pass through these dealers and usually onto their ultimate 
destination. 
Expertise of Market: Because these open criminal markets have been established for at 
least a couple of years, there exist middlemen and brokers who have become self-taught 
and self-labelled experts of the types of antiquities which are being taken out of Syria.  
One particular example in the data refers to a specific middleman who is used by other 
criminal actors in the network (including other dealers) as a reference for determining the 
validity and possible worth of an object (Giglio and al-Awad, 2015).  As with any criminal 
market, those who operate within the illicit antiquities network are well aware of how the 
market is valuing objects, and quickly become well acquainted with the expected value of 
different types of antiquities.  This is ultimately determined by the legal antiquities market 
– as the final retail value of the object will influence its value while still an illicit object.  
As this object moves through the illicit antiquities network, it will typically gain a sense of 
legitimacy – and with it a higher price tag.  While there are instances where experts or 
academics have been asked to help value objects, there were not many reports of such 
experiences in the data that was analysed for this project.  One of the main facilitators for 
this stage seems to be taught or learned knowledge of the antiquities market and the use of 
messaging services to access such knowledge when not immediately present. 
Provenance Decision: An especially important factor for this specific script is that the 
middlemen do not need to engage with this stage.  Because these middlemen are operating 
in a criminal market, there is no need to create a provenance for these objects – everyone 
they interact with in the market is aware of the illegality of these objects.  This provides a 
lower risk type situation where the middleman is able to sell their objects with no hassle in 
creating a provenance, and little chance of being caught out by buyers.  In contrast the 
broker figure would be more inclined to create or establish a false provenance for an 
object, as they may (depending on the transaction) be attempting to make the object appear 
to be legitimate (Brodie, 2006; Davis, 2011; Hardy, 2016; Tremain, 2017).  If selling to 
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another criminal actor, this would not be necessary, but when selling to an individual who 
is seeking to purchase (or have the appearance of purchasing) a legal object, then the 
broker would likely establish a provenance for the sake of appearing legitimate.  
Criminal and Working Relationships: Finding potential buyers, for any type of broker 
(or indeed dealer), is highly dependent upon the number and breadth of contacts that they 
have access to, when attempting to sell their wares.  This proves to be an important stage in 
the illicit antiquities network, as it typically is the bridge between the illicit and legal 
antiquities market.  In the case of illicit antiquities networks operating in and surrounding 
Syria, there is little information or data regarding these bridging sales – most of the data 
centres on criminal brokers.  There are a few instances of buyers coming directly to these 
markets and purchasing illicit antiquities:  
His [a Turkish dealer] best client, in fact, was an American, he said. He described 
the client as a man of about 50 who visited a few times a year with a translator. 
The last trip had been a few months before. “He is a really good guy,” the man 
said, “and he pays a lot of money”. (Giglio and al-Awad, 2015)   
The signifies that the criminal open market of illicit antiquities has become so established 
that buyers have been made aware of its existence, and the ability to directly purchase 
objects from the source.  In the instance of a broker actively finding a buyer, this would be 
done via working relationships between dealers established in the market.  For example, a 
lower level broker may seek to sell their objects to higher-level dealers with international 
connections, or with clients seeking specific types of objects.  These connections are 
dependent upon the brokers knowing the market and the players within them. 
8.4.3.2 Internet 
The internet has been an incredible facilitator for those operating within ATNs to find 
potential buyers, as it allows them a cheap and low-risk way in which to connect with 
interested parties.  This is especially relevant as it has allowed looters a direct line to 
buyers, where traditionally their only options included working via middlemen or brokers 
(Lidington et al., 2002; Fay, 2011; Brodie, 2015c).  Through various online sites, social 
media platforms, or messaging services, actors are able to quickly and efficiently offer 
prospective clients illicit antiquities.  This also allows them to connect with new buyers 
who are knowingly and actively engaging in the illicit antiquities network – meaning that 
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the dealers do not have to be as concerned about the criminality of their actions.  If for 
example, a site does require some sort of ‘provenance’ the broker can supply a very flimsy 
attempt at a provenance, and the requirements of the site are fulfilled, but the buyers who 
access the page are well aware of the criminality of the objects and are playing along in 
order to purchase the illicit antiquities.   
Messaging/Social Media Services: Why bother arranging for an in-person meeting when 
a digital snapshot can be just as effective?  This is a question that can be applied to many 
aspects of modern life but is especially relevant when it comes to the sale of illicit 
antiquities.  Giacomo Medici may have used Polaroid photos at the height of his illicit 
dealing days, but a digital photograph (easily taken on a camera phone) is the modern 
equivalent.  Being able to send a text with photos attached allows dealers to potentially sell 
objects to buyers from all over the world.  All that is needed is a cell phone.  The majority 
of these sales are focused on lower level, or lower valued objects – nothing compared to a 
Euphonious Krater – and as such photographic evidence seem to be more than enough of a 
visual assessment for the objects.  These services allow brokers to advertise their illicit 
antiquities by catching the eye of clients – with visual evidence of their ‘products’.  
Jurisdiction: Internet regulations are still in their infancy, from a legal perspective.  With 
the internet being only decades old, and constantly evolving, it has caused difficulty in 
many aspects of law and regulation, but one of the central issue when it comes to internet 
regulation is in determining jurisdiction (Lidington et al., 2002; Fay, 2011; Brodie, 2015c).  
This would be similar to white-collar crimes, as the internet offers the possibility of 
committing a crime without being physically present at the scene.  Cybercrimes present 
issues and difficulties that many nations or states have not had to consider previously 
(Hunton, 2009).  While the looting of an antiquity is physical, and occurs at a specific 
physical location, the actual act of selling the item or creating (electronically) a false 
provenance for an object can be done on a mobile phone or computer (Brodie, 2006; 
Hardy, 2014a; Brodie, 2015b; Hardy, 2016).  This creates difficulty in determining the 
jurisdiction of a crime (Hunton, 2009).  As it has taken place in an online format, what is 
the jurisdiction for an individual who resides in Germany, and is selling an illicit antiquity 
on an online auction site to someone living in America?  The smuggling or transportation 
of the object would qualify as a traditional form of crime, but the actual sale/purchase of 
the object would be more complex, especially if Germany and America had different 
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regulations concerning the transport of antiquities.  As was discussed previously, many 
source nations have stricter regulations regarding the export of cultural objects, while 
(generally) market nations are comparatively less strict (Ulph et al., 2012).  Even in 
traditional cases of antiquities looting, the transnational aspect of these networks makes 
tracking or persecuting antiquities traffickers difficult (Brodie et al., 2000; Bowman, 2008; 
Campbell, 2013; Dietzler, 2013; Mackenzie, 2015).  The issue of jurisdiction within online 
or non-physical crimes has proved to complicate an already complex situation.  As a result 
of this ambiguity concerning internet jurisdiction, it has allowed criminals to take 
advantage of a lack of regulation to exploit it for their activities (Hunton, 2009).   
Auction Sites: The creation of online-auction sites (such as eBay) have drastically 
changed how markets operate, and allowed for those within ATNs to take advantage of 
loopholes concerning the sale of antiquities (Lidington et al., 2002; Fay, 2011; Brodie, 
2015c).  The use of auction sites has allowed lower level individuals in the ATN to connect 
and supply antiquities directly to buyers and collectors (Lidington et al., 2002; Fay, 2011; 
Brodie, 2015c).  This is evident in examples from the data, where looters have described 
being able to sell products to European based clients with relative ease (Shabi, 2015). 
8.4.3.3 Middleman 
This role within the illicit antiquities network specifically poses one of the more fluidic and 
advantageous roles as the middleman typically has contact with some form of looter and a 
dealer.  They generally are the most profitable, and arguably the network could not operate 
effectively without their role (Brodie, 1998; Kersel, 2006a; Brodie et al., 2013; Campbell, 
2013; Mackenzie and Davis, 2016).  They prove to be an especially important part of the 
network operating around and within Syria.  They are the linchpin between different levels 
of dealers and objects and seem to operate largely as essentially low-level broker in 
countries surrounding Syria.  The term ‘middleman’ is not used as often as ‘broker’ in 
much of the data, but from the description of their activities and functions are similar to 
what experts would refer to as a middleman.  A middleman works to get an object to a 
dealer – and this may or may not involve trafficking the object themselves (Kersel, 2006a; 
Kersel, 2007; Campbell, 2013; Mackenzie and Davis, 2016; Magrans, 2018).  They may 
arrange for the object to be trafficked, and then take on the job of finding a dealer who is 
interested in purchasing the object (Brodie, 1998; Kersel, 2007; Campbell, 2013; 
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Mackenzie and Davis, 2016; Magrans, 2018).  They essentially, arrange deals.  The 
middlemen in Syria – from the data that was available – seems to have the most important 
job in working with looters in Syria to find dealers and potential buyers in neighbouring 
countries (typically Turkey).  This role works to perpetuate the illicit antiquities network, 
as it allows large quantities of antiquities to enter the illicit antiquities market. 
8.5 Situational Crime Prevention Strategies for Future 
Conflict Zones 
The conflict in Syria highlighted the issue of cultural heritage destruction and looting to the 
world in a way that previous instances have not (Rutelli, 2016).  While the looting of the 
Baghdad Museum in 2003 presented a renewed focus on antiquities, it represented the loss 
of known objects from an established museum (Atwood, 2004; Rothfield, 2009).  This is 
not to say that Iraq did not face widespread looting from archaeological and cultural sites 
as a result of the Iraq War of 2003, but, in the case of Iraq the main focus was on the theft 
of objects from the Baghdad Museum, and not the deliberate destruction of a UNESCO 
world heritage site such as Palmyra (Rothfield, 2009; Rutelli, 2016; Bilefsky, 2017).  The 
Syrian Civil war has made it apparent to the world that conflicts present a heightened 
danger to the cultural heritage of a nation, on a visual level never quite seen before (Rush, 
2016; Rutelli, 2016).  The capture and destruction of part of Palmyra, demonstrates the 
threat such terrorist organizations pose for such objects, while also highlighting the 
damage they can inflict (Layton et al., 2001; Urquhart Irvine, 2011; Roorda et al., 2013).  
This section proposes potential prevention strategies for future conflict zones, based on the 
analysis offered by the Syria conflict.  Syria represents a modern perspective on cultural 
heritage issues – especially in light of how cultural heritage has been used as a 
propagandistic prop by some militant and terrorist groups (Rush, 2016; Rutelli, 2016).  The 
main focus here is on prevention, not reactionary measures or strategies.  Any efforts 
undertaken to help protect or recover objects or sites in Syria now would be reactionary.  
Preventative measures are considered, to try to assist in situations where conflicts are likely 
to break out.  These strategies offer a modern perspective on the issue of illicit antiquities, 
based on the study and analysis of a previous conflict.  
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8.5.1 Situational Crime Prevention Strategies of the Looting Phase  
From a prevention perspective, this represents the most important phase, as if no large-
scale looting takes place it is unlikely that the trafficking or marketing of illicit antiquities 
as a result of a specific conflict would occur.  Unfortunately, this phase also represents the 
most difficult phase for prevention strategies.  The analysis of Syria demonstrates that 
significant contributing factors are a lack of infrastructure, and culturally rich 
areas/regions.  As such, the prevention strategies presented here will focus on increasing 
infrastructure, where possible, as well as increased monitoring of cultural sites.  
8.5.1.1 Culturally Rich Areas  
Establish Anti-Looting Culture Prior to Conflict (Reduce Provocation): Within 
conflict zones, it is likely that normal services will be disrupted.  This includes emergency 
services, law enforcement, and day-to-day infrastructure.  This lack of structure and 
normalcy can lead to a breakdown in traditional behaviours – this is evident from scenes 
following natural disasters, including looting – and can also encourage people to engage in 
non-normal activities – such as looting.  Without the threat of repercussions or 
enforcement, coupled with this break from norms, it is likely that communities and 
individuals will engage in looting (often as a means of survival), as seen in the case of 
Syria.  This phenomenon has been identified as being likely to occur when individuals and 
communities are faced with conflict or political or social upheaval, and as such, 
preventative measures should focus on creating an anti-looting culture.  This would include 
working with the community, religious leaders or figures, and especially schools or 
educational programs to promote and teach about the importance of local culture.  Creating 
a culture of respect and pride of local culture may help to curtail wide spread looting at 
times, for instances where societal norms are in upheaval.  This is not necessarily a 
strategy, but more of a preventative measure that would likely generally benefit the 
community and presents the additional benefit of potentially helping to prevent looting 
from occurring.  
8.5.1.2 Conflict Zone 
Within a conflict zone there are always going to be many obstacles to face, especially 
when communities are being broken and destroyed.  In reference to antiquities trafficking, 
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there are a number of strategies which can target specific factors that facilitate the looting, 
transit, and marketing of illicit antiquities.  These factors will be explored in the following 
section.  
Establish/Provide Infrastructure (Reduce Provocation): An obvious solution to a 
community, region, or state lacking in infrastructure is to provide a more stable 
infrastructure.  However, in a potential conflict zone, this presents a significant difficulty.  
When thinking of potential future conflicts, two options must be considered – similar to the 
Syria instances where the conflict occurs rather suddenly.  In contrast there are many types 
of conflicts for which there are warning signs and were preventative actions could take 
place – prior to unrest.  In cases where there might be indications of a future conflict, 
outreach programs could be initiated – preventative campaigns to not only establish 
connections with perhaps more rural communities, but also potentially employ these 
communities to begin documenting known archaeological or cultural sites.  Additionally, 
educational and awareness campaigns directed at local communities, particularly 
demonstrating the potential economic opportunities or resources these cultural or 
archaeological sites may pose.   
There have been programs to target communities in economic need – such as those 
discussed in chapter 7 – but there has been little research concerning specifically 
communities at risk of conflict.  Following the Iraq War of 2003, there was much interest 
in conflict antiquities (or cultural heritage sites), and researchers and academics at the time 
proposed two contrasting options:  providing an alternative means of income (either by 
paying the community to not loot, or as hiring local communities to act as guards (and 
providing them with weapons) (Rothfield, 2008; Rush, 2010).  Both of these options 
present difficulties, including where to source funding to pay these communities, and the 
risk of endangering lives of community guards and/or their families.  These options 
additionally, present reactionary strategies – options for when the conflict has already 
occurred.  Much of the literature available concerning war or conflict zones are written 
from the perspective of an invader.  This has links to the 1954 Hague Convention on the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, regarding correct 
behaviour of an invading state in relation of the cultural heritage of another state (B.T. 
Hoffman, 2006; Gerstenblith, 2008; Ulph et al., 2012).  It does not consider complex 
situations such as the annexing of Crimea by the Russian state – an action they deemed not 
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viable for the 1954 Hague Convention as the territory they annexed was the rightful 
property of Russia (B.T. Hoffman, 2006; Gerstenblith, 2008; Ulph et al., 2012).  The 
situation in Syria presents a similarly complex scenario of a civil war, with many different 
religious and political groups fighting for power (Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-Kassab and Al-
Shami, 2016).  Generally engaging the local community with their local heritage and the 
cultural value of local sites is always a goal to work toward, but especially in at-risk 
communities these types of engagements may ultimately deter individuals from engaging 
in looting.  This type of community engagement could be accomplished by community 
leaders (including academic and cultural specialists), or even via online presence 
(YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, etc.).  While this strategy is rather broad and does not 
propose specific strategies, it does attempt to highlight an important issue that is prevalent 
throughout the study of antiquities trafficking – that of placing more focus on preventative, 
rather than reactionary strategies.   
Restrict or Monitor Access to Equipment (Increase Effort): Evidence that large-scale 
looting occurred is Syria has been produced, with the aid of specialized looting equipment 
including bulldozers, metal detectors, saws, and drills (Casana and Panahipour, 2014; 
Drennan, 2014; Giglio and al-Awad, 2015).  In a scenario where a conflict is likely to 
break out, or is just beginning, a number of strategies could be implemented to attempt to 
remove the ability to use such specialised equipment.  The main strategy for this could be 
to monitor or even attempt to regulate or remove heavy machinery or equipment from a 
conflict zone prior to the outbreak of a conflict.  These include ‘sabotaging’ equipment, 
removing equipment, or tracking equipment.  Sabotaging equipment may include removing 
key-components which are necessary for the equipment to operate (i.e. distributor cap in a 
car), or as heavy machinery is often installed with modern technology, create a program or 
safety mechanism that would override a physical key, and not allow the equipment to work 
correctly (i.e. car locks).  In cases where this is not viable, there is the rather obvious 
solution of removing the equipment from areas close to cultural heritage sites – such as 
transporting them to more urban environments.  Additionally, machinery can be easily 
GPS equipped, which could potentially be used to track the machine (Jackson, 2016).  A 
preventative strategy would be to ensure all public (and even private) machinery is GPS 
equipped, this would allow for remote tracking of such objects, and even the potential for 
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alerting authorities as to if and/or when looting is occurring – as it might be assumed to be 
looting if it is located near a cultural site.  
Identify/Monitor Criminal/Terrorist Groups which Target Cultural Heritage 
(Reduce Rewards): Criminal or terrorist groups engaging in large-scale looting is a 
familiar issue – especially within conflict zones (Khmer Rouge, Lebanon, and Timbuktu) 
(Prott, 2006; Urquhart Irvine, 2011; Auwera, 2012; Goods and 2015, 2015; Davis and 
Mackenzie, 2015).  Considering the evidence from the Syrian conflict, it can be assumed 
that is also unlikely to be the last instance of criminal or terrorist group engaging in 
antiquities looting.  The strategy presented here specifically targets criminal organisations 
that are taking part in the act of looting of antiquities.  The hope is that by demonstrating 
that these actions will be held accountable by the international (or national) community, 
this will create a deterrent for the crime.  Ultimately, this would result in these criminal 
groups being denied the benefits of antiquities looting, as they would, instead of receiving 
a reward, receive punishment.  
 
Fig. 8-6: Site of Apamea in 2011 (left) and 2014 (right) – source: The Atlantic 
 
As evident in Syria, the international community has made use of satellite technology to 
photograph and document the condition of sites.  Examples of this are evident in satellite 
photos of Apamea, Syria in 2011. Photographic evidence can provide information as to 
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who might have engaged in the looting - depending on which group or organisation had 
control of the region at the time.  While this may not provide a direct means of stopping 
the looting from occurring, it can provide a form of deterrence.  Though there is consistent 
fighting occurring within Syria, the movements, gains, and losses of many of the groups 
involved in the conflict have been documented as well – with the result that often those 
monitoring the situation are aware of who was in control of which areas (or archaeological 
or cultural site) at the time when antiquities looting, or destruction occurred.  The ability to 
reasonably determine which groups are responsible for allowing the looting to occur, or 
even participating the looting, also allows for these actions to be brought to trial, as was the 
case with the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague when they charged an 
individual solely with a charge of cultural destruction, as a war crime (Burke, 2016). 
The junior civil servant turned Islamic militant leader pleaded guilty last month 
to the single charge of “intentionally directing” attacks on nine of Timbuktu’s 
mausoleums and the centuries-old door of its Sidi Yahia mosque in 2012, when 
the Malian city was occupied by a coalition of militant groups.  (Burke, 2016) 
This proved to be an important and ground-breaking legal precedent for cultural heritage 
protection and accountability.  This is the first time that any individual was face a singular 
charge for the destruction of cultural heritage (Burke, 2016).   
These long-revered shrines were an immediate target for the hardliners, often 
from abroad, who followed an extreme variant of literalist doctrines practised in 
Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia.  Pangalangan said Mahdi had 
initially opposed militant leaders’ decision to destroy the shrines, saying they 
should spare them to avoid offending the local community. When his arguments 
were rejected, Mahdi gave orders to level them and oversaw the operation. 
(Burke, 2016) 
If the international community is willing to consider the destruction and targeted attack of 
cultural heritage as a criminal offence worthy of conviction, this could serve to provide a 
deterrent for groups or individuals engaging in such activity.  While no one has been 
convicted by ICC for the looting or trafficking of antiquities, considering the scale and 
targeted focus that cultural heritage in Syria has faced this may prove to change in the 
future.  This type of international accountability may work to deter individuals or groups if 
they know they will be held accountable even after the conflict has resolved.  Additionally, 
making these groups aware that the international community is watching, doing 
surveillance, and taking note of the damage that is being inflicted on the cultural heritage 
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of a country or specific culture may have some sort of impact.  This could help to deter or 
influence criminal or terrorist groups in future conflicts.     
8.5.2 Situational Crime Prevention Strategies of the Transit Phase 
Situational prevention techniques and strategies for the transit phase are going to be largely 
focused on regulation of the border and the general movement of objects.  As the phase 
with the least amount of detailed information concerning how objects are smuggled or 
transported, these strategies target general smuggling issue, but from a prevention 
perspective, there are a number of strategies which can be considered.    
8.5.2.1 Border  
Provide Adequate Training or Resources (Remove Excuses): Providing the appropriate 
training for border personnel so that they may have a more informed method of detecting 
or identifying illicit antiquities may prove to be an extremely effective manner in which to 
prevent the trafficking of illicit antiquities.  Additionally, having practices and procedure in 
place for when border personnel are unsure of the authenticity or origin of an object would 
help to allow for a structured method by which suspicious objects could be assessed.  This 
might include establishing a relationship with a local university or museum – creating an 
on-call designation so an assigned individual can be called in for assistance when 
necessary.  If possible, even having an expert on staff, particularly in regions or areas 
which have a high concentration of cultural objects could prove useful and efficient.  As 
there are often objects which are region specific, particular objects could be highlighted as 
most likely to be trafficked – and specialised training could then be tailored to each 
particular region or country. 
Increase Access and Border Control (Increase Risks): When a country or region is in 
conflict, it is likely that border control will be one of the government aspects that is 
affected by the instability.  This would typically mean that that the country sharing the 
border takes on a greater responsibility during this time.  It can also be assumed that during 
a time of conflict there will be an increase in people and objects both entering and exiting 
the country.  For example, Iraq, Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan all share borders with 
Syria, and have been identified as being relevant to objects (and people) being smuggled 
and transported. The Syria example is useful to better understand how these bordering 
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countries have played a role furthering or allowing antiquities trafficking or occur on such 
a large scale.   
Lebanon: Lebanon has faced a situation similar to Syria only a few decades ago.  The 
Lebanese Civil War took place for a number of years ranging from 1975-1990s (Gaub, 
2015).  During this time Lebanon faced the issue of illicit antiquities and is still working to 
recover objects which were lost during this period.  The current situation in Syria has 
resulted in thousands of people and objects flooding through Lebanon in the wake of the 
conflict, and there has been a detectable increase in illicit antiquities being trafficked and 
sold in the country.  The situation has gotten so serious that the Lebanese government’s 
own Bureau of International Theft is now also busy with tracking and recovering Syrian 
illicit antiquities (Cox, 2015).  It is headed by Lt. Col. Nicholas Saad who has given a 
couple interviews concerning his new position (Cox, 2015).  Since the conflict in Syria 
began, Sadd has noticed a significant increase in the smuggling of looted artefacts, and his 
team has seized hundreds: 
…especially from the Islamic parts, Raqqa (the base) of the Islamic State… “We 
have the archaeology expert that said they're very valuable from the Roman 
period, from the Greek period, years before Christ,” he [Saad] says.  “However, 
there is not a market for them in Lebanon”.  “Lebanon is a transit station; it's one 
of the doors that goes to Europe.  The real money is made in Europe.” (Cox, 
2015). 
Turkey: In contrast, Turkey has remained relatively closed-mouth about any antiquities 
which may have been seized as illicit antiquities.  They have stated that they have in their 
possession thousands of objects of Syrian origin but will not return them to Syria unit the 
conflict has been resolved (Cornwell, 2016). It has been previously noted that Turkey was 
a popular route for trafficking for a variety of objects, as it represents an entry point to the 
European Union from the Middle East (Hunter, 2015).  As is evident from the thousands 
upon thousands of refugees making their way to Europe via Turkey, this route has been 
expanded upon since the Syria Civil War began.  It also now serves as a transit country for 
many individuals and objects hoping to sell to buyers and dealers in the EU.   
“Some international dealers … started to come in to Syria but it quickly got too 
dangerous for them. Now the dealers all hang out across the border in Turkey. 
Only Turkish dealers come into Syria to meet with locals. They buy and take it 
back. One of the main centers for the illicit trade is Tell Abiab, on the Syrian 
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side, across the border from Urfa. There is also lots of smuggling in [the Turkish 
border town of] Kilis. … From there, I don’t know where it goes,” Al-Azm said. 
(Erciyes, 2014) 
Unlike the vast majority of traders, these men are Syrian, not Turkish, and eager 
to show their wares to a foreigner. Turkish buyers are their staple, the two say, 
but they don’t pay top prices, and so sales were down. (Hunter, 2015) 
At this time, Turkey was also facing social unrest, with an attempted and unsuccessful 
coup occurring in the spring of 2016.  That being said, in winter of 2017 Turkey 
announced a successful anti-smuggling ring bust that resulted in the arrest of 19 
individuals and over 25,000 antiquities ranging from Greek, Egyptian, and Angolan 
(Delzo, 2017).  Operation Zeus, as it was called, included four of Turkey’s largest cities, 
and was a result of three months of surveillance by Turkish authorities (Delzo, 2017).   
Jordan and Israel: There has not been much data related specifically to these countries, 
but that does not mean that they should be disregarded as a potential site of trafficking.  
Israel is an especially interesting case, as the sales of antiquities is widely accepted, and the 
law regarding antiquities is slightly more lax than other countries.  The 1978 Antiquities 
law states that any object found within Israel belongs to the state - with the exception of 
any antiquity that was owned by an antiquities dealer prior to that date  (Kersel, 2008).  
This and further legislation enacted by Israel, provides the perfect set of conditions for the 
laundering and trafficking of illicit antiquities (Kersel, 2008).  This loophole provides 
enough wiggle-room that dealers can present enough doubt so as to evade being accused of 
illegal activities.  This has resulted in many objects being trafficked to Israel, whereby the 
ability to sell these items (even though they are illicit) is made easier (Kersel, 2008).  As 
such, it may be possible that antiquities are also making their way through the antiquities 
galleries and dealers of Israel, but there is not much data at this time to support this 
possibility.  There is also the additional complication of Israel being seen as an unwelcome 
country in the Middle East (Laqueur and Rubin, 2008).  As Israel is seen as occupying the 
Palestinian state by, the majority of states within this region - not to mention that few 
countries even recognise Israel as an official entity (Laqueur and Rubin, 2008).  With this 
being the case, and with heavy security between Palestine and Israel, this may not seem to 
be the most viable or appealing option. 
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There was only once instance of reference of trafficking objects through Jordan, which was 
given as a general statement by expert Al Azm.  “The Islamic State profits nearly 
immediately, selling the goods to middlemen who then smuggle them into neighbouring 
countries such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, according to Al-Azm”. (Drennan, 2014)  
As Jordan shares a border with both Syria and Saudi Arabia this would seem to be the most 
logical route of trafficking.  There are few examples of proven Syrian objects being 
trafficked through Jordan, though this instance presents the possibility that this route is 
being used (Times and Luck, 2013).  Additionally, Jordan has historically been used as a 
means of trafficking objects and as a fairly well-established smuggling route.  It would 
then make sense to take advantage of such a route for illicit antiquities.   
This analysis of the interplay and relevance of the bordering countries of Syria has 
demonstrated the complex and difficult nature of securing borders within conflict zones.  
This is especially difficult in a region such as the Middle East where large areas are 
currently facing social and political unrest.  When considering border control in a 
preventative framework it is apparent that the regional context must be understood in order 
to determine effective strategies.  For example, the instability along the Iraq and Syrian 
border provided a potential – and most likely exploited – route which illicit goods as well 
as people were likely smuggled or transported.  Perhaps the most effective preventative 
measure would include assessing the weak points of a border in the case of conflict and 
attempting to create or establish different sorts of controls or regulations in order to help 
strengthen these areas.  Additionally, if this is not possible, then monitoring or surveilling 
the area could prove useful in providing up-to-date information and data concerning the 
situation.   
8.5.3 Situational Crime Prevention Strategies of the Market Phase 
The market aspect of ATNs poses the most complex as it represents both legal and illicit 
objects.  As can be seen from the Syria script and examples, there is certainly a market for 
conflict antiquities, but one of the more difficult aspects to determine is how and when 
these conflict antiquities enter the market – as well as what can be done to prevent such an 
occurrence.  This section discusses some of the more prevalent issues for conflict 
antiquities within the market phase of ATNs.   
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8.5.3.1 Demand Drives the Market 
Identify and Target Potential Market Locations (Reduce Rewards): As was seen from 
the case study of Syria, Turkey has become a main hub for trafficking Syrian antiquities.  
This has been acknowledged as a bias in the data in chapter 4, as Turkey at the time 
presented an opportunity for many reporters to either enter Syria, or interview individuals 
who often crossed the border (Hunter, 2015).  However, there is additional evidence that 
neighbouring countries often become funnels for conflict nations.  This was evident in a 
study by Simon Mackenzie and Tess David (2014) which examined the structure of the 
statue trafficking network in Cambodia.  Their study included some of the practices that 
took place during the reign of the Khmer Rouge in the 1980-1990s.  They determined that 
the major route for objects made its way into Thailand, from where the objects could then 
be sold or transported.  From this, one can assume that illicit antiquities markets are likely 
to be established in areas surrounding conflict zones – especially those which neighbour 
such culturally rich areas such as Syria.  Currently, there is UN Security Resolution 2199 
which states that no Syrian objects can be exported or sold during this conflict (United 
Nations Security Council, 2015).  Nevertheless, this resolution targets only those objects 
which have been declared as Syrian, or (based on expert knowledge) could originate from 
no other area than Syria.  For criminal actors within an ATN, this simply means that they 
claim Syrian objects as originating from other geographically close or similar countries: 
One dealer, an amiable man in a quiet, small store filled with near-eastern 
objects, told us that he’d acquired some glass fragments very recently, and that 
they had likely come out of Jordan. Later, Altaweel tells me: “It’s obviously not 
Jordanian, so my suspicion is that it’s coming out of Syria.” The piece he shows 
us – a fragment of a cup or glass container, selling for £250 – is, he adds, highly 
distinctive of the area. “It’s very early glass and is concentrated in very few 
areas,” he says. (Shabi, 2015) 
This would indicate that preventative measure for future conflicts should focus on creating 
a hostile environment for any illicit antiquities trade, especially in areas surrounding the 
conflict.  By establishing and enforcing strict policies concerning the sale or transfer of 
undocumented antiquities following the outbreak of a conflict, this would help to deter 
individuals from engaging with ATNs.  
Require Provenance (Reduce Rewards): During the aftermath of the outbreak of the Iraq 
War of 2003, the international community put an embargo on any cultural objects 
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originating from Iraq being sold on the antiquities market with reasonable suspicion of 
having been illegally obtained (B.T. Hoffman, 2006; Brodie, 2011; Ulph et al., 2012).  
This was likely a reaction the looting (theft) of objects from the Baghdad museum.  The 
goal of this embargo was to attempt to help eliminate the possibility of selling suspicious 
objects on the antiquities market.  Previous UN resolutions had attempted to address the 
looting of Iraq objects in the early 1990s but had little effect on the sale of unprovenanced 
objects on the antiquities market (Brodie, 2011).  The lifting of sanction with Iraq via 
UNSCR 1483 excluded weapons of cultural items, with the result being a massive drop in 
sales of unprovenanced items specific to Iraq (Brodie, 2011).  Neil Brodie (2011) 
conducted a comprehensive study of the market of cuneiform tablets which are specific to 
Iraq, and represent an apt object to illustrate the Iraqi antiquities market.  This represents 
an excellent example of when regulatory and media super controllers were able to 
influence, even if only for a short period of time, a change in procedure regarding 
provenance within the antiquities market.  Similar types of measure could be taken for 
future conflicts, with focus placed on not only regulatory mechanism (such as embargos or 
sanctions), but also on public outcry or attitude towards such items being openly sold on 
the antiquities market.  These types of measure would mainly seek to reduce the reward 
gained from trafficking in illicit antiquities, through the specific disrupting markets and 
denying benefits techniques.  The concept of making it more difficult from criminal actors 
to profit and succeed in trading these objects is a fundamental premise of SCP – increase 
risk and effort, and reduce rewards.  Further regulations and policy, with more targeted and 
informed measures could help to significantly disrupt ATNs. 
Disrupt Middlemen Figures (Reduce Rewards): Middlemen represent a major 
contributing factor to ATNs, as they represent a bridging of legal and illicit (Brodie, 1998; 
Kersel, 2007; Proulx, 2011b; Mackenzie and Davis, 2016).  As was apparent from the 
evidence from Syria, a large portion of the interviewees were operating in the role of 
middleman.  These individuals are helping to supply and funnel objects from Syria to the 
rest of the world.  The strategy for this section is dependent upon other strategies presented 
in this chapter.  Therefore, some of the strategies within this chapter – such as identifying 
and targeting potential target locations, or working to secure borders, and regulating social 
media and auction sites are directly relevant to disrupting these middlemen figures.  
Additionally, it is recommended that more research and resources that focus on studying 
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and understanding exactly how these actors operate could prove useful to determining 
future targeted and efficient strategies. This could include research concerning: how they 
became brokers, how they learned the trade, why specifically they engaged in the trade, 
and how they conduct business (internet, phone, in person), where these objects are 
transported, or where they ultimately are destined.  These are all important and valuable 
questions regarding the trafficking of antiquities, and for which there are rarely answers for 
such questions.   
8.5.3.2 Internet 
Regulating Social Media/Auction Sites (Remove Excuses): Working with website hosts 
and social media platforms to create clear and well-defined regulations regarding the sales 
and posting of illicit antiquities would be an effective step in helping to regulate this 
market.  While creating and publicising such regulations would not directly stop any 
individuals from engaging in such activity, it would allow law enforcement with clearly 
criminal actions if someone did break such regulations.  At the moment, this is too much 
uncertainty and lack of regulation when it comes to online sales of illicit antiquities.  
Consider that most social media are owned and operated by large tech companies.  This is 
a perfect example of examining super controllers.  In this instance, the controller would be 
the tech company, while the super controller would be an institution such as the 
government, which could regulate or reward those tech companies that made targeting 
illicit antiquities trafficking a priority.  In order for a government, or indeed a tech 
company, to act upon such issues, it must be seen as being of vital importance – from 
either a public relations or strategic perspective.  As such, further pressure upon 
government by groups or organisations may have some influence.  Consider the issue of 
Nazi stolen/looted art during the Second World War.  Families of victims whose artwork 
was stolen, or pressured into selling by the Nazis often ended up in major American art 
museum’s collections.  The families of these victims were often facing difficulties such as 
statute of limitations or physical documentation/provenance (Kaye, 2009).  In 1998 the 
Washington Principles were agreed upon to help overcome such issues and work to 
reinstate works of art to Holocaust victims or their families, and though non-binding, many 
museums held to the principles laid out, so as to not be seen as taking advantage of 
Holocaust victims (Kaye, 2009).  While the issue of illicit antiquities on social media or 
auction sites is not the same, the underlying issues are similar.  If these institutions view 
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regulating illicit antiquities as strategic and beneficial to themselves, they are more likely 
to adhere and enforce such regulations.  If the reports of terrorist organisations financially 
benefitting from such networks were found to be systematically true, regulating online 
antiquities sales would like be seen as a strategic.  Additionally, regulatory measures could 
be made, which could increase the risk or effort of those who fail to implement 
preventative measures.  Social media is still a new phenomenon and as such, there are still 
many grey areas of operation.  However, with outside influencing factors pressuring these 
companies, progress could be made.  
8.6 Discussion  
The goal of this research project was to demonstrate the abilities and benefits of the 
application of SCP to the issue of antiquities trafficking.  By creating and analysing a 
crime script specific to antiquities trafficking, or ATNs, this project has provided and 
explored a means by which ATNs can be empirically examined and perhaps develop 
successful means of enabling in the prevention of antiquities trafficking.   
Through a close examination of antiquities looting and trafficking during the Syria 
conflict, a better understanding of the tactics, and methods used can be gained.  This 
included a crime script and facilitating factors for the Syrian conflict, which helped inform 
the SCP strategies for future conflicts.  These strategies demonstrate the ability of SCP to 
provide detailed insight into determining and recommending preventative or proactive 
strategies and solutions of potential conflicts – rather than reactionary responses.  It often 
feels as though the field is simply catching up when it comes to antiquities trafficking, and 
it may prove helpful to consider prevention tactics and strategies; an ideal concept which 
has proven rather difficult to execute. 
In the previous chapter, the crime triangle, and the three necessary elements consisted of a 
target - guardian, place-manager, and offender – handler was discussed.  A consideration 
of specifically how antiquities trafficking poses a difficult situation as the target, or 
antiquity, typically lacks a guardian has also been debated.  When considering the Syria 
script, it is evident that as a result of the civil war the place-manager elements have also 
broken down, as infrastructure has fractured and broken in some parts of the country (or 
even been re-assimilated by terrorist or rebel groups at certain points).  This has made it 
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difficult to attempt to conceive practical strategies when one of the fundamental elements – 
the controller, or even super controller in the form of the government – is relatively 
ineffective. 
When considering the role of super controllers, it can be determined that any type of 
influence to either (1) deter individuals from engaging in criminal acts, or indeed (2) 
encourage individuals to actively assist in some crime prevention strategies, must come 
from either an offender-handler element or from super controllers adjacent to the fighting.  
The result of this has indicated that potential crime prevention strategies for Syria are 
dependent upon super controllers such as:  
• Regulatory actors – UNESCO embargo on Syrian objects 
• Political – pressure from allies or trade partners 
• Financial – Trade and embargo on necessary items, or even weapons/equipment 
• Courts – International Criminal Court 
• Media – International Press bringing attention to the issue  
Syria is an ongoing conflict and demonstrates the difficulty in attempting to prevent or 
reduce antiquities trafficking after the conflict was initiated.  Syria was also an unexpected 
conflict, as prior to the beginning of the civil war in 2011, the country was considered to be 
relatively stable when compared to surrounding nations (Hokayem, 2013; Yassin-Kassab 
and Al-Shami, 2016).  The analysis of the specific conditions and trends within Syria 
informed the SCP techniques for future conflict, which may offer potentially useful 
strategies for future conflict. 
In considering the SCP strategies for future conflicts one of the more significant aspects of 
these strategies as a body of work, is that they are preventative and proactive.  They are 
intended to be considered and implemented by nations or regions which have been 
identified as unstable or areas of potential violence. 
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Fig. 8-7: Situational Crime Prevention Strategies for Potential/Future Conflict Zones 
 
Figure 8-7 shows the strategies distributed in their relevant SCP categories and phases.  It 
is evident that large portions of the strategies over all three phases are focused on reducing 
rewards and eliminating excuses.  From a comprehensive perspective, it can be determined 
that a focus on education, reiterating or establishing rules, and developing ways to allow 
people to actively not engage in criminal activities within ATNs may prove to be effective 
focus for crime prevention, while also tackling the serious issue of regulating the 
antiquities market.  As SCP is intended for highly specific types of crimes, the use of CSA 
and SCP may be effective in working to prevent antiquities trafficking for specific at-risk 
sites.  Considering that some of the larger, more prominent sites within Syria were targeted 
for looting, this would indicate that a specific prevention script could be developed on a 
site-by-site basis.  This would allow for input and considerations from the local 
community, as well as take into account relevant social and political factors.  The crime 
script, facilitating factors, and SCP techniques and strategies presented for the Syrian (and 
future) conflict, were more targeted than those presented in chapters 5, 6, and 7, but still 
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presented a generalised overview of the situation.  More importantly, the script that was 
developed for the Syrian conflict helped to establish a basic understanding of how ATNs 
can operate within a conflict zone, thus helping to determine significant and relevant 
strategies for future conflicts.  By working to establish a global culture of ethical 
antiquities practices and incentivising the market to adhere to preventative and regulatory 
strategies or techniques, it could be possible to significantly reduce antiquities trafficking.   
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9. Conclusion 
Having now examined and discussed the two crime scripts, facilitating factors, and 
situational prevention strategies that were presented in this thesis, this concluding chapter 
will consist of a brief review of the aims and goals, provide a summary of important 
findings, and discuss potential future research for crime prevention techniques and 
recommendations for ATNs.  As noted at the outset of this study, the two prominent 
research questions for this research project were:  
(1) Can Situational Crime Prevention, with the use of Crime Script Analysis, be 
effectively applied to Antiquities Trafficking Networks? 
(2) When applied to case/crime-specific studies, can the application of Situational 
Crime Prevention and Crime Script Analysis indicate effective preventative 
measures?   
9.1 Summary of Findings and Limitations 
In the first three chapters of this thesis, both the issues of antiquities trafficking and SCP 
and CSA were introduced in an effort to provide both the context for this research, and also 
provide a better appreciation of what this project aims to achieve.  Chapter 4 focused on 
discussing the manner in which these aims and goals would be accomplished.  Particular 
attention was given to discussing the data sources and how crime scripts were generated 
for both the ATNs script and the Syria script. 
Chapter 5 was the first analysis chapter, in which the overall ATNs crime script was 
examined, and discussed.  Within this chapter, the broad and comprehensive script that was 
presented offered a total of thirteen specific stages within the three phases of the operation 
of ATNs and demonstrated a broad model of ATNs for future research.  Chapter 6 then 
focused on determining facilitating factors presented in the crime script and discussed 
significant elements that have allowed ATNs to develop and subsist.  Some of the more 
prominent factors which were discussed included: lack of formal infrastructure; known 
archaeological sites; access to equipment; nature of antiquities; previously established 
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smuggling routes; easily disguised/hidden; national borders; corruption; provenance 
unnecessary; profit; and long-term investments. 
Taken together, chapters 5 and 6 served to then frame chapter 7, which focused on the 
application of SCP to ATNs, and the development of specific SCP strategies for antiquities 
trafficking.  The specific strategies presented in chapter 7 included: restrict access to 
equipment; secure borders; identify criminal networks; monitor archaeological sites; assist 
in the detection of objects; reduce profit; deny long-term investments; create infrastructure; 
reduce corruption; requires/establish provenance; criminalise antiquities trafficking 
activity; address the nature of antiquities and the internet. 
Chapter 8 then dealt with an evaluation and application of all three elements (scripts, 
facilitating factors, and SCP analysis) outlined in chapters 5, 6, and 7 to a specific case 
study – that of the Syrian civil war.  The most significant findings from chapter 8 relate to 
the identification of a number of SCP strategies potentially applicable not only for this case 
study but also to future conflict zones. These would include the following goals or 
activities: establish anti-looting culture; establish or provide infrastructure; restrict or 
monitor access to equipment; identity or monitor criminal groups; provide adequate 
training to border personnel; increase access and border controls; identify and target 
potential market locations; require provenance; disrupt middlemen; and regulate social 
media and online auction sites.   
9.2 Practical Applications/Implications 
The situational strategies presented in both chapter 7 and chapter 8 offer a unique 
perspective on the potential of crime prevention research within the field of antiquities 
trafficking.  These strategies have taken into consideration all stages necessary to loot, 
transport, and market an illicit antiquity, and have provided relevant preventative 
techniques and strategies.  The thirteen strategies that were discussed in chapter 7 did not 
offer any particularly revolutionary concepts – in fact, many of them had been suggested or 
mentioned in previous research.  However, the manner by which they were determined, 
their scope, and the ability of this framework to present them as consolidated and uniform 
manner demonstrates the strength of the SCP framework.  The strategies presented in 
chapter 8 also demonstrate a new perspective within research concerning ATNs.   
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 Antiquities Trafficking 
Networks SCP Strategies Future Conflict SCP Strategies 
1 Restrict Access to Equipment Establish Anti-Looting Culture 
2 Secure Borders Establish or Provide Infrastructure 
3 Identify Criminal Networks Restrict or Monitor Access to 
Equipment 
4 Monitor Archaeological Sites Identity or Monitor Criminal Groups 
5 Assist in the Detection of 
Objects 
Provide Adequate Training to Border 
Personnel 
6 Reduce Profit Increase Access and Border 
Controls 
7 Deny Long-Term Investments Identify and Target Potential Market 
Locations 
8 Create Infrastructure Require Provenance 
9 Reduce Corruption Disrupt Middlemen 
10 Requires/Establish 
Provenance 
Regulate Social Media and Online 
Auction Sites. 
11 Criminalise Antiquities 
Trafficking Activity 
 
12 Address the Nature of 
Antiquities 
 
13 The Internet  
Fig. 9-1: Table of SCP Strategies 
 
Perhaps the most important and significant product of this thesis was the development of 
the two overall crime scripts specifically developed for ATNs, and the SCP strategies that 
were produced for both ATNs and for future conflict zones similar to the case study of the 
Syrian conflict.  The broader ATNs script that was developed in this study can serve as an 
effective methodology and may provide a set of analysis tools that may be of use to anyone 
working with or researching ATNs. 
This study also constitutes a somewhat novel application of well-established CSA and SCP 
concepts to ATNs, and provides a new structure from which more complex and case-
specific scripts can be developed.  In addition, it should be noted that the scripts were 
designed to operate as individual phases or combinations of phases, this characteristic 
allows for great application flexibility and therefore it should be versatile enough to be 
used within various stages of ATNs.  The script that was developed specifically for the 
Syria conflict took the shape of a more traditional crime script format but demonstrates that 
a fully functional crime script can be successfully generated for crimes unique to ATNs.  
However, the key value of the Syria script is that it demonstrates the adaptability of crime 
scripting – in short, the broader ATNs script can be applied to any instance of looting or 
trafficking of antiquities. 
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In summary, the approach used in this study and the strategies developed represent one of 
the first pieces of research to offer a cohesive and concise analysis of a particular type of 
antiquities trafficking while presenting preventative strategies for all stages of the 
networks.  These strategies are indicative of a wide variety of crime prevention research 
that if undertaken, could potentially help to influence and reduce ATNs on a global scale.  
With this in mind, some opportunities for future research will now be examined.  
9.3 Recommendations for Further Research 
As has been established, the aim of this thesis has never been solely to produce specific or 
targeted crime prevention recommendations or strategies.  The underlying motivation for 
this study was the process of considering ATNs from a crime prevention perspective.  
Much of the literature that has focused on ATNs touches on issues or techniques that are 
used in crime prevention, but this thesis is the first paper to empirically consider and 
examine crime prevention theories within the context of ATNs. 
At the beginning of this thesis, a paper by Marcus Felson was introduced, which discussed 
the lack of a clear criminological paradigm (2017).  It is the position of this thesis that it 
has demonstrated the possibility of a paradigm specific to crime prevention in ATNs.  Now 
is the time to examine the goals which this field of research hopes to accomplish.  It seems 
there are numerous groups across the world which are seeking to evaluate and study 
antiquities in conflict, which is evident in the surge of groups or initiatives being 
established following the Syrian civil war and the cultural heritage crisis which has 
emerged.  However, with the creation of large research bodies, it seems likely such groups 
are overlapping or conducting similar research.  Additionally, as Neil Brodie addresses in 
his paper concerning policy related to Syria (2015b), the issue of reactive policy 
interventions is coming under greater scrutiny.  He details that general policy for protecting 
or recovering objects is reacting to the situation, which ultimately leads to its failure 
(Brodie, 2015b).  Part of the issue with reactive policy is that it can take months or years 
for policies to be enacted, or for claims of damage or looting to be verified (Brodie, 
2015b).  This thesis offers an alternative. 
As of now, the paradigm of ATNs research has focused on establishing the scale and 
damage of antiquities trafficking, and subsequently retracing steps in order to address said 
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damage.  The resulting policies reflect an attempt to ‘stem the flow’ of illicit objects out of 
conflict zones or areas being heavily targeted for looting and trafficking.  While this is 
necessary and important work, it overlooks the practical and necessary aspect of 
preventative measures. This project has sought to provide a prevention perspective to this 
field, and provide a framework from which further research can be produced. This is 
demonstrated in the use of the potential script format, from which the ATNs and Syria 
scripts were developed.  These scripts provide a method of formatting and then analysing 
data to provide results that target specific actions or motivations for antiquities trafficking.  
This approach provides not only a basic model which can be expanded upon depending on 
the specific instance, but also a clear path forward for further crime prevention research 
and prevention focused research.  The use of CSA and SCP can provide a basic model that 
will allow future researchers from all backgrounds – not just criminology – to use and 
apply to relevant research.   
While the results of this work can provide a solid starting point, it is evident that further 
research concerning crime scripting and SCP strategies is required to provide a more 
detailed understanding of the various ways in which antiquities trafficking occurs.  Future 
research, for example, could focus on creating individual scripts for a wide variety of case 
studies, and as more recent cases are exposed.  Ideally, this type of research would clearly 
benefit from fieldwork that focused on interviewing or surveying actors who currently 
operate within ATNs.  This would undoubtedly be very challenging work, considering the 
ethical, monetary, and safety issues that would have to be overcome.  With more research 
using CSA and SCP, a wider breadth of knowledge can also be established within this 
field, which would in turn allow for more effective and efficient outcomes.  SCP has the 
potential to allow significant strides to be made to combat antiquities trafficking, however, 
as this thesis has established, the most significant difficulty the study of antiquities 
trafficking faces is a lack of data, and any empirical research will always be cherished. 
The major contribution this thesis brings to the field, has been in establishing the 
importance and potential for crime prevention research.  It is the author’s hope that this 
thesis has achieved its aim of considering and demonstrating the potential of the 
application of specific criminological techniques such as Situational Crime Prevention and 
Crime Script Analysis may have for Antiquities Trafficking Networks. 
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Appendix 1: Crime Script Analysis Case Studies  
Understanding Money Laundering – A Crime Script Approach: Gilmour 
(2014) 
Aim of Study: To discuss the suitability of crime scripts for improving understanding 
in relation for specific methods of money laundering (ML – through case intensive 
businesses, and ML through purchasing of high value portable commodities). 
Type of Data: 170 questionnaire responses and 12 
in-depth interviews with AML experts and 
practitioners from across 11 professional AML 
backgrounds. 
Number of Participants: 170 
questionnaires and 12 
interviews. 
Format of Crime 
Script: Stage 1: 
Identification of 
suitable business 
from which to 
purchase the high 
value portable 
commodity or 
commodities. 
 
Stage 2: 
Placement stage 
within which 
the commodity 
or commodities 
are purchased 
using illicit 
cash. 
 
Stage   3: 
Further 
preparatory 
work. 
 
Stage 4: 
Layering stage 
in which the 
illicit 
commodity or 
commodities 
sell 
legitimately. 
 
Stage 5: 
Integration 
stage when 
money is used 
to make 
purchases. 
 
Crime Script Analysis of the Online Stolen Data Market: Hutchings and 
Holt (2015) 
Aim of Study: To better understand the online black-market economy, specifically 
relating to stolen data, using crime script analysis. 
Type of Data: 1,889 exchanges between buyers and sellers from a 
sample of 13 web forums where financial and personal information 
are bought sold and traded. 
Number of 
Participants: 
13 web forums 
Format of Crime Script: 
• Preparation: setting up necessary client software and creating accounts, steps 
towards anonymity and security, marketplace location, learning specialist 
knowledge 
• Entry: learning workplace language and rules, pre-condition (obtaining and 
manufacturing products to sell) 
• Instrumental pre-condition: advertising products and services, undergoing 
verification procedures for products and services 
• Instrumental initiation: exchanging law enforcement information, negotiating 
and communicating 
• Doing: packing goods, transporting 
• Post-condition: reputation management, exchanging currency 
• Exit scenes: laundering proceeds 
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Scripting the Crime Commission Process in the illicit online prescription 
drug trade: Leontadis and Hutchings (2015) 
Aim of Study: to examine the process of the illicit online prescription trade that allows 
this trade to be profitable through crime script analysis. 
Type of Data: data used was from previous study 
Measuring and analysing search-redirection attacks in 
the illicit online prescription drug trade (Leontiadis et 
al., 2011).  Pharmacy related online search terms were 
conducted every day for nine months. 
Number of Participants: 
256 unlicensed online 
pharmacies from which data 
was collected over a nine-
month period. 
 
Format of Crime Script 
Illicit advertising: 
• Identify vulnerable website, compromise 
vulnerable websites 
• manipulate search engines 
• hijack acquired web traffic 
• redirect traffic 
• receive web traffic 
• process payments 
• ship merchandise 
 
Pharmacy operation: 
• identify drug 
suppliers 
• select drugs for sale 
• define pricing 
strategy 
• deploy pharmacy 
website 
• receive web traffic 
• process payments 
• ship merchandise 
 
The Online trade in counterfeit pharmaceuticals: New Criminal 
opportunities, trends and challenges: Lavorgna (2015) 
Aim of Study: To consider how the Internet is used to facilitate the trade in counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals. 
Type of Data: Case studies were drawn from law enforcement 
operations identified through keyword searches in Italian and English 
media sources. As well as 12 semi-structured interviews with key 
informants.  30 case studies (Italy, UK and US) were chosen for the 
study. 
Number of 
Participants: 
30 cases 
Format of Crime Script 
Stage 0: Preparatory activities antecedent to the trade in counterfeit pharmaceutical  
Stage 1: Production of pharmaceuticals products 
Stage 2: Intermediate passage through transit networks (wholesalers and other 
importers operating at the international level) 
Stage 3: Intermediate passage through local retailers 
Stage 4: Distribution of the pharmaceutical product to the final user 
Stage 5: Activities that are directly consequential or subsequent to the trafficking 
activity 
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Wildlife Trafficking in the Internet Age: Lavorgna (2014) 
Aim of Study: To consider how the Internet facilitates wildlife trafficking, as well as 
how a script scheme is used to highlight the opportunity structure the Internet offers to 
carry out wildlife trafficking. 
Type of Data: Law enforcement 
operations where Internet played major 
role. Primary document sources: judicial 
transcripts and records from police 
investigations, as well as face-to-face, 
semi-structured interviews with Italian law 
enforcement officers and acknowledged 
experts.  
Primary document sources: Judicial 
transcripts and records from police 
investigations, as well as face-to-face, 
semi-structured interviews with Italian 
law enforcement officers and 
acknowledged experts.  
 
Number of Participants: 25 cases 
Format of Crime Script: 
Stage 0: Preparatory activities antecedent to the commission of wildlife trafficking 
Stage 1: Poaching, harvesting or breeding of the animal/plant 
Stage 2: Intermediate passage through local intermediaries/the domestic market 
Stage 3: Passage through regional intermediaries/international traders 
Stage 4: Intermediate passage through local intermediaries/the domestic market 
Stage 5: Distribution of the animal/plant/product 
Stage 6: Activities that are directly consequential or subsequent to the trafficking 
activity 
 
Drug Dealing: Amsterdam's Red Light District: Scott Jacques and Wim 
Bernasco (2014) 
Aim of Study: to address three questions (1) what are the general actions involved in 
drug dealing. (2) how does street dealing in Amsterdam’s RLD unfold. (3) what 
opportunities does this afford prevention oriented formal control. 
Type of Data: data from a study of quantitatively 
oriented interviews with 50 drug dealers and 
qualitatively oriented independent observations of the 
scene.   Interviews consisted of a on a fixed-choice 
survey type item. 
Number of Participants:  
50 drug dealers 
 
Format of Crime Script: 
Necessary steps:  
(1) Agreeing on trade terms 
(2) making an exchange 
 
Facilitating steps:  
(A) searching for a customer,  
(B) soliciting, and (C) arrange time and 
place 
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Profiling Illegal Waste Activity: Using crime scripts as a data collection and 
analytical strategy: Tompson and Chainey (2011) 
Aim of Study: Use CSA to help identify data requirements as well as illustrate the 
utility of this methodology to ultimately provide a more objective assessment and 
understanding of illegal waste activity.  
Type of Data: “This analysis was carried out using our expertise and 
experience into real world examples of illegal caste activity.  That is, 
it draws from our knowledge of illegal waste activity across many 
incidents rather than a particular investigation…” 
Number of 
Participants: 
NA 
Format of Crime Script: 
(1) Creation (2) Storage (3)  Collection (4) Transport (5) Treatment (6) Disposal 
 
Crime Script Analysis of Drug Manufacturing in Clandestine Laboratories: 
Chiu, Leclerc and Townsley (2011) 
Aim of Study: To better understand the crime commission process of clandestine drug 
laboratories and identify significant points for intervention by using crime scripts. 
Type of Data: Content analysis of 25 court 
transcripts of cases of drug manufacturing in 
clandestine labs in Australia 
Number of Participants: 25 
court cases from Australian 
government  
Format of Script: 
• Location of laboratory (Home, shed) 
• Getting the goods (legal purchase, illegal purchase, social network) 
• Storage of goods (laboratory, rental sheds, storage facilities) 
• Cooking drug (test cooks, Chemist experts) 
• Packing drug 
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Appendix 2: Draft Version of Antiquities Trafficking 
Network Crime Script 
Looting Scripts 
Stage 1: Motivation for Looting 
◦ Subsistence  
◦ Criminal/Profit  
◦ Interest/Hobby 
◦ Preservation/Safeguarding Looting 
◦ Ideological  
Stage 2: Type of Looter 
◦ Individual  
⁃ Working for criminal organisation 
⁃ Working for themselves 
⁃ Pays/seeks permission off criminal group/organisation to loot 
◦ Groups or pairs of individuals  
⁃ Working for themselves (more than 1 person) 
⁃ Working for themselves 
⁃ Pays/seeks permission off criminal group/organisation to loot 
◦ Criminal Organisation 
⁃ Local criminal organisation 
⁃ International criminal organisation 
Stage 3: Location 
◦ Already knows where items to loot can be found (previous first-hand knowledge) 
◦ Searches randomly for loot in hope of finding object 
◦ Gets information of where to loot from other sources (friends, rumours, criminal 
organisation) 
◦ Object(s) has been made visible/discovered randomly by individual  
◦ Searches for loot in known archaeological site 
Stage 4: Research 
◦ Consider specifications of sites (through first-hand knowledge) – type of security, 
types of tools necessary 
◦ Consider specifications of sites via second-hand knowledge (including photographs 
and video)  
◦ Scouts out specific site – actually visits site prior to looting to determine specifics of 
looting operation 
◦ Considers specific of site (either through first or second-hand knowledge) as well as 
physically visits site to determine specifics of looting 
◦ Does not consider site specifics or visit site prior to looting 
Stage 5: Equipment 
◦ Has specialised looting equipment (tech, bulldozer, hacksaws, drills) 
⁃ Gained through payment to criminal organisation 
⁃ Obtained through ownership 
⁃ Owned by Criminal organisation 
◦ Has simple looting equipment (shovels, picks) 
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Stage 6: Looting 
◦ Loot object in secret 
◦ Loot object openly 
Stage 7: Transportation from site of Origin: 
◦ Transport objects directly from site to further movement towards border 
◦ Transports object(s) to looters home OR storage facility  
◦ Transport objects to criminally organised storage facility 
Stage 8: Storage 
◦ Objects are stored on a long-term basis 
◦ Objects are stored on a short-term basis 
◦ Objects are not stored, but transported directly out of country 
Stage 9: Selling  
◦ Looter keeps item for him/herself (self-interest or “safety of object”) 
◦ Looter does not sell object 
◦ Objects are not sold, but destroyed 
◦ Looter sells object at border of Country of Origin 
◦ Objects are forcibly taken from looters  
◦ Looter sells object to middleman/smuggler 
◦ Looter sells object to dealer 
⁃ International 
⁃ In person 
⁃ Via social media/electronic device 
⁃ Local 
⁃ In person 
⁃ Via social media/electronic device 
◦ Looter sells object to buyer 
⁃ International 
⁃In person 
⁃ Via social media/electronic device 
⁃ Local (Country of Origin) 
⁃ In person 
⁃ Via social media/electronic device 
◦ Looter sells object(s) to local/international auction house, gallery, or museum 
⁃ Local or international  
⁃ Auction house  
⁃ In person 
⁃ Via social media/electronic device 
⁃ Museum  
⁃ In person 
⁃ Via social media/electronic device 
⁃ Gallery 
⁃ In person 
⁃ Via social media/electronic device 
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Transit Phase 
Stage 10: Smuggling Actors 
◦ Middleman smuggles object out of country (individual) 
◦ Smuggling network gets object out of country  
◦ International criminal organisation  
⁃ Tied to looting forces individuals to smuggle items out of country (blackmail, 
coercion, threats) 
⁃ Tied to looting smuggled objects out within own organisation 
⁃ Independent from looting forces individuals to smuggle items out of country 
(blackmail, cohesion, threats) 
⁃ Independent from looting, smuggles object out itself 
◦ Looter  
⁃ Smuggles items out of county him/herself 
⁃ Pays other criminal actors to smuggle item out of country 
⁃ Forces individual to smuggle item out of country 
◦ Dealer 
⁃ Smuggles items out of county him/herself 
⁃ Pays other criminal actors to smuggle item out of country 
⁃ Forces individual to smuggle item out of country 
Stage 11: Smuggler Decides on Smuggling Technique  
◦ Smuggler conceals object(s) from authorities’/border checks 
◦ Smuggler falsifies papers concerning object from authorities’/border checks 
◦ Smuggler does not conceal object, faces no authorities or border checks 
◦ Smuggler declares object(s) as incorrect object to authorities or at border check 
◦ Smuggler bribes authorities/border check personnel 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 12: Preparation 
◦ Smuggler creates false documentation for objects to cross border 
◦ Smuggler actively hides/disguises object(s) for transport 
◦ Smuggler arranges bribery (prior to event) 
◦ Smuggler does not make any preparations 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 13: Mode of Transport 
◦ Objects are transported via car/bus/lorry 
◦ Objects are transported via airplane 
◦ Objects are transported via shipping/boat 
◦ Objects are transported via railways 
⁃ Objects are transported via all methods of transport (car, plane, ship, rail) 
⁃ Objects are transported via a combination/pair of methods such as plane, ship, car, 
or rail 
◦ Objects are transported via other method (bulldozer, bike, etc.) 
◦ Objects are transported on person (on foot)  
◦ Unknown 
Stage 14: Transport to Country of Purchase 
◦ Objects(s) are smuggled to purchase country via multiple countries  
⁃ Listed as incorrect objects (Decorations) 
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⁃ Undeclared object (Hidden) 
⁃ With false papers 
◦ Objects(s) are smuggled directly to purchase country  
⁃ As undeclared object (Hidden) 
⁃ With false papers (fraudulent provenance) 
⁃ As incorrect objects (Decoration) 
◦ Objects are transported directly to purchaser (in-country purchase, no need to 
smuggle) 
◦ Unknown 
 
Market Phase 
Stage 15: Type of Dealer 
◦ Local 
◦ International 
◦ Both 
Stage 16: Obtaining of Objects 
◦ Dealer buys object(s) off an individual smuggler 
◦ Dealers purchase objects from other dealers 
◦ Dealers purchase objects off local organised smuggling/criminal operation 
◦ Dealers purchase objects from international organised criminal organisation  
◦ Dealer is given object as part of criminal organisation 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 17: Assessment 
◦ Dealers assesses object in person to determine value/authenticity of object 
◦ Dealer assesses object via photograph or video (second-hand viewing) 
◦ Dealer does not assess object, but purchases without viewing/assessment 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 18: Storage 
◦ Dealer stores object(s) on a short-term basis 
◦ Dealer stores object(s) on a long-term basis 
◦ Dealer does not store object 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 19: Provenance 
◦ Dealer does not attempt to create false provenance 
◦ Dealer creates false provenance for object(s) 
◦ Dealer does not specify provenance for object(s) 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 20: Potential Buyers 
◦ Dealer shows illicit object(s) to potential buyers in person  
◦ Dealer shows illicit object(s) to potential buyers via social media/electronic device 
◦ Dealer shows ‘legal’ object(s) to buyers in person 
◦ Dealer shows ‘legal’ object(s) to potential buyer via social media/electronic device 
◦ Dealers do not show objects to buyers 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 21: Purchase 
◦ Dealer sells object(s) to other local dealers  
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⁃ Dealer sells object(s) to other local dealers via social media/electronic device  
⁃ Dealer sells object(s) to other local dealers in person 
◦ Dealer sells object(s) to other international dealers 
◦ Dealer sells object(s) to other international dealers via social media/electronic 
device 
◦ Dealer sells object(s) to other international dealers in person 
◦ Dealer sells object(s) directly to buyer 
⁃ Dealer sells object(s) directly to buyer, in person (Locally) 
⁃ Dealer sells object(s) directly to buyer, via social media/electronic device 
(Locally) 
⁃ Dealer sells object(s) directly to buyer, in person (Internationally) 
⁃ Dealer sells object(s) directly to buyer, via social media/electronic device 
(Internationally) 
◦ Dealer sells object(s) to auction house 
⁃ Dealer sells object(s) to auction house in person 
⁃ Dealer sells object(s) to auction house via social media/electronic device 
◦ Dealer sells object(s) to gallery 
⁃ Dealer sells object(s) to gallery in person 
⁃ Dealer sells object(s) to gallery via social media/electronic device 
◦ Dealer sells object(s) to museum 
o Dealer sells object(s) to museum in person 
o Dealer sells object(s) to museum via social media/electronic device 
◦ Dealer does not sell object 
◦ Dealer does not sell object(s) – third-party country storage 
◦ Unknown 
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Appendix 3: Draft Syria Crime Script 
Looting Phase 
Stage 1: Type of Looters 
• Criminal/Profit 
o Individual OR Groups/ pairs of individuals 
§ Working for criminal organisation 
§ Working for themselves 
§ Pays/seeks permission off criminal group/organisation to loot 
o Criminal Organisation 
o International criminal organisation 
• Subsistence 
o Individual OR Groups/ pairs of individuals 
§ Working for criminal organisation 
§ Working for themselves 
§ Pays/seeks permission off criminal group/organisation to loot 
o Criminal Organisation 
o International criminal organisation 
• Iconoclast 
o Individual OR Groups/ pairs of individuals 
§ Working for criminal organisation 
§ Working for themselves 
§ Pays/seeks permission off criminal group/organisation to loot 
o Criminal Organisation 
o International criminal organisation 
Stage 2: Location/Object 
•    Already knows where items to loot can be found (previous first-hand knowledge) 
•    Searches randomly for loot in hope of finding object 
• Gets information of where to loot from other sources (friends, rumours, criminal 
organisation) 
• Object/Archaeological site is publicly known/visible (famous sites) 
• Object(s) has been made visible/discovered randomly by individual  
• Searches for loot in known archaeological site 
Stage 3: Equipment 
• Has specialised looting equipment (tech, bulldozer, hacksaws, drills) 
o Gained through payment to criminal organisation 
o Obtained through ownership 
o Owned by Criminal organisation 
• Has simple looting equipment (shovels, picks) 
Stage 4: Looting 
• Loot object in secret 
• Loot object openly 
Stage 5: Transportation from site of Origin: 
• Transport objects directly from site to further movement towards border 
• Transports object(s) to looters home OR storage facility  
• Transport objects to criminally organised storage facility 
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Stage 6: Storage 
• Objects are stored on a long-term basis 
• Objects are stored on a short-term basis 
• Objects are not stored, but transported directly out of country 
Stage 7: Selling  
• Looter keeps item for him/herself (self-interest or “safety of object”) 
• Looter does not sell object 
• Objects are not sold, but destroyed 
• Looter sells object at border of Country of Origin 
• Objects are forcibly taken from looters  
• Looter sells object to middleman/smuggler 
• Looter sells object to dealer 
o International 
§ In person 
§ Via social media/electronic device 
o Local 
§ In person 
§ Via social media/electronic device 
• Looter sells object to buyer 
o International 
§ In person 
§ Via social media/electronic device 
o Local (Country of Origin) 
§ In person 
§ Via social media/electronic device 
• Looter sells object(s) to local/international auction house, gallery, or museum 
o Local or international  
o Auction house  
§ In person 
§ Via social media/electronic device 
o Museum  
§ In person 
§ Via social media/electronic device 
o Gallery 
§ In person 
§ Via social media/electronic device 
 
Trafficking Phase 
Stage 8: Smuggling Actors 
• Middleman smuggles object out of country (individual) 
• Smuggling network gets object out of country  
• International criminal organization  
o Tied to looting forces individuals to smuggle items out of country (blackmail, 
coercion, threats) 
o Tied to looting smuggled objects out within own organization 
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o Independent from looting forces individuals to smuggle items out of country 
(blackmail, cohesion, threats) 
o Independent from looting, smuggles object out itself 
• Looter  
o Smuggles items out of county him/herself 
o Pays other criminal actors to smuggle item out of country 
o Forces individual to smuggle item out of country 
• Dealer 
o Smuggles items out of county him/herself 
o Pays other criminal actors to smuggle item out of country 
o Forces individual to smuggle item out of country 
Stage 9: Smuggling Technique 
• Hides/Disguises objects 
o Smuggler conceals objects from border patrol 
o Smuggler disguises objects as non-antiquities from border patrol 
• Forges or Falsifies travel documents pertaining to objects 
o Smuggler falsifies papers concerning object from authority’s/border checks 
o Misrepresents objects as non-antiquities 
• Openly transports antiquities as illicit objects 
o Smuggler does not conceal object, faces no authorities or border checks 
o Smuggler bribes authorities/border check personnel 
Stage 10: Mode of Transport 
• Objects are transported via car/bus/lorry 
• Objects are transported via airplane 
• Objects are transported via shipping/boat 
• Objects are transported via railways 
• Objects are transported via all methods of transport (car, plane, ship, rail) 
• Objects are transported via a combination/pair of methods such as plane, ship, car, 
or rail 
• Objects are transported via other method (bulldozer, bike, etc.) 
• Objects are transported on person (on foot)  
• Unknown 
 
Trade Phase 
Stage 11: Type and Intent of Dealer 
• Local Criminal Dealer 
• International Criminal Dealer 
Stage 12: Obtaining of Objects 
• Dealer buys object(s) off an individual smuggler 
• Dealers purchase objects from other dealers 
• Unknown 
Stage 13: Assessment 
• Dealers find independent expert to assesses object in person to determine 
value/authenticity of object 
• Dealer finds independent expert to assess via photograph or video 
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• Dealer does not assess object, but purchases without viewing/assessment 
• Dealer uses source/contact within network to assess object in person 
• Dealer uses source/contact within network to assess object via photograph or video 
• Dealer (Him/herself) assess object 
• Unknown 
Stage 14: Storage 
• Dealer stores object(s) on a short-term basis 
Stage 15: Provenance 
• Dealer does not attempt to create false provenance 
• Dealer does not specify provenance for object(s) 
• Unknown 
Stage 16: Dealer Lines Up Buyers:  
• Dealer already has established relationship with purchaser via prior 
experience/business 
• Dealer find purchaser through friend/contact 
• Dealer finds purchaser via internet 
• Dealer find purchaser via in-person encounter 
• Dealer find purchaser via another random occurrence 
Stage 17: Potential Buyers 
• Dealer shows illicit object(s) to potential buyers in person  
• Dealer shows illicit object(s) to potential buyers via social media/electronic device 
• Dealers do not show objects to buyers 
• Unknown 
Stage 18: Purchase 
• Dealer sells object(s) to other local dealers  
o Dealer sells object(s) to other local dealers via social media/electronic device  
o Dealer sells object(s) to other local dealers in person 
• Dealer sells object(s) to other international dealers 
o Dealer sells object(s) to other international dealers via social media/electronic 
device 
o Dealer sells object(s) to other international dealers in person 
• Dealer sells object(s) directly to buyer 
o Dealer sells object(s) directly to buyer, in person (Locally) 
o Dealer sells object(s) directly to buyer, via social media/electronic device 
(Locally) 
o Dealer sells object(s) directly to buyer, in person (Internationally) 
o Dealer sells object(s) directly to buyer, via social media/electronic device 
(Internationally) 
• Dealer does not sell object 
• Dealer does not sell object(s) – third-party country storage 
• Unknown 
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Appendix 4: Antiquities Trafficking Networks 
Dataset 
 
 
 
Case Study Aidonia Treasure   Ban Chiang   Batán Grande   
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.o
rg/encyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.or
g/encyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.o
rg/encyclopedia/case-
Date 1970s Start: 1970s 1930s-1960s
Location Greece Thailand Peru
Full Script? No No No
Phase(s)? Looting Looting Looting
One 
Instance
No No No
Multiple 
Occurances
Yes yes Yes
Individual No No No
Group Yes No Yes
Community No Yes Yes
Common 
Elements
Local criminal gang
Corruption among local
Smuggled out of country
Disguised 
Local Community
Known Site
Demand fueled 
Objects smuggled through 
airbase
Subsistence Looting
Community/gang looting
specialised Equipment
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Case Study Cancuén Ballcourt Marker    Cancuén Panel    .   Cara Sucia      
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/encyclop
edia/case-studies/cancuen-ballcourt-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingcultu
re.org/encyclopedia/c
Date 2001 1981 1980
Location Guatemala Guatemala El Salvador
Full Script? Yes No No
Phase(s)? Looting Looting Looting
One 
Instance
Yes Yes No
Multiple 
Occurances
No No Yes
Individual No NA No
Group Yes NA Yes
Community No NA Yes
Common 
Elements
Chance find
Local looter
removed from site of origin by boat
Photo used to sell object
dispute over object between looters
Drug traffickers attempted to steal
Object was moved to border, then 
trasported back to original town
locals informed authorities of object
object was recovered by authorities
Looted
Transported from site by boat
object was lost when sunk in 
river
Group of looters
targeted looting (jade)
Large scale looting
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Case Study Cerro El Plomo Child    Dacian Gold Bracelets   Dos Cabezas    
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/cerro-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/dacian-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/dos-
Date 1945 1999-2001 2009
Location Chile Romania Peru
Full Script? Yes No No
Phase(s)? All Looting Looting
One 
Instance
Yes No No
Multiple 
Occurances
No Yes Yes
Individual No No NA
Group Yes Yes NA
Community No No NA
Common 
Elements
Group of looters
Search for objects at known 
structures
Looters hid object while 
seeking buyer
Met with Museum to attempt 
to sell
Sold to National musum of 
natural history
Criminal Looters
Objects smuggled to other 
countries
Object was recovered at 
border in possession of 
criminal
Object was recovered after 
being placed on sale by 
authories
Multiple instances of looting
criminal gangs of looters
Objects appeared on market
pieces recovered on flight by 
customs
forged invoiced stated objects 
purchased prior to 1960
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Case Study El Zotz    El Zotz Lintel 1    Empress Dou Figurines    
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/el-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/el-zotz-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
Date 1960s-1970s 1960s-1970s 2001
Location Guatemala Guatemala China
Full Script? No No No
Phase(s)? Looting Looting Market Looting
One 
Instance
No Yes No
Multiple 
Occurances
Yes No Yes
Individual Na No No
Group Na Yes Yes
Community Na No No
Common 
Elements
Large scale looting group of looters
object was damaged in 
removal
trafficking to US
appeared in gallery years later
object sold to law firm
firm donated object to museum
Loot to order
five famers blasted with 
dynamite and shovels
three people caught
other instances of looting 
occurred
looting gang
multiple visits to tomb
objects smuggled to Hong 
Kong (hid in trucks)
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Case Study Euphronios (Sarpedon) Krater   Fano Bronze    Garland Sarcophagus    
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/fano-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
Date 1971 1964 1987
Location Italy Italy Turkey
Full Script? Yes Yes Yes
Phase(s)? All All All
One 
Instance
Yes Yes Yes
Multiple 
Occurances
No No No
Individual No No No
Group Yes Yes Yes
Community No No
Common 
Elements
Looting gang 
Anticipated find (cemetary)
Sold to Medici (broker)
object smuggled to switzerland
sold to broker (Hecht)
object restored by expert in 
Zurich
Hecht prompt Met with object 
(Letter)
Hecht provides false 
provenance for krater
(attached prov of similar 
object)
Sold to MET
Chance find
group of fishermen
sold object to local antiquities 
dealer(Broker)
hid object in local site
object smuggled out of country
object restored by expert
object marketed to 
museum/collector
Object discovered by looters
buried (stored) for safekeeping
object was smuggled out of 
country
bought by collector
lent to museum
discovered to be trafficked
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Case Study GE Mound     Getty Aphrodite    Ixkun Stela 5  
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/ge-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/1059/
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/ixkun-
Date 1988 1977-1978 1972
Location USA Italy Guatemala
Full Script? No Yes No
Phase(s)? Looting All Looting
One 
Instance
Yes Yes Yes
Multiple 
Occurances
No No No
Individual No NA No
Group No NA Yes
Community No NA No
Common 
Elements
objects found during 
contruction
specialised equipment
group of individuals
object looted
pass through hands of 
antiquities broker
broker (symes) bought it with 
false provenance
false provenenace - old family 
object
item broken to allow for easier 
transit
Broker sold to Museum
object looted
object damaged - broken into 
pieces
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Case Study J Paul Getty Museum Returns 
to Italy (1999)   
J Paul Getty Museum Returns 
to Italy (2005)    
J Paul Getty Returns to Italy 
(2013)   
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/j-paul-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/j-paul-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/j-paul-
Date 1980 1970 1970
Location Italy Italy Italy
Full Script? No Yes No
Phase(s)? Market All Looting
Market
One 
Instance
No Yes Yes
Multiple 
Occurances
Yes No No
Individual No Yes Yes
Group No No No
Community No No No
Common 
Elements
false provenance (fake 
collection established)
object discovered by chance 
(individual)
object was bartered
oject purchased by broker
object sold to museum
Object looted from 
sancuary(anticipated)
Broker had possession of 
object
sold to collector
sold to museum
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Case Study Jiroft  La Amelia Stela 1    La Mina   
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/jiroft/
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/la-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
Date 2001 1965 1989
Location Iran Guatemala Peru
Full Script? No Yes No
Phase(s)? Looting All Looting
One 
Instance
No Yes No
Multiple 
Occurances
Yes No Yes
Individual No No No
Group No Yes Yes
Community Yes No Yes
Common 
Elements
community looting/groups of 
locals
mass scale looting
two looters executed for 
participation 
subsistence looting
group/gang of looters
object was cut into pieces 
(transit)
object smuggled to other 
country
Sold to antiquities dealer (non 
illicit)
object bought by collector - 
taken to Switzerland
individual (looter) discovered 
material while digging
looter continually looted mound 
when in need of $
antiquities dealer contacted 
archaeologist to alert to looting
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Case Study Machaquilá Stela 2   Malagana   Maya antiquities sold at 
Sotheby’s in 1995   
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/maya-
Date 1971 1992 1995
Location Guatemala Columbia Mexico
Guatemala
Full Script? Yes Yes Yes
Phase(s)? All Looting
Market
All
One 
Instance
Yes No No
Multiple 
Occurances
No Yes Yes
Individual No No Yes
Group Yes No Yes
Community No Yes No
Common 
Elements
object looted by gang 
object cut into pieces by 
looters
broker purchased object
sold to three individuals
object stored for time
objects smuggled with shrimp
object was restored
object was smuggled to NYC
Object was offered to museum 
and dealers
obejct was transported all over 
USA
sold to restorer
Farmer discovered site 
(accidental)
farmer removed objects
large scale looting resulted
museum purchased objects to 
keep them within country
objects were looted 
broker smuggled objects
broker disguised and hid 
objects - false reason for travel
smuggler would bring other 
minor illegal obejct to distract 
from objects
objects smuggled to border
smuggler flew with object into 
USA
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Case Study Mimbres Pottery    Morgantina Silver    Mosaic Maya Mask    
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/mosaic-
Date 1960s 1970-1980s 1960s
Location United States Italy Mexico
Full Script? No Yes Yes
Phase(s)? Looting All All
One 
Instance
No Yes Yes
Multiple 
Occurances
Yes No No
Individual No No No
Group Yes Yes Yes
Community No No Yes
Common 
Elements
looter used heavy machiney 
resulted in much destruciton
specialised equipment
Looters (gang of local looters)
sold to middleman in 
switzerland
sold to Hecht (broker)
Hecht (broker) sold objects to 
Museum
antiquities dealers (broker) told 
to fly to Mexica
taken to uknown location to 
view objects
purchsed objects
object was sold through other 
dealer
purchased by other dealer 
objects smuggled to USA
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Case Study Motunui Panels   Nok Terracottas  Ocucaje Cemeteries     
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/nok-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
Date 1972 1994 1941
Location New Zealand Nigeria Peru
Full Script? Yes No No
Phase(s)? All Looting
Transit
Looting
One 
Instance
Yes No No
Multiple 
Occurances
No Yes Yes
Individual Yes No No
Group No Yes Yes
Community No Yes No
Common 
Elements
chance find
individual discovered
brought back to home
broker came and viewed in 
person
broker removed objects to 
other country
broker falisifies provenance
Broker sells to collector
large scale looting
team looters
wide variety of means of 
selling 
internet
trafficking
galleries
anticipated finds (cemetary)
large scale looting
clandestine looting
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Case Study Paracas Textiles    Peruvian Antiquities Seized at 
Dulles Airport (1981)  
Piedras Negras   
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
Date 1930 1981 1960s
Location Peru United States
Peru
Guatemala
Full Script? No No No
Phase(s)? Looting Transit Looting
One 
Instance
No Yes No
Multiple 
Occurances
Yes No Yes
Individual No Yes No
Group Yes No Yes
Community Yes No No
Common 
Elements
local looting gangs
objects smuggled
large scale looting
large amounts entered 
international market
broker found to be carrying 
illicit objects at customs
broker claimed object were 
legal and rightfully his
groups or gangs of looters
objects were sawed into pieces 
and carried across border
objects sold to multiple 
countries
objects were 'thinned' for 
transport - parts of back taken 
off
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Case Study Placeres Stucco Temple 
Facade    
Río Azul    Slack Farm    
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/rio-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/slack-
Date 1968 1976 1987
Location Mexico Guatemala United States
Full Script? Yes No No
Phase(s)? All Looting
Transit
Looting
One 
Instance
Yes No No
Multiple 
Occurances
No Yes Yes
Individual No No No
Group Yes Yes Yes
Community No No No
Common 
Elements
loot to order
looters alerted brokers and 
middleman to object
broker ordered looting
object looted
object sawed into pieces
object smuggled by plane to 
USA
object offered to museum
site targeted specifically
collector targeted site
funded groups of looters
local helped organise looting 
groups
Possible that objects smuggled 
by plane (remote landing strip)
possible dark archaeologist 
advised 
looters paid land owners to loot 
on land
Large scale looting (650 pits)
speacialised machinery was 
used
law allowed looting, but not 
disrupting human remains.
Looters claimed no HR, but 
clearly evident
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Case Study Toledo Museum of Art Return 
to Italy (2013)    
Ubina Hoard    Valdivia Figurines    
Viable? YES YES YES
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/toledo-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/ubina-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
Date 1981 2005 1970
Location Italy Estonia Ecuador
Full Script? No No No
Phase(s)? Transit
Market
Looting Looting
One 
Instance
Yes Yes No
Multiple 
Occurances
No No Yes
Individual Yes No No
Group No Yes Yes
Community No No Yes
Common 
Elements
object smuggled out of country
Medici (Middleman) took 
object to Switzerland
Medici (MiddleMan) sold 
object to Becchina (Broker)
Broker created false 
provenance
Broker sold object to museum 
with false provenance
Provenance was piece of 
paper (typewriter) indicating 
previous owner had inherited 
object from father - who 
purchased in 1935
looting of existing 
archaeological site
use of specialised equipment
targeted specific areas marked 
by archaeologists
car seen circling the site, left 
when spotted by archaeologists
Looters discovered objects 
long before archaeologists
large scale looting
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Case Study Vibia Sabina Statue    Wang Chuzhi Tomb Panel    Giacomo Medici   
Viable? YES YES SMUGGLER
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/vibia-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/wang-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
Date 1974 1994 NA
Location Germany/Italy China Italy, Switerland
Full Script? No No No
Phase(s)? Transit
Market
Looting Transit
Market
One 
Instance
Yes Yes No
Multiple 
Occurances
No No Yes
Individual Yes No Yes
Group No Yes No
Community No No No
Common 
Elements
dealer made aware of object 
about to appear on market
object stored in warehouse of 
dealer in Munich
Medici (on behalf of dealer) 
asked to view object
object purchased by Hecht 
(Broker)
Broker sold to museum via 
conservator"
covervator acted as "front" for 
broker 
looters used dynamite to enter 
tomb
lotoed large panels
panel appeared on market in 
NYC
correct provenance - listed the 
tomb as site of origin
consigned by gallery from 
Hong Kong
used multiple (own) companies 
to generate provenance 
one company sells, other 
purchases
created false demand in 
market
laundered objects to make licit
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Case Study Incirlik smuggling network, 
Turkey (1998)   
Operation Andromeda    South California Museum 
Raids (2008)  
Viable? SMUGGLER SMUGGLER SMUGGLER
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/incirlik-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/south-
Date 1997 1980s 2008
Location Turkeu/USA Tokyo USA
Full Script? Yes No No
Phase(s)? All Transit
Market
Transit
Market
One 
Instance
No No No
Multiple 
Occurances
Yes Yes Yes
Individual Yes Yes Yes
Group Yes No No
Community No No No
Common 
Elements
smuggling network
individual at US airforce base
ordered looting, was then 
smuggling
individual sold objects to 
collectors
individual sold object to dealers
obtained objects from 
Bacchina (middlemen/broker)
acted as agent for Museum 
(purchasing)
tax-deductable donation to 
museums
broker - provided objects to 
collectors and dealers
produced a catalouge of 
exhibition, increased demand
Mis-label or Mis-describe 
objects for transport
Bridbe customs officials 
disgusie objects as modern
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Case Study Swetnam, Drew, Kelly 
Smuggling Ring of Objects 
Vaman Ghiya  
Viable? SMUGGLER SMUGGLER
Link https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-
https://traffickingculture.org/en
cyclopedia/case-studies/vaman-
Date 1987 2003
Location Peru India
Full Script? Yes Yes
Phase(s)? All All
One 
Instance
No No
Multiple 
Occurances
Yes Yes
Individual No Yes
Group Yes No 
Community No No
Common 
Elements
group of smugglers/middlemen
bribeing of border agents
smuggling agents to transport 
object via plane
disgusied objects (mud cover 
bottom) souvenir
transported via multiple 
countries
looters stored objects until 
investigation stoppped
dealers made contact with 
local dealer
organised purchase of objects 
and transort
false provenance
agent claimed object came of 
family collection - false 
provenance
three front compaies
three companies could transact 
material - laundering
sold to deals and collectors
network of looters and 
middlemen/dealers
operated as a broker/smuggler
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Appendix 5: Syria Looting Dataset  
Syria Direct: Artifact trafficking and the battle to stop it: 'It's open season' 
https://syriadirect.org/news/artifact-trafficking-and-the-battle-to-stop-it-its-open-season/ 
In the late hours of the night, 30-year-old Abdelrahman wanders the ancient city of Apamea with a metal 
detector.  Built by Selucid kings 2,300 years ago, Apamea was once a repository for the wealth of their 
empire, which spread from ancient Anatolia to modern-day Pakistan. over the past two millennia, the ancient 
city, located in today’s northwestern Syria on a frontline between government and opposition forces, passed 
through Roman and Byzantine hands, among others.  Now, the tourists are gone and the site has fallen into 
disrepair, the land pock-marked with holes dug by treasure hunters such as Abdelrahman.  When luck is on 
his side, Abdelrahman can make between $300 and $500 a month selling buried artifacts, a decent living in 
the opposition-controlled province of Idlib northwest Syria, where monthly salaries rarely exceed $75.  
Apamea lies on the border between opposition-held Idlib and government-controlled Hama province, 
pushing.  Abdelrahman and his partners to work only at night—hidden from the watchful eye of both the 
regime and local rebel militias.  If caught by the regime, they could face up to 25 years in prison. If caught by 
an Islamist group, treasure hunters could have their hands cut off.  The reward, says Abdelrahman, is worth 
the risk.  “Once, I sold a single ancient coin for $500,” he tells Syria Direct. “But it’s not always this way. 
We can dig for weeks and weeks without finding anything.”  The fruitless digging can make Abdelrahman 
feel “hopeless,” but he and his partners continue searching until they find a piece they can sell. “Of course, I 
feel guilty whenever I sell a piece of my country’s history,” he says. “But I feel more guilty when I see my 
kids go hungry.”  Abdelrahman is a small part of a larger picture:   Dealers and middlemen, with ties to both 
opposition fighters and regime officials, purchase the objects he finds. They then smuggle them to Turkey or 
Lebanon.  From there, the relics join a vast black market frequented by wealthy buyers from Europe, the 
United States and the Arab Gulf states. But as this vast network of treasure hunters, smugglers and art dealers 
seeks to profit from the destruction of Syria’s historical sites, an equally diverse group of activists, 
archeologists and United Nations officials has mobilized to protect it. It is unclear whether this law or similar 
ones are in fact curbing the pillaging of ancient sites. While one Victory Army official told Syria Direct that 
a group of looters was recently arrested, a Victory Army judge told the Syrian Voice last month that trading 
in antiquities is permitted—provided a cut of profits was given to the local government. Antiquities broker 
Abu Tariq says that his business hasn’t been affected. “We work with a dealer in Lebanon, and we smuggle 
relics to him via Turkey,” he explains. “From Lebanon, they’re sold to museums and collectors in Europe.” 
 
Stage 1: Motivation for Looting 
• Substance  
Stage 2: Type of Looter 
• Group or pair of individuals 
• Working for themselves 
Stage 3: Location 
• Searches for loot in known archeological site 
Stage 4: Research 
• Unknown  
Stage 5: Equipment 
• Has specialized looting equipment (Tech, bulldozer, hacksaws, drills, metal detector) 
Stage 6: Looting 
• Loot object in secret 
Stage 7: Transportation from site of Origin: 
• Transports object(s) to looters home OR storage facility  
Stage 8: Storage 
• Objects are not stored, but transported directly out of country 
Stage 9: Selling  
• Looter sells object to middleman/smuggler 
• Looter sells object to dealer 
• Local 
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Syria Untold: The Long Walk to Protect Syrian Artifacts 
http://syriauntold.com/2016/11/protect-syrian-artifacts-dr-ali-cheikhmous/ 
 
Inside Syria, smugglers of antiquities and residents of nearby villages do the excavations.  When they 
stumble upon artifacts, they either sell them to local merchants or smuggle them directly into neighboring 
countries to be sold there. In some cases, the excavation first needs to be authorized by the military force in 
control of the region, like Daesh [Arabic derogative acronym for the self declared Islamic State (IS)] in the 
countryside of Dayr az-Zawr and Raqqa. That way, they can get a piece of the cake. In every military faction, 
including the regime’s army, you find a group involved in facilitating excavations and smuggling operations. 
Before the Palmyra site fell in the hands of Daesh, for instance, numerous smuggling operations were 
organized under the regime’s eyes. The same goes for Apamea; where there’s a checkpoint called Hajez al-
Athar (the Antiquities Checkpoint), and excavations take place in broad daylight without any intervention 
from officers or soldiers. In terms of facilitating smuggling operations, everyone knows that Hezbollah and 
the Syrian Army control the borders between Syria and Lebanon. Nonetheless, there are often news of the 
Lebanese authorities arresting smugglers and traffickers and confiscating Syrian antiquities. The question is: 
how did these artifacts reach Lebanon in the first place? Syrian Army and Hezbollah officers undoubtedly 
have something to do with this. 
 
Stage 1: Motivation for Looting 
◦ Substance 
◦ Stage 2: Type of Looter 
◦ Individual 
⁃ Working for themselves 
⁃ Pays/seeks permission off criminal group/organization to loot 
◦ Group or pair of individuals 
⁃ Working for themselves 
⁃ Pays/seeks permission off criminal group/organization to loot  
Stage 3: Location 
◦ Searches randomly for loot in hope of finding object 
◦ Object(s) has been made visible/discovered randomly by individual  
Stage 5: Equipment 
◦ Has simple looting equipment (Shovels, picks) 
Stage 6: Looting 
◦ Loot object openly 
Stage 7: Transportation from site of Origin: 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 8: Storage 
◦ Objects are not stored, but transported directly out of country 
Stage 9: Selling  
◦ Looter sells object to middleman/smuggler 
◦ Looter sells object to buyer 
Local (Country of Origin) 
In person 
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Foreign Policy: The Black-Market Battleground 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/17/the-black-market-battleground/ 
When Islamic State fighters capture an archaeological site, they’re faced with a series of choices. Do they 
destroy it or sell its artifacts?  If they decide it’s idolatrous, do they extort protection money for it from the 
Shiite, Sufi, Yazidi, or other religious minority group that values it? Or do they demolish it right away and 
feature the demolition in their propaganda? If they loot it, do they ransack the place themselves or do they 
hire others to do it?Or do they tax the opportunistic looters who show up?  Actually, all of the above is going 
on. How the self-proclaimed Islamic State militant group approaches each site depends on a range of factors, 
including the area’s land ownership system and the payoff of plundering the site, says Michael Danti, one of 
the archaeologists leading a U.S. government-funded effort to document the destruction and looting of the 
cultural heritage of Iraq and Syria. At first, the Islamic State simply asked anyone who chose to loot areas it 
controlled for khums, a tax on the spoils of war paid in Islamic tradition to the government. But by this 
summer, Al- Azm said, ISIS started taking a more deliberate approach, actively employing contractors to do 
the excavation. These contractors take some of the profits, and the rest goes to the Islamic State. “It’s part of 
a growing escalation,” he said.  “The most recent reports I’m getting is that ISIS is actually engaging itself: 
They’re hiring their own people, they’re using a lot of earth-moving equipment — bulldozers, et cetera,” Al-
Azm said. “So what I can tell you is they’re making enough to make it worth their while.” The Islamic State 
profits nearly immediately, selling the goods to middlemen who then smuggle them into neighboring 
countries such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, according to Al-Azm. Some middlemen belong to organized 
crime syndicates that smuggle a range of things — electronics, people, antiquities — and have done so since 
long before the rise of the Islamic State. That traffic, along with the illegal arms flowing in the opposite 
direction, is a large part of why control of border locales such as Kobani is so strategically important.  But 
the murkiness around what happens to artifacts once they leave Syria or Iraq makes these international 
agreements harder to implement. In the short term, they may cause middlemen to hold onto the artifacts until 
the furor has died down — which generally takes several years. Most of what was plundered from Iraq 
between 2003 and 2005 is only now appearing in aboveground international markets, the main exception 
being when a particular collector has a request out for a specific kind of artifact, Al-Azm and Danti said.  
“The material is gradually, incrementally laundered in the world-antiquities market, and it becomes very 
difficult to establish when, where, who, what, why at that point in time,” Danti said. “So we’ve got to 
chronicle everything we can now so we can try to determine what was stolen by whom and even try to get the 
slightest inclination as to where they’re going.” 
 
Stage 1: Motivation for Looting 
• Criminal/Profit  
Stage 2: Type of Looter 
• Criminal Organization 
⁃ International criminal organization 
Stage 3: Location 
• Searches randomly for loot in hope of finding object 
Stage 4: Research 
• Unknown 
Stage 5: Equipment 
• Has specialized looting equipment (Tech, bulldozer, hacksaws, drills) 
Stage 6: Looting 
• Loot object openly 
Stage 7: Transportation from site of Origin: 
• Unknown 
Stage 8: Storage 
• Objects are not stored, but transported directly out of country 
Stage 9: Selling 
• Middleman/Smuggler 
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Chasing Aphrodite: Inside the ISIS Looting Operation: U.S. Lawsuit Reveals 
Terror Group’s Brutal Bureaucracy of Plunder 
https://chasingaphrodite.com/2016/12/15/inside-the-isis-looting-operation-u-s-lawsuit-
reveals-terror-groups-brutal-bureaucracy-of-plunder/ 
 
In 2013, seven women from the village of al-Duwayr spent eight months digging with pick axes in the al- 
Salihiyyah archaeological site outside Damascus. (There are two locations named al-Salihiyyah in Syria, but 
as Paul Barford notes in the comments below, given the context this likely refers to the site outside Deir ez-
Zor, where Abu Sayyaf was based.)   During the illicit dig they found a cache of gold and other ancient 
relics.  The women asked a male relative, whose name is redacted, to sell the finds, but he could not reach an 
agreed upon price with local merchants, who offered up to $180,000. (It is not clear what currency is being 
discussed, but else where the records note many deals were transacted in U.S. dollars.). Abu Sayyaf’s deputy, 
Abu Layth, learned of the find and came to collect the ISIS Khums tax, 20% of the discovery’s value. He put 
the value of their discovery at just $70,000 and offered to buy it all. When the looters refused the low ball 
price, Abu Layth attempted to take one-fifth of the find in lieu of the tax. That too was refused by the 
women.  Days later, Layth and five members of the Islamic State arrived at the house of one of the looters in 
masks and toting guns. Abu Layth, brandishing a pistol, demanded to know where the gold was. The women 
said it had already been taken to Turkey.  At that point one of the ISIS men grabbed a 15-year-old boy. Abu 
Layth stated, “I will take the boy to al-Raqqah and I will not bring him back until you bring the gold.”  The 
boy testified about his abduction, saying he was blindfolded, beaten in the back of the vehicle, threatened 
with a pistol to his head and then held for 15-days in al-Raqqah.  In his own testimony, Abu Layth 
acknowledged he had no experience with antiquities. He had worked for the ministry of natural resources for 
nine months, and had previously sold clothes and food.  Abu Layth testified that he was given $130,000 to 
purchase the relics but offered only $70,000 to the looters.  Merchants in Turkey, who he communicated with 
“via mediators,” said the finds could be worth as much as $200,000. He said he had arrested the boy at the 
order of his boss, Abu Sayyaf.  Having heard the testimony, the Islamic State’s General Supervising 
Committee issued its ruling: Abu Sayyaf should fire Abu Layth, hire own responsible men, and apologize to 
the family for arresting the boy without justification. 
 
Stage 1: Motivation for Looting 
◦ Substance  
Stage 2: Type of Looter 
◦ Group or pair of individuals  
⁃ Pays/seeks permission off criminal group/organization to loot 
Stage 3: Location 
◦ Searches for loot in known archeological site 
Stage 4: Research 
◦ unknown 
Stage 5: Equipment 
◦ Has simple looting equipment (Shovels, picks) 
Stage 6: Looting 
◦ Loot object openly 
Stage 7: Transportation from site of Origin: 
◦ Transports object(s) to looters home OR storage facility  
Stage 8: Storage 
◦ Objects are stored on a long-term basis 
Stage 9: Selling  
◦ Looter sells object to buyer 
Local (Country of Origin) 
In person 
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Chasing Aphrodite: Twenty Percent: ISIS “Khums” Tax on Archaeological 
Loot Fuels the Conflicts in Syria and Iraq 
https://chasingaphrodite.com/tag/amr-al-azm/ 
 
AA: It’s very widespread…just about everybody is doing it. Its happening all over.  Especially in the Eastern 
areas, along Euphrates, there are thousands uponthousands of Archaeological sites. They’re destroying many 
many layers of history and culture that we’ll never recover. It’s so systematic right now, huge chunks of our 
history is disappearing.  Now with ISIS on the scene, this has become much much worse. ISIS has instituted 
the concept of khums, the 20% tax, and said to the locals, you can dig on your own land but pay us a fifth of 
what you make. On public land, they’ve started licensing crews to come in – Turks, Kurds, Iraqis coming 
with bulldozers to get at the few bobbles coming out. Most of the stuff coming out is not priceless artifacts. 
They’re pots, a small statue, a tablet or cylinder seals. This stuff is small potatoes economically, so the 
income is based on bulk more than a significant piece of great value. 
 
JF: What evidence is there to support this? 
 
AA: The evidence comes from locals who we know who I communicate with regularly. They tell is ISIS 
representatives are at the archaeological sites to make sure the khums is paid. 
 
JF: What are the trafficking networks that move the objects out of the country to the market? 
 
AA: My sources tell me a lot of this stuff ends up crossing the Turkishborder. Some international dealers, 
non- Turks, started to come in to Syria but it quickly gottoo dangerous for them.  Now the dealers all hang 
out across the border in Turkey. Only Turkish dealers come into Syria to meet with locals. They buy and take 
it back. One of the main centers for the illicit trade is Tell Abiab, on the Syrian side, across the border from 
Urfa. There is also lots of smuggling in Kilis, some of it archaeology. From there, I don’t know where it 
goes.  There is also evidence of some looting to order by wealthy private collectors. For example, in Palmyra, 
which is under regime control, there is a famous Roman tomb called the Brothers Tomb. I’ve been told the 
Tomb of the Three Brothers has been looted and sold off. My suspicion is that it’s looting to order for a 
collector. Something that well known and important won’t show up on the market. 
 
Stage 1: Motivation for Looting 
◦ Substance  
◦ Criminal/Profit  
Stage 2: Type of Looter 
◦ Group or pair of individuals  
⁃ Pays/seeks permission off criminal group/organization to loot 
Stage 3: Location 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 4: Research 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 5: Equipment 
◦ Has specialized looting equipment (Tech, bulldozer, hacksaws, drills) 
Stage 6: Looting 
◦ Loot object openly 
Stage 7: Transportation from site of Origin: 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 8: Storage 
◦ Objects are not stored, but transported directly out of country 
◦ unknown 
Stage 9: Selling  
◦ Looter sells object to middleman/smuggler 
◦ Looter sells object to dealer 
⁃ International 
⁃ In person 
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Buzzfeed: This Is How Syrian Antiquities Are Being Smuggled And Sold 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikegiglio/the-trade-in-stolen-syrian-artifacts 
 
In order for traders to sell antiquities, diggers around Syria work daily to pull them from the ground. The digs 
range from backyard affairs by heavy-handed amateurs to skilled excavations. 
One such digger, a 36-year-old Syrian, works near Apamea with permission from a local rebel group, rolling 
a bulldozer over acres of land to turn up small artifacts or uncover clues that might lead to a greater score, 
such as an ancient burial cave. Inching through the chambers and reaching into tombs can be exhilarating as 
he wonders what he’ll find. He might discover jewels that wealthy citizens of past empires took to the grave. 
Often, he said, “there are only bones.”  On a warm evening in June, he and a colleague sat on the floor of a 
living room near the border and served tea as they waited out the last hour of the Ramadan fast. The two men 
are part of a team of six that splits any money they make. They can go for weeks without a payday, sweating 
“for nothing” in the sun, the digger said.  “We feel bad because we are stealing our history and selling it for a 
cheap price,” his colleague said. “But we have become homeless and jobless, so we don’t care.” 
 
Stage 1: Motivation for Looting 
◦ Substance  
Stage 2: Type of Looter 
◦ Group or pair of individuals  
⁃ Pays/seeks permission off criminal group/organization to loot 
Stage 3: Location 
◦ Searches randomly for loot in hope of finding object 
Stage 4: Research 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 5: Equipment 
◦ Has specialized looting equipment (Tech, bulldozer, hacksaws, drills) 
Stage 6: Looting 
◦ Loot object openly 
Stage 7: Transportation from site of Origin: 
◦ Unknown 
Stage 8: Storage 
◦ unknown 
Stage 9: Selling  
◦ Unknown 
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Appendix 6: Syria Transit Dataset 
 
BuzzFeed: This Is How Syrian Antiquities Are Being Smuggled And Sold 
“He asked me not to photograph the bust, since it was on the market, but texted 
me photos of several others he said he had picked up during the same raid. He 
had already sold those busts to a friend, he said, and then conspired to smuggle 
them from Turkey back through Syria and on to Lebanon, a common path 
because Turkish authorities are far more diligent about cracking down on the 
trade than their counterparts in Lebanon.”  
Looters found the mosaic in Syria, in the floor of an ancient villa buried 
underground. First they covered it with elastic glue and, using a rubber hammer, 
tapped the pieces into place. When the glue set they peeled the mosaic from the 
floor. Then they rolled it into the carpet and smuggled it across the border into 
Turkey, where Mohamed, a black-market antiquities dealer in his mid-thirties, 
hid it in his home. 
BBC: The man who smuggles the loot that funds IS 
To sell looted antiquities you need a middle-man, like "Ahmed". Originally from 
eastern Syria, he is based in a town in southern Turkey - he doesn't want me to 
specify which one as he doesn't want the police to know.  As a Turkish-speaker 
he is popular with Syrian smugglers, who ask if he can move goods on to local 
dealers. When I speak to him via Skype he shows me a blanket next to him filled 
with artefacts - statues of animals and human figures, glasses, vases and coins. 
The main trade is in stoneworks, statues and gold, and it can be extremely 
lucrative. "I have seen one piece sold for $1.1m," he says. "It was a piece from 
the year 8500BC." He gently handles each artefact as he brings it closer to the 
webcam to give me a better view. He has had to pay a sizeable bond to the 
smugglers to get this material and he doesn't want to lose any of it. The final 
destination is Western Europe, he says. 
If it was only a small mosaic I wanted, I could take the chance and try to smuggle 
it out myself but he warns it's a serious decision, as I could get caught. For a fee 
he can have them shipped to the UK but it will cost me many thousands of 
pounds. We shake hands as I leave and he gives me his business card. It has only 
taken 10 minutes to be offered illicit antiquities. 
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Independent: Syria Conflict: The illicit art trade that is a major source of 
income for today’s terror group is nothing new 
Once brought to Turkey, Syrian artefacts travel out of Turkey’s big coastal ports 
– Mersin, Antalya or Izmir – alongside smuggled Syrian refugees desperate to 
reach European shores. Once they arrive in Europe, usually via Cyprus, Italy, 
Greece or Portugal, a dealer will concoct false papers for the artefact. 
The burden is mostly falling on Turkey however, which is under continuing 
pressure to tighten its long and porous border. It’s not only foreign jihadis that 
are taking advantage of lax border spots to join Isis, but artefacts are just as easily 
smuggled into the country to be picked up by organised crime gangs, as well as 
amateurs. 
“People are trying to make a living,” Dr Danti says. “The biggest culprits in all 
of this have to be the refugee crisis, the humanitarian crisis and the issue of 
poverty – right now that’s really contributing to property crime. “Locals will go 
out and excavate for antiquities and bring this stuff to Isis and get paid, or they’re 
willing to traffic this stuff and pay Isis a tax to smuggle it into Turkey.” 
“It’s like a business,” they reassure me, albeit one that’s replete with a network 
of diggers, smugglers and dealers. “Anything you want, we can get for you. Just 
look at the pictures and tell us what you like. 
DW: Germany attracts trade in looted artifacts 
 
Day in and day out, go-betweens smuggle looted art from the war zones in the 
Middle East first to Turkey or Lebanon, and then on to, for instance, the Dubai 
foreign trade zone. Here, the artifacts can either be purchased on the spot, or they 
are shipped to antiques dealers and auction houses in Europe and the US, 
complete with export documents supplied by the intermediary. 
National Geographic: ISIS Cashing in on Looted Antiquities to Fuel Iraq 
Insurgency 
But Sam Hardy, an archaeologist at University College London, who studies the 
trade in illicit antiquities, notes that insurgents and paramilitaries generally enter 
the trade in at least one of three ways: by running a trafficking network, 
facilitating smuggling through offering a service, or levying a tax on traffickers 
who move looted artifacts through their territory. 
 
291 
 
 
 
 
New York Times: Looting Antiquities, A Fundamental Part Of ISIS' Revenue 
Stream 
After antiquities leave the Islamic State’s territory, experts say they fall into the 
hands of existing smuggling and criminal networks that are practiced at 
trafficking people, drugs or other contraband from Syria and Iraq. “Once they 
hit these networks, they go everywhere, and they’re very hard to track,” said 
Brent Easter, a customs special agent in New York who investigates art 
smuggling. 
Pulitzer Centre: Stealing Syria’s Past 
Amer’s new business, I discovered, was a lean, multinational enterprise. Small 
teams armed with metal detectors or brushes began by spreading out and 
searching an area. Some were skilled in archaeological excavation before the 
revolt, others had learned on the job. Another group of specialists was charged 
with certifying the authenticity of anything found, after which the objects were 
passed to polishers who’d get them ready to be sold. Then they were passed to 
the smugglers who moved them into Turkey. Only then would they make it to 
Amer 
Al-Monitor: Islamic State makes millions from stolen antiquities 
As a result, many smugglers, among them Turks, have rushed in — virtually 
“with bulldozers.” Judging by Al-Azm's account, Turkey and Turkish nationals 
play a leading role in this disgraceful affair. The smugglers’ highway is passing 
through Turkey. All artifacts are funneled to the world via Turkey. 
Foreign Policy: A How-To Guide To Buying Artifacts Looted by the Islamic 
State 
 
It begins with the Islamic State looter, who actually steals the piece from inside 
Iraq or Syria. Then, this looter would contact a smuggler, who would pay the 
finder a tax as high a 50 percent of the artifact’s suspected price and use existing 
rat lines to get it out of the country. It would most likely end up in Turkey, 
according to Amr Al-Azm, an archaeologist at Shawnee State University in Ohio 
who is also leading efforts to document Islamic State looting through satellite 
imaging. 
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New Yorker: The Real Value of the ISIS Antiquities Trade 
 
The Apamea looters were free from the ideological and territorial constraints 
that limit ISIS profits: statues and idols are fair game, collectible, and apparently 
seeping into the international black market through established smuggling routes 
that predate Syria’s war. The archeologist Michael Danti, who spoke at the Met, 
recently told me in a phone call from Iraq that he has seen looted antiquities 
marketed directly to potential buyers via social networks, including Facebook, 
WhatsApp, and Snapchat.  
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Appendix 7: Syria Market Dataset 
CBS: Following the trail of Syria's looted history 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-looted-syrian-ancient-artifacts-black-market-us-and-
europe/ 
To get a firsthand look at this underground world, Ward's producer Jennifer Janisch posed as a buyer and 
made contact with Omar, a Syrian living in Turkey who offers looted artifacts to international buyers. He 
sent us images of coins and statuettes, jewelry and ancient books -- likely a mixture of real and fake items, 
experts told CBS News.  Omar claimed to have mosaics freshly ripped out of the ground in Syria. Janisch 
and Ward met him in Istanbul and recorded the meeting on hidden cameras. Archaeologist Amr al-Azm 
joined the CBS News undercover team to help authenticate the mosaic.  Two nervous young Syrians took us 
to a run-down apartment on the outskirts of town, and there it was; a beautiful roman mosaic, nearly 2,000 
years old and, as we learned later, potentially worth $100,000. They said it was taken out of Syria only 
recently -- one of seven mosaics they had dug up in the ancient city of Apamea, one of Syria's most 
significant archaeological sites. Satellite photos show the ground around Apamea pockmarked with the 
telltale holes left by looters. Ward and Janisch then moved to their waiting van, where they were also offered 
Roman glass stolen from a tomb. There the negotiating began: $200,000 for the mosaic, they said, but that 
quickly dropped to $60,000. They were eager to get the illegal piece off their hands.  "Clearly this is part of 
the tragedy of the war in Syria," said al-Azm, the archaeologist. "The fact that they feel that this is the only 
way they can essentially survive and feed their families... Syria has such a rich history, rich cultural 
heritage.” A history al-Azm said is being "totally pillaged and destroyed... Syria's cultural heritage has 
become a casualty of war." In Gaziantep, Turkey, near the Syrian border, we met Abu Walid, who told us he 
felt he had no choice but to loot and sell artifacts.  "There is no more work in Syria," he said, explaining that 
people have to sell artifacts or join an armed group, obliged to either fight or steal. ISIS is the primary 
beneficiary, making tens of millions of dollars through the illegal trade. The group issues licenses to looters 
to dig in their territory.  "If you find an artifact, you take 80 percent and ISIS takes 20 percent," he said. Or, if 
the equipment used to unearth the treasure belongs to ISIS, they take a 40-50 percent cut instead. "The illegal 
traffic in looted antiquities is buying the bombs and the bullets that are killing so many," U.S. Marine Col. 
Matthew Bogdanos, who led the investigation into the 2003 looting of the National Museum of Iraq, told 
CBS News. Now he prosecutes antiquities cases as an assistant district attorney in the U.S.  "In a surprisingly 
small number of steps, you can go from the looter in ISIS controlled territory to the smuggler who gets it out 
of the country... to a gallery owner who provides forged documentation... and ultimately getting a buyer 
making its way to the four destination points of New York, London, Paris and Tokyo," Bogdanos said. He 
said he and his colleagues have seen evidence of artifacts "looted by ISIS or under the authority of ISIS" 
ending up on the markets in London and even New York. 
Stage 5: Obtaining of Objects 
• Unknown 
Stage 6: Assessment 
• Unknown 
Stage 7: Storage 
• Dealer store object(s) in on a short-term basis 
Stage 8: Provenance 
• Dealer does not attempt to create false provenance 
Stage 9: Potential Buyers 
• Dealer show illicit object(s) to potential buyers in person  
Stage 10: Purchase 
• Dealer sells object(s) directly to buyer 
• Dealer sells object(s) directly to buyer, in person 
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Bloomberg: Islamic State Is Selling Looted Art Online for Needed Cash 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-28/isis-has-new-cash-cow-art-loot-it-s-
peddling-on-ebay-facebook 
 
The Whatsapp message appeared on his iPhone: photos of an ancient Mesopotamian vase worth $250,000, 
part of a highlyvalued set that is waiting to be extracted. The recipient, Amr Al Azm, replied that he was 
interested. How to proceed? A message from a different account followed. The vase could be smuggled 
through Lebanon.  Al Azm, an anthropology professor in Ohio, was faking it, as he does when photos of 
looted antiquities are sent to him in the belief that he is a collector or dealer. He is a detective - - self-
appointed -- hoping to save some of mankind’s rarest and most vulnerable artifacts by tracking the 
burgeoning antiquities trade of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.  Al Azm, who teaches at  Shawnee State 
University and is chair of the Syrian opposition’s Syrian Heritage Task Force, says that in recent months the 
group has set up a government branch, chillingly known as the archaeological administration, in the Syrian 
city of Manbij near the Turkish border, which manages loots and sales. “They bring in their own trucks, their 
own bulldozers, hire their own work crews and pay them salaries,” he said. Islamic State acts as a supplier 
for a complex chain involving at least five brokers and dealers, said Michael Danti, an adviser to the U.S. 
State Department on plundered antiquities from Iraq and Syria. The extremists are closely linked to Turkish 
crime networks in the border towns of Gaziantep or Akcakale, he said. Once the artifacts are smuggled into 
Turkey, a broker will cash them for resale to dealers who have pockets deep enough to pay for storage and 
wait up to 15 years to sell, when law enforcement is less focused on them. “Shady dealers sit on smuggled 
items for years to launder the provenance before trying to sell them for lump sums,” McAndrew said. 
“There’s enough awareness among major auction houses such as Sotheby’s and Christie’s to avoid handling 
any antiquity believed to be from Iraq or Syria. ‘‘But the challenge is monitoring private sales, which are 
driving the global antiquities market,” McAndrew said. “I’m pretty confident those pieces from Iraq and 
Syria are being sold to locals in the region -- wealthy Saudis, Emiratis, Iranians.” One concern is that the 
items may end up in freeports, which are tax-free storage spaces at international airports that do not require 
passage through customs. “The best way to stop this is by intercepting the items before they end up in the 
freeports,” said Daniel Brazier of Homeland Security, adding that freeport search warrants are near 
impossible to obtain. 
 
Stage 5: Obtaining of Objects 
Dealer buys object(s) off an individual smuggler 
Stage 6: Assessment 
Unknown 
Stage 7: Storage 
Dealer store object(s) in on a short-term basis 
Stage 8: Provenance 
Dealer does not specify provenance for object(s) 
Stage 9: Potential Buyers 
Dealers do not show objects to buyers 
Stage 10: Purchase 
Dealer does not sell object(s) - Third party country storage (i.e. Freeport) 
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Buzzfeed: This Is How Syrian Antiquities Are Being Smuggled And Sold 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikegiglio/the-trade-in-stolen-syrian-artifacts 
Looters found the mosaic in Syria, in the floor of an ancient villa buried underground. First they covered it 
with elastic glue and, using a rubber hammer, tapped the pieces into place. When the glue set they peeled the 
mosaic from the floor. Then they rolled it into the carpet and smuggled it across the  border into Turkey, 
where Mohamed, a black-market antiquities dealer in his mid-thirties, hid it in his home.  Tall and athletic 
with intense brown eyes, Mohamed crouched down to scoop up some stones that had come loose from the 
mosaic, dropping them into a plastic bag. When he began trading stolen antiquities, in 2003, he was hoping 
to make a better living under a dictatorship with few options for ambitious men with no ties to the ruling 
elite. Now he is a veteran of a trade that has exploded with the chaos of a brutal civil war, using the money to 
support his extended family living in Turkey as refugees. The work relies on secrecy — to avoid arrest and to 
hide the illicit origins of the artifacts, so they can adorn homes and galleries worldwide — so Mohamed 
asked to use only his first name. Four years into a conflict that has killed more than 200,000 and displaced 
millions, Syria’s immense history is being sold off on en masse as looters descend on ruins across the 
country. An untold number of people have joined Mohamed in a black market that helps to fund armed 
groups from ISIS to Western-backed rebels to the Syrian regime. Many of the newcomers have no interest 
other than making money, but Mohamed is enamored with the history of the ancient objects in which he 
trades. Known among his colleagues for having an expert eye, his phone buzzes endlessly as he receives 
photos via WhatsApp from sellers trying to catch his interest and fellow traders wanting advice. People ask 
him to come and “talk” with their artifacts. “Falso,” he says, his voice rising, when he sees a forgery. If he 
likes a piece, he calls it “fantastic.”  The mosaic was looted from Apamea, a city in northwest Syria with vast 
ruins that are under rebel control. Mohamed bought it for $21,000 from a dealer in Syria and hoped to sell it 
for $30,000. He guessed the mosaic might change hands once or twice more from there — and that its final 
destination, like its original one in ancient times, would be a rich person’s villa. Wherever it ends up, the 
mosaic, still stuck to its elastic sheet, will be set again inside a wall or on a floor. Then the elastic will be 
peeled back, revealing the front of the mosaic once more, the colors much deeper than on the flip side that 
Mohamed showed me in the bedroom near the border. By this point, he will be a forgotten part of the 
mosaic’s long history. “I’m invisible,” he said.  Over the course of a month, I traveled along Turkey’s 565-
mile-long border with Syria to meet more than a dozen people involved in this illegal trade, from the grave 
robbers and excavators who steal the artifacts to the middlemen and dealers who sell them. They showed me 
photos and videos of items for sale and let me view in person three high-value objects, including the mosaic, 
that are normally kept hidden from anyone who isn’t part of this underground world. For the same reasons as 
Mohamed, all requested anonymity.  Convinced that their artifacts were destined for Western buyers, these 
sources opened a window onto the extent of the looting and the guile and professionalism with which their 
trade is carried out.  They also spoke to the desperation that fuels the pillage. “We have been living in a war 
for more than four years, and people will do anything to feed their kids,” said one middleman on the border, 
guilt-ridden over his role in bleeding Syria’s history. “I don’t care if the artifact is coming from [rebels] or 
from ISIS. I just want to sell it.”  Mohamed, the dealer, was excited — there was a new item on the market 
that he badly wanted to see. It had fallen into the hands of a Turkish dealer higher up the food chain who 
often dealt in Syrian antiquities more expensive than Mohamed could afford. Mohamed was paying him a 
visit and invited me to join.  We left Antakya early in the morning in a beat-up van, driving northeast through 
the mountains along the border until we reached the city of Gaziantep. The Turkish dealer — a gruff and 
stocky man in a pink polo shirt and jeans — then joined us in the van. He directed us to the outskirts of the 
city and beyond as his partner tailed us in a white sedan. The man didn’t seem to believe I was a journalist, 
but he was happy to have an American along for the ride. His best client, in fact, was an American, he said. 
He described the client as a man of about 50 who visited a few times a year with a translator. The last trip 
had been a few months before. “He is a really good guy," the man said, "and he pays a lot of money."  He 
took on the tone of a salesman at Istanbul’s Grand Bazaar, claiming he’d never sell a fake to an American 
because it was against Islam. He said that the item we were headed to see was beautiful, and repeated one of 
the few English words he knew several times, “Guarantee.” He added, in Turkish, “I swear on Obama’s life.”  
We rolled for miles down a road with nothing but brown grass on either side, arriving finally at an isolated 
villa. The man and his partner led us inside. Mohamed sat on the floor of an airy den with windows that 
looked onto a mountainside. Then the man's partner brought in a small bundle covered in a white sheet. 
Mohamed unwrapped it eagerly. “Slowly, slowly,” the partner said.  Inside was a copper statue about 18 
inches in height. It showed what appeared to be a deity from ancient Greece, with laurels in his hair and 
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winged sandals on his feet. Mohamed traced his finger over veins that ran down either arm. It was the kind of 
classical artifact that can be found in Syria and across the region, a remnant of a time long before today’s 
borders were drawn. In this case, the Turkish man claimed it had been dug up illegally in Turkey, near the 
Aegean Sea. This blurring of boundaries can help traders say their objects came from any number of ancient 
sites outside Syria. Whatever the statue’s origins, it was another item sucked up into a black market that 
grows with the unrest across the Middle East.  One reason Syrian items sell so easily is that this global 
exchange predated the war; dealers with international connections have often simply folded the new Syrian 
artifacts into their businesses. The Turkish man said the price for the statue was $250,000, a bargaining 
position he'd likely bring down significantly. Mohamed held the statue in his hands as if it were an infant, 
and then he brought it to his face, pressing his nose against its stomach and inhaling deeply. He was trying to 
sense the integrity of the patina — the green coating that comes from age — smelling for traces of paint that 
would tell him it was fake. Satisfied and glowing with a quiet intensity, he pulled a magnifying glass from his 
pocket and moved it over the statue inch by inch, his right eye pressed against the lens. The room was silent.  
Later, on the ride home, Mohamed said he thought the statue was authentic — and a "fantastic" find. He had 
in mind a buyer who lived in Turkey, he said, and if the price came down he could likely arrange a sale. I 
asked what would happen to the statue if it ended up in his buyer’s hands. “Direct to Europe,” he said. After 
four years of war, Mohamed said, Syria "will never be like it was before." There have been too many lives 
and too much history lost. "It's a different country now," he said. Wearing loafers and a button-down shirt, he 
had come to Istanbul to meet potential buyers, and we sat drinking coffee at a downtown brasserie. His 
Android phone suddenly erupted as a barrage of photos of artifacts arrived. Scrolling through the new 
images, he stopped on one that showed an Egyptian coin from the age of Ptolemy, between the first and 
second centuries A.D., that a contact had uncovered in Syria. It was corroded and nearly worthless, he said, 
but he seemed happy to have it saved on his phone. "It's history," he said. "And not everyone has the chance 
to learn the past." He daydreamed for a minute about finding a way to work legally with antiquities one day, 
maybe for a museum in Syria if democracy ever came, or even for a legitimate dealer in the West. “Maybe 
after everything — after everything — I will make this a real job," he said. He whistled at the idea, shaking 
his head. 
Stage 5: Obtaining of Objects 
Dealers purchase objects from other dealers 
Stage 6: Assessment 
Dealers assesses object in person to determine value/authenticity of object 
Stage 7: Storage 
Dealer store object(s) in on a short-term basis 
Stage 8: Provenance 
Dealer does not attempt to create false provenance 
Stage 9: Potential Buyers 
Dealer show illicit object(s) to potential buyers in person  
Dealer show illicit object(s) to potential buyers via social media/electronic device 
Stage 10: Purchase 
Dealer sells object(s) to other international dealers 
Dealer sells object(s) to other international dealers via social media/electronic device 
Dealer sells object(s) to other international dealers in person 
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Appendix 8: Additional Syria Source Contributions 
The Independent: Syria Conflict: The illicit art trade that is a major source of income for 
today’s terror group is nothing new 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-conflict-the-illicit-art-trade-
that-is-a-major-source-of-income-for-todays-terror-groups-is-10204285.html 
 
The Guardian: Looted in Syria – and sold in London: the British antiques shops dealing 
in artefacts smuggled by Isis 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/03/antiquities-looted-by-isis-end-up-in-
london-shops 
 
BBC Radio 4: ISIS: LOOTING FOR TERROR 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/17_02_15_fo4_lootingforterror.pdf 
 
BBC: The man who smuggles the loot that funds IS 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-31485439 
 
Wall Street Journal: Syrian ‘Monuments Men’ Race to Protect Antiquities as Looting 
Bankrolls Terror 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/syrian-monuments-men-race-to-protect-antiquities-as-
looting-bankrolls-terror-1423615241 
 
DW: Germany attracts trade in looted artifacts 
https://www.dw.com/en/germany-attracts-trade-in-looted-artifacts/a-18019083 
 
National Geographic: ISIS Cashing in on Looted Antiquities to Fuel Iraq Insurgency 
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/06/140626-isis-insurgents-syria-iraq-
looting-antiquities-archaeology/ 
 
The Art Newspaper: What Do We Really Know About the Islamic State’s Role in Illicit 
Antiquities Trade? 
http://ukblueshield.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/What-do-we-really-know-about-
Islamic-State%E2%80%99s-role-in-illicit-antiquities-trade_.pdf 
 
National Public Radio: Looting Antiquities, A Fundamental Part Of ISIS' Revenue Stream 
https://www.npr.org/2014/09/29/352538352/looting-antiquities-a-fundamental-part-of-isis-
revenue-stream?t=1542656172441 
 
New York Times: Looting Antiquities, A Fundamental Part Of ISIS' Revenue Stream 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/world/europe/iraq-syria-antiquities-islamic-
state.html 
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Pulitzer Center: Stealing Syria’s Past 
https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/stealing-syrias-past 
 
Al-Monitor: Islamic State makes millions from stolen antiquities 
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/09/turkey-syria-iraq-isis-artifacts-
smuggling.html 
 
Foreign Policy: A How-To Guide To Buying Artifacts Looted by the Islamic State 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/28/a-how-to-guide-to-buying-artifacts-looted-by-the-
islamic-state/ 
 
Al-Monitor: Turkey major conduit for Syrian 'blood antiquities' 
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/turkey-syria-cultural-heritage-turns-
into-blood-antiquities.html 
 
The New Yorker: The Real Value of the ISIS Antiquities Trade 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-real-value-of-the-isis-antiquities-trade 
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Appendix 9: Antiquities Trafficking Networks Crime 
Script 
 Antiquities Trafficking Networks Crime Script 
L
oo
ti
ng
 P
ha
se
 
STAGES P r o f i t ,  S u b s i s t e n c e ,  O r  L e i s u r e  
ENTRY 
Access Site 
(Intentionally, unintentionally) 
INSTRA.INIT. 
& ACTUA. 
Search and Find Objects 
(Chance, Anticipated, Certain) 
DOING 
Loot Objects (Remove from location) 
(Overtly, Clandestinely) 
POST-
CONDITION 
& EXIT 
Dispose of Object 
Tr
an
si
t P
ha
se
 STAGES S m u g g l e r  
ENTRY Obtains Object 
INSTRA.INIT. 
& ACTUA. Transit Decision 
DOING Smuggles/Transports object across border 
POST-
CONDITION 
& EXIT 
Delivers OR sells object 
M
ar
ke
t P
ha
se
 STAGES M i d d l e m a n  B r o k e r  
ENTRY Purchases Object Purchases Illicit Antiquity 
INSTRA.INIT. 
& ACTUA. Contacts Buyer 
Research/ 
Assesses Object 
DOING Sells Object to Buyer Provenance Decision 
POST-
CONDITION 
& EXIT 
 Sell Object 
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Appendix 10: Syria Crime Script 
Syria Crime Script 
L
oo
ti
n
g 
 Subsistence or Profit Looter 
Stage 1 Select Location 
Stage 2 Acquire Tools/Labour 
Stage 3 Access Site 
Stage 4 Search & Find Objects 
Stage 5 Loot Objects 
Stage 6 Transport from Site 
Stage 7 Dispose of Object 
T
ra
n
si
t 
 Smuggler 
Stage 8 Entry 
Stage 9 Contact 
Stage 10 Obtains Object 
Stage 11 Prepares Object 
Stage 12 Travels to Border 
Stage 13 Smuggles over Border 
Stage 14 Destination of Object 
Stage 15 Obtains Profit 
M
ar
k
et
 
 Middleman Broker 
Stage 16 Notified of Object Learns of Object 
Stage 17 Assesses Object Assesses Object 
Stage 18 Purchases Object Purchases Illicit Antiquity 
Stage 19 Finds Objects Researches Object 
Stage 20 Meets with Buyer 
Provenance Decision 
- Creates false 
provenance 
- Does not create 
false provenance 
Stage 21 Sells object to buyer Arranges Buyer 
Stage 22 Delivers object to buyer 
Sells Object 
- Private Dealer 
- Auction House 
- Museum 
- Dealer 
Stage 23 Obtains profit  
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Appendix 11: Syria Search Dataset 
1 Y Looted in Syria – and sold in London: the 
British antiques shops ... 
/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1
&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiL8uKur9bTA
hWlDMAKHaiZAQ4QFggnMAA&url=https%3A
%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fworld%2F20
15%2Fjul%2F03%2Fantiquities-looted-by-isis-
end-up-in-london-shops&usg=AFQjCNH4gWr-
WqmkDftoBU8oBNmvZjAS6g&sig2=BjLjlwOd
DayIDoChSxZyrg 
2 Y ISIS' Looting Economy: Financial and 
Cultural Implications | St ... 
http://foreignaffairsreview.co.uk/2015/10/isis-
looting-economy-financial-and-cultural-
implications/ 
3 Y ISIS and illicit trafficking in cultural 
property: Funding terrorism through ... 
http://f3magazine.unicri.it/?p=1098 
4 Y Looters find path to export antiquities via 
Lebanon - Al-Monitor 
http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/security/2015/07/middle-east-
smuggling-antiquities-lebanon.html 
5 Y Inside ISIS' looted antiquities trade - The 
Conversation 
http://theconversation.com/inside-isis-looted-
antiquities-trade-59287 
6 Y Syria conflict: The illicit art trade that is a 
major source of income for ... 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/syria-conflict-the-illicit-art-trade-that-is-a-
major-source-of-income-for-todays-terror-groups-
is-10204285.html 
7 Y Almost 70% of smuggled objects seized in 
Syria and Lebanon are ... 
http://theartnewspaper.com/news/almost-70-of-
smuggled-objects-seized-in-syria-and-lebanon-are-
fakes-antiquities-chief-says/ 
8 Y UN Targets Illegal Trafficking of 
Antiquities - artnet News 
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/un-bans-export-
of-antiquities-to-target-islamic-state-revenue-
255058 
9 Y ISIL and Antiquities Trafficking — FBI https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/isil-and-
antiquities-trafficking 
10 Y Islamic State makes millions from stolen 
antiquities - Al-Monitor 
http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/09/turkey-syria-
iraq-isis-artifacts-smuggling.html 
11 Y Syrian 'Monuments Men' Race to Protect 
Antiquities as Looting ... 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrian-monuments-
men-race-to-protect-antiquities-as-looting-
bankrolls-terror-1423615241 
12 Y The Greatest Threat to Cultural Heritage in 
Syria - Counterpunch 
http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/12/26/the-
greatest-threat-to-cultural-heritage-in-syria/ 
13 Y ISIS, Blood Antiquities, and the 
International Black Market - Human ... 
http://www.hscentre.org/policy-unit/isis-blood-
antiquities-international-black-market/ 
14 Y Broken System' Allows ISIS to Profit From 
Looted Antiquities - The ... 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/world/europe
/iraq-syria-antiquities-islamic-state.html 
15 Y ISIS Cashing in on Looted Antiquities to 
Fuel Iraq Insurgency 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/06/
140626-isis-insurgents-syria-iraq-looting-
antiquities-archaeology/ 
16 Y ISIS Is Making Millions From The Art 
Market. Here's How Congress ... 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/islamic-state-
smuggling-bill_us_56324969e4b0c66bae5b5c4d 
17 Y Looting Is the Greatest Threat to Our 
Cultural Heritage in Syria ... 
https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/12/29/l
ooting-is-the-greatest-threat-to-our-cultural-
heritage-in-syria/ 
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18 Y Instability in the Middle East Is Fueling an 
Illicit Antiquities Trade - Muftah 
http://muftah.org/instability-in-the-middle-east-is-
fueling-an-illicit-antiquities-trade/ 
19 Y The Real Value of the ISIS Antiquities 
Trade - The New Yorker 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-
real-value-of-the-isis-antiquities-trade 
20 Y This Is How Syrian Antiquities Are Being 
Smuggled And Sold ... 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/the-trade-in-
stolen-syrian-artifacts 
21 Y Confronting 'Looting to Order' and 
'Cultural Racketeering' in Syria 
http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/10/02/confronti
ng-looting-to-order-and-cultural-racketeering-in-
syria/ 
22 Y Legislators call for US Treasury sanctions 
against dealers of looted ... 
https://www.rt.com/usa/245669-treasury-sanctions-
syrian-artifacts/ 
23 Y Trafficking in Antiquities | The Cipher 
Brief 
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/trafficking-
antiquities 
24 Y Where Do ISIS-Looted Antiquities Go? - 
Motherboard 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/where-
do-isis-looted-antiquities-go 
25 Y How Tomb Raiders Are Stealing Our 
History - National Geographic 
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2016
/06/looting-ancient-blood-antiquities/ 
26 Y Syrian rebels loot artifacts to raise money 
for fight against Assad - The ... 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_ea
st/syrian-rebels-loot-artifacts-to-raise-money-for-
fight-against-assad/2013/02/12/ae0cf01e-6ede-
11e2-8b8d-e0b59a1b8e2a_story.html 
27 Y Antiquities, looted from Syria's Palmyra 
Museum, seized while for sale ... 
https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2015/11/2
9/syria-palmyra-museum-turkey-elazig-harput-
refugee-subsistence-trafficking/ 
28 Y Iraq/Syria: ISIL/ISIS fundraising by 
antiquities trafficking | conflict ... 
https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2014/06/1
6/iraq-syria-isil-isis-antiquities-trafficking-
fundraising/ 
29 Y Syria/Lebanon: Syrian-Lebanese 
antiquities-for-arms trade | conflict ... 
https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2013/05/1
2/syria-conflict-funding-lebanon-illicit-antiquities-
trade/ 
30 Y Turkey major conduit for Syrian 'blood 
antiquities' - Al-Monitor 
http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/turkey-syria-
cultural-heritage-turns-into-blood-antiquities.html 
31 Y The antiquities looting crisis in the Middle 
East - Al Jazeera English 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/
antiquities-looting-crisis-middle-east-
160310093409472.html 
32 Y The Greatest Threat to Cultural Heritage in 
Syria 
http://mwcnews.net/focus/analysis/48722-cultural-
heritage-in-syria.html 
33 Y Private collectors fuel demand for looted 
Mideast antiquities - Al-Monitor 
http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/syria-egypt-
yemen-antiquities-smuggling-illegal-
collectors.html 
34 Y policy | Market of Mass Destruction http://www.marketmassdestruction.com/tag/policy/ 
35 Y Trafficking out of Syria | Market of Mass 
Destruction 
http://www.marketmassdestruction.com/trafficking-
out-of-syria/ 
36 Y Trafficking Culture | History Today http://www.historytoday.com/donna-
yates/trafficking-culture 
37 Y ISIL Making Millions From Looted 
Antiquities | The Huffington Post 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/katy-gregory/isil-
making-millions-from_b_7480792.html 
38 Y U.S. stopping black market trafficking in 
Syria | ShareAmerica 
https://share.america.gov/u-s-stopping-black-
market-trafficking-in-syria/ 
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39 Y BBC - Culture - Islamic State and the 
'blood antique' trade 
http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20150402-is-
and-the-blood-antique-trade 
40 Y Was the plaque in Finland sold on the 
French market with an accurate ... 
https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2015/06/0
7/syria-finland-russia-iran-france-trafficking-
policing-capacity/ 
41 Y the 'first material proof' that Islamic State is 
trafficking antiquities ... 
https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2015/07/1
5/syria-iraq-islamic-state-conflict-antiquities-
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